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Winner of the Edmund Burke Award for Best Undergraduate Essay

A Critique of Conceptual Idealism

Harry Loftus

Welcome from the Editor-in-Chief

I am delighted to welcome you to Volume II of the *Trinity Student Philosophical Review*. This review was established to provide a platform to encourage undergraduate students to showcase their academic endeavours. We anticipate that every successful submission within this year's edition will serve as a stepping stone for each author's philosophical journey. Each of the seven essays selected possess a level of sophistication and originality in their thought that far exceeds what is expected of undergraduate students. We hope that the broad collection of philosophical themes discussed will give everyone something to enjoy.

It was an arduous task for the editorial team to select which essays to include in this year's review given the quality of the submissions. We have attempted to display a diverse range of topics with the strongest essays on each. Both myself and the rest of the editorial team took great pleasure in reading through all the essays submitted and took far less in deciding which ones to include. Sadly, not every submission could be included in the *TSPR* with many tough decisions having to be made. I would like to sincerely thank all those who submitted their work to the *TSPR*. Though the *TSPR* is still in its infancy, we hope that every successful edition will encourage more and more students each year to submit their own work. I would most importantly like to thank all those whose work has contributed to this year's review.

I would also like to briefly touch upon each essay included in this edition of the *Trinity Student Philosophical Review.* We begin this year's edition with 'A Critique of Conceptual Idealism' by Harry Loftus, the deserved winner of the Edmund Burke award. Loftus showcases a masterful defence against Hofweber's argument for conceptual idealism by arguing firstly, that on Hofweber's preferred 'inferential role' reading of the quantifiers, he is not licensed to draw the metaphysical conclusion he arrives at, and secondly that we can, in any case, perform a Moorean shift on Hofweber's argument given the metaphysically weighty conclusion it draws based on a contentious theory of quantification. The second essay 'Friends Shouldn't Eat Friends – But Support Their Murder? Jeff Jordan's Friendship Argument and Obligate Carnivore Pets' by Ryszard Madejczyk, in which Madejczyk argues against Jeff Jordan's Friendship argument that it is unable to defend the claim that there are no morally relevant differences between pets and foodstuff animals. The subsequent essay: 'Socrates' Disobedience to His Divine Dream of Practicing Poetry'

by Andrei Popa is an original examination of Socrates' interpretation of a particular dream, and why it can be understood as the cause of his relationship towards the senses in his care for the soul.

The following essay is 'Conditions and Capacities: An Account of the Structure of Knowledge-How Based on the Structure of Knowledge Itself' by Jack Palmer. Palmer develops a novel account of knowledge-how based on David Lewis's contextualist account of propositional knowledge which combines features of both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts in an attempt to avoid objections. The fourth essay is 'Worldhood as Embodied Significance in Heidegger & Merleau-Ponty' by Seán O'Leary. This technical examination justifies Heidegger's conception of the world as an existential-ontological component of Dasein, while additionally delving into how the corporeality of Dasein fits within this analysis. Following this is Matia Legnani's essay titled 'Quine and Williamson: Do We Need a Modal Science?'. Legnani defends Quinean anti-realism about modality against arguments from Timothy Williamson which purport to show that modality is indispensable for science because of its use in probability. The concluding essay in our review this year is 'A Defence of Plato's *Lysis*' by Finghín Little. This thoughtful essay sheds new light on Plato's underappreciated dialogue. Little's reading of the *Lysis* portrays the dialogue as an aporetic invitation to philosophy using the medium of play.

The continuation of the *Trinity Student Philosophical Review* relies on support from many facets of the college and the wider community. To begin with, I would like to thank our Patron and head of the Philosophy Department, Professor John Divers, who has provided persisting support and stability. Secondly, I would like to thank both our sponsors for this year's review: the Trinity Trust and Tethras Technology Ltd. It is only through the generosity of our sponsors that we can put this together and provide a platform for students of philosophy. I would also like to thank the Philosophy Department, and in particular, Katy Armstrong and Tania Pañero García who have both played vital roles throughout the applications and editing process.

Finally, I would like to give a special thanks to all our committee members this year who have all stepped up to make this year's edition such a success. The editorial team consisted of myself, Rían Coady, and Frank Wolfe. Both Frank and Rían have offered invaluable experience and philosophical acumen to the editing process, while I have felt personally to have learnt a great deal from both of them. Our treasurer Eric O'Riordan has been industrious in helping us receive the support that gives life to this review. I would also like to thank our production manager Ferdia

Roche who has worked tirelessly to put together what you hold in your hand. Finally, I would like to thank our events manager Emma Horan for organising the launch for this year's edition. It has been a real pleasure to serve as editor-in-chief for this year's volume surrounded by such a brilliant committee.

Jasper Tahany
Editor-in-Chief
Trinity Student Philosophical Review, Volume II

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The Trinity Student Philosophical Review

A Critique of Conceptual Idealism

By Harry Loftus

In this essay I discuss Thomas Hofweber's conceptual idealism, and specifically his claim that there are no structurally ineffable facts. I begin by outlining Hofweber's general argument. I then discuss quantification and how his view hinges on his 'inferential role' reading of quantifiers over propositions and facts. I offer two critiques of his argument. The first grants the truth of his inferential role reading of quantifiers, but contends that he is not entitled to draw the conceptual-idealist conclusion on this view of quantification. Furthermore, I argue that even if he is entitled to do this, one can reasonably cast doubt on his argument by performing a Moorean shift. Though this strategy does not settle the issue, it is appropriate here because of the metaphysically weighty conclusion being drawn based on a contentious theory of quantification.

The Question to Be Raised

Hofweber wishes to raise the question as to whether human beings are metaphysically central to reality. Will we be 'discussed in the main text' or merely 'mentioned in a footnote' in the 'overall story of reality' (Hofweber, 2019, p. 699)? To begin thinking about this question, Hofweber distinguishes between two ways of thinking about reality. One is to think of reality as the totality of facts while the other is to think of reality as the totality of things. Hofweber claims that we are metaphysically central to reality in the first sense, but not in the second. Thus, he argues for a 'conceptual idealism' where the totality of facts somehow depends on our minds, as opposed to an 'ontological idealism' where the totality of things depends on our minds (Hofweber, 2017b, 2019)

The form of facts, the form of conceptual thought, and the form of sentences all seem to map on to each other. The fact that my table is brown is reflected in the thought that my table is brown, as in the corresponding sentence 'my table is brown'. According to Hofweber, the subject-predicate structure of sentences corresponds to the forms of conceptual thought and of facts. Hofweber presents two broad candidate explanations of this alignment. One is the 'realist' stance that the form of our conceptual thought corresponds to the facts of reality because the facts themselves have that form. Thus, our thoughts mirror that form in order to aptly represent the facts. The second is the 'idealist' stance that construes this story exactly the other way around; it is because our

thoughts have a subject-predicate form that the facts of reality have such a form (Hofweber, 2019). These two posited explanations are key to his argument, because on the realist view, it is at least in principle possible that there are facts that we cannot conceive of; though it seems that for many facts, we possess the corresponding conceptual structure that allows us to represent them, it remains coherent to suppose that the structure of some facts do not correspond to the structure or form of our thought. This realist position is similar to the one taken by Nagel (1986). However, under the idealist view, the possibility of facts that are beyond what we can conceptually represent is, in principle, ruled out. This is because if the range of facts that can obtain are dependent on our forms of thought, then there can be no facts that are wholly independent of our forms of thought, and thus unable to be represented by human beings. It is this latter, idealist view according to which these 'structurally ineffable facts' are in principle ruled out that Hofweber (2019) wishes to defend.

Hofweber (2017a, p.142) defines a structurally ineffable fact as a fact that has a structure such that it cannot be represented in the thought or language of human beings. The emphasis on structure here is intended to accommodate the possibility that there may be facts about things which we currently have no name for, or the possibility that there are facts which are too long and complex. They may involve billions of words, and we may not have enough time in our finite lives to express them. But ultimately these facts still have a structure that conforms to our forms of thought and thus we could in principle—perhaps if our lives were longer or our cognitive capacity greater—represent them. Hofweber calls the thesis that no fact or proposition is structurally ineffable the 'structural effability thesis'. The opposing 'structural ineffability thesis' holds that there could be at least some facts or propositions that are structurally ineffable (Hofweber, 2019, p. 716). For Hofweber, which thesis is true depends on the truth about quantification in language. It is to that issue we now turn.

Quantification

Hofweber claims that there are two ways in which a quantifier over propositions (or facts) could be understood. The 'domain conditions' or 'external' understanding of a quantifier is one in which we are quantifying over a domain of entities in the world. Under this reading, when using a quantifier to talk about propositions or facts, we are referring to existing abstract entities in the world. This is akin to the Quinean understanding of quantification (Quine, 1948). There is also the 'inferential role' or 'internal' reading of quantifiers on which the quantified sentences inferentially relate

to sentences that may not be quantified ones. For example, if I know that there is someone who my friend and I admire, but I forget who it is, this 'someone' may not be something I want to quantify over, if say, it is a fictional character such as Mary Poppins. Instead, the sentence 'there is someone we both admire' can be regarded as true in the case that we both admire Mary Poppins. Thus, the apt reading of the quantifier used in 'there is someone we both admire' is this broader one in which the sentence is true iff there is a true sentence of the form 'we both admire x' where 'x' is replaced by a name in our language (Hofweber, 2017a, p. 132). On this view, a sentence of the form '$\exists x F x$' is true iff the disjunction '$Fa \lor Fb \lor Fc \lor ...$' is true, where the lower-case letters stand for all the singular terms in the English language. Hofweber offers certain linguistic arguments for taking an inferential role reading of quantifiers when quantifying over numbers, propositions, and facts. When quantifying over these, we must understand that we are not referring to abstract, language-independent entities. For my first point of critique, I will grant that Hofweber's view on this is correct. However, as we will see, the proposed 'straightforward argument' from the truth of an inferential role reading of facts and propositions to the truth of conceptual idealism is not as straightforward as he thinks (Hofweber, 2019, p. 716).

The Not-So-Straightforward Argument

If we adopt an inferential role reading of quantifiers, it does indeed seem that one could not truly say that there are structurally ineffable facts. This is because the truth conditions of the general claim 'there is an x such that x is a structurally ineffable fact' are equivalent to those of 'a is a structurally ineffable fact or b is a structurally ineffable fact or c is a structurally ineffable fact or…'. However, one cannot successfully express such a fact without falling victim to self-refutation, for to express such a fact would be to show that it is structurally effable.

Regarding this, Hofweber says:

It is no accident that every fact is effable, since 'every fact' is a quantifier that generalises over the instances in our language. Thus, no wonder it is true that every fact is effable. All of our own instances are effable by us. (2017b, p. 135)

He thus argues that conceptual idealism is true, because under this understanding of quantification, all the facts or propositions must be structurally effable by us. Consequently, there is a 'guaranteed harmony between the form of our thoughts and the structure of the facts' (Hofweber, 2019, p. 716). Hofweber does admit of the intuitive appeal of a common critique of this type of position, to which

we now turn.

