Metaphor and what is meant: Metaphorical content, what is said, and contextualism

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ABSTRACT

Traditional pragmatic accounts of metaphor typically classify the metaphorical content (e.g., “Bill is a bulldozer”) as ‘what is implicated’ (alongside Gricean conversational implicatures), as opposed to ‘what is said’. A more contemporary view held by a number of theorists maintains that classifying metaphor as ‘what is implicated’ is mistaken, and oversimplistic. Instead, they classify metaphorical content as something a speaker says. They offer a number of compelling arguments in favour of this classification. I identify and challenge four recent arguments against the traditional, broadly Gricean classification. Following Grice (1975), Searle (1993), Martinich (1984), and Camp (2006), I believe there is good reason to treat metaphor as what a speaker means, but does not say. I qualify my view by briefly sketching how it departs from the classical Gricean view.

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1. Introduction

The following paper functions primarily as a reply to arguments in favour of treating metaphorical content as ‘what is said’ as opposed to what a speaker means, but does not say. More specifically, I evaluate the position taken by Patti Nogales (2012). Nogales’ view of metaphorical content (i.e., the meaning of a metaphor) in line with other contextualists views including Bezuidenhout (2001) and Recanati (2001) and relevance theorists. In her 2012 paper, she provides four arguments in support of the view that metaphorical content belongs to what a speaker says. I identify and challenge each of these arguments. I then propose a way to deal with metaphorical content that is based on, but not reducible to, the classical Gricean account.

Metaphor is, undeniably, a context-sensitive phenomenon. As Bergmann (1982) seems to correctly note, determining whether an utterance is metaphorical, or deciding on the meaning of a metaphor “relies on recognizing, or assuming, something about the intentions of the person who uses the sentence” (1982, p. 232). Consider a paradigmatic example below. I provide the literal interpretation (1’) and a possible metaphorical one (1’’). Consider a paradigmatic example below. I provide the literal interpretation (1’) and a possible metaphorical one (1’’).

(1) Juliet is the sun.
(1’) Juliet is the largest gaseous star in the solar system.
(1’’) Juliet is an exemplar of beauty and goodness.¹

¹ This interpretation is from Camp (2006a, p. 3).

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The point of Romeo’s utterance (1) is to convey something like (1"), following Grice (1975), traditional pragmatic accounts of metaphor typically treat it as a brand of speaker meaning where a speaker says one thing (e.g., (1)), and communicates something else (e.g., (1")) by their utterance. In so doing, many traditional pragmatic accounts classify metaphor as a form of implicature, in contrast to ‘what is said’. The broadly Gricean view is intuitive because it provides a technical overlay to our common sense understanding of metaphorical meaning, and couches it within a view of communication where speakers and hearers exploit principles of conversation to effective communicative ends.

The arguments against the traditional implicature view are numerous and complex. Since it is not possible to address all of the concerns in one paper, I am focusing on a recent paper by Patti D. Nogales (2012), Metaphorical content as what is said where she defends a broadly contextualist view of metaphor. In her wonderfully articulated article, Nogales provides a rigorous overview of the controversy between traditional pragmatic accounts such as Grice’s (1975), Searle’s (1993), Martinich’s (1984) and Camp, 2006b, 2008 on the one hand, and contextualists such as Recanati (2001) and Bezuidenhout (2001), their allies in relevance theory, Wilson and Sperber (2012), Carston (2002), and semanticist Joseph Stern (2000) on the other. Nogales (Nogales, 2009, 2012) aligns herself with the latter group, arguing that metaphor comprehension is one sort of process among a set of contextual processes such as semantic decoding, reference resolution, indexical fixing, and disambiguation. She provides compelling arguments in favour of her position. Like contextualists, and relevance theorists, Nogales’ theory is semantic in that it claims that the propositional content expressed by a metaphorical utterance is its metaphorical content; it is pragmatic in the sense that extralinguistic knowledge is required for the derivation of this content.

Nogales begins her article by defining ‘what is said’ in a way that significantly diverges from the Gricean programme, and converges more closely on the contextualist notion. From this re-worked understanding, she makes four arguments in favour of classifying metaphor as ‘what is said’ rather than what is implicated by a speaker. First, she argues that metaphors cannot be implicatures because the metaphorical content, R of an utterance, U, must be consistent with “the content the speaker uses to provoke the implicature” (Nogales, 2012). Second, she argues that speakers and hearers are often willing to use “say” to report the content of a metaphor. Thus, our philosophical notion of ‘what is said’ ought to be sensitive to our common sense intuitions about saying. Third, she argues that the content of a metaphor is explicit, in the sense that hearers can respond to and reject the speaker’s intended content, in a way that cannot be done with the literal meaning of the utterance. Fourth, she argues that metaphorical content is the input to implicatures. Finally, she argues that psycholinguistic evidence points in favour of her preferred classification. In what follows, I present her arguments and provide rejoinders. I attempt to demonstrate that her well-crafted rebuttals are still problematic.

Finally, I sketch a view of metaphor where speakers say one thing which they typically don’t mean, in order to say something else. Spoiler alter: although my proposal treats metaphor as something a speaker intends to communicate, I do not understand metaphor qua implicature. Rather, I see it as something like implicature: Metaphors are best understood as figurative acts where an auditor exploits numerous factors (such as the literal meaning, the conversational background, and context) in order to compute the speaker’s intended meaning. I draw on Korta and Perry’s (2011) Critical Pragmatics to explain my view.

2. What is ‘what is said’?

The first line of argument pursued by Nogales relies on redefining the term ‘what is said’ to accord more with ordinary intuitions of saying, which, she says must take into account those aspects of the utterance speakers are committed to. I will quote some of the key passages, then reconstruct the argument below. Recall that for Grice, ‘what is said’ by a sentence S is tightly constrained by the linguistic meaning of S.

Nogales is a contextualist who insists that what language participants are willing to report as what a speaker says confirms “a need for and a way of defining” a new notion of ‘what is said’ that corresponds to more ordinary uses of that term (Nogales, 2012, p. 1000). She proposes that ‘what is said’ be “the truth conditions to which the speaker becomes committed to having said in performing the utterance they do in the context in which they perform it” whereby “the difference between saying and implicating has to with the nature of the commitment and the relationship between deduction of content and the derivation of inferences such that the derivation of the content of implicatures always starts with the derivation of the content of ‘what is said’” (Nogales, 2012, p. 1000). In a footnote she mentions that “[...] metaphorical content is the launching point for both ironic content and implicatures. This seems to show that metaphorical content is ‘what is said’” (footnote 6, p. 1000).

2 Although index resolution and disambiguation require pragmatic input, no one claims that the results of these processes constitute implicatures. Indexical resolution involves making inferences about to who or what indexicals refer, while disambiguation involves making inference about which sense a word or sentences with multiple senses refers.

3 More specifically, in contrast to an analysis of indexicals, such as that of Stern (2000), enrichment and loosening, such as Bezuidenhout (2001), Nogales claims her “notion of ‘what is said’ comes from the notion of speaker commitment (tied to semantic competence)...that functions as the truth conditions of an utterance” (Nogales, 2012).
Nogales favours the idea of speaker commitment as determining ‘what is said’ because, as she argues, it accords more with everyday intuitions of saying. Like contextualists and relevance theorists, redefining ‘what is said’ based on our ordinary practices of saying is an attempt to show that pragmatic processes “contribute not only to what is implied, but also what is explicitly communicated by a speaker” (Haugh, 2002, p. 119).

2.1. Counterargument

Nogales’ notion of ‘what is said’ is practically synonymous with what contextualists and relevance theorists call explicature. Explicature is the development of the logical form encoded by an utterance, whose content includes both linguistically decoded, and pragmatically inferred material. The processes involved include disambiguation, saturation (including reference assignment), enrichment (including unarticulated constituents) and ‘ad hoc concept construction’. The term explicature is meant to reflect our ordinary intuitions about saying.

For example, a speaker who utters “I’ve eaten” is typically understood to mean that they have eaten earlier that day. The bit that is italicized constitutes the explicature of the utterance and corresponds to the contextualist notion of ‘what is said’. The main idea of a contextual approach to metaphor is to treat it like a form of utterance explicature, and thus, a matter of ‘what is said’. On the view endorsed by Nogales, phenomena such as conventional implicatures, generalized conversational implicatures, as well as metaphor and metonymy are all a part of ‘what is said’.

I have three issues with stretching the definition of ‘what is said’ in the way Nogales does. The first is that it is unclear to me where she draws the boundary between her notion of ‘what is said’—understood as explicature—and paradigmatic implicatures, such as ironic utterances or Grice’s letter of recommendation.4 If I’m interpreting Nogales correctly, and ‘what is said’ is treated as “the truth conditions to which the speaker becomes committed to having said in performing the utterance they do in the context in which they perform it” (Nogales, 2012)5 then, presumably, this classifies ironic utterances as part of what a speaker says. For if I perform an ironic statement well, and with outward candor, it becomes clear that I have committed myself to the ironic content, and thus the truth conditions that obtain just if the ironic content is the case. But this is a rather bold claim, considering that numerous theorists (e.g., Camp and Hawthorne, 2008; Carston and Wearing, 2015; Garmendia, 2010; Popa-Wyatt, 2017; Recanati, 2001) agree that ironic content counts as an implicature. I am not entirely sure she is willing to endorse this claim. Nevertheless, I will represent Nogales’ definition of ‘what is said’ as: ‘what is said’.

The second issue is that she claims that implicatures are prompted by the assumption of the truth of the content of the conventional meaning of an utterance. She says: “When one communicates something indirectly (such as the message “No, John won’t fly to Paris” by saying “John now has five children”), it is the assumption that John now has five children (the assumption of the truth of ‘what is said’) that provokes the hearer to derive the implied request” (Nogales, 2012).

However, there are numerous examples of paradigmatic implicatures that do not require either the hearer or speaker to make an assumption about the truth of ‘what is said’. One such example comes from flouting Grice’s maxim of Quantity. Suppose a professor writes a letter of recommendation consisting entirely of:

(2) Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular.

