Democracy and Development B
Module Code: POU33062
Module Name: Democracy and Development B 2019-20
- ECTS Weighting: 5
- Semester/Term Taught: Semester 2 Only
- Contact Hours: 2 hours lecture/seminar per week; 1 tutorial per fortnight
- Module Personnel: Lecturer - Dr. Roman-Gabriel Olar
Learning Outcomes
On successful completion of this module students should be able to:
- Understand and debate different understandings and conceptualizations of corruption
- Assess the strengths and weakness of cross-national corruption measures
- Discuss the difference and connection between political and bureaucratic corruption
- Understand the mixed effects of corruption on economic development, growth and social inequality
- Assess how institutions and electoral rules shapes incentives for corruption
- Differentiate and compare the effectiveness of domestic and international anti-corruption tools
Module Learning Aims
By the end of this module, students will be familiar with the impact of corruption on democratic regimes.
Module Content
This course examines corruption, a global problem present in dictatorships as well as democracies, in developing and more developed societies alike. In particular, the course focuses on the impact of corruption on democratic regimes. At the extreme, corruption hampers economic development, reinforces social inequality, and undermines democratic development generally. We start by defining and conceptualizing corruption, and discuss alternative tools to measure and evaluate the extent of corruption within a given country. The course will then examine the causes and consequence of political and bureaucratic corruption. Last, but not least, the course explores existing domestic and international strategies to contain and control corruption.
Recommended Reading List
Required Readings:
- Johnston, Michael. 2005. Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 2007. The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Della Porta, D. (2017). Corrupt exchanges: Actors, resources, and mechanisms of political corruption.
Week 1: Introduction and what is corruption?
Clark, William, Matt Golder, & Sona Golder. 2012. Principles of Comparative Politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Chapter 2.
Paolo, M. (1997). Why Worry about corruption. Economic Issues, 6(10).
Malcolm Gladwell (2011). The order of things. The New Yorker.
Recommended:
Johnston. 2005. Chapter 1, pp. 5-13.
Lambsdorff. 2007. Chapter 1.
Ko, K., & Weng, C. (2011). Critical review of conceptual definitions of Chinese corruption: A formal–legal perspective. Journal of Contemporary China, 20(70), 359-378.
Week 2: Conceptualizing and measuring corruption
Camerer, M. 2006. “Measuring Public Integrity”. Journal of Democracy 17:152-165.
Johnston. 2005. Chapter 3.
Ko, K., & Samajdar, A. (2010). Evaluation of international corruption indexes: Should we believe them or not?. The Social Science Journal, 47(3), 508-540.
Recommended readings:
Williams, R. (1999). New concepts for old?. Third World Quarterly, 20(3), 503-513.
Bardhan, P. (2006). The economist’s approach to the problem of corruption. World Development, 34(2), 341-348.
Warren, M. E. (2006). Political corruption as duplicitous exclusion. PS: Political Science & Politics, 39(4), 803-807.
Sequeira, S. (2012). Chapter 6 Advances in Measuring Corruption in the Field. In New advances in experimental research on corruption (pp. 145-175). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Week 3: What we (do not) know about corruption
Treisman, Daniel. 2007. “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 211-244.
Svensson, Jakob. 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3): 19-42.
Johnston. 2005. Chapter 2.
Recommended:
Lambsdorff. 2007. Chapter 2.
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006). Corruption in America. Journal of public Economics, 90(6-7), 1053-1072.
Dininio, P., & Orttung, R. (2005). Explaining patterns of corruption in the Russian regions. World Politics, 57(4), 500-529.
Samuel Huntington, 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 1-78.
Week 4: Political corruption
Lambsdorff. 2007. Chapter 4 and 6.
Caiden, Gerald E. 1988. "Toward a general theory of official corruption." Asian Journal of Public Administration 10.1: 3-26.
Recommended readings:
Philp, M. (1997). Defining political corruption. Political Studies, 45(3), 436-462.
Colazingari, S., & ROSE‐ACKERMAN, S. (1998). Corruption in a paternalistic democracy: Lessons from Italy for Latin America. Political Science Quarterly, 113(3), 447-470.
Della Porta, D. (2017). Corrupt exchanges: Actors, resources, and mechanisms of political corruption. Routledge. (Chapters 3 and 4).
Week 5: Electoral contests and corruption
Chang, E. C., & Golden, M. A. (2007). Electoral systems, district magnitude and corruption. British Journal of Political Science, 37(1), 115-137.
Johnston. 2005. Chapters 4 and 5.
Recommended readings:
Golden, M. A., & Chang, E. C. (2001). Competitive corruption: Factional conflict and political malfeasance in postwar Italian Christian Democracy. World Politics, 53(4), 588-622.
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., & Trebbi, F. (2003). Electoral rules and corruption. journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 958-989.
Kunicova, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption. British Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 573-606.
Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni. 2011. "Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3 (3): 144-74.
Ames, B. (1995). Electoral rules, constituency pressures, and pork barrel: bases of voting in the Brazilian Congress. The Journal of Politics, 57(2), 324-343.
Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 315-325.
Week 6: Bureaucratic corruption
Lambsdorff. 2007. Chapter 3.
Choi, Jin-Wook. 2007. “Governance Structure and Administrative Corruption in Japan: An Organizational Network Approach”. Public Administration Review 67.