It is coherent to suppose that there could be beings who speak a structurally limited and diluted version of our language by which they cannot represent facts that are of the forms that we can represent. These beings, under the influence of Hofweber's argument, could conclude that there are no facts which their forms of thought cannot structurally represent because they cannot express any such facts in their own impoverished language. We humans, on the other hand, know that there are indeed such facts because our more expansive forms of thought can represent them. Given this, why is it not coherent to suppose that we could be in an analogous position to that of these conceptually impoverished beings in relation to other beings? These other beings may have far more expansive forms of thought than our own and thus may be able to express facts that are structurally ineffable for us. This humbling thought ought to resign us from the position that we are the ultimate conceptual arbiters of reality.

Despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, Hofweber thinks it is unsound. In the case of those beings who speak an impoverished language relative to us, they may assert truly that 'there are no structurally ineffable facts for us', because this statement is true in their language. But crucially, for Hofweber, this does not *mean* the same thing that it does in our language. Though it is true in their language, it does not mean that there are no structurally ineffable facts for them. The sentence in their language has different truth conditions than it does in our language. It does not carry the metaphysical weight that it does when we humans say that 'there are no structurally ineffable facts for us'. Hofweber comments on the possibility of us being in an analogous situation to the limited beings:

> Furthermore, we can conclude, given internalism, that no other creature can truly say that there are facts structurally ineffable for humans. They might utter sentences that sound like this, but these sentences would either not mean that or else they would not be true. (2019, p. 728)

But why could these other creatures not utter such a sentence and it mean that there are certain facts that we humans cannot represent, and thus see that we do not mean what we think we mean when we say there are no structurally ineffable facts for us? If there were such beings, then they would see that, contrary to what we think, when we utter the sentence 'there are no structurally ineffable facts for us', it does not actually mean that there are no structurally ineffable facts for us! Thus, we cannot know when we utter the sentence 'there are no structurally ineffable facts for us'

that this means what we think it means i.e., that it has the metaphysical significance that we think it has. Unfortunately, Hofweber does not give an additional argument for this exceptionalism and simply restates the conclusion he wishes to reach:

> Some languages can be poorer than ours and represent fewer structures of facts, but no language can be richer, since we can already represent the structures of absolutely all facts. Instead, there is only one totality of the facts, reality as all that is the case, but it is tied to our human representational capacities. (2019, p. 729)

There is no provided reason as to why the language-impoverished beings are not entitled to the metaphysical conclusion that there are no structurally ineffable facts, other than that we can conveniently see that they are wrong. If they are not entitled to draw the metaphysical conclusion, then why are we? Hofweber will say that according to his inferential role reading of quantifiers, we can draw the relevant metaphysical conclusion, but this would seem just as convincing to the language-impoverished beings *from their perspective.* Hofweber's argument would seem just as sound to them. After all, we are carrying out this investigation from *our* human perspective, and the insistence that we are the exception simply because it is *our* perspective seems to completely miss the point of the thought experiment. It is as if Hofweber has correctly recited the parable but failed to recognise the moral of the story. Because our conceptually superior position in relation to these beings conveniently allows us to judge that they cannot coherently draw the metaphysical conclusion when following Hofweber's argument, then we, following Hofweber's argument, ought to refrain from doing so as well. It seems that if one is committed to an inferential role reading of quantifiers, and one recognises that such language-impoverished beings would not be entitled to draw the relevant metaphysical conclusion, then one ought to not arrive at the exceptional conceptual idealist conclusion for humans.

Under one interpretation (that of Levine, 2013), a similar position was taken by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, where he adopted an inferential role reading of quantifiers akin to Hofweber, but claimed that we cannot coherently raise the metaphysical issue of solipsism (understood as the question of whether there are possibilities beyond those I can conceive or beyond my logical space). Wittgenstein recognised that although under his reading of quantifiers he cannot—contra Russell—deny the metaphysical thesis of solipsism, he also recognised—unlike Hofweber—that he cannot affirm it either. This is because to adjudicate between the truth or falsity of such

metaphysical positions, one would have to occupy a vantage point where one can see beyond one's logical space (or conceptual structures), and this is an undertaking that we are not capable of doing. It is because we *can* see beyond the conceptual structures of the language-impoverished beings that we can see their fault in claiming a guaranteed harmony between their forms of thought and the structure of all facts. However, just as they cannot do this for themselves, we cannot do it for ourselves.

Hofweber may retort by doubling down and saying that he need do no more. If the inferential role reading of 'there are ineffable facts' is correct, then that sentence is guaranteed to be false. And if it is false, then the conclusion that there are no ineffable facts is guaranteed. Considerations of perspective do not threaten the deductive validity and soundness of this argument. The metaphysical question has just been raised and the metaphysical conclusion has just been arrived at. However, I will argue that even if this response succeeds, we should not be conceptual idealists.

An Alternative Critique

Even if such a reply were cogent, there is still good reason to be sceptical of conceptual idealism. This is because of the sheer intuitive strength of the original objection based on other possible perspectives which was sketched above. The proposition that there are facts that we cannot structurally represent is more likely to be true than Hofweber's particular theory of thought and language. Thus, even if the entirety of Hofweber's argument is valid, it is reasonable to deny its soundness because it is more likely that his conclusion is false than it is that all of his premises are true. I am here employing the 'Moorean Shift' objection encapsulated by the slogan 'One philosopher's modus ponens is another philosopher's modus tollens'. Though it may not be healthy to unrestrictedly apply this form of argumentation, for fear of excessive stifling of philosophical discourse regarding counterintuitive positions, I believe its application is warranted in this case. The inferential role reading of quantification proposed by Hofweber is by no means a consensus view. There are many opposing views of quantification that garner at least equal purchase among philosophers and logicians. In this case, where a highly counterintuitive substantial metaphysical conclusion is being drawn solely on the basis of a particular theory of quantification that has not yet achieved common consent among experts, one is in a position to deny that the conjunction of the premises is true because it is more likely that the conclusion is false than it is that all of the premises are true. And one is entitled do this without providing an alternative theory of quantification to

support their own contrary conclusion.[1]

This is similar to a move made by Nagel (1986) in his challenge to the 'Idealist' position which he attributes to Davidson (1974). Davidson argues that it could not be the case that some parts of reality are inconceivable to us. Nagel, in contrast, asserts the 'Realist' position that it could be the case that there are parts of reality that are inconceivable to us. Reality may extend beyond what we can represent. What is the case and what we, as a species with naturally endowed limitations, can represent, are two different things. The latter may be a subset of the former. As he says, 'what there is or what is the case, does not coincide necessarily with what is a possible object of thought for us' (Nagel 1986, p. 92).

According to Nagel, we have a general concept of reality that extends beyond what understood content we can fill into that concept. For example, we think there may be 'unrecoverable details of the past which cannot be given verificationist or even evidential significance' (Nagel 1986, p. 107). We do not and may never know what was the case before the Big Bang, yet we can conceive that there was a state of affairs before the Big Bang, regardless of whether there was or not, or whether we could know about it. Similarly, there may be propositions in mathematics that we will never know the truth value of, yet this possibility does not threaten the soundness of our concept that these propositions may have a truth value. For Nagel, the idea of that which we cannot conceive is just another extension of this general concept of reality that extends beyond what understood content we can fill into it. We have a general concept of everything that is the case, and the appropriateness of this concept is not threated by the possibility that contained within it are things we cannot name or describe. Without providing his own alternative theory of thought and language, Nagel asserts that the intuitive veracity of this concept is such that one is justified in denying the Idealist position and, consequently, the accompanying theory of thought and language which entails said position (Nagel, 1986). Realism is so much more plausible that in a credibility comparison against the Idealist argument, it seems far more likely that at least one of the idealist's premises is false than that the Idealist conclusion is true.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have argued against Hofweber's conceptual idealism. I began by outlining Hofweber's claims that we humans are metaphysically central to reality when reality is understood as

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[1] See Lycan, 2019 (especially chapters 1 and 2) for an extended defence of this Moorean method.

the totality of facts, not of things. I then explained the two primary ways that Hofweber understands quantifiers: as having an internal, inferential role reading and as having an external, domain conditions reading. Hofweber contends that when dealing with facts or propositions, one ought to take the inferential role reading, which allows one to conclude that conceptual idealism is true. I have tried to show that this is not the case. Even on Hofweber's own terms of quantification, we are not justified in drawing the metaphysical conclusion that there are no facts which we could not structurally represent, for to do this, we would have to attain a perspective beyond our forms of conceptual thought, and it is the possibility of this very perspective which Hofweber wishes to rule out. Furthermore, I argue that we have good reason to be sceptical about conceptual idealism because of its sheer counter intuitiveness. Though liberal use of a 'Moorean Shift' may not be a good philosophical habit, its application seems apt here because of the lack of consensus support for Hofweber's reading of quantification, and the highly counterintuitive conclusion he draws from it.

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Friends Shouldn't Eat Friends – But Support Their Murder? Jeff Jordan's Friendship Argument and Obligate Carnivore Pets

By Ryszard Madejczyk

In this paper, I will argue that Jeff Jordan's 'Friendship Argument' fails to motivate vegetarianism, for it fails in defending the claim that there is no 'morally relevant difference' between animals commonly considered as pets and foodstuff animals (Jordan, 2001. p. 320). Firstly, I will offer a summary of Jordan's 'canonical version' of the Friendship Argument (hereafter, 'FA'). Then, I will outline FA's salient features. Secondly, I will outline Jordan's use of Aristotle's account of friendship and Jordan's account of companion-friendship. Thirdly, I will attempt to illustrate that there is a morally relevant difference between pets and foodstuff animals. I will attempt to show that pethood, once construed as guardianship, a type of companion-friendship, reveals a morally relevant difference between pets and foodstuff animals. Then, I will respond on Jordan's behalf by claiming that, given FA, one ought to simply abandon guardianship with obligate carnivores. However, I will conclude by asserting that FA faces a dilemma: the friendship-vegetarian must either accept or reject pethood (guardianship). Both options are unfavourable for FA insofar as the former renders FA self-defeating and the latter renders FA unconvincing. Therefore, Jordan's FA fails to motivate vegetarianism.

The 'Canonical Version' of Jordan's Friendship Argument (FA) goes as follows:[1]

1. A vegetarian diet is a diet free from the meat of possible friends.

2. Given an instance of *possible* friendship between X and Y, it is morally impermissible for Y to be consumed by X in normal circumstances and the consumption of Y is not a morally sufficient reason for X to kill Y.

3. Given a set of animal-kind K, where members of K are *possible* friends of X, it is morally impermissible for X to use members of K as foodstuff in normal circumstances and the consumption of the members of K by X is not a morally sufficient reason for X to kill members of K.

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[1] In my reconstruction of FA, I follow Jordan, 2001, pp. 310, 312, 314–15, and Townley, 2010, p. 56.

4. Many animal-kinds used as foodstuff have members, which, for humans, are possible friends.

5. Hence, animal-kinds used as foodstuff are impermissible foodstuff and the consumption of such animals is not a morally sufficient reason for the killing of such animals in normal circumstances.