Here, it isn’t important that the audience assumes the truth of what the author said to generate the relevant implicature; what is important is that the receiver of the letter appreciates that author has written a rather peculiar letter of recommendation, one that breaks with convention in an important way.6 Moreover, the author of the letter may not believe Mr. X to possess the characteristics penned in the note, but still intend to communicate that Mr. X is not well-suited for the desired position. I would argue that the implicature (that puts Mr. X’s competence into question) is generated by the tension between the content of the utterance in (2) and the expectations surrounding letters of recommendation.

I now consider a more general point concerning the notion of explicature that underlies Nogales’ conception of ‘what is said’. Neo-Griceans, such as Bach, 2001a, 2001b, Cappelen and Lepore (2005), Haugh (2002), and Levinson (2000) note that the idea of explicature as a catch-all for numerous pragmatic phenomena is still quite dubious.7 For

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4 See Camp (2006b) for discussion.

5 Emphasis mine.

6 This is because the implicature is said to flout the maxim of relation, which maintains that one be relevant, and say things that are pertinent to discussion. Here, it is obvious that native-like speech production and punctuality are presumably irrelevant (even if they are true) to the committee.

7 In fact, under a contextualist approach (which Nogales seems to adopt), the category of ‘what is said’ seems to fall victim to the Humpty Dumpty criticism launched by Alfred MacKay (1968), attacking Donnellan’s theory of reference. The idea is that it relies too heavily on the intentions of the speaker at the expense of semantic input. I thank Eros Corazza for pointing this out to me.
example, contextualists subsume pragmatic features identified by neo-Griceans, such as generalized conversational implicatures, short-circuited implicatures, conventional implicatures, and metaphor and metonymy under the category of explicature. But this approach neglects important features of the various pragmatic phenomena. Take for example, the indirect requests below:

(3) Can you pass the salt?

or

(4) Could you close the window?

A contextualist interpretation of the data would understand the requests associated with utterances like (3) and (4) as explicatures rather than short-circuited implicatures. However, Haugh (2002)\(^8\) believes this argument is weakened by the fact that “there is no mention at all of the potential politeness effects associated with Can you ...? as a request” (Haugh, 2002, p. 122). Haugh asks us to contrast this with similar cases, such as, “can you do a handstand?” where no such politeness effect arises. Furthermore, the notion of explicature fails to capture the intuition that “one can still ‘hear’ in a peripheral kind of way the ‘ability reading’ of can” ((Haugh, 2002, p. 123). I believe that this point can be extended into arguing that the degree of conventionalization of indirect requests does not thereby constitute firm criteria on which to extend the notion of ‘what is said’ to cover these cases. Finally, doubt about the empirical data of explicature is also well-documented. As Haugh (2002, p. 122) notes:

Moreover, Haugh notes that other experiments demonstrate that ordinary speakers may perceive unequivocal examples of implicature to be a part of what the speaker has said in some cases (Ariel, 2002; Bezuidenhout and Cutting, 2002; Nicolle and Clark, 1999). These results indicate that intuitions about ‘what is said’ may actually overlap with ‘what is implicated’.

Furthermore, explicature, as exemplified in Carston (1988, p. 40) is problematized by Davis (2014). For instance, he argues that the formulation is problematic because it assumes that implicatures are never logically related to ‘what is said’, when in reality, some implicatures may entail ‘what is said’. Litotes is a figure of speech in which a speaker understates. For example, a speaker can utter “that’s not bad” implying that “that’s good”. In this case, what is implicated entails ‘what is said’. Carston argues that (5b) below is an explicature on the grounds that an implicature cannot entail “what is said” (i.e., her Functional Independence Principle).

(5) Alice ran to the edge of the cliff.

a. The distraught woman jumped.

b. She jumped off the cliff.

Yet, it isn’t obvious that we have a case of explicature here. Although a speaker typically utters (5a) to convey that the woman in question jumped off of the cliff (5b), (5a) does not entail (5b). Davis argues that if the speaker knew that the woman in question jumped backwards from the precipice, the speaker could be accused of misleading, but not of blatantly lying (which, presumably, she would be doing if it were a part of what she said). Similarly, a speaker can utter “that’s not bad” implying that “that’s good”. In this case, what is implicated entails ‘what is said’. Carston argues that (5b) below is an explicature on the grounds that an implicature cannot entail “what is said” (i.e., her Functional Independence Principle).

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\(^8\) For a more comprehensive treatment of the ways in which the notion of explicature can be problematized, see Haugh (2002).
It may be the case that John forgets the excuse that Sue gives him (what she says) because he is frustrated that she cannot come to the party (what she implicates) (Davis, 2014). Thus, the move to explain so many pragmatic phenomena as explicature may be quite problematic. Furthermore, the formulation assumes that implicatures are never logically related to ‘what is said’, when in reality, some forms of implicatures may entail ‘what is said’. Consider, again litotes. A speaker can utter “that’s not bad” implying that “that’s good”. In this case, what is implicated entails ‘what is said’. Other examples of this entailment from ‘what is implicated’ to ‘what is said’ include disjunctive permission and free choice (Kamp, 1973). Here, I have in mind utterances of the form “You may A or B” where the implicated content is “You may A and you may B”. The fact that the speaker implicates that the auditor may A and B entails that the auditor may do (at least) one thing (A or B).

Whether or not we should classify these phenomena as explicature or implicature is an issue that has not been resolved. At the very least, we have some reasonable ground on which to argue that subsuming all of these phenomena under ‘what is said’ requires more careful examination of the phenomena in question. In what follows, I look at and evaluate four arguments in favour of treating metaphor as an explicature, or ‘what is said’.

2. Metaphor and the argument from norms of consistency

The first argument Nogales makes in regards to subsuming metaphor under the category of explicature is based on the following line of reasoning:

“For any proposition to be a content of implicature of the utterance meaning of a speech act, that proposition must be consistent with the content the speaker uses to provoke the implicature. In fact, it’s the assumption of the truth of the content that allows the derivation of the implicature… the fact that metaphorical content is incompatible with a literal interpretation of the utterance makes it impossible for metaphorical content to be an implicature of it (Nogales, 2012).

This requires a bit of explication. First, Nogales finds it useful to distinguish between content and manner implicatures. A manner implicature is one which is implicated by the way that the utterance is performed. A content implicature is one which follows from the content of an utterance. Nogales argues that the traditional pragmatic account treats metaphor as a content implicature. But, she continues, this is mistaken, since the literal content of a metaphor is inconsistent with the metaphorical content produced by the metaphor. To illustrate this point, consider:

(7) Bill is a bulldozer.
(7’) Bill is a large excavator, capable of moving large amounts of earth and rock.
(7”) Bill is very forceful in dealing with others.

Nogales argues that it is impossible for an entity to be both an inanimate object, and a person who embodies certain characteristics. From this, Nogales concludes that (7”) cannot be an implicature of (7) because it clashes with the literal interpretation (7’). She further argues that “the inconsistency does not lie in the conflict of the claims to veridity [sic] of different interpretations, but rather in the clash between assumed taxonomies (or cognitive environments)” (Nogales, 2012). In her words, the content of a content implicature “follows from the content expressed by an utterance in a context” (Nogales, 2012). The point she makes about the alleged veridicality of an interpretation is a good one, for it seems to shut down possible counterarguments by pointing to what Ted Cohen (1976) calls ‘twice-true’ metaphors. A twice-true metaphor is a metaphor which is true on both a literal and metaphoric level. Consider, a twice-true metaphor:

(8) No man is an island.

Here, (8) is true on a literal and figurative reading. If the inconsistency were about the veridicality of interpretation, then twice true metaphors could possibly undermine her argument. The reason is that the content of the literal interpretation is not a patent falsehood, or an absurdity. In fact, the veridicality of both the literal and metaphoric interpretation is the same. Given that both interpretations have the same truth conditions in their context of utterance, she reasons that it must be something else that discredits the view that metaphors are a matter of “what is implicated”. Thus, the content must be inconsistent in another way. Nogales refers to this ‘other way’ as an ‘assumed taxonomy’. I discuss this below.
2.1. Counterargument

By drawing a contrast between what Noagles calls ‘manner’ and ‘content’ implicatures, Nogales claims that the latter, but not the former must ‘follow from’ the content expressed by an utterance in a context. I am not entirely convinced that all the types of implicatures that Nogales wants to consider respect this criterion.9

Nevertheless, we may ask, just what does Nogales mean by ‘follows from’? On one (rather general) reading, her definition falls in line with Gricean theory, and for that reason, is inconsistent with her argument. For Grice’s calculability assumption maintains that all implicatures ‘follow from’ the content expressed in the context of utterance. To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer relies on the data from (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved, (2) the Cooperative principle, its maxims, (3) the context, (4) linguistic background, and (5) the fact that data (1)–(4) are available to the discourse participants. However, it seems clear that Nogales does not intend such an encompassing reading of ‘follows from’.

A strict reading of the phrase ‘follows from’ may treat it as entailment. Yet, as Bach (2005) notes, “most implicatures (by speakers) are not entailments...but there are exceptions” (2005, p. 5). He gives the example: “nobody has ever long-jumped over 28 feet.” And your friend replies “Bob Beamon long-jumped over 29 feet”. Here, the second speaker has implicated that somebody has long-jumped over 28 feet; it is entailed by the fact that Beamon long-jumped over 29 feet. But I’m not sure that Nogales is wanting to restrict the scope of content implicatures to these ‘exceptional’ cases. Finally, reading ‘follows from’ as meaning “entailment” would violate Carston’s ‘Functional Independence Principle’.10

A more charitable reading may understand ‘follows from’ as some sort of relation of similarity between the content of an implicature and the utterance from which it is generated. This is perhaps why Nogales brings into play the idea of an ‘assumed taxonomy’ and equates it to the term ‘cognitive environment’. The term cognitive environment is a technical one introduced by Wilson and Sperber (2012) that encompasses the set of assumptions an individual exploits during online processing of an utterance. By equating conceptual taxonomies with cognitive environments, perhaps Nogales is saying that taxonomies represent a network of related concepts, structured by our worldly assumptions about particular domains of knowledge—a kind of ‘family resemblance’ among our conceptual domains.

How does this come to bear on implicature? It seems that something is a content implicature if it is consistent with the set of properties subsumed by the content of the utterance under a literal interpretation. That is to say, the content of an implicature must be related to the content of the utterance in that it shares similar salient properties. Under this rubric, Nogales is lead to reject the implicature view of metaphor because a metaphor, such as (7) exhibits two incompatible contents, (7’) and (7”). At the level of assumed taxonomy, inanimacy is incompatible with animacy.