Van Rijckeghem, C., & Weder, B. (2001). Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?. Journal of development economics, 65(2), 307-331.
Recommended readings:
Della Porta, D. (2017). Corrupt exchanges: Actors, resources, and mechanisms of political corruption. Routledge. (chapter 5).
Mbaku, J. M. (1996). Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups. Cato J., 16, 99.
Andvig, J. C., & Moene, K. O. (1990). How corruption may corrupt. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 13(1), 63-76.
Justesen, M. K., & Bjørnskov, C. (2014). Exploiting the poor: Bureaucratic corruption and poverty in Africa. World Development, 58, 106-115.
Week 7: Corruption, political legitimacy, and economic development generally
Nye, Joseph S. 2002. “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. In Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 3rd edition, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (eds.) New Brunswick and London: Transaction.
Drury, A. C., Krieckhaus, J., & Lusztig, M. (2006). Corruption, democracy, and economic growth. International Political Science Review, 27(2), 121-136.
Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, and Laurent Weill. "Is corruption an efficient grease?." World development 38.3 (2010): 244-259.
Recommended readings:
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?. Economics of governance, 3(1), 23-45.
Lambsdorff. 2007. Chapter 5.
Manzetti, L., & Blake, C. H. (1996). Market reforms and corruption in Latin America: new means for old ways. Review of international political economy, 3(4), 662-697.
Krueger, Ann. 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Societies." American Economic Review, 64(3): 291-303.
Week 8: Institutions and corruption
Johnston. 2005. Chapters 6 and 7.
Robinson, James, et al. 2006. “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse”. Journal of Development Economics 79: 447-468.
Recommended readings:
Johnston, M. (2013). More than necessary, less than sufficient: Democratization and the control of corruption. Social Research: An International Quarterly, 80(4), 1237-1258.
Sung, H. E. (2004). Democracy and political corruption: A cross-national comparison. Crime, Law and Social Change, 41(2), 179-193.
Mitchell Seligson (2006).The Measurement and Impact of Corruption: Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America, World Diplomat, 34(2), 381–404.
Fjelde, Hanne, and Håvard Hegre (2014). Political corruption and institutional stability. Studies in Comparative International Development 49.3, 267-299.
Svetlozar Andreev (2008). Corruption, Legitimacy, and the Quality of Democracy and Eastern Europe and Latin America, Review of Sociology, 14(2).
Eric Chang and Yunhan Chu (2006). Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?. Journal of Politics, 68(2) 259-271.
Week 9: Anti-corruption strategies
Lambsdorff. 2007. Chapter 9.
Johnston. 2005. Chapter 8.
Jenkins, R. (2007). Civil society versus corruption. Journal of Democracy, 18(2), 55-69.
Meagher, P. (2005). Anti‐corruption agencies: Rhetoric Versus reality. The Journal of Policy Reform, 8(1), 69-103.
Recommended readings:
Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. Journal of political Economy, 115(2), 200-249.
Asibuo, S. K. (2001). The role of anti-corruption agency in the struggle against corruption: The case of the serious office in Ghana. African Administrative Studies, 56, 1-14.
Bobonis, G. J., Cámara Fuertes, L. R., & Schwabe, R. (2016). Monitoring corruptible politicians. American Economic Review, 106(8), 2371-2405.
Quah, J. S. (2008). Anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries: a comparative analysis. In Comparative governance reform in Asia: Democracy, corruption, and government trust (pp. 85-109). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Week 10: Media and corruption
Balán, M. (2011). Competition by denunciation: the political dynamics of corruption scandals in Argentina and Chile. Comparative Politics, 43(4): 459-478.
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2): 703-745.
Brunetti, A., & Weder, B. (2003). A free press is bad news for corruption. Journal of Public economics, 87(7), 1801-1824.
Recommended readings:
Waisbord, S. (2000). Watchdog journalism in South America: News, accountability, and democracy. Columbia University Press. (p. 209-242).
Kramer, E. (2013). When news becomes entertainment: Representations of corruption in Indonesia’s media and the implication of scandal. Media Asia, 40(1), 60-72.
Thompson, J. B. (2013). Political scandal: Power and visability in the media age. John Wiley & Sons (p. 28-31).
Stapenhurst, R. (2000). The media's role in curbing corruption. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.
Week 11: International anti-corruption strategies
Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Introduction: The Role of International Actors in Fighting Corruption” in Rose-Ackerman and Carrington (eds), Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors Play a Constructive Role? (Carolina Academic Press, 2013), pp 3-35.
The UN Convention Against Corruption.
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2009). Is transparency the key to reducing corruption in resource-rich countries?. World development, 37(3), 521-532.
Recommended readings:
Sampson, S. (2010). The anti-corruption industry: from movement to institution. Global Crime, 11(2), 261-278.
Davis, K. E. (2009). Does the Globalization of Anti-corruption Law Help Developing Countries?. In INTERNATIONAL LAW, ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Julio Faundez and Celine Tan, eds.
Brown, E., & Cloke, J. (2004). Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption in the south: Assessing the international anti‐corruption crusade. Antipode, 36(2), 272-294.
Assessment Details
5% participation, 35% written assignment and presentation, 60% end of semester 90 minute examination.