6. Therefore, vegetarianism is 'morally mandated'.

In addition to the 'canonical version' of the Friendship Argument (FA), Jordan provides two additional arguments (Jordan, 2001, p. 320). These two arguments provide reasons which purport to justify FA. The first argument, the 'moral leverage' argument, purports to support premise four above (Townley, 2010. p. 54). Jordan proceeds as follows: dogs are possible friends. There is no morally relevant difference between dogs and animals commonly used as foodstuff. Therefore, animals commonly used as foodstuff are possible friends. The second argument, the 'mere thing' argument, expresses the 'basic contention' of the canonical version of FA above (Jordan, 2001, pp. 317, 320). It attempts to provide support for premise two above, the 'most controversial' premise (ibid., p. 317). It proceeds from the assumption that friendship presupposes the friend's membership in the moral community. Something x is part of the moral community if it is not a thing (ibid., p. 316). Hence, one cannot be friends with a mere thing. Therefore, if x is a possible friend, then it is not a mere thing. Friends—possible or otherwise—ought not to be treated as mere things. To eat something x is to use x as a mere thing. Therefore, if one can befriend x, x is not a permissible foodstuff (ibid., p. 317). Jordan provides a *reductio* in support of the claim that one *cannot* be friends with a mere thing. This is outside the scope of this paper. Hence, I assume that one cannot be friends with a mere thing. Let us call Jordan's position 'friendship-vegetarianism'.

Let us outline FA's salient features. Firstly, animal-kinds, in the relevant sense, are '*species*' (ibid., p. 310, original emphasis). For example, dogs, cats, and alligators are different animal-kinds, viz., species. Foodstuff animals, for Jordan, include 'cows and sheep and pigs' (ibid., p. 311). For Jordan, the selection process for membership in the set of possible friends is as follows: if one member of a set K is a friend, then K is a set of possible friends (ibid., p. 310). Although 'defeasible', Jordan claims that it is a 'good' reason for accepting foodstuff animals as possible friends (ibid., p. 311). For, there are hard cases where possible-friend membership selection is not intuitive, as in the case of 'crabs' (ibid.). Given that there are such 'hard cases', premise one—

Jordan's vegetarianism thesis—ought to be construed as a limited-vegetarianism. Limited-vegetarianism is the claim that not *all* animal-kinds are impermissible foodstuffs because not all animal-kinds are possible friends (ibid.). Importantly, the *possibility* included in Jordan's definition of a possible friend is not a logical possibility. For Jordan, one is a *possible* friend if one is capable of being befriended by a 'normal adult human' (ibid.). Premise two excludes extreme cases, such as thought experiments (Doggett, 2018).

But what is a friend? Here, I firstly provide a brief outline of Aristotle's account of friendship. Secondly, I define Jordan's account of companion-friendship. For Aristotle, friendship is 'grounded' in three types of lovable qualities, viz., the objects of friendship: the useful, the pleasant, and the good (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1155b20). Jordan's reading of Aristotle follows Cooper's interpretation of Aristotle's account of friendship: the central idea of friendship, for Aristotle, is wishing the other well for the *other's sake* and having the inclination to bring about such well-wished goods (Cooper, 1977, pp. 620–21). As such, the most 'complete' type of friendship, friendship based on the good—virtue friendship—does not feature a self-regarding attitude (Annas, 1977, p. 546). It is based on a *purely* other-regarding attitude (Jordan, 2001, p. 313). That is, virtuous friends love (*philia*)[2] each other 'by reference to the way the person loved *is*', while non-virtuous friends love each other 'incidentally', i.e., for each other's particular qualities (*Nicomachean Ethics,* 1156a17–18). Hence, derivative types of friendship—friendships of utility and pleasure—admit of an 'overdetermination' of well-wishing (Jordan, 2001, p. 320): an other-regarding attitude, in such cases, is intermixed with a self-regarding attitude such that one wishes the other well in order to benefit from the other's pleasant or useful qualities (Pangle, 2003, p. 46). Jordan notes that Aristotle's three types of friendship are 'symmetrical' such that both friends—be they utility, pleasure, or virtue friends—receive the same kind of benefit in return: utility-friends receive advantage or benefit, pleasure-friends receive pleasure, and virtue friends receive virtue from each other (Jordan, 2001, p. 314).

Secondly, Jordan claims that human-animal friendship is possible. However, there are some kinds of friendship which are not applicable to animal-human relations. For example, Jordan claims that human-animal virtue friendship is not possible (Jordan, 2001, p. 320). Therefore, Jordan's account of human-animal friendship is a 'partial-exclusion view'—some, but not all types

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[2] *Philia* has a much wider range than our conception of love. It includes friendship, comradeship, and familial relationships, for example (Hughes, 2013, p. 129).

of friendship are possible between humans and animals (Townley, 2017, p. 22). With this in mind, let us outline Jordan's definition of companion-friendship. Companion-friendship is asymmetrical: it is a 'hybrid' of Aristotle's pleasure and utility friendships (Jordan, 2001, p. 315). For Jordan claims that Aristotle's account of friendship allows 'permutations' (ibid., p. 314): for example, X may receive pleasure from his friendship with Y, while Y may receive benefit from his friendship with X. Companion-friendship requires the satisfaction of three conditions. Firstly, companion-friends X and Y must prefer each other's company at a particular time; they need not prefer each other's company at *all times.* Secondly, for X and Y to be companion-friends, X must receive a different type of good than Y—otherwise, X and Y are utility, pleasure, or virtuous friends. Thirdly, there must be a time t_1 wherein X has an other-regarding attitude for Y and a time t_2 wherein Y has an other-regarding attitude for X. Times t_1 and t_2 need not be contemporaneous. Animals may satisfy the third condition by showing affection for humans (ibid., p. 315).

Here, I claim that there *is* a morally relevant difference between animals used as foodstuff and household pets, viz. dogs and cats. As such, I target premise five above. Contrary to Jordan's contention, there appear to be cases of possible friendship wherein X, under normal circumstances, has a morally sufficient reason to kill Y. This follows if one accepts that cats and dogs are possible companion-friends. For, such companion-friends, if actual, appear to be pets. Since a relationship between a person and a pet is an instance of guardianship, and guardianship entails moral obligations, it follows that a guardian of an obligate carnivore has a moral obligation to support the killing of possible, foodstuff companion-friends.[3]

Consider the following: Jordan claims that dogs are possible companion-friends. Since cats *and* dogs are common domesticated animals, it appears that cats are possible companion-friends This is warranted by Jordan's selection-criterion outlined above. We may define domesticated animals as pets. Pets, I claim, are nonhuman animals whom we accept as a 'member of our household' (Bok, 2011, p. 769). For example, dogs and cats are pet-animals. We may reformulate Jordan's no-moral-difference thesis to accommodate pet-animals as follows: there is no morally relevant difference between pets and foodstuff animals. Townley claims that a human-pet relationship is a form of human-animal guardianship (Townley, 2010, p. 48). One is an animal's guardian when one is responsible for the satisfaction of an animal's 'infrangible self-interests' (Johnson,

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[3] My account is indebted to Townley's discovery of the obligate carnivore 'paradox' (Townley, 2010, p. 56)

2018, p. 27). An animal's interests in the continuation of life and the maintenance of one's bodily and psychological condition are such infrangible self-interests (ibid.). Since guardians are responsible for the satisfaction of their pet's self-interests, it follows that guardians have moral obligations for animals under their care. This may be illustrated by the fact that pet-negligence is considered, *prima facie,* morally wrong insofar as it produces gratuitous suffering, or it violates the animal's—or abuser's—personhood or virtue. Hence, virtue ethical, deontological, and utilitarian accounts, broadly construed, may hold that pet-negligence is morally wrong, regardless of the abused animal's moral status (Hursthouse, 2007, p. 159).

However, FA concerns friendship. Hence, I claim that guardianship—a relationship between a human and an animal pet—is a form of companion-friendship. Crucially, like companion-friendship, guardianship is an asymmetrical relationship (Bok, 2011, p. 771): pets are physically dependent on their human guardians—and, in some cases, psychologically dependent too. As such, I claim that guardianship is like companion-friendship insofar as it satisfies all three conditions of Jordan's companion-friendship: since guardians and their pets are unequal, they receive different benefits in return. They receive different goods at different times. They prefer each other's company and *sometimes* exhibit other-regarding attitudes. In non-extreme cases,[4] it appears that pets receive utility—food, exercise, and shelter—while their guardians receive pleasure. There are cases wherein both parties exhibit an other-regarding attitude. Guardians exhibit such attitudes when they fulfil their responsibility of care for their pets. Pets exhibit other-regarding attitudes when they show affection. Jordan accepts this feature. For, he notes that, in the case of a cow, 'recognition, coupled with playfulness' is a sufficient condition of 'bovine affection' (Jordan, 2001, pp. 320–21). However, guardianship differs from companion-friendship insofar as guardianship requires the guardian to act and decide on behalf of his ward (Townley, 2010, p. 48). Therefore, unlike Milligan (2009, p. 410) and Townley (2010, pp. 47–50), I claim that guardianship is the primary relevant form of friendship available to human and animal *pet* relationships. For, if a pet, per definition, is an animal under human care, it follows that guardianship must be the *primary* form of friendship between humans and animal pets. This does not preclude any other forms of friendship. However, any other type of friendship cannot obtain without guardianship obtaining with the relevant pet.

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[4] Pet negligence and pet abuse are candidates for extreme cases of pet-guardianship.

Next, consider the fact that cats and dogs are obligate carnivores.[5] Obligate carnivores *require,* as part of their infrangible self-interests, the meat of other animals. To do otherwise would be to deliberately decrease the quality of a pet's life. Since a domesticated cat or dog—a pet— cannot hunt for its own food, a human guardian is obligated to source food for her pet. For, by definition, pets are dependent on their guardians physically and, in some cases, psychologically. Since cats and dogs are obligate carnivores *and* guardians have a moral obligation to feed their pets, it appears that there is a morally sufficient reason for one to *support* the killing of a possible friend (Townley, 2010, pp. 56–57). Yet, the sourcing of meat, in this case, may *implicitly* or *explicitly* support the killing of a possible companion-friend for the sake of consumption (ibid.). Implicitly, one may support the killing of a possible companion-friend by purchasing food for one's cat or dog. That is, one is morally responsible via 'participation'. Whereas the explicit support of possible friend-murder may be construed as the physical process of possible-friend murder and meat processing. That is, one is responsible via 'production' (Doggett, 2018). Hence, it follows that, given cat and dog guardianship, one has a reason to support the killing of a possible friend, viz., foodstuff animals. Therefore, FA seems to entail a contradictory vegetarianism wherein one condemns the eating of possible friends, and yet indirectly supports the killing and consumption of possible friends.

It seems that since cat and dog guardianship entails that one has a moral obligation to source animal products (meat, for example), it follows that one ought to abandon the enterprise of obligate carnivore guardianship. After all, if one considers FA sound or, for charity's sake, assumes its validity, there is no reason to think that 'prudential considerations [may] override the plausibility' of FA (Jordan, 2001, p. 321). Instead, as Jordan argues, moral claims override pragmatic considerations such that there are no 'too costly' revisions to our current practices *if* such practices are morally wrong (ibid.). Hence, it follows that, given the plausibility of FA, we ought to abandon obligate-carnivore guardianship. That is, if it is the case that specific cases of guardianship or companion-friendship render FA problematic, then one may merely forsake such specific cases: it may just be the case that we are mistaken in our practice of keeping obligate carnivore pets.