I think understanding the calculation of the content of a content implicature in this way actually reinforces the traditional pragmatic classification. Following Black (1955), Goodman (1968, 1979); Ricoeur (1977); Beardsley (1978); Camp (Camp, 2003, 2006b, 2008); and Reimer (2008) I agree with the idea that metaphor works its magic by evoking a “system of related commonplaces” (Black, 1955, p. 288). Roughly, what this means is that a well-defined concept is not just composed of its encyclopedic information, but may often include “half-truths or downright mistakes” (Black, 1955, p. 287). In brief, a taxonomy can be composed of many stereotypical properties.11,12 The upshot of this is that stereotypical properties can belong to both the source and the target of a metaphorical utterance.13 If so, then a metaphorical interpretation does not have to clash at the level of assumed taxonomy with the sentence literally understood. Rather, the metaphor can serve to emphasize our ways of thinking about the target via our stereotypical ways of understanding the source term.

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9 When we consider norms of consistency, it is not completely obvious that they remain entirely relevant for the computation of an implicature. For example, in the Gricean framework, cases of obvious flouting, such as tautologies and many metaphors, render consistency irrelevant. On the other hand, consistency matters for some implicatures. For example, scalars demand consistency with ‘what is said’ because their computation requires belief in ‘what is said’.

10 Although, as we have noted, there are reasons to doubt the validity of this principle.

11 I would like to note that I do not believe commonplaces to be properties of words (as I believe Black had intended). Rather, I think about them as mental structures associated with our concepts of individuals, and kinds. To be clear, an individual must exploit a commonplace that leads them to establish the appropriate relations between the literal and intended content of a metaphorical utterance. I would like to thank Jacob Hesse for helping me flesh out this point.

12 One way in which this could be interpreted empirically is along with Glucksberg and Keysar (1993), who suggest that metaphor is based on dual reference. This means that processing a metaphor does not require interpretation of the literal utterance. Assuming that the source of the metaphor has both literal and metaphorical reference, in order to process a metaphorical meaning, an auditor need only to select the appropriate meaning. Consider the metaphor Bill is a bulldozer. What is activated are only those aspects of the category of bulldozer that are relevant for the metaphor (e.g., being forceful). It also maintains that none of the properties irrelevant to the metaphor are activated (e.g., having a shovel). In this case, access to literal meaning is not obligatory. I do not wish to endorse this interpretation. I believe that the literal meaning of a metaphor facilitates its metaphorical one. I discuss this in more detail in Section 6.

13 The ‘source’ is the governing metaphorical term; the ‘target’ is the word that is to be understood by the metaphorical ‘source’. Theorists also refer to the ‘source’ and the ‘vehicle’, and ‘target’ as the ‘topic’. For consistency, I employ the terms ‘source’ and ‘target’. In Black’s example, the ‘source’ is ‘wolf’ and the ‘target’ is ‘Man’.
I would like to turn to Black’s example “Man is a wolf”. It is worth quoting a great deal of this passage, here. I will unpack it below. He says:

[The metaphorical sentence in question will not convey its intended meaning to a reader sufficiently ignorant about wolves. What is needed is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary definition of ‘wolf”—or be able to use that word in literal sense—as that he shall know what I will call the system of associated commonplaces. Imagine some layman required to say, without taking special thought, those things he held to be true about wolves; the set of statements resulting would approximate to what I am here calling the system of commonplaces associated with the word “wolf”. I am assuming that in any given culture the responses made by different persons to the test suggested would agree rather closely, and that even the occasional expert, who might have unusual knowledge of the subject, would still know what the man in the street thinks about the matter. From the expert’s standpoint, the system of commonplaces may include half-truths or downright mistakes (as when a whale is classified as a fish); but the important thing for the metaphor’s effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked.

[…] I am suggesting, literal uses of the word normally commit the speaker to acceptance of a set of standard beliefs about wolves (current platiitudes) that are the common possession of the members of some speech community […] A speaker who says ‘wolf’ is normally taken to be implying in some sense of that word that he is referring to something fierce, carnivorous, treacherous, and so on. The idea of a wolf is part of a system of ideas, not sharply delineated, and yet sufficiently definite to admit of detailed enumeration.

The effect, then, of (metaphorically) calling a man a ‘wolf’ is to evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on. If we take seriously the view that the interpretation of metaphorical content is partly constituted by stereotypes (or a system of commonplaces) then perhaps there is a reason to reject the idea that the content of a metaphor runs orthogonal to its literal interpretation, as Nogales suggests. It may be the case, for instance, that my stereotypical understanding of wolves (the source) allows me to emphasize some aspects of people (the target) without being inconsistent at the level of assumed taxonomy. For example, suppose I have an acquaintance, Bill. My knowledge of Bill includes, among other things, the fact that he regularly goes to bars alone, behaves aggressively towards other patrons when he is drunk, and quite often supports Nogales’ view as mistaken. Consider (9) uttered about John who has just donated a great deal of his earnings to charity, despite the fact that he struggles to make a livable wage. I spell out the possible interpretations of the utterance underneath it:

(9) John is warm-blooded.
(9’) John is an endothermic mammal.
(9”) John is altruistic.

Presumably, within our ‘feature set’ of (endothermic) mammals, we include humans. Among humans, one may hold a general belief that they possess a capacity for altruistic behaviour. Specifically, we may consider John’s act of charity altruistic. I believe this reasoning also applies to.

(10) Donald Trump is a primate.
(10’) Donald Trump is a homo sapiens among the order of primates.
(10”) Donald Trump is a wild, unrefined beast.

whereby the metaphorical content is a subset of the things associated with the literal content, strictly speaking. For example, there are many species within the order primate that are wild, prone to aggression, and display particularly relevant attitudes concerning things such as acquiring and defending territory. These beliefs may make up part of the stereotypes of primates being brutish, and unrefined, which can be extended to our metaphoric appraisals of people we take to exhibit similar characteristics. I must admit that the content of a metaphor may not always be consistent (in Nogales’ sense) with the content of the utterance literally expressed. However, my only concern is to show that speakers regularly utter metaphors with the intention to exploit stereotypical properties in order to produce meanings that do not necessarily clash with the content of their utterance, literally understood.

It is worth pointing out that there are also many cases of content implicatures that violate the principle of consistency that supports Nogales’ distinction between manner and content implicatures. That is to say, there are many cases of inconsistency between literal and conveyed content so that the alleged consistency does not hold. For example, I may go to the theatre to see what has been hailed as an extremely accurate depiction of the Rohingya crisis. You ask me: “How did you like the documentary?” I answer by saying, sarcastically: “It was excellent; it was the best fictional story I have seen this year”. Being an excellent documentary is inconsistent with being a terrible fictional story, which is what I convey.14

14 I would like to thank Genoveva Marti for offering me the example as well as sharpening the argument in this section.
3. Argument from speech reporting

Another argument made by Nogales (and her contextualist allies) to include metaphor in ‘what is said’ is that people are typically willing to report the contents of their metaphorical utterances as something that the speaker ‘said’. Nogales offers a rejoinder to an issue brought up by Camp (2006b). Camp identifies conventional metaphors with other implicatures. She points to the fact that speakers are usually willing to report the implied contents of utterances such as conventionalized indirect requests (12), and computational implicatures (13) as things a speaker says. In drawing our attention to the kinds of speech acts that people are ordinarily willing to classify as having said, Camp hopes to show that the problem of redrawing the boundary of ‘what is said’ to reflect ordinary use is that metaphors and implicatures “fall on both sides of the line between what speakers are and are not willing to report people as having said” (Camp, 2006b, p. 286).15 For example, it may be fine to report the speaker of (7), (12), and (13) as having said their implied content, whereas it is unacceptable to report the speaker as having said the implied content of (11).

(7) Bill is a bulldozer.
  Speech Report: Bill is pushy and forceful.

(11) Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player,
  That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
  And then is heard no more.
  *Speech Report: Life is futile.

(12) I could use some salt on this pork chop
  Speech Report: She said she’d like the salt.

(13) Inquirer: Did Alice pass the exam?
  Professor: I did not fail any students.
  Speech Report: The professor said that Alice passed the exam.

Nogales argues that due to the high degree of conventionalization in indirect requests and computational implicatures, Camp’s examples (12 and 13) are not representative of the entire class of implicatures. This consideration leads Nogales to conclude that Camp’s arguments are unsuccessful. I address Nogales’ assessment below.

3.1. Argument from speech reporting of poetic metaphors

Nogales devotes a section of her article to what she considers to be one of the most compelling arguments against her view. The argument Nogales challenges comes from Camp (2006b). In this article, Camp attempts to demonstrate that the content of a poetic metaphor is difficult to capture, and not easily paraphrased. She asks us to consider the following poetic metaphor:

(14) The hour-glass whispers to the lion’s paw. (Auden)

Camp offers the following interpretation of (14).

(14’)* Every source of activity and forcefulness is undone by the passage of time.

Camp’s claim is, roughly, that because a poetic metaphor can have numerous interpretations, speech reporting is undermined as a method for arguing that the content of a metaphor belongs to ‘what is said’. Nogales argues that the alleged difficulty with paraphrasing is not an objection. Nogales argues that we can offer speech reports of (14) which can serve to make explicit a poetic metaphor’s indeterminacy and therefore ‘remedy’ the issue Camp raised. Nogales asks us to consider:

(14”) Auden claims that the very source of activity and forcefulness is ultimately undone by the passage of time, I think, by saying “the hourglass whispers to the lion’s paw,” but he said this in the context of…and literary theorists have said…and Auden may have wanted to express this overall message…and to do…using this metaphor and poem.

and

(14”) Auden said the hour-glass whispers to the lion’s paw—and I don’t know what that means but he said this in the context of…and literary theorists have said…and Auden may have wanted to express this overall message…and to do…using this metaphor and poem.

Finally, Nogales claims that regular, literal utterances can exhibit similar under- and indetermination that is so often attributed to poetic metaphor. She offers the example:

15 See Section 2.1.
Reporting on a metaphor, Nogales concludes, is no different than when speakers provide extensions of what they said in a way that contributes to the truth conditions.

