Productivity, Rank and Returns in Polygamy
Julia Anna Matz
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of individual productivity in the
matching process of spouses and in the allocation of resources among
them, focusing on a polygamous setting. Using a simple game theoretical
approach I show that highly productive wives are more strongly
demanded in the marriage market than less productive ones so that
a selection into being the first wife with respect to productivity takes
place. Furthermore, productivity is positively associated with a woman's
share of family income to be spent on consumption and investment,
due to greater contributions to family income and larger incomes when
single. The findings are empirically supported by a positive relationship
between indicators of female productivity, women's levels of seniority
among wives and their children's educational outcomes in rural
Ethiopia.
Short Summary
This paper investigates the role of individual productivity in the matching
process of spouses and in the allocation of resources among them, focusing
on a polygamous setting. Using a simple game theoretical approach I show
that highly productive wives are more strongly demanded in the marriage
market than less productive ones so that a selection into being the first wife with respect to productivity takes place. Furthermore, productivity is
positively associated with a woman's share of family income to be spent on
consumption and investment, due to greater contributions to family income
and larger incomes when single. This limits the role of rank itself as the source
of differences in female returns. The findings are empirically supported by
a positive relationship between indicators of female productivity, women's
levels of seniority among wives and their children's educational outcomes in
rural Ethiopia.
The paper herefore offers a simple economic explanation for the common
finding that children of first wives fare better along educational and
nutritional dimensions than children of later wives. The findings indicate
that polygamous households should not be treated as a uniform family but
as a collection of nuclear families consisting of the household head, a wife
and their joint children. Consequently, for development policy and interventions
aiming to increase school attendance in regions that exhibit polygamy,
the target unit should be the maternal nuclear family and special attention should be paid to children of junior wives.
Key words: Polygamy, Rank, Intrahousehold Allocation
JEL classification: D13, J12, O12