To this, I claim that such a move would drastically reduce the plausibility of FA. For Jordan's support of premise four above—which, one must note, does substantial work in meriting the inference of FA's conclusion—relies heavily on the intuition that, since pets are possible companion-

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[5] Here, I assume that both cats *and* dogs are obligate carnivores.

friends, foodstuff animals are companion-friends too! Dogs are offered as candidates for Jordan's moral leverage argument. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how FA could establish premise four without the intuition that dogs and cats are, more often than not, *actual* friends with some humans in the form of *guardianship*. For, if any animals *are* friends, it is dogs and cats. As such, the friendship-vegetarian is met with a dilemma: accept obligate carnivore pethood but accept inconsistency. Then, in this case, it is up to the friendship-vegetarian to either reformulate or discard premise two. Or, on the other hand, the friendship-vegetarian may reject pethood but discard the moral leverage argument, i.e., support for premise four. Since Jordan's FA does not appear to have a plausible answer to the obligate carnivore case, it appears that FA, in its current state, does not entail a tenable form of vegetarianism.

To conclude: I have summarised and outlined Jordan's Friendship Argument, his use of Aristotle's account of friendship, and his account of animal-human companion-friendship. I have attempted to illustrate a morally relevant difference between pets and foodstuff animals. Since pet-guardianship may be construed as a type of companion-friendship, one has a morally relevant reason to *support* the killing of foodstuff animals insofar as pet-guardianship involves obligate carnivores such as dogs and cats. As such, the friendship-vegetarian is faced with a dilemma: reject or accept pethood. In each case, the friendship-vegetarian is left in an unfavourable position. For FA requires the absence of a morally relevant difference between pets and foodstuff animals. While FA is better than *no* vegetarianism *simpliciter*, FA is untenable: eating meat is morally wrong. However, in its current form, FA fails to establish a tenable account of vegetarianism.

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Socrates' Disobedience to His Divine Dream of Practicing Poetry

By Andrei Popa

At the beginning of the *Phaedo*, Socrates tells his friends of a dream he has had throughout his life, often expressed under different forms, but always alluding to the same message, that of 'practicing and cultivating the arts' (60e). In this essay, I will analyse Socrates' relation to this particular dream, by arguing that the disobedience, (or better yet the sleight of hand) which he performs onto this divine call, expressed as the interpretation of philosophy as 'the greatest of arts', is the *cause* for his discriminative relationship of the senses; progressively mediated by the self-induced evaluation of truth as rational investigation being greater than truth as lived creation, rather than the *effect* of a genuine obedience to the divine call of his dream. I will pursue this argument, by making the case that the rationalising 'sleight of hand' that Socrates performs onto that dream becomes, once read philosophically *and* poetically, a self-reflecting allegory regarding the treatment of the soul which seeks to tend towards divinity (god). This act of rationalising one's dream(s) is what thus becomes the self-induced reflection which keeps Socrates (the individual) from fully *actualising* his (their) soul. The justification for this will be that actualisation requires taking poetry as valuable in of itself, which would in turn evolve the spiritual relation between Socrates and his dream from one of interpreting his dream to one of bringing his dream to life, of turning the virtual actual.

The first interaction between Socrates and his friends in the *Phaedo* concerns the senses: 'What a queer thing it is, my friends, this sensation called pleasure! It is remarkable how closely it is connected with its apparent opposite, pain' (60b). This is then immediately followed by Socrates alluding to the poetry of Aesop, which sparks a preamble to the upcoming arguments Socrates will present in favour of the immortality of the soul, concerning poetry. Therefore, it is stylistically clear that poetry—and more generally the senses—will tacitly play an important part in this dialogue, further implied by the fact that even philosophical arguments concerning the after-life, although presented as rational, will have to be founded on speculative intuition rather than *a priori* reasoning, given the necessarily mysterious nature of the theme in question.

Once Socrates alludes to the poetry of Aesop, his friends ask the reason for his recent turn of interest towards the practice of 'popular' poetry, so close to his upcoming death, indeed

incredibly uncharacteristic of him (60d). Socrates explains that all throughout his life, he has had a recurring dream, always alluding to the same command: to practice and cultivate the arts. Throughout his life, Socrates says that he thought that this dream was encouraging him to pursue what he was already doing, for in Socrates' eyes, 'philosophy is the *greatest* of arts, and [he] was practicing it' (61a*,* my emphasis). Socrates put this conviction into doubt in his final days once the festival of a particular god 'delayed' his execution. This god is explicitly referred to as Apollo,[1] hence explaining the mystical inference Socrates makes that his execution was delayed through the festival as a divine sign of good-will by the god of dreams, 'in case that it should be this popular form of art that the dream intended [him] to practice' (61a), so that he may practice the art of *poetry* before his death. Inversely, this colours the essence of Socrates' recurring dream with a nature of divinity, as it is necessary that the dream had, since the beginning, been a call from the Divine in order for the belief that the will of Apollo delaying Socrates' execution so that he may supposedly execute his dream's command properly before his death to be coherent. This, accordingly, marks the event of the recurring dream, and hence the consequences of Socrates' relation to it, with divine gravity.

Socrates then makes the key point that the reason he thereby chooses to practice poetry during his last few days is so that he doesn't 'take [his] departure before [he] had cleared his conscience by writing poetry in *obedience* to the dream' (61b, my emphasis). What we can thus extrapolate from this last statement is that Socrates is in *bad conscience*, for he believes (or perhaps rather feels) that the inference he repeatedly made throughout his life to interpret his dream as one which encouraged his practice of philosophy to be one of disobedience to what we might call Apollo's '*divine voice*'.

What, perhaps, might *a priori* confirm such suspicion for disobedience, and assure us that this change of mind from Socrates is not one of tacit cowardice expressed as irrational superstition, but instead the supposed indication of the courageous soul he was, who was ready to admit a wrong even in a context in which he possessed such little time to correct it? Socrates doesn't explain the spiritual working of this inference to his friends, but if there is authentic courage to it, so must be the explanation. In answer to this question, I propose that the indication is not the interpretation Socrates ever makes of his dream itself, but precisely *that* he interprets it instead of humbly

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[1] See footnote 15 from the particular edition of the *Phaedo* referenced in the essay.

obeying it at face value—indeed, it is the nature of the very act itself which reveals the operation as being disingenuous.

Taken at face value, there is no indication in the dream whose meaning is the 'practice of arts' that philosophy is what the voice implies: there is no indication either that philosophy is the highest of arts, nor for the actual ontological existence of a hierarchy of arts. *There is not even an indication that the practice of philosophy is kindred to that of the practice of the arts, as the Greeks would have understood it then*; the etymologies of *poesis* and *philosophia* alluding to distinctly different actions, respectively that of 'to make (create)' and 'love of wisdom'. This lack of indication is of great significance, for the dialectic in which Socrates finds himself is between the voice of the Divine and the person of Socrates, and within the latter's relation to the dream, whatever is not revealed by the former and inversely not taken at face value by the latter, *must* be the insertion of the latter.

What exactly, then, is this insertion from Socrates? I argue that it is not an objective, but a dynamic insertion: that of a turn, or of an *inversion*, of the direction of the divine command back onto itself. To understand this statement, we must accordingly clarify the relation between philosophy and poetry: that Socrates mistakes philosophy for a form of poetry is somewhat understandable, for both practices are inherently creative,[2] and have the potential to exude *vitality*. However, where they differ from each other, and not in degree, but by *kind*, is in their respective directions of expression, poetry being the creative act affirming itself as *actual*, philosophy as *virtual*. We may understand these two terms according to the manner Deleuze interrelates them in *Bergsonism*: 'the possible is the opposite of the real, it is opposed to the real; but, in quite a different opposition, the virtual is opposed to the actual. We must take this terminology seriously: The possible has no reality (although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but *as such possesses reality*' (Deleuze, 2018, p. 96). The subtlety is *ontological*: what is real, what *exists*, can exist according to two radically different tendencies of expression: virtual existence and actual existence; whereas what does not exist, but what *may* exist, is the possible, regardless of whether we will talk about virtual possibility or actual possibility. The virtual thus exists, but in the inverse manner as does the actual. What then is the tendency of the actual? The one which tends *into*, rather than *away* from the material, the virtual tendency thus being the inverse of the actual, and

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[2] At least, the kind of philosophy which Socrates practices, although dotted with an incredibly rigorous logical coherence which often employs methods of deduction, certainly is creative nonetheless.

which accordingly might be said to tend towards the ideal. When we tend towards the actual, we might hence say we point the expression of our soul *into* the matter, and accordingly, when we tend towards the virtual, we point the expression of our soul *towards* ideas.[3]

According to this conceptual vocabulary, we may thus properly understand Socrates' turn onto his dream: the very medium in which the divine voice appears to Socrates being oneiric, the divine call originates *from* the virtual, is itself virtual—understood at face value, the dream commanding Socrates to practice the arts, then performatively becomes a pattern of the Divine calling onto the individual to *actualise* the virtual, to bring (the) dream(s) into the world, to actualise life into the world. Socrates, however, does just the inverse, for by interpreting the dream as encouraging him to continue to practice philosophy, he performs the movement that loops the virtual back into itself, keeping it from passing into the actual. We might perhaps say that this effective turn of the virtual back into itself from Socrates is instinctive, for Socrates *already* found himself in a context of pointing his soul into the virtual as this dream began appearing to him—whence exactly does this instinct come from, is ambiguous. Indeed, this is because Socrates' turn towards the virtual is *immanent*, and hence happens wilfully before it can be reasoned (in this case, reasoning itself is the aesthetic of the essential expression which is the turn towards the virtual). Accordingly, it is perhaps this very same ascetic turn into the virtual which allows Socrates as a result to distil his soul from the tendencies of the actual enough to be able to *hear* the divine voice in the virtual realm—but then, having arrived in the divine voice by way of spiritual distillation from the actual, once Socrates witnesses this command, he mistakes it for the indication that he ought to continue in the same direction he came from, rather than take it as the mark that the event which calls for inverting his soul back into the actual has arrived. As a result, the mark of inversion is instead placed on the dream itself; hence, the oneiric message being identical throughout his life, since the point of repetition and onwards marks Socrates as no longer living in line with, but against, the divine will: the repetitive identity of his dream is not a mark of *progress*, but a warning indicating spiritual *stagnation*.

This spiritual stagnation/divergence from the divine furthermore necessarily grows

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[3] For this reason, we may say that poetry, being an act of 'making', is an act of actualization of one's soul, whereas philosophy, as Socrates clearly demonstrates time and time again through his relegation of the physical world, most apparent by his creativity which lacks a *techne* to be expressed through, is an act of virtualisation of one's soul.

throughout Socrates' life, by virtue of the organic and enduring nature of life, be it towards the virtual or the actual; and it is *exactly* the growth of this divergence which persistently causes Socrates to relegate his relation with the actual, and as a result his partnership with his senses, to lower levels of spiritual truth. We may thus understand why Socrates believes philosophy to be the highest of arts, and inversely why the senses necessarily stand to lose in credibility as a result—because once the divine impulse from the virtual is answered with a return into it, there can only be one answer as to where life should tend towards—the direction which tends towards the virtual, whereas everything which tends towards the actual, which now as a result, being perceived without soul anymore, becomes a lifeless reflection of what it could be (were the divine impulse channelled through and into it).