3.2. Counterargument

Still, I feel Camp’s argument is largely unscathed. To acknowledge that speakers can and do report the contents of poetic metaphors does not by itself definitively prove that the reported content is part of what the speaker said. Camp observes that in addition to conventionalized speech acts where speakers mean “something more than the content of their uttered sentence’s conventional meaning, that it is often acceptable to use ‘say’ to report the speaker’s intended content when she means something different from her uttered sentence’s conventionally encoded content” (Camp, 2006b, p. 285). Camp offers the sarcastic utterance (16) below as an example where speech reporters report the intended content as what the speaker said. It is not uncommon, she says, for the following exchange to take place.

In the case of sarcasm, we have a gap between the sentence meaning and the reported content that is too great for even contextualists to include (16) into ‘what is said’. Thus, Camp’s original point still holds firm: there are many genuinely pragmatic phenomena (in addition to conventionalized conversational implicatures) that speakers are willing to report as having said, but under no reasonable account would they be included in a theoretically disciplined understanding of ‘what is said’. For example, we can and do report sarcastic speakers as having said their intended content. In addition, this meshes well with Haugh’s (2002) point above: that we ought to be a bit cautious using ordinary intuitions about ‘what is said’ since ordinary speakers are not as theoretically disciplined in carving out each of their utterances at their theoretical joints. The leading idea here is that the mere fact that a speaker can (and often does) report the intended content of an utterance does not justify classifying the content of the report as what the speaker said.

At the same time, we can (and do) put our literal utterances to poetic uses in interesting and novel ways. Consider the poem by Rihaku below:

The poem clearly demonstrates how difficult it can be to provide an adequate paraphrase of even a nearly entirely literal utterance. The translation by Ezra Pound provides some useful information for cultivating, what Camp (2008) refers to as an “appropriately open-ended, imagistic, affectively-laden understanding of the scene being described, it doesn’t aim to restate the poem’s meaning in explicit literal terms” (2008, p. 20). That is to say, like metaphor, the above poem evokes many different emotions and images which can be difficult (or even impossible) to capture in a speech report.

We may ask ourselves: when does a speech report cease being a speech report and become an exercise in (literary) interpretation? Consider the Nietzschean dictum:

The poem is clearly meant to be meditative. However, a paraphrase could grossly downplay that cerebral quality. For example, I can paraphrase it in the following way: I am walking home at night. I see the moon, and my socks are wet from the dew. There is something very important missing from the above paraphrase.

(15) Department chair: Call me only in the case of an emergency. And by emergency I mean “a death threat, the demand of the College dean, etc.”

(16) What a brilliant idea: let’s spend our last dollar on beer! Then I suppose we can hitchhike home.
   Speech Report: She said that we should save our money for the cab.

(17) The jeweled steps are already quite white with dew,
   It is so late that the dew soaks my gauze stockings,
   And I let down the crystal curtain
   And watch the moon through the clear autumn.

The poem clearly demonstrates how difficult it can be to provide an adequate paraphrase of even a nearly entirely literal utterance. The translation by Ezra Pound provides some useful information for cultivating, what Camp (2008) refers to as an “appropriately open-ended, imagistic, affectively-laden understanding of the scene being described, it doesn’t aim to restate the poem’s meaning in explicit literal terms” (2008, p. 20). That is to say, like metaphor, the above poem evokes many different emotions and images which can be difficult (or even impossible) to capture in a speech report.

We may ask ourselves: when does a speech report cease being a speech report and become an exercise in (literary) interpretation? Consider the Nietzschean dictum:

(18) Become who you are!

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16 For a more detailed discussion, see Camp (2006b), especially Section 2.
17 Example taken from Camp (2008).
18 See appendix.
19 For a complete contrast between metaphor and various other poetic features, see Camp (2008).
20 The poem is clearly meant to be meditative. However, a paraphrase could grossly downplay that cerebral quality. For example, I can paraphrase it in the following way: I am walking home at night. I see the moon, and my socks are wet from the dew. There is something very important missing from the above paraphrase.
This statement is entirely literal, although cryptic. Its meaning is not immediately obvious. In order to profit from it—to understand what Nietzsche's Zarathustra is trying to communicate—it's necessary to engage in a bit of interpretation. I offer a simple speech report:

(18') I think Nietzsche means that one ought to be true to oneself.

To my ear, (18') does not do justice to the sort of interpretive game that is required to understand the dictum. At the very least, it doesn't seem to exhaust the meaning of the utterance in the way a typical speech report operates, or the way in which the refinement of the meaning of "emergency" in (15) works. The reason it seems that something is lacking from the speech report in (18') is because (18) requires an imaginative interpretation, not a mere speech report. This is the reason why the interpretation in (18') seems incomplete: (18') is a mere speech report; it isn't a reflective interpretation nor meditative paraphrase. For it doesn't seem to fully exhaust the communicative and imaginative import of the utterance. Furthermore and alongside the intended propositional contents\(^{22}\), the speaker intends to communicate something essentially non-propositional\(^{22}\) which the audience is expected to cultivate in their imagination.

Now, I agree with contextualists in that metaphors are continuous with ordinary loose and literal talk.\(^{23}\) I agree with Nogales that (14') through (14'\textsuperscript{m}) count as (potential) metaphorical interpretations. My disagreement is with treating the interpretations as what the speaker said. The mere fact that someone can report their interpretation of (14) does not by itself count as evidence that it is 'what is said' by the utterance.

Nogales overlooks the fact that (14')-(14'\textsuperscript{m}) are imaginative and literary interpretations, not mere speech reports. That is to say, the contents in (14')-(14'\textsuperscript{m}) are markedly different than mere clarification, such as that offered in (15). Rather, poetic interpretations, of the kind I have in mind, are products of research, scholarship, imagination, etc. Interpretations serve as adequate ways to paraphrase (and, thus capture) the speaker's intended content, but interpretations are better understood as what the speaker or author intends to convey, as opposed to what they 'said'.

What does a faithful paraphrase of a metaphor attempt to capture? I think it instructive to follow Camp (2006a), in saying that a faithful paraphrase is one that captures the content of the speaker's intended illocutionary act, and not simply the content of what she said. In uttering a metaphor, a speaker utters something with a certain illocutionary force, and often intends their utterance to include several propositions as well as imagistic and evocative features. A paraphrase is be faithful if it attempts to capture all of this in a way that makes the intentions explicit.

By extension, a literary interpretation, such as the ones we've examined offered by Nogales and Camp, involve some exploratory method for discovering the meaning of an utterance. We can identify this exploratory method even in Nogales' examples. Clauses such as 'but he said this in the context of,' 'literary theorists have said,' 'Auden may have wanted to express this overall message,' and 'using... [such and such device]' It seems obvious to me that the interpreter is involved in a game of meaning discovery, by utilizing literary devices employed in the poem, its surrounding context, as well as relevant paratextual information, including other prominent interpretations offered by other literary critics.

We would be remiss to treat (14')-(14'\textsuperscript{m}) as mere speech reports akin to the quick elaboration in (15) or on par with (19), below:

(19) It's freezing!

Speech Report: She said that it's cold in here.

where the speaker means that it is merely cold, in the current physical context in which the utterance takes place. Here, linguistic competence (understood as the basic ability to assign values to semantically context-sensitive terms) does not include the rich sort of interpretive abilities we bring to bear in the recovery of meaning in poetic metaphor. Classifying the content of (14')-(14'\textsuperscript{m}) as 'what is said' in (14) would be to miss an important feature of poetic language. We can see that the paraphrased interpretations offered are just a few among many possible candidates. Some will be better representative of the meaning than others. In fact, some authors argue that a complete understanding of Auden's poem requires readers to be familiar with Shakespeare's "Devouring Time, blunt thou the line's paw"\(^{24}\) as well as dealing with the poem as responding to other works by Auden, himself.

For instance, we can elaborate Camp's interpretation of Auden's lines by adding that there is good reason to treat them as a part of a recurring theme: it is not simply the abstract concept of time that the poem is depicting, but humanity's attempt to

\(^{21}\) Which are numerous, to be sure.

\(^{22}\) For a detailed discussion on this aspect of metaphor, see Donald Davidson (1978). The term 'non-propositional' is often used synonymously with 'non-cognitive'. Briefly, they are meant to capture those aspects of an utterance that are non-propositional. In fact, Davidson argues that a metaphor communicates no propositional content at all. All that it can achieve is its literal meaning plus non-propositional features. An oft-quoted passage from Davidson makes this point: "A picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture" Davidson (1978).

\(^{23}\) See Wilson and Sperber (2012).

\(^{24}\) Sonnet 19.
‘capture’ time via technology—a mechanical realization of time, as it has been suggested by some. To complicate the matter, at the end of the poem, Auden seems to flip the power he places in the concept of time demonstrated by the opening lines. If so, there is reason to re-read (14) with a sense of dramatic irony. Now, all of this changes our original interpretation of (14). A better understanding of the lines would view Auden in conversation with Shakespeare, arguing that our concept of time, and its mechanical realization are in fact naïve approximations of a much grander, more mystical process. Surely, this adds an entirely new dimension to the meaning of the metaphor. I will go so far to say that this content can in a way be reported as what the poem intends to communicate. But the claim that content is part of ‘what is said’ is left in want of justification.25

4. Metaphorical content and speaker commitment

To further distinguish metaphor from implicature Nogales appeals to an alleged difference in speaker’s commitment to the communicated content. In the case of genuine implicatures, an audience is aware that they cannot hold speakers accountable to the implied content. This claim rests on the assumption that speakers can be held accountable for content that is directly expressed. Presumably, she means that a speaker is held accountable to ‘what is said’, writing that the audience is usually aware they are unable to hold speakers accountable for implicated content, “but can only hold him/her accountable for direct content” (Nogales, 2012). For example, consider the implicature generated by an utterance where it is common knowledge that John has a wife:

(20) John is going out with a woman tonight.

A hearer may challenge the implicature that John is being adulterous. Nevertheless, based on Grice’s defeasibility principle, the speaker can undermine the perceived commitment to the content of their conversational implicature by cancelling it with some other utterance. Specifically, the speaker can challenge their audience by stating that all she meant to say was what the sentence means on its conventional understanding and nothing more. Alternatively, the speaker has the ability to cancel the implicature in question by offering that his true intention was to say that the woman John is going out with tonight is, in fact, his wife.