In Socrates' defence, he arrived at philosophy by way of natural science, which he became disenchanted from, as he quickly realized that that science could not help him understand spirit itself, or 'Intelligence' as Anaxagoras calls it in his memories (96a–100a), realising that *analysing* the behaviour of the natural world through rational methods would not bring him closer to the source of life itself (which would explain his naïve cynicism towards the senses). This point is perfectly coherent with Plato's general body of work, for he famously makes the case that the source of life originates in the ideal realm. Socrates, thus looking through natural science into the actual source of life, of course, will find only disappointment, for he is mistakenly referring to the source of life *transcendentally* rather than *immanently*, and looks for it in extension rather than in lived experience itself; but in this case the problem lies, again, in the *movement* of the soul in its relation to the virtual and the actual, not in the inherent *nature* of things, and it is because he uses his senses to search for a transcendental source of life that he finds himself lead him into error. In other words, *the problem lies not in the senses themselves, but rather in treating them as the source of life, instead of the medium through which to express it.*

This problem Socrates is then further guilty of, as we persistently see in his criticism of poets, be it in the *Apology* (22a–22d), the *Republic* (Book X), etc., or implicitly in his criticism of the senses in the *Phaedo* (63d–67d), a predication of his own mistake of using the senses in accordance with the belief that partnership with them implies asserting that the *source* of life (or truth) is to be found transcendentally of one's soul and that one hence *must* employ the senses to have access to it. But is this really what poets do, or is this version of them that Socrates gives us already guilty of being expressed once the soul has made its decision to turn the virtual back onto

itself? I make the case for the latter, within the general gist of the argument of this essay that the divine movement calls for an actualization of the virtual through art and poetry - thus, it necessarily must be that the 'poet', being indeed the one which follows the divine dream, treats the source of life as immanent, just as Socrates does, but inversely to him, uses their senses to express it into actuality. The divine dream commands to make the virtual actual, and hence a creative and artistic employment of the senses is perfectly coherent with a rigorous and philosophical relation to the virtual, so long as the soul returns from the virtual into the actual by way of poetry, and vice versa. In Socrates' final days, we thus witness, in his re-evaluation of his expression of his dream to practice poetry, through the actual practice of poetry, an artistic *redemption*.

We may conclude thus, with the assertion of a radical difference in kind between poetry and Socratic philosophy, and that neither is reducible to the other, but that they ought instead to complement each other. Both practices relate immanently to the divine, yet, like the breath which the *psyche* alludes to, one reaches it in inhalation, and the other expresses it through exhalation. Regardless of our respective styles, when we practice philosophy, we enter within the realm of the virtual, and we unleash our capacity to dream. But life is both virtual and actual, we are equally mind and body, and neither is the curse of the other. It is thus not enough merely to dream or contemplate our life away, but instead, through a poetic (or 'mystic' movement, as Bergson would call it), bring forth into the world the essence of life we so dearly care for in our philosophical adventures, and *actually* colour life around us with a vitality and creativity only we as humans can bring forth.

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Worldhood as Embodied Significance in Heidegger & Merleau-Ponty

By Seán O'Leary

Heideggerian Terminology:

- **Dasein:** Heidegger's name for humans. Translates as "being-there".

- **Worldhood, *Weltlichkeit*:** That which makes a world what it is.

- **Existential:** Of or pertaining to the being of Dasein.

- **Existentiale (noun):** An essential feature of Dasein's being.

- **Existentiell:** Of or pertaining to Dasein as an entity, not to its being. Includes contingent features of the self which could be otherwise without changing Dasein's being. Ontic in character.

- **Ontic:** Of or pertaining to entities, rather than being.

- **Ontological:** Of or pertaining to being.

- *Bewandtnis*: Roughly translated as involvement or affordance.

- *Befindlichkeit*: How one finds oneself, our sense of ourselves in a given situation.

Heidegger claims that the world is an existential of Dasein. For Heidegger, Dasein, i.e. human subjectivity, maintains and animates the world: it is not an ordinary object within it, nor an object outside it, but rather more like its heart. Without Dasein, the world would not be what it is: the two are mutually fundamental to each other in that Dasein is always in-the-world and the world is always constituted by Dasein. Heidegger would go further in claiming that Dasein is 'world-forming'. I will outline and justify Heidegger's conception of world as an existential-ontological component of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The worldhood of world, which stands for the world as an existential of Dasein, is the reference-whole, the *significance*-whole, its totality of meanings. I will thereafter consider the implications for language of Heidegger's conception of world. Finally, I will turn to the *Zollikon Seminars* and Maurice Merleau-Ponty for a discussion of how the corporeality of Dasein fits into this analysis.

The obvious starting point for a discussion of world in Heidegger is to clarify what is meant by 'world'. Heidegger identifies four senses in which 'world' is used (*Being and Time* [*SZ*], 1962,

pp. 64–65). Heidegger makes clear that what he thereafter calls 'world' refers to 'that "*wherein*" a factical Dasein as such can be said to "live"'. This is an existentiell signification that may refer to the *Umwelt* or the public 'we-world'. World as an existential of Dasein is referred to as *worldhood* (*Weltlichkeit*). Worldhood is 'the articulated reference-whole (significance-whole), in which and from which Dasein in advance refers himself to any possible beings he might meet' (King, 2001, p. 65). We should begin with Dasein as being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is a unity whose constituents are equiprimordial. Dasein exists always-already in-the-world, and it cannot exist otherwise. This world is in advance available to Dasein (and Dasein is in advance actively *open* to it) and cannot be a totality consisting of things, since Dasein's understanding of his own being-in-the-world is a prerequisite for the possibility of his encountering things at all (*SZ*, p. 73). The world can even less be a thing or entity, since the world as such is not present-at-hand or ready-to-hand for Dasein: Dasein never encounters the world. For Heidegger, in encountering entities within-the-world, the world announces itself for Dasein through its 'worldly' character. The ontological-existential always has an ontic-existentiell basis, and the existentiell basis of worldhood (as an existential of Dasein) is the world. Heidegger takes the *Umwelt*, the immediate environment, as his starting point for an analysis of ontic-existentiell world. The primary approach that Dasein takes toward the world is practical, not theoretical. By this, we mean that entities within the world are encountered first and foremost in terms of some relation to Dasein, e.g., usefulness, interactiveness, etc. Heidegger puts this in terms of the ready-to-hand—that which is available in our *Umwelt* for us in some relation, for instance to use. The ready-to-hand is ontologically constituted by a complex of relations, references, or assignments. It is explicitly not defined by properties that it possesses, but relations and assignments of appropriateness for a purpose *for the sake of Dasein*. This reference-complex is what makes the world meaningful, significant as it is. It is only by depriving entities of worldhood that they become present-at-hand and thus available for theoretical examination. This deprivation of worldhood is, such as in the case of theoretical science, an active penetration 'beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern' (*SZ*, p. 71). However, it is specifically when the ready-to-hand becomes conspicuous, obtrusive, and obstinate (through breaking down, etc., thus disrupting the reference-whole) that the tacit system of references and assignments (in-order-to…, towards-which…) that makes up the world (*SZ*, pp. 74–76) is revealed. The reference-

whole always leads back to that from which it emerges—Dasein, its *Umwillen*, its *for-the-sake-of*. The unique worldly character of Dasein is that it is a 'towards-which' 'in which there is *no* further involvement' (*SZ*, p. 84), i.e., the end of all *Bewandtnis*. In understanding a reference-whole Dasein relates itself to that reference-whole which makes up the worldhood of the world. Thus the worldhood of the world—the reference-whole—both originates with and ends with Dasein's be-ing-in-the-world; worldhood is an existential of Dasein.

The significance and function of this needs further elaboration. Firstly, it is important to re-emphasise the meaning of 'worldhood'. Heidegger puts it as follows: 'the Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all' (*SZ*, p. 88). Thus the reference-whole is that condition which makes it possible for entities to be discovered. This makes practical sense, as when entities in the world are proximally encountered, it is always-already entered into such a referential complex. It is additionally pertinent as Dasein's being is finite, dependent on the world, and with limited possibilities. It is because of the finitude and de-pendence of Dasein's being that it must "in advance refer [it] to the possibility of meeting other beings and prescribe the ways in which it can bear on his own existence" (King, 1962, p. 55). This disclosure is relevant for fully understanding worldhood as significance. *Befindlichkeit* (affectiv-ity) is the existential structure most responsible for disclosure of being. It is ontically manifest as mood, which discloses to Dasein its being-as, so to speak: in fear, Dasein is disclosed to itself as a Dasein which is afraid for its existence, who feels that its existence is in jeopardy. *Befindlichkeit* however discloses Dasein to itself never in isolation but as a being-in-the-world thrown into the midst of other entities. It is *Verstehen*, the act of understanding, that holds the relations between things in their disclosedness; it is what makes things make sense. Understanding is not a faculty, as Kant would have it, but a way for Dasein to be. It is characterised by a projective quality, an *Entwurf*, that in advance circumscribes the reference-whole as consistent, and capable of signifi-cance. In other words, understanding combined with *Befindlichkeit*, an understanding that is 'at-tuned' to the ontic possibilities of Dasein's thrown existence, is responsible for assigning the ref-erence-whole. Heidegger calls this Dasein 'signifying' to itself; the reference-whole is a signifi-cance-whole (*SZ*, p. 87). The sense in which this significance-whole is an existential of Dasein should be clear by now; Dasein is the origin and end of the significance-whole, it is a condition

for Dasein's being-in-the-world. Thus we can take "significance", the reference-whole combined with the *for-the-sake-of* (Dasein), to be the worldhood of the world.

It may be necessary briefly to note that Dasein's being-in-the-world is always a being-with-others-in-the-world; *Mitsein* (being-with) is another existential of Dasein. Dasein's ability to relate itself to others is not the result of the others factically happening to be there, but rather because of a prior disclosure of his being as being-with; were it not the case, then the possibility of meeting and entering into relations with others would be impossible. A sustained analysis of *Mitsein* is not the object of this essay, but *Mitsein* is relevant for its relation to worldhood understood as significance. One of the key implications of Heidegger's conception of worldhood as significance-whole is that the ontological-existential bases for language and perception are radically reworked. Heidegger himself discusses this in ¶34, where he says that language's existential-ontological foundation is *Rede* (discourse, talk), and that *Rede* is itself an existential of Dasein, equiprimordial with *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen*. *Rede* is the expression of 'the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world' (*SZ*, p. 161). Put another way, it is 'the Articulation of intelligibility' (*ibid.*). Discourse is worldly, possessed of worldhood. Yet it is not language itself, but rather its foundation. *Rede* may be non-linguistic: any articulation of a signification, for instance, the use of a hammer articulates its significance as ready-to-hand *for the purpose of* hammering a nail. We might put the origin of language in worldhood as follows: an attuned understanding assigns the reference-whole which has meaningful relations to Dasein, creating significance. This significance is made articulable through *Rede*, either linguistically or non-linguistically, as specific significations. The articulated significations are made intelligible (*to others*, to Dasein itself) through language. The significations are prior, and are already articulated by *Rede* before language as we know it even arises. Heidegger puts it as '[t]o significations, words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied with significations' (*SZ*, p. 161).[1] Hubert Dreyfus articulates nicely the way that *Rede*, which he

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[1] See also *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 262: '*Language makes manifest.* First of all, it does not produce anything like discoveredness. Rather, discoveredness and its enactment of being, understanding as well as its continuation in interpretation, being grounded in the basic constitution of in-being, are conditions of possibility for something becoming manifest. As conditions of being, they enter into the definition of the essence of language, since they are conditions of possibility for such manifestation' and '...speaking is being toward the world-discourse. It expresses itself first and foremost as a speaking

translates as 'telling', works: '1. Originary telling as the activity of articulating significations. 2. *Picking out* significations by using them. 3. *Pointing out* significations. 4. Telling as language. Articulation by attaching words to significations' (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 217). So we can see that Heidegger's conception of worldhood as significance, an existential of Dasein, leads to *Rede* as articulation first and foremost of significations, which only secondarily become language. The significations are prior to language.

This is quite a radical reversal of language theories, opposed notably to Husserl and analytic language theorists like John Searle (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 218), according to whom language consists of signs, noises, and markings, which are then secondarily *given* meaning; the word occurs before significance. Heidegger's conception of language as founded upon *Rede*, which is the articulation of the significations that make up the worldhood of the world, which is an existential of Dasein, means that this radical reversal is founded upon his claim that the world is an existential of Dasein; it all leads back to being-in-the-world(-with-others). Heidegger takes the being-with-others-in-the-world foundation of language a step further by claiming that through language a 'co-state-of-mind [*Mitbefindlichkeit*] gets 'shared', and so does the understanding of being-with' (*SZ*, p. 162).

Language, then, is an articulation of being-with-others-in-the-world, dependent upon [1] the worldhood of the world as a complex of significant relations originating from and for the sake of Dasein (significance); and [2] the existential of Dasein as being-with-others. Heidegger makes this clear in ¶18: 'But in significance itself, with which Dasein is always familiar, there lurks the ontological condition which makes it possible for Dasein, as something which understands and interprets, to disclose such things as 'significations'; upon these, in turn, is founded the Being of words and language' (*SZ*, p. 87) Heidegger explicitly connects this theory of language back to the worldhood of a shared world through a brief note on perception:

It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. The very fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells *alongside* what is ready-to-

concern for a world'.

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hand within-the-world… Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood. (*SZ* 1962 p. 164)

Applying this to language, it implies that we do not hear noise-sounds which are then interpreted and imbued with meaning after the fact. Rather, language is 'used in a shared context that is already meaningful, and it gets meaning by fitting into and contributing to a meaningful whole [*significance, Weltlichkeit*]' (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 219). This emphasises further the *shared* status of the significance-whole; Dasein is always-already being-with-others-in-the-world, and the *Weltlichkeit* of the world is shared with others, and this is articulated and made communicable to others through language as the ontic manifestation of *Rede*.

Yet something is missing in this story: the body. Heidegger only wrote six lines about the body in *Being and Time*, but addressed it more fully in the *Zollikon Seminars 1959–1969* [*ZS*] and in conversations with phenomenological psychologist Medard Boss from 1961–1972. In a 1972 conversation with Boss at Freiburg-Zähringen, Heidegger addresses a reproach from Sartre on his lack of attention to the body. He first outlines Dasein as existing in 'a domain of standing-open-toward-the-world', and subsequently that Dasein, in its 'essential receptive-perceptive relatedness to what addresses him from his world-openness', is called to respond and relate to the world that is unveiling itself to it (*ZS*, p. 231). He then makes clear that this would be impossible without the embodied nature of Dasein. Embodiment 'belongs essentially to existing', and is not akin to a tool that is used by Dasein, but rather the body *is* Dasein's existence. The capacities of the body are not used by Dasein, but rather are the result of Dasein's fundamental openness to the world; for instance, Heidegger writes that '[w]e are not able to "see" because we have eyes; rather, we can only have eyes because, according to our basic nature, we are beings who can see. Thus we would not be bodily [*leiblich*] in the way we are unless our *being-in-the-world* always already fundamentally consisted of a receptive/perceptive relatedness to something which addresses us from out of the openness of our world' (*ZS*, p. 232). Distilling this into something neater, we can redefine Dasein as 'receptive-perceptive world-openness', and the body as a material manifestation of that receptive-perceptive world-openness. This brings us back to the beginning of this essay, where we discussed Dasein's fundamental openness to the world, whose worldhood is the reference-whole,

made articulable by *Rede*, discourse. Now, the body becomes a manifestation of receptive-perceptive world-openness.

It is not until Maurice Merleau-Ponty, however, that the body explicitly becomes a vessel for expression and worldhood. Expression is important because of its role in forming a significance-whole. Merleau-Ponty argues, quite convincingly in my view, that the body is the root of worldhood-as-significance-whole (and then ultimately of language, through *Rede*). In the *Phenomenology of Perception* [*PP*], Merleau-Ponty claims that the body is reducible neither to a biological object nor a vehicle for the subject, but is rather the locus of our being-in-the-world, intertwined with our personal projects and the system of significations that give the world its worldhood. The lived body, for Merleau-Ponty, is one's 'intentional opening to the world, through which alone one experiences meaningful things in the first place' (Diprose & Reynolds, 2008, p. 111). Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl (see his *Collected Works*, 1989, p. 159) the claim that '[c]onsciousness is originally not an "I think that," but rather an "I can"' (*PP*, p. 139) This is to say that our pre-reflective way of relating to the world is in practical space, which is not reducible to a consciousness of geometrical space. This is encountered and instantiated by the body's motricity and intentionality—for instance, the position that my mug of tea occupies is significant for me, since it is graspable, within reach, in my practical space. To grasp its handle, bring it to my mouth and drink from it requires a series of complex movements that do not each require my intentionality, but rather rely on that of the body, its intuitive orientation in meaningful space. The body is the mediator of our world, and does not exist in space or time but rather *inhabits* space and time meaningfully. This may be analogised to Heidegger's concept of the ready-to-hand, which is where we began this journey. For Merleau-Ponty, the ready-to-hand is constituted by the body which inhabits practical space. This operates by way of what Merleau-Ponty calls the body schema. The body schema is 'that in virtue of which a bodily movement is a finely coordinated ensemble of motions intentionally organized in advance towards targets that are to be meaningfully moved' (Diprose & Reynolds, 2008, p. 116) The phantom limb example is perhaps the most intuitive way to show this—the patient feels pain where his leg used to be because that leg is still meaningful for him, it still possesses intentionality in his body schema.

Going further, Merleau-Ponty claims that the motor intentionality of the body is the

original and most powerful intentionality that we experience. He quotes psychiatrist A. A. Grünbaum: 'Motricity is the primary sphere in which the sense of all significations (*der Sinn aller Signifikationen*) is first given in the domain of represented space' (p. 143). Merleau-Ponty goes on to claim that '[*Our body*] is the very movement of expression, it projects significations on the outside by giving them a place and sees to it that they begin to exist as things, beneath our hands, and before our eyes. … The body is our general means of having a world' (p. 147). A full exegesis of Merleau-Ponty's argument is not possible here, but we can take the general point that he makes about the body as the originator of all expression, meaning and significance. Applying this to Heidegger's claim in the *Zollikon Seminars*, we might extend our analysis of worldhood to the body, concluding that the body as mediator of the world and the reference-whole that makes it meaningful, is that which gives Dasein its 'receptive-perceptive world-openness', in Heidegger's terms. If the body is altered, the worldhood of the world, its significance, is also altered. With Merleau-Ponty we might further claim that motor intentionality, as the first point of meaning-creation, is at the root of the worldhood of the world, and thus at the root of language itself if we merge with Heidegger's claims in *Being and Time*. This is the significance of Merleau-Ponty's claim that '[o]ne's own body is in the world just as the heart is in the organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible spectacle, animates it and nourishes it from within, and forms a system with it' (p. 209). Dasein's body is what makes a world a world— in other words, its worldhood. Combining the insights we have gleaned from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, we might alter our idea of worldhood slightly now: the worldhood of the world is now to be seen as a matrix of meaningful relations originating from and for the sake of *Dasein's embodied existence.* This complex is made articulable by *Rede*, and becomes language. The implication here is that ultimately, language is rooted in an *embodied being-in-the-world-with-others*.

Here we have seen how Heidegger's claim that the worldhood of the world, that existential-ontological condition that makes it possible for Dasein to encounter things of any kind, is an existential of Dasein, overturns the traditional account of language as sensation imbued with meaning. Heidegger's world, rather, is manifest *as* meaning, as significance from and to Dasein; language is a secondary development, an intelligible articulation of this meaning shared between Daseins for the purpose of communicating a shared state of being. We further examined the embodied

nature of Dasein for Merleau-Ponty, and showed how the body is the starting point for worldhood-as-significance-whole.

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Conditions and Capacities: An Account of the Structure of Knowledge-How Based on the Structure of Knowledge Itself

By Jack Palmer

In this essay I will argue that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge in conjunction with basic capacities. I will first distinguish between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge before briefly outlining David Lewis's account of knowledge itself. I then use his account to suggest a new model for how we ought to understand knowledge-how. I will then consider possible issues for the account I forward, notably Setiya's contention that all knowledge-how should be explained by the same model. In defence of my account, I will contend that the active differentiation between basic capacities and knowledge-how for complex tasks is in fact a crucial virtue of this paper's account.

The debate on the difference between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge began with Ryle's (1949) distinction between the two. Ryle argued that, prior to himself, the literature had failed to ask how one may know how to perform tasks, focusing instead on the details of facts about nature (1949, p. 17). Ryle's core argument is not the focus of this paper; rather, what is crucial is his identification of the wide range of actions which are performed intelligently, and which are potentially distinct from the propositions of the description of the action. We may be able to break down all the premises behind why the method involved in the performance of an activity is successful, or even express the method as a proposition itself, but often we just learn how to perform said activity from practice, and only discuss what we have learnt as knowledge-*how* (Ryle, 1949, pp. 28–30).

Stanley and Williamson (2001)—who provide the main account for arguing that knowledge-how is a form of propositional knowledge—broadly agree with Ryle's definition, though they disagree with his strong distinction between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge. They accept Ryle's definition that knowledge-how relates to knowing *how* to do something (e.g., knowing how to ride a bike), whereas propositional knowledge relates to knowing *that* something is the case, e.g., knowing that the sky is blue (ibid, p. 411).

It is important to note that 'knowledge-how' and 'ability' are sometimes used interchangeably in both the literature on this topic and in common parlance. However, I wish to stress here

that one may have an ability to perform an action if they perform that action successfully, but this could be done with luck, merely guessing how to perform the act, whereas knowledge-how requires that one know that they are able to perform an act with a method that will work reliably. A child who has never seen a bike before, yet who can balance and kick their legs, could randomly guess the correct way to ride a bike on the first attempt. However, another child may guess incorrectly. They may peddle backwards, forget to balance, and so on. At any rate, the child would in some sense have the ability (though unrealised) to cycle the bike, or else it would be impossible for the child to cycle the bike even in the scenario where they correctly guess the technique for doing so. However, we would not say that a child knows how to ride a bike until they know which way to push the pedals while staying balanced, steering correctly, and so on. The crucial note here is that while we use 'ability' and 'know-how' somewhat interchangeably in day-to-day conversation, the presence of knowledge within know-how is what distinguishes it from mere ability, which could be exercised with mere guesses and luck.