Conversely, the speech reporter of a metaphor would under no circumstance “answer with the sense and reference of the literal interpretation”…speech reporters of metaphors either cite metaphorical content as ‘what is said’ or restate the sentence, word for word…so their audience can derive the appropriate metaphorical content themselves” (Nogales, 2012). I think this claim also misses the mark and denies an important fact about what makes metaphor a special case of language use.

4.1. Counterargument

In the case of genuine implicatures, speakers can cancel the intended meaning. Nogales argues that this is not possible to do with metaphorical meaning, since it is ‘directly expressed’. But before turning to the issue of accountability, I would like to examine the assumption of directness, or what Nogales refers to as ‘direct content’. How exactly are we to understand ‘directness’ on this view? If Nogales is to be consistent with contextualism, it is worth examining the contextualist notion of ‘directness’. Recanati (2001), for example, grounds directness in our ordinary views of meaning. To say that metaphorical meaning is direct is to say that it doesn’t flaunt its nonliteralness: hearers just get the meaning.26 By contrast, for something to count as nonliter, speakers must be aware of the two layers of meaning (i.e., between the conventional and intended meaning). In his own words, for something to count as non-literal “it must not only go beyond the conventional significance of the uttered words […] but it must be felt as such” (2001, p. 271).

Recanati refers to this as the ‘transparency condition’. Speakers are aware of the two layers of meaning involved in paradigmatic implicatures, such as (2) and (6), as well as sarcastic utterances such as (16), above. Metaphor, he argues, does not count as a genuine nonliteral utterance because speakers can jump so easily and unreflectively to the metaphorical meaning. However, I think that speakers can generally articulate between the two layers of meaning at play in metaphor. Moreover, I think a view that argues that a speech reporter of a metaphor would under no circumstance answer with the literal interpretation misses the point. Language users can and often do point to the literal content as a means to differentiate between the two layers of meaning in the metaphor. We can consider the metaphor (7) above. Camp argues.

25 Indeed, this gets to the heart of another hotly debated aspect of metaphor: the problem of paraphrase. Providing a literal paraphrase of the metaphorical content proves to be no easy task. As Davidson (1978, p. 263) said, “when we try to say what a metaphor ‘means’, we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention.” However, I don’t think that this eliminates the possibility of providing a paraphrase that, as Camp (2008, p. 7) puts it, “as nuanced and detailed as our current purposes demand”.

26 This view is itself problematic. I am not usually aware of the inferential process involved in interpreting utterances contextualists usually maintain to be indirect. For example, when speakers are being sarcastic. Often times, I simply just understand the implied content, although I am definitely aware of the two layers of meaning available to me.
[Speakers] can and do offer justifications along the following rough lines: ‘Well, she can’t really be claiming that Bill is a bulldozer, because that’d be absurd: he’s a man, not a piece of landscape machinery. But he does share with bulldozers a propensity to obliterate obstacles. Since we’re talking about whether Bill would be a good department chair, she must mean that he would stand up to the administration and get things done (Camp, 2006b, p. 289).

Here, the ‘but’ functions to caution the audience to take the utterance figuratively. It emphasizes the two layers of meaning available to the discourse participants, showing that “metaphorical speech exploits established conventional meanings to novel ends” (Camp, 2006b, p. 289), contrary to what Nogales and contextualists claim.

Furthermore, I believe the above leads us to wonder whether the options that ‘speech reporters of metaphors either cite metaphorical content as ‘what is said’ or restate the sentence, word for word is exhaustive of those available to ordinary language users. I don’t believe that it is. In fact, I think speakers can respond by highlighting their intended meanings. For example, a speech reporter may offer their audience the following derogatory reports of (7).

Of course, this is not what the speaker of (7) said, but it does represent an approximation of the speaker’s intended meaning. Rather than coming out and putting themselves on record as saying (7’”), What I want to draw attention to is the accountability Nogales claims speakers of metaphors allegedly undertake in making them. As we can see, the speaker of (7) has various contents that she could mean. Like Nogales, I don’t think speakers can be held accountable to things they intend to communicate, but do not say. For example, it would not be permissible to hold the writer of the letter of recommendation (4) accountable to the content that Mr. X is a bad philosopher. Unlike Nogales, I think metaphors make up part of this class of phenomena with this kind of deniability. In fact, I think this is one of the reasons speakers often employ metaphor in speech. Consider a remark made by Bernie Sanders when asked to reflect on the character of Donald Trump.

Someone at Fox news might hold Sanders accountable for saying something along the lines of:

However, I think it is plausible to deny the content of (21’), claiming that this is something he does not endorse and instead offer clarification of his utterance of (21):

Discourse participants may take issue with (21”), given their knowledge of Sanders, his opposition to Trump, and his earlier criticisms of him. Yet, they cannot deny that (21”) is a legitimate interpretation. For what the metaphor leaves inexplicit is precisely the ways in which Trump is like a snake. Rather, Sanders may be criticised for speaking indirectly, and not explicit about his views on Trump.

It is worth pointing out the major difference between my view of metaphor and implicature. By implicating something, speakers are able to deny the commitment to their implicated content simply by sticking to the literal content of what they said. For example, in the case of the professor’s utterance of (2), he may stick to the literal content: “Oh, no I think he’s very good, but punctuality is a quality I deem worthy of reporting”. Here, the professor does not appeal to some other interpretation to deflect the commitment. Contrast this with a metaphorical utterance: such a possibility of sticking to the literal content (in most cases) is barred. However, there are contexts in which recourse to the literal content would be appropriate (e.g., twice-true/apt metaphors, or to generate humour, such as a pun). In other words, a speaker’s commitment to metaphorical content is not as strong as it would be to a genuine literal assertion. In metaphor, a speaker has recourse to other legitimate interpretations of the metaphorical utterance (for example, if a speaker wants to save face, as illustrated by the above example).

27 These interpretations were offered to me by two colleagues.
28 We could perhaps hold them accountable for writing such a spectacularly poor letter of recommendation, but I think this is another issue.
29 Often times, politicians can be criticized for their rhetoric. Metaphor is no exception. One of the benefits of uttering a metaphor is that it often buys the speaker a bit of deniability of the intended content.
4.2. Metaphor as the springboard for implicatures

In a footnote, Nogales makes a passing argument that metaphorical content ought to be part of ‘what is said’ because it serves as the input to implicatures. She says, metaphorical content is the launching point for both ironic content and implicatures. This seems to show that metaphorical content is ‘what is said’ (Nogales, 2012, p. 1000 ft. 6). However, I hope to show, the fact that an interpretation can serve as a launching point for implicature is not sufficient to establish the boundary of ‘what is said’.

4.3. Counterargument

It is widely known that implicatures and figurative language can be used to generate further implicatures. For example, consider the following utterance:

(22) I’ve listened to a few Stones records in my day.

Here, it seems to be the case that the speaker is indicating that they have listened to more than one Rolling Stones album. At the same time, this knowledge, combined with the triteness of the response further implicates that the speaker is also a hipster and diehard fan, and therefore somewhat of an expert on the Rolling Stones’ discography. The same thing can happen in sarcasm. Suppose John asks Jane whom they should invite for dinner. Jane gives the response:

(23) Joe is always so utterly wonderful to be around

Here, the speaker implicates a critical attitude about Joe (i.e., that Joe is not very pleasant). And the speaker further implicates that Joe should not be invited for dinner.

5. The argument from psycholinguistic evidence

Nogales’ final argument comes from psycholinguistics. One of the central questions in surrounding metaphor in this domain is whether meaning is accessed directly or indirectly. Nogales assumes that the Gricean picture of metaphor predicts comprehension to be indirect. Her basis for this claim is that the Gricean model “requires that the audience first derive the literal content, then notice the incongruity that signals the flouting of a maxim and then, by some unspecified process (of which Searle (1993) provides a faint sketch), derive the metaphorical content” (Nogales, 2012). The idea is that comprehension of metaphorical utterances are predicted to exert a cognitive cost relative to literal counterparts. The theorists Nogales cites are Gibbs (1994), Glucksberg and Keysar (1990), and Pierce and Chiappe (2009) who have all found evidence in support of the direct access model. They have done so by conducting reading/reaction time experiments where subjects are asked to read through a list of stimuli, indicating if and when they have ‘understood’ the passage, or provide a reconstruction of the meaning of a metaphorical utterance.

5.1. Counterargument

Nogales does correctly note that the inference patterns active in metaphor as described by Grice and many of his followers do not differentiate it from other figurative tropes and implicatures. She suggests that this is disadvantageous. I agree with her. A theory of metaphor ought to describe the mechanisms that delineate it from other uses of language—whether this explanation be couched within philosophical or psychological terms will depend on largely on the author’s intentions. What is necessary, I think, is that any account be informed by the empirical data, and any empirical account provide a theoretical apparatus through which to couch the data.

Now, while Grice and Searle did not separate metaphor from, nor contrast it with other forms of indirect uses of speech, there have been numerous contributions that pick up where they remained silent. Metaphor has been shown to share features with, as well as depart from, other forms of figurative language such as sarcasm and irony (Camp and Hawthorne, 2008; Carston and Wearing, 2015; Garmendia, 2008; Popa-Wyatt, 2017; Wang et al., 2006), simile and analogy (Barnden, 2012; Carston and Wearing, 2011; Gentner, 1982, 1983; Gentner et al., 2001; Glucksberg and Haught, 2006; Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990), hyperbole (Carston and Wearing, 2015; Walton, 2017; Wilson and Carston, 2007) as well as implicature
(Camp, 2003, 2006a, 2017). The issue most central to present concerns is whether metaphors are processed differently from literal speech. Despite the research Nogales cites, I believe there is more recent empirical evidence to the contrary.

Critics of Grice’s theoretical model typically structure the psychologized version of his theory as follows: compute what is said via syntactico-semantic processing; reject the meaning of what is said as contextually inappropriate; run pragmatic processing to recover contextually appropriate meaning (i.e., speaker’s meaning). This commits Grice and his followers to a matter of serial processing. By turning Grice’s program into a serial processing issue, dissenters, such as Nogales and other proponents of the direct access model, typically point to reading time studies that provide evidence in favour of their alternative view.