Before I outline an account of the structure of knowledge-how, I must first give a brief overview of David Lewis's (1996) account of the structure of knowledge itself. The core problem within much of epistemology is that of avoiding scepticism of all non-analytic propositions. Lewis's solution to account for the difficulty of reconciling the many possible worlds which sceptics suggest with our everyday ascriptions of knowledge is to suggest that much of our knowledge is context-dependent. We cannot be certain that we are not in fact being deceived by a demon, but we also wish to be able to say that we know what day it is. In order to do so, without accepting fallible knowledge, Lewis suggests that many of our ascriptions of knowledge are enabled by ignoring those possible worlds where our basic evidence cannot rule out, say, that it is not Tuesday as I write this because days themselves are merely part of the deceiving demon's illusion (ibid, pp. 553–54). The specifics of which possible worlds we may ignore are not important for the purposes of this paper; rather, the way in which our knowledge is context-sensitive is the key point of note.

I am employing Lewis' idea here as the framework for an account which argues that knowledge-how is a form of propositional knowledge. Due to this, I will not be arguing generally in favour of Lewis's position; rather, my argument is that we can use Lewis's framework in the debate of how we ought to understand knowledge-how, and its success here is independent of its merits in the context of analysing propositional knowledge, which is why I have only briefly outlined the core idea.

I wish to begin this account by pointing out how a description of how to ride a bike may not lead to success even if followed properly. When we say 'one way to ride a bike is to start by standing either side of the frame over the bike, and then place your foot on one pedal, push off the ground with your other foot, and then begin to push the pedals with both feet, while keeping your weight central, and using the handlebars to point the front wheel in the direction which you wish to go', this seems intuitively to be the method to ride a bike; however, we are here not considering contexts such as those where the chain is not attached properly and thus the pedals do not turn the wheels as intended. It seemed like we knew how to ride a bike, but that was only because there was an unspoken and unquestioned context of a bike where this method would be sufficient, while other contexts were simply ignored.

However, the trouble now is: how do we ensure we can still claim to know how to ride a bike in light of the possibility of an unattached chain, a possibility which—until we forget about it—we may not ignore? (Lewis dubs this the 'Rule of Attention'; see Lewis, 1996, pp. 559–60). Well, we can add conditions to the proposition. I can say that I know how to ride a bike by first checking that all aspects of the bike are working, repairing anything which may be awry (presuming I know that if the chain is unattached, I should put the bike standing upside down, and feed the chain onto the hooks of the mechanism while slowly turning the pedal), and then following the previous instructions. In this way, our knowledge-how is ultimately dependent on the exclusion of many contexts where our knowledge is insufficient, and/or the inclusion of many conditions to ensure that our knowledge is sufficient. Without the employment of specific contexts and conditions, our knowledge-how will become elusive.

The importance of this to the wider debate on the nature of knowledge-how is that the need for conditions means that—outside of the most basic of actions—oftentimes much propositional knowledge is required for the successful performance of many different intelligent actions. The conditions relate to some descriptive facts about the state of the world, knowledge of which is clearly propositional knowledge. For example, you must know whether or not the chain is unattached as part of the foolproof method of riding a bike. (This example would relate to knowing how to ride a specific bike, which may or may not require reattaching its chain.)

However, it is important to stress that the initial method for how to ride a bike is still itself propositional knowledge. The ability to balance and kick your legs out slowly does not by itself guarantee that one knows how to ride a bike. One must know that pushing the pedals forward while

staying balanced atop the bike will cause it to go forward as part of knowing how to ride a bike generally (as opposed to knowing how to ride a specific bike, where additional conditions may be relevant).

However, we must still differentiate complex activities such as riding a bike from basic actions such as blinking. Complex conditions are not necessary for reliably knowing how to blink, which is such a basic act that while conditions which relate to descriptive realities can arise, they rarely do, and in fact the crucial factor in saying I know how to blink is ignoring contexts where my eyes are not real, or where I do not possess eyelids. However, while such descriptive knowledge is necessary for *knowing* that I know how to blink, I may be able to blink so long as I have eyelids—whether or not I *know* I have eyelids—because I know how to *attempt to* blink.

This analysis suggests that knowledge-how is made up of basic capacities, in conjunction with propositional knowledge. Both are required, as where there are no conditions, we cannot guarantee the presence of knowledge-that. Before I consider possible critiques of my account here, I wish to first note its virtues.

The first virtue is that very simply, my account begins with a plausible conception of what knowledge itself is. Of course, if you disagree with Lewis's conception, then this is hardly a virtue. However, it seems strange to me that many other accounts do not use a concept of knowledge generally as the starting point for an analysis of knowledge-how. Possible arguments against centring knowledge itself within the foundation of any account of knowledge-how would rely either on the centring of another field (such as linguistics), or instead by holding that knowledge-how is itself not a form of knowledge. Neither path seems attractive to me, as the lack of a certain answer in linguistics once multiple languages are considered means other fields are yet to lead to clear answers, as seen in how Stanley and Williamson's (2001) linguistic analysis works for English, but—as Rumfitt (2003) points out—does not apply to other languages such as French and Russian. Unless we wish to use a new term entirely, it seems obvious to me that knowledge-how's relationship to knowledge itself is crucial.

The second virtue is the capacity for gradability. A person has a greater knowledge-how to complete a task based on more conditions being added. This not only allows for their know-how to remain across multiple contexts, but also often leads to an increase in the quality of the actions that know how to perform. Top chefs season according to the taste of what is being cooked and its varying natural salts. In this way, conditions which take multiple scenarios into account can be

used to guarantee not only consistency, but also quality. This is a clear virtue, as we often ascribe knowledge-how to people with qualifiers, such as saying one person can *kind of* cook, whereas someone else may cook very well, and so a model which can easily account for what those qualifiers relate to in terms of what that quality consists of should be the expectation of any model for knowledge-how.

With these virtues having been mentioned, I wish to note how the account here avoids traditional claims against 'intellectualist' accounts which see knowledge-how as a form of propositional knowledge. I wish to reiterate that I do not share that conclusion, as the model suggested in this paper is a hybrid between intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts. It is due to this hybrid nature that many traditional responses pose no issue for the account presented here.

Ryle's core argument against intellectualist accounts was that if for any intelligent action to be performed, we must consider propositional knowledge, then this consideration is itself an intelligent action, and thus an infinite regress is born (Ryle, 1949, p. 30). However, modern intellectualists do not rely on the active consideration of all relevant propositions every time knowledge-how is exercised, since much non-intentional action employs knowledge-how which is just ingrained; however, when actions are intentional, we do engage in some such consideration of propositional knowledge (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, pp. 4–6).

Separately, Hyman (1999) points out how considering different propositions involves the ability of allowing oneself to be guided by the facts. This concept works especially when in the scenario of applying conditions to our knowledge-how, where I know that if the food I am cooking is too acidic, I should add sugar, and perceive the food I am cooking is indeed too acidic, I merely follow the propositional knowledge I possess and allow myself to be guided by the facts accordingly by adding sugar. In this way, my hybrid account avoids a regression because it claims that the structure of knowledge-how involves both basic capacities and propositional knowledge working in tandem.

Aside from Ryle's regression, a more contemporary critique of intellectualist accounts is that of Setiya (2012), who argues that intellectualists are unable to explain basic action, something which any account of knowledge-how should aspire to. The second half of this critique is what is crucial for this paper, as the very design of the account proposed is such that it does not even attempt to explain basic action due to its status as a hybrid account. Setiya contends that intellectualists cannot account for basic instances of knowledge-how (such as blinking) since they cannot

explain the basic knowledge involved, and intentional action requires knowledge (ibid, pp. 287–94). My core contention here is that a model of knowledge-how ought to treat basic actions such as blinking and complex actions such as riding a bike or playing the piano in fundamentally different ways.

How can we seriously compare the act of blinking to that of playing a sonata? This contention is crucial, as Setiya's model is built on the notion that we should explain both acts the same way, as they are both instances of knowledge-how. Such an explanatory burden is in clear tension with my move of saying that knowledge-how consists of basic capacities in conjunction with propositional-knowledge.

Unless we grant that there are eventually just basic capacities which we can perform intentionally but which we do not know the precise function of, we accept explanatory burdens which we are far from meeting. I do not say this in the same way that some say that one is simply able to lift their finger without knowing what they are doing (Snowdon, 2004). It is clear that babies explore their dexterity. However, the function enabling that exploration is not yet fully explained. This is to say, that Setiya, in saying that basic action must be explained, must accept the burden of explaining the most basic of actions. I know I raise my finger by tensing the necessary muscles, but how is it that I tense those muscles? How is it that I control the neurons which give these motor commands? Setiya is himself reliant on 'the capacity to act for reasons as a capacity to know' (Setiya, 2012, p. 285). How is it that we have this capacity? Must we know its nature to exercise it?

The questions I pose to Setiya are clearly distinct from explaining how one rides a bike. But the complexity in the unknown of how it is that I raise a sole finger is distinct from the answerable question of how one plays a sonata. Due to this, we must conclude that knowledge-how for complex actions is wildly different to our execution of the most basic of actions. I not only see this response to Setiya as a defence of this paper, but in fact, I believe the active differentiation of basic capacities from the rest of our knowledge-how—which all can potentially have conditions applied to ensure success—is in fact a further virtue of the account presented here. Any model which attempts to explain basic actions and complex performances alike is surely mistaken, and models of knowledge-how should differentiate the two.

In conclusion, the structure of knowledge-how is as follows: for complex actions, one must know that if they perform the action in a certain way and that if a certain state of affairs happens

to be the one that obtains, they will perform the action successfully if they also have the basic capacities necessary to perform the action in the relevant way. Thus, propositional knowledge—in the form of conditional claims—is required in conjunction with basic capacities in order for a person to know-how to perform a complex action. There are clear virtues of such an account. It is only when we conceptualise knowledge-how in this way that we are able to differentiate between basic actions and complex actions. Moreover, such a model is related to an account of the structure of knowledge itself, while also allowing for gradability, and thus I believe it is one we should employ to understand knowledge-how accurately.

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Quine and Williamson: Do We Need a Modal Science?

By Matia Legnani

I.   Introduction

In this essay I am going to argue that Quine's philosophy, when considered according to his aim of explicating traditional metaphysics, gives good enough reason to reject modal realism. I will only focus on the arguments Quine gave against *ideological* modal realism. There are two reasons for doing so, the main one being that I believe ideological modal realism to be, at least in theory, closer to the descriptive needs of science, and therefore more important for Quine to assess, as he would perhaps have been more tempted to allow for its implementation. By contrast, he makes fun of ontological modal realism for its commitment to an 'overpopulated reality' (Quine, 1948, p. 23). Secondly, I will focus on Quine's rejection of ideological modality because one of his opponents, Williamson, argues that science is committed to ideological modal realism, and so tackles Quine on the main premise of his argument, viz., that modality is dispensable for science. I will defend Quine's view against Williamson's.

II.   Quine's Explication Project

Before delving into Quine's material, I will give a broad explanation of what is meant by 'modal realism'. We can identify two main strands of the doctrine: *ontological* modal realism claims that there exist modal entities like possibilia, possible worlds, and so on; *ideological* or typological modal realism claims that entities have modal attributes such as *being necessary* or *being possible*.[1] These theses are independent: the metaphysical status of modalities in the latter does not follow from the existence of modal entities claimed in the former (Divers, 2020, p. 129).