For this reason, Nogales claims that Gricean pragmatics of metaphor processing is not psychologically plausible. It is not difficult to see why. Given what we know about the brain, such a serial processing model would seem hopelessly naïve. For a long while the alternative, direct access model, which claims that the input from semantics is unnecessary, had gained traction. Since people say things and implicate things by them, one may naturally take this to mean that what is implicated is figured out only after determining ‘what is said’. However, it is a mistake to suppose that ‘what is said’ must be determined first (Korta and Perry, 2006, 2011, 2015). Such a misconception has been used to bolster arguments claiming that ‘what is said’ is a theoretically useless notion, or that in order to make it functional, that it involves, what contextualists call pragmatic intrusion.

It is worth pointing out that Grice did not intend his account to be taken as a cognitive model. He was more interested in describing the ingredients necessary for implicatures to be worked out, and providing how this information could be organized logically. In fact, I think there are numerous examples where it seems pretty clear to the hearer that the speaker doesn’t mean what they are saying without an awareness of what he speaker said. I think some of the most compelling examples are those that contextualists point to. In uttering a conventional metaphor, such as (7). A hearer doesn’t have to be aware that a speaker doesn’t mean that Bill is a bulldozer in order to figure out what the speaker means.

A more plausible version of the Gricean model would be one concerned with the role of the literal in the construction of metaphorical meaning. On this account, bottom-up syntactic and semantic processing occurs, while top-down pragmatic processes consider contextual factors/background information either in parallel. It may turn out that during online comprehension, one process is selected over the other. In the case of metaphorical meaning, it could be the case that the literal interpretation is quickly extinguished. At this level, literal meaning serves as a complement to the metaphorical meaning, where literal meaning undergoes contextual adjustment so rapidly that the hearer is unaware of it at a conscious level.

The account predicts that metaphorical meaning, although making use of literal meaning, would become less dependent on it given the conventionality of the metaphor. As such, hearers would become less aware of the role of literal meaning given the familiarity and conventionality of the speaker’s metaphoric utterance. Although reading time (RTs) paradigms could show differences between poetic metaphors and literal utterances, they are less sensitive to the cognitive differences between conventional metaphors and their literal counterparts. However, processing time is not the only way to cash out the cognitive effort involved in metaphor processing. Rather, just what exactly accounts for cognitive effort may centre on which cognitive resources are recruited.

Recently, more fine-grained analyses than RTs have been implemented in psycho and neurolinguistics. Research suggests that metaphors exert cognitive costs, relative to literal controls. Several psycholinguistic studies have significantly qualified the findings of the direct access view. For example, Cacciari and Glucksberg (1994) have shown that the relative ease in which a metaphor is processing is dependent upon factors such as its familiarity, aptness, and the larger context Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) Glucksberg and Keysar (1993). Other studies have demonstrated that novel metaphors take significantly longer to process than both literal sentences and familiar metaphorical ones (Blasko and Connine, 1993). In addition, Bowdle and Gentner and Bowdle (2001) found that novel similes are processed significantly faster than novel metaphors, suggesting that it is not the unfamiliar juxtaposition of terms, but some aspect of the literal reference itself that comes to bear on processing time. At the same time, features such as the aptness of a metaphor seems to have a significant role in processing speeds. Among unfamiliar metaphors, highly apt meanings are interpreted quickly, although not as quickly as literal meanings while less apt metaphors take significantly longer to process.

In neurolinguistics, electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging have been implemented to uncover the cognitive underpinning of metaphor processing. A compelling number of ERP studies conducted in various languages. For example, in English: Coulson and van Petten (2002); Lai et al. (2009); De Grauw et al. (2010). In French Pynte et al. (1996). In Hebrew, Arzouan et al. (2007). In Italian Resta (2012). In German, Weiland et al. (2014). A common tether among these studies is that each have reported an enhanced N400 component for metaphors in contrast to literal control.

32 In fact, contextualist Robyn Carston (2010) proposed the idea of a dual-route model of metaphor comprehension to account for the fact that some metaphors do require assistance of their literal meaning in order to generate and fix the appropriate metaphorical content. I am sympathetic to this view, but believe it does not go far enough.

33 The N400 is a negative-going waveform. This is an event related potential linked to meaning comprehension. It has been identified as a stable component in metaphor research. In this context, it is typically associated with a search conducted in semantic space triggered by the processor identifying an aberrance in comprehension. Thus, the presence of an N400 is taken to reflect extra cognitive effort.
conditions. Furthermore, various types of metaphors (e.g., literary (Resta, 2012)), conventional, (e.g., verbal (Lai et al., 2009) and nominal (Pynte et al., 1996)) have shown an enhanced N400 component relative to literal controls.

Furthermore, experiments conducted by Pynte et al. (1996) and Lai et al. (2009) had manipulated the conventionality of the metaphors as well as the surrounding context. The data suggests a more pronounced N400 for all metaphors. These studies seem to confirm that the N400 component is linked to additional processing costs needed to comprehend a metaphor.

Finally, fMRI has been used to determine differences between metaphors and literal controls by observing differences in the activation of different brain regions. To highlight some key findings, studies conducted by Mashal et al. (2007), Stringaris et al. (2007), Ahrens et al. (2007) found lateral differences in hemispheric activation, as well as regional differences between metaphoric and literal sentences. The first study found that there is significant involvement of the right hemisphere (Mashal et al., 2005), particularly in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (PSTS) in processing the non-salient (low apt) meanings of novel metaphors. Interestingly, the PSTS has been shown to be involved with creative tasks, such as verbal problem solving, verbal creativity, and multisensory processing (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004).

The second study determined that metaphoric sentences, and not literal ones, recruit the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) and the left thalamus. This region of the brain is associated with Brodmann's area 44, 45 (together, Broca's area), and 47—our language processing network. The third study indicated that both conventional and anomalous metaphors differ from literal controls. Conventional metaphors differ with a slight amount of increased activation in the right inferior frontal temporal gyrus. Anomalous metaphors differed from literal controls by increased bilateral activation of the frontal and temporal gyri.

The recruitment of the RH in verbal creativity allows us to explain the comprehension of distant and multimodal semantic relationships in metaphorical comparisons. In support of this result, studies have been conducted on patients with left (LHD) and right hemisphere damage (RHD) (Rinaldi et al., 2004). In two studies, subjects listened to sentences containing metaphoric expressions and were presented with four pictures that were related either to the metaphoric or literal meaning of the sentences, or to a single word in the sentences. In a visuo-verbal task, patients were asked to point to the picture that they felt represented the meaning of the sentence. RHD patients preferred pictures related to literal meaning, but were able to explain verbally the metaphoric meaning of the sentences, suggesting that without the aid of the RH in general, and the PSTS in particular, preference for metaphorical interpretation can be overridden for LH preference of literal interpretation.

The recruitment of the PSTS and the LIFG suggest that metaphor typically involves extra processing effort. This is likely because metaphorical language, in contrast to literal language, involves rich, imagistic, and poetic—highlighted by potent metaphors such as (8), (11), and (14). As such, I believe these findings significantly qualify Nogales' claim that reading time studies provide definitive evidence in favour of the direct access model. Extending this argument, the data gives us a sufficient reason for rethinking the idea that metaphor is a matter of 'what is said'.

In the final section I attempt to sketch a theory of metaphor that takes into account those criticisms above. I treat metaphor as a form of speech where a speaker says one thing, but typically mean something else.

6. Metaphor and Critical Pragmatics

Briefly, my theory of metaphor maintains the following: A metaphorical utterance is one in which the speaker does not primarily intend to commit herself to 'what is said'. Rather, a metaphorical utterance demands that an auditor generate the appropriate aspect that guides them from 'what is said' to speaker's intended meaning. I draw heavily from Garmendia's (2008) critical approach to irony. I explain what taking a critical approach means in more detail below.

Theorists of metaphor all want the same thing: we want an account that can accommodate and generalize across cases without needlessly multiplying the machinery and information required to compute metaphorical content. This is the one of the primary motivations behind applying the notion of enrichment to metaphor. As I mentioned early, enrichment is considered to be the content conveyed by an utterance which comes to include all sorts of elements which are contextually implied without being part of what the utterance literally means. And this process carries one from the speaker's utterance to the metaphorical meaning, directly.

While I don’t take issue with this process per se, I do believe that one unfortunate consequence of the contextualists’ application of enrichment to explain metaphor comprehension is that they conflate the act of the computational process with the output of that act. What I mean is that the process of enrichment ought to be sensitive to many different layers of information that lead from 'what is said' to the speaker's meaning. By glossing over this, many theorists are compelled to cram many important steps together to give as output a single proposition. This is what Korta and Perry (2011) refer to as the dogma of mono-propositionalism. Mono-propositional accounts assume that all the information conveyed by an utterance is part of its interpretation. That is to say, such accounts tend to collapse the gamut of content available to and exploited by an auditor into a single output. As a result, theories led by this assumption often miss the nuances of communication, more

34 This study did not support the laterality thesis found in the former one.
35 The term aspect is used by Camp (2006) and Reimer (2008). It emerged from considerations on Davidson's comments on metaphor and his distinction between “seeing-that” and “seeing-as” from his now (in)famous 1978 article What Metaphors Mean.
36 The term mono-propositionalism grew out of the book Situations and Attitudes by Barwise and Perry (1983). It was first used when discussing the “fallacy of misplaced information”. This error in reasoning holds that all the information conveyed by an utterance is contained in one interpretation.
Generally, as Korta and Perry suggest, we may liberate ourselves from this dogma if we view the role of contents/propositions as classificatory and not constitutive of an utterance.

I sketch a theory of metaphor that builds on pluri-propositionalism based on Perry’s (2012) *Reference and Reflexivity* and Korta and Perry’s (Korta, 2013; Korta and Perry, 2006, 2007a, 2011) *Critical Pragmatics*, developed by Garmedia for the purpose of ironic utterances (e.g., He is a fine friend, said about someone who the speaker believes to be a terrible). This account is a renovation of the classical Gricean paradigm.

6.1. Metaphor and ‘making as if to say’

Grice reserved the term ‘making as if to say’ in order to deal with the problem of figurative speech where a speaker doesn’t ‘say’ the literal content of their utterance but implicates something else instead. For example, Grice said that in uttering a metaphor, a speaker typically doesn’t mean their literal content, but something else. If what a speaker communicates is the sum of what they say and what they implicate, then figurative utterances present a problem. The reason why becomes obvious when we consider that speakers are committed to the contents of what they said.

That is to say, if speakers ‘say’ the contents of their literal meanings, then they are committed to these contents. However, in the case of metaphorical utterance (e.g., 7), this would commit a speaker to a patently false belief (in a case where a hearer can take it as evident that the speaker does not believe the absurd proposition). For example, a speaker who utters (7) metaphorically intends to communicate something like (7”), and not (7). Metaphor (and figurative language more generally), as Grice noticed, possess an issue for speaker’s commitment to content. In order to avoid the commitment issue, and offer a way for speakers to assert metaphorical utterances, Grice appealed to the notion of ‘making as if to say’ whereby he concluded it was possible to implicate something without ‘saying’ anything. Rather, a speaker ‘makes as if to say’ the literal meaning, and this ‘making as if to say’ prompts the audience to search for a metaphorical meaning. According to Grice, metaphorical meaning is generated by flouting a conversational maxim. An important question remains: How exactly can a speaker exploit a maxim if they merely ‘make as if to say’ something, and therefore, don’t say anything at all? A related issue is how a speaker, not saying anything, can suggest or insinuate something. Grice himself doesn’t offer any solutions to this issue. I attempt to sketch a solution to this problem in the following section.

6.2. Ways a communicative act can succeed

My plan in this section is twofold. First, I identify a few ways a communicative act can succeed according to a broadly Gricean, auditor-directed intentional account of communication. Although only one of these acts will be our focus, I present a list if only to alert the reader’s attention to this unusually broad point of view, bracketing those that are not pertinent to our present purpose. Along the way, I hope to show that Grice’s notion of ‘making as if to say’ can be viewed as a non-problematic form of communication where a speaker hedges their metaphorical assertion, x, with the intent of convey its content, P.

One of Grice’s main distinctions in his analysis is between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’. However, as we have seen, Grice also remarked that there are implicatures in cases where a speaker says nothing, but ‘makes as if to say’. Metaphor and irony are cases in point. On this account of ‘making as if to say’ a speaker does not commit themselves to expressing the truth of the locutionary content (i.e., the content determined by the contribution of the words used and facts that determine reference). Presumably, in uttering a metaphor, a speaker expects the auditor to understand that she is not committed to expressing the trivially-true content of her literal utterance, and accommodate her figurative use of the metaphor. Yet, the locutionary content does play a role in the understanding of the speaker’s intended meaning.

On my account, metaphor is a form of deliberate and overt suggestion. Nuances aside, a speaker has ‘said’ their content when she is committed to the truth of the locutionary content. A speaker is committed to such content of an utterance if they take responsibility for believing in the truth of that content. However, in genuinely asserting a metaphor a speaker conveys their commitment to some metaphorically-intended meaning by ‘locuting’ the literal content (Korta and Perry, 2007b, 2011)—with illocutionary force, and perhaps hoping to produce perlocutionary effects in the auditor. If requested or challenged by an auditor, the speaker can expand/refine/sharpen (and sometimes cancel) their metaphorical meaning. The difference between a standard implicature and metaphor is that a speaker typically lacks commitment toward the locutionary (here, literal) content of their metaphorical utterance. The literal utterance prompts the auditor to generate the intended metaphorical content. I delineate precisely how I understand the speaker’s illocutionary act of asserting a metaphor in relation to Grice’s ‘making as if to say’.

37 Although, as we have seen, there are exceptions to this (e.g., twice-true and twice-apt metaphors).
38 I believe a speaker can assert something without saying it, and say something without asserting it. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Beznuidenhou (2001); Camp (2006b); Cappelen and Lepore (2005).
39 Metaphors are thought to arise primarily from flouting the maxim of quality, but they can also arise from violations of the maxim of manner.
40 A Gricean could respond to the question by amending the maxims to include ‘making as if to say’ part of the formulation. However, just exactly which ones need to be amended according to the trope employed, and how this is fleshed out is unclear.
41 I sharpen my definition of ‘assertion’ in the following section.
42 Although my examples of metaphor focus on a specific subset of metaphorical expressions (i.e., noun—noun predicative metaphors, but I suggest a parallel strategy for various other types as well).
'Making as if to say' revolves around broader considerations of coordinating expectations about communicative plans. First, asserting a metaphor in a discourse context requires some level of accommodation between interlocutors. Specifically, it requires both the identification of the utterance being used as a metaphor, and to assert something (Bergmann, 1979). By doing so, the speaker 'influences' the auditor to further mental states and actions. The notion of 'influence' comes from Harris (in press), and is part of a species of communicative acts. The communicative acts I have in mind are those that one performs by producing an utterance with the communicative intention of getting the one's auditor to accept some proposition. Harris, following Stalnaker (1984, pp. 79–84) understands ‘acceptance’ to mean a family of propositional attitudes that include paradigm attitudes such as belief, but also various more provisional belief-like attitudes that don’t entail belief. Assertion, as Grice thinks of it, has the more precise aim of producing belief. For Stalnaker, however, acknowledges a parallel consideration by saying that assertion, as he defines it, is a broader notion than the one that is often discussed by philosophers.

Following Harris we can refer to the genus of communicative act ‘assertion’ where we can focus on acts of intending to produce acceptance rather than intending to produce belief. Suppose we have a speaker S addressing some utterance x, to an auditor A, thereby asserting* P. Harris lists seven ways in which assertion* can succeed, along with their corresponding success conditions.

(S1) PERFORMANCE
S utters x intending: (i) for A to accept P; and (ii) for A to believe that S uttered x intending for A to accept P.

(S2) UPTAKE
A accepts that S uttered x intending for A to accept P.

(S3) ACCEPTANCE
A accepts P.

(S4) INFLUENCE
A enters further mental states or takes further actions, partly a result of accepting P, thus fulfilling one or more of S's goals in uttering x.

(S5) COMMON UPTAKE
S and A commonly accept that S uttered x intending for A to accept P.

(S6) COMMON ACCEPTANCE
S and A commonly accept P.

(S7) ANAPHORIC LICENSING
Utterances anaphoric on x are felicitous

The precise details of each communicative act of assertion* aside, I want to focus on (S4) as the kind of communicative act that characterizes metaphorical assertions on the basis of ‘making as if to say’. In paradigm cases of literal assertion, a speaker, S, says that P, with assertoric force, so as to express the corresponding belief, ψ, thus giving A reason to think that S holds P to be true.

Thus, a genuine act of assertion that the speaker, S, undertakes a commitment to defending their belief, ψ, if challenged by A, in virtue of having asserted that P. This means that S is held to defending the truth-aptness of their belief that P. So, in a paradigm case of assertion (where speakers mean what they say, and say what they mean), an utterance expresses a belief on the part of the speaker, it has locutionary content, it counts as an act of saying something, and it will be taken a certain way by an audience.

By contrast, ‘making as if to say’ does not require such commitment to the locuted content. On this understanding, a speaker ‘makes as if to say’ the locutionary content, coupled with the communicative plan (S4) as the primary goal driving the utterance. Notice, above, that success conditions are satisfied just if the auditor can satisfy some aspect of S’s goal in uttering x. Here, the relevant satisfaction condition is for A to infer the appropriate further content intended by S, by engaging in further reasoning. On this account, the speaker’s goal is not to express commitment to the proposition conveyed by the locutionary content.

To capture this more formally, I draw a distinction between a genuine literal assertion (a conflation between S5 and S6 where S5 \(\models\) S2 and S6 \(\models\) S3) and the kind of communicative act I have in mind. When everything goes right in a basic assertive act:

(S1- 3) S utters x intending: (i) for A to accept P; and (ii) for A to believe that S uttered x intending for A to accept P. S expresses a genuine commitment to x's corresponding mental content, ψ, (e.g., S's belief that ψ). S intends A to recognize S's utterance as a commitment to P (which involves S's recognition of S's corresponding mental state, ψ). A accepts that S uttered x intending for A to accept P. A accepts P.

(S4) S's utterance of x conveys some mental content, ψ. S asserts x intending for A to accept P's locutionary content provisionally. S's asserting x, influences A to enter further mental states or to take further actions, partly as a result of accepting P, in order to fulfill one or more of S's goals in uttering x: such as reasoning about S's intended mental state, ψ via their utterance x.

---

43 Note that this accommodation is merely optional. Speakers may feel that an interlocutor, insisting on a strict interpretation of their words is being silly or over scrupulous. At the same time, speakers cannot deny that such an interpretation is a consequence of their locutionary content.

44 Harris does not intended the list to be exhaustive.

45 The literal assertion "the cat is on the mat" has a corresponding mental state that can be represented by the following proposition: \(\langle\text{THAT THE CAT IS ON THE MAT}\rangle\).

46 Note that the defense of a commitment does not have to be compelling.
Above, (S1–3) expresses the stronger attitude: *one’s belief that P*. This contrasts with the weaker formulation in (S4) where the speaker locutes *that P* in order to get A to provisionally accept it. Literal assertion includes endorsement of the locuted content, while ‘making as if to say’ as I understand it, does not. Rather, a speaker ‘makes as if to say’ their locuted content thereby licensing A to engage in further reasoning.

I now want to provide an outline of Korta and Perry’s (2011) Critical Pragmatic theory so that I may later demonstrate how their account informs our discussion of metaphor. When a speaker utters a sentence, there are a variety of contents that reflect the conditions under which the utterance would be true. Within these contents, we distinguish (a) the minimal reflexive content (PMIN); (b) a variety of reflexive (or, hybrid) contents; (PX); (c) the locutionary content—or, as I have seen it more often described, the official content (PR). Roughly, (a) refers to contents or truth conditions that are relative to it. Content at this level is utterance-bound. One grasps the reflexive truth conditions by being linguistically competent. This is content that includes the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered, prior to any other pragmatic information that contributes to resolve reference resolution. Given consideration of various contextual factors, an utterance has various reflexive contents that develop incrementally. The locutionary content is the fully incremental content—what obtains after disambiguation and reference of context-sensitive expressions.

For example, suppose Jane and John are in line at a grocery store. They do not know one another. Jane, noticing John putting his green apples to the side, turns to John and says.

(24) I love green apples.

The proposition expressed, or the official content is.

(24) a. That Jane loves green apples.

However, John doesn’t have access to the information in (24a) at the time of the utterance, because at the time, John’s back is turned to Jane. He does have access to reflexive content, given his knowledge of English and no other contextual information besides the fact that (24) has been uttered. This can be captured by the proposition:

(24b) That the speaker of (24) loves green apples.

(24b) is reflexive for it has (24), the utterance itself as a constituent. It is therefore a singular proposition having an utterance as a constituent. This is not what Jane said in uttering (24). Yet, grasping it plays a role in Jane’s communicative plan—getting John to offer her the apples. Given that John comprehends (24b), and before turning around to view the speaker, he can comprehend that the speaker of (24) is the person standing in front of him. Therefore, he can grasp the following:

(24c) That the person in front of me loves green apples.

Again, this is not what is expressed by (24). It is nevertheless the crucial content that John must grasp for Jane’s plan to succeed. That is to say, this content helps John to be in a position to offer the person in front of him the green apples he was going to put back. It is this content that accounts for the motivating belief and cognitive impact of (24). It is the content that allows John to compute the implicature that Jane would like John’s green apples.

As we have seen, Jane utters a sentence with numerous contents, and expresses beliefs, desires, and intentions which all represent her communicative plan. Among these, there is the motivating belief (MB)—it is the belief that prompts the utterance. In paradigmatic cases, the referential content of the motivating belief will be the same as the locutionary content. If, for instance we subtract the implicature generated by Jane’s utterance (supposing she simply wanted to assert her love of green apples), then we may represent both contents by the same proposition:

(MB24): That Jane loves green apples.

(PR24): That Jane loves green apples.

\[ \text{\texttt{47 We may understand this as something akin to \textit{simulation}. For discussion and examples, see Cosmides and Tooby (2000); Leslie (1987).}} \]

\[ \text{\texttt{48 I use the following notation adapted from Perry (2012, p. 33). Bold face tells us which things are the subject matter (named or described). Boldface plus italics indicates the identifying conditions that are subject matter, but not the objects they designate.}} \]
6.3. The Critical Pragmatics of metaphor

As described above, the speaker’s motivating belief prompts a communicative utterance, and in normal circumstances, triggers a communicative exchange. However, in metaphors, such as (7), the referential content of the motivating belief does not match the locutionary content of (7).

Let’s look at how this framework allows us to keep track of the variegated content at play in a metaphorical utterance. In the simplest case, a speaker utters a is (an) F intending for the auditor to culminate the appropriate prominent and central features associated with our characterization of F and matching features f and a, characterizations with the goal of structuring a so that it resembles F as much as possible. The auditor is able to adopt the relevant way to think of a and can identify those prominent features shared between a and F. We shall call the feature set of mappings from F to a the associated commonplace content (ACC). I shall use (7) as an example (see Table 1 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivating belief:</th>
<th>That Bill is a ‘bulldozer’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive content(s):</td>
<td>That the person designated by the name ‘Bill’ is a bulldozer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulldozer def. lit:</td>
<td>‘Bill’ is a large tracker equipped with tread and a blade, equipped for moving large quantities of earth, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locutionary content:</td>
<td>That Bill is a bulldozer def. lit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As-if content:</td>
<td>That Bill is a bulldozer def. lit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC contents:</td>
<td>Bulldozers are large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulldozers move slowly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulldozers push a lot of weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulldozers are loud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulldozers are boxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill is large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill moves slowly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill has a lot of clout in the department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill is loud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bill has a square build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphorical content:</td>
<td>That Bill is aggressive pushy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicature(s):</td>
<td>+ &gt; Don’t get in Bill’s way today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ &gt; Bill is relentless during departmental meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ &gt; Bill is not tactful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ &gt; Bill is not graceful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By uttering a metaphor, a speaker does not necessarily commit themselves to the locutionary content. In (7), the speaker certainly doesn’t believe, nor intend to be taken as believing that ‘Bill is a bulldozer’. In the case of twice-true metaphors (e.g., 8), a speaker may only be weakly committed to the literal content. Because the locutionary content is so trivial (and already an established part of the common ground) it is most likely not what the speaker intends to commit themselves to. For it if were, and the auditor believed that this is what the speaker intended, there would be no metaphor!

One of the upshots of considering the pluri-propositional approach in relation to metaphor is the way we may speak to the generation of implicatures before calculating “what is said” (i.e., the locutionary content). A Gricean account is unable to accommodate this fact. For example, on a pluri-propositional view, the auditor need not be aware of the referent of ‘Bill’, yet, she may still generate the appropriate metaphorical content. This is because the reflexive content alone may give way to the ACC content. We have no trouble deploying our common, stereotypical notions of bulldozers to people, in general.

Another benefit of adapting the pluri-propositional account to a theory of metaphorical meaning is the way it preserves the intuition that metaphors often communicate various contents. The pluri-propositional approach allows us to make sense of the appropriate content that contributes to the speaker’s meaning. It can also give us an idea of what information is suppressed in comprehension. Such an account attests to the unique ways we employ metaphor. Nogales approach does not account for the variegated metaphorical content associated with a single utterance. It may be the case that an auditor entertain multiple relevant metaphorical contents or she could stop computing when she reaches one or only a few of the intended contents. Such processing will depend largely on what the auditor looks to take from the utterance and the constraint with the current conversational context.

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*Following the work on conceptual metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), it seems quite plausible that a belief can take the form of a conceptual metaphor, which I capture by adding the ‘...’ around the predicate. By doing so, I do not intend to suggest that the metaphor is limited to the predicate. I take the entire structure to participate in the metaphor. By representing the ‘motivating belief’ as the metaphor, we observe a claim made by Camp (2003) that metaphorical content is often largely indeterminate. Representing the ‘motivating belief’ as the original utterance reflects the openedness of the speaker’s thoughts in a way that offering a list of the literal content would not.*
Table 1
A list of the content involved in metaphorical communication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Content</th>
<th>Source Characterization</th>
<th>Target Characterization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivating belief</td>
<td>is a ‘bulldozer’</td>
<td>Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive</td>
<td>“bulldozer” defi: a large tracker with tread and blade, equipped for moving large quantities of earth, etc.</td>
<td>the person designated by the name ‘Bill’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locutionary</td>
<td>Bulldozer</td>
<td>Bill/The individual designated by the name “Bill”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As-if</td>
<td>Bulldozer</td>
<td>Bill/The individual designated by the name “Bill”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>+Bulldozers are large</td>
<td>+Bill is large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphorical content Implicature(s)</td>
<td>+Bulldozers move slowly</td>
<td>+Bill moves slowly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+Bulldozers push a lot of weight</td>
<td>+Bill has a lot of clout in the department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+Bulldozers are loud</td>
<td>+Bill is loud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+Bulldozers are boxy</td>
<td>+Bill has a square build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>is aggressive and pushy</td>
<td>That Bill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boldface tells us which things are the subject matter (named or described). Boldface plus italics indicates the identifying conditions that are subject matter, but not the objects they designate.

7. Conclusion

What distinguishes metaphor from other non-literal and indirect utterances is that a speaker intends for their auditor to determine the content of the primary communicative commitment by deploying the aspect F to identify the metaphorical matches within the subject characterization. On these grounds, metaphor is different from literal utterances in which a speaker also intends for the auditor to cultivate an aspect. In speaking metaphorically, the primary communicative commitment is uncovered via the cultivation of the aspect through which the subject characterization is understood. That is to say, generally, in speaking metaphorically, a speaker does not intend to commit themselves to the semantic content; whereas this is the case in a literal utterance.50

On this understanding, I align my view with Black (1955), Ricoeur (1977) and Camp (2003) in that I promote a brand of ‘interactionism’. ‘Interactionism’ promotes the idea that the meaning of a metaphor depends on the ‘interaction’ between the ‘source’ and ‘target’. I refined this account, taking lead from Camp, 2003, 2006b, 2008, by treating the cultivation of an aspect as dependent upon the interaction between the governing characterization and the subject characterization. However, like Camp, I go further than Black and Ricoeur in arguing that matches aren’t simply made between both subjects—pushing certain features to the fore, while certain others are omitted. Additionally, the matching process alters the role of certain features of the subject characterization that “are merely similar in some respect to features of the governing characterization” (Camp, 2003, p. 240).

Of course, there is an objection that can be raised against my account. A major problem for my ACC account is that ordinary, conventional metaphors don’t work in the way I am suggesting. One may object that in many conversational metaphors, such as (7) above, we don’t have to cultivate an aspect, or entertain the way the governing characterization interacts with the subject characterization. The relevant resulting metaphoric features have already been established via routinization. However, there are at least two reasons for rejecting this argument.

First, even if the metaphorical meaning that the speaker is committed to is itself a routine interpretation, the speaker “still intends to suggest at least some of the features and especially the attitudes that would be delivered by actively applying the aspect” (Camp, 2003, p. 235). This makes the cultivation of the aspect something indispensable to the meaning of the metaphor.

Secondly, routine conversational metaphors that use the same governing characterization can be used to convey different contents and non-propositional (e.g., attitudes) depending on the speaker’s intentions, the context of utterance, and the subject under discussion. For example, ‘is a bulldozer’ can be used metaphorically to characterize someone as slow, uncoordinated, loud, heavy, abrasive, large, or some combination of these features. What these features share in common is that they feature prominently in our characterization of bulldozers. What features are applied to our subject under discussion will depend on which will be appropriate in the current conversational context.

In speaking metaphorically, a speaker intends to convey, more or less determinate contents. The auditor understands the hearer to the extent that they understand what the speaker is committed to in their utterance. However, unlike the majority of genuine implicatures, speakers don’t simply insinuate or suggest what they mean. Rather, they “openly and obviously commit themselves to certain propositional contents—contents that are distinct from ‘what is said’ (Camp, 2003, p. 270).

50 However, there may be exceptions to this. See Camp (2003, p. 228).
Importantly, I disagree with Grice and Searle that metaphor is merely implicature. Metaphorical meaning can serve as the springboard to implicatures, and audiences can adopt and reject the metaphorically intended meaning. That is to say, what the speaker identifies as the ‘making as if to say’ need not be identical to the locutionary content.

References