A good starting point to explain Quine's argumentative strategy is, as is the case with any philosopher, to clarify what he wants to do with his philosophy. 'Quine's aim is to explicate "metaphysics" rather than to eliminate it', and he understands metaphysics as a 'proto-scientific project' (Divers, 2017, p. 194). The old and the new metaphysics are thus one single project, whose unified aim is to 'offer the optimal general and systematic characterization of all that there is and how it

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[1] The terminology is borrowed from Divers, 2020, p. 125

is' (ibid., pp. 194–95). Quine's method of metaphysical explication is a logistical one, which turns questions about things into formal questions about symbols. The region we look to in order to address these questions is our current best scientific theory. This method is applicable to both ontology and ideology; thus, for Quine, in the case of modality, the two crucial questions of modal realism are both about symbols: in our best theory, are possibilia indispensably the value of a bound variable? And: are modal sentence operators indispensable?

In trying to answer these questions, Quine (1966, 1980) gave multiple arguments against the implementation of modality. These can be summarised into two main problems he had with it:

1) Modality is either theoretically expensive to implement, requiring significant revision of our logic, or it is dispensable (like the commitment to possibilia) because it can be explicated in a non-modal, fully extensional account.

2) Even when the implementation of modality is simply expensive but not dispensable in the explication of metaphysics, it ought not to be done, because it does not find any useful application in our best scientific theories (the field in which the explication of metaphysics is useful).

Williamson objects to Quine on point 2, so I will focus on the latter. I believe that we must assess Quine's view on his own terms, otherwise we would simply be adopting a different metaphilosophical view without really passing a fair judgement on the achievements of such project. Quine himself adopted a similar principle of charity when assessing modal views. This is shown by his recognition of the usefulness of *de dicto* modal talk in the analysis of everyday language,[2] although he denies its usefulness in science.

III.   Quine on the Three Grades of Ideological Modal Realism

Quine (1966) specifies three ways (or 'grades') of formalising modalities: as predicates, as whole statement operators, and as open-sentence operators. Quine is quickly able to explicate the first grade in non-modal, fully extensional language, transforming sentences like 'It is necessary that "9 > 5"', into: '"9 > 5" is Nec'. 'Nec' is a predicate which applies to the *name* of a statement (hence the quotation marks) and is truth-functional, since '9 > 5' can be replaced *salva veritate* by other names of the same statement. Quine (1966, p. 163) notes that this (by now non-modal)

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[2] As I believe Quine to have done; see, for instance, his 1960, pp. 119, 199.

predicate is useful in defining the notion of *validity* in proof theory.

The second grade, exemplified by *de dicto* modal statements like 'It is necessary that 9 > 5', has the issue of being non-extensional. For instance, both '9 > 5' and 'it is necessary that 9 > 5' are true statements, but 'the number of planets in our solar system is > 5' is a true statement while 'it is necessary that the number of planets in our solar system is > 5' is not. The implementation of such operators would lead to complications (see Quine, 1966, p. 166) and Quine finds no immediate useful application for them, preferring to convert claims of grade 2 into grade 1.

Finally, Quine (1980) notes that the third grade, exemplified by *de re* propositions such as '9 is necessarily > 5', is not only non-extensional, but also if such statements are regimented according to the understanding of necessity as analyticity (that was ordinary in the '50s when Quine was writing), we obtain unintelligible claims like 'there is something that is necessarily greater than 5' (which is supposedly true in virtue of meaning alone). He notes (ibid., p. 155) that one way of making sense of such statements is to revert to a form of Aristotelian essentialism that sees some qualities as necessary and some as contingent. However, he could not accept such a conclusion, nor could the other logical empiricists who were his dialectical opponents, as both Quine and the positivists believed essentialism to have no use in science. He thus rejects grade 3.

IV.   Williamson on Probability

Williamson's (2016) argument poses a threat to Quine because he believes ideological modal realism to be both needed and already used in the language of science; i.e., he objects to Quine's claim that when the implementation of modality is expensive, it ought not to be done, because it does not find any useful application in our best scientific theories.[3] Williamson's argument goes as follows: he claims (1) that scientific theories need subjunctive conditionals (counterfactuals), and shows that (2) if they do, they also commit us to some sort of metaphysical modality. Then, (3) he gives examples of scientific theories whose content is 'objectively modal' (p. 469). Here, I will oppose the third claim. Perhaps Williamson argues successfully for his first two claims, but I believe that he certainly does not argue successfully for the third. The importance of rejecting the third claim, however minor, is not to be underestimated. Williamson's arguments would prove extraordinarily more powerful if he was able to show that modality is already used in some instances of scientific theory.

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[3] This was the second problem Quine had with modality; see Section II above.

Williamson believes that 'explicit quantification of probability… requires some sort of modality' (2016, p. 469), and proceeds to give a modal interpretation of probability. Williamson argues that modal talk about 'objective' probabilities is needed in the explanation of real-life proto-scientific cases. Suppose a coin is tossed 1,000 times, and 500 times it lands on heads. We want to know why. Williamson says that probability 'enters the explanation in… two ways' (2016, p. 471), the first being that the explanans—namely, the coin having a probability of ½ to land on each side and the probabilities of each throw being mutually independent—is already probabilistic. Now certainly, if I were a mathematician, this would be an excellent real-life explanation of *mathematical concepts* that I use abstractedly. But if I were an empirical scientist, I would be very disappointed that such mathematical concepts are held to explain why the coin landed on heads 500 times instead of 900. An explanans for such an empirical situation should instead appeal to the dynamics of forces, coin structure, the movement of my arm, etc.

Williamson proceeds by saying that the explanans makes the explanandum (the scenario of the coin tosses)—even though it does not entail it—'probable'; this is the second reason why probability inevitably crawls back into our explanation. I do not see how Williamson arrives at this conclusion. When exactly, does an adequate explanation of an event have an *effect* on the event itself? The supposed cause of an event is clearly different from the *explanation* of the supposed cause of an event. Either probability is used to explain this cause, or it is itself the cause. But saying that probability *is* the cause that makes an event more probable is circular, because a more probable event is something with a higher probability (and it seems, in fact, that the relation should be reversed: it is being more or less probable that determines the probability of an event); or else probability is an adequate *explanation* of the actual cause of the empirical situation at hand (but I argued above that it seems *not* to be an adequate explanation).

Now, we ought to be more charitable to Williamson. While the probabilistic one is by no means an adequate empirical *explanation* of why we tossed a coin and got heads 500 times over 1,000 throws, it is very easy to admit, along with scientists, that it is an adequate mathematical *description* of the event. But such a modelling of reality only requires mathematical probability theory which, as already mentioned, makes no use of modal operators. I believe Quine would adopt this latter line of argument to reject Williamson's argument for the supposed need of metaphysical modality in the application of probability to real-world cases.

V.   Conclusion

I have shown how Quine's arguments for ideological modal antirealism were formulated. I have stated Williamson's objection to one of them, viz., that modal operators—being theoretically expensive to implement and requiring significant revision of extensional logic—ought not to be implemented, because such implementation does not find any useful application in our best scientific theories. Williamson, in his objection, provided probability as an example of the use of an 'objective' modality that is supposedly already in use in science to provide explanations for empirical phenomena. I have shown that probability is not an adequate explanation of empirical phenomena (it seems that it is in fact the empirical phenomena that may be used to explain probability as illustrative examples), but at best a mathematical description of them that contains no modal operators. Finally, I have shown that the claim that the probability theory, as an explanans, makes its explanandum 'probable' is circular.

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A Defence of Plato's *Lysis*

By Finghín Little

Introduction

Lysis is considered a bad egg among Plato's works. Set aside for its alleged argumentative sophistry and liberal equivocation, the established view holds that it contains little that cannot be found better expressed in other dialogues. *Lysis* is understood as an aporetic dialogue grouped with other early Socratic works, which alone, I argue, is not the most sympathetic framing for this brief but meandering text. Instead, I propose that *Lysis*' unsophisticated backdrop explains Socrates' quickness to confuse as an attempt to provide a dazzling introduction to philosophy, rather than an erroneous but genuine protreptic. Namely, the youth of his interlocutors calls for playfulness and facility in argument, and he intends the subsequent puzzlement to elicit motivation to practice philosophy. This may be clearer given the naïveté of the young characters, in contrast with the educated readership Plato wrote for. The role of the dialogue, I conclude, is not only to discuss friendship between people but to serve as an exhortation to philosophy by drawing a connection between *philia* and wisdom, a strange and not wholly rational relationship.

1. The *Lysis* and its woes

Lysis is ostensibly concerned with friendship (φιλία), namely the question of what it is, and though the character of Socrates emerges unsatisfied with any of the definitions elaborated throughout the discussion, it is his argumentation that has been criticised rather than the vacuum of his conclusion. The inconclusive state of puzzlement (ἀπορία) in which *Lysis* terminates has led to its being bundled with other early Socratic dialogues exhibiting aporetic conclusions, most specifically constellating with *Charmides* and *Laches* due to their similarity in setting, aporetic quality, and thematic interplay (Kenyon, 2020). In what follows I set these dialogues aside to identify other candidates more congenial to literary and philosophical comparison.

Many of the questions raised throughout the dialogue appear *prima facie* aberrant if not nonsensical, for instance an early question of Socrates' to the young Menexenus at 212b:

> So tell me: when someone loves someone else, which of the two becomes the

> friend of the other, the one who loves or the one who is loved? Or is there no difference?[1]

Besides the superficial strangeness in translation, we might acknowledge David Robinson's analysis of the operative words 'φίλος' and 'φιλεῖν' identifying the manner in which this approaches malapropism according to what we know of these words' use. Such slippery, sophistic argumentation has been pointed out throughout the *Lysis*, not least by Robinson in highlighting an apparent equivocation between friendship among men and their pursuit of other desired things without indication of a change in topic (1986, pp. 70, 77). Similarly, others censure the 'inadvertent or deliberate confusion caused by failure to make distinctions in ambiguous terms' (Emlyn-Jones & Preddy, 2022, p. 17). Such criticisms are abundant, to cut a long story short.

Lysis' treatment of φιλία places it in a close relationship with *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, both of which enjoy a much more iconic status. This link may be drawn from the banal observation that φιλία could connote relationships that were also erotic, but perhaps more pointedly from the framing that sets the narrative going. Beginning at 203e, Socrates comes upon Hippothales, a brooding teenager, outside the wrestling school where he and others pass their time. Almost immediately the latter has assured Socrates it will be well worth his while to join him and the others inside, on account of the attractive young men within. Soon Socrates notices Hippothales blushing and quickly pries out whom it is he is in love with: Lysis, the namesake of the dialogue. Evidently, erotic undertones are suggestively established by the time any philosophising is underway.

Despite close thematic analogy to the aforementioned dialogues concerning erotic love (ἔρος), it has been argued that *Lysis* makes little contribution of its own to a Platonic doctrine of relationships, and that whatever redemption it can be allowed to have can only be retrospective, applying Plato's later theories to its otherwise unstable content (Verenyi, 1975). In a similar assessment, noting that her reconstruction of a Platonic theory of friendship coheres with readings of *Lysis*, it is in the *Phaedrus* that Sheffield (2011, p. 270) situates its most proper expression.

Finally, though he manifests no substantive conclusion, reflecting on the notions that Plato employs in arguing about the place of one's friends in *Lysis* leads one to question the dialogue's ethical integrity, if it is to be about friendship at all. Socrates' idea of φιλία embodies a certain utilitarian selfishness; the apparent absence of affection is at least partly to blame for this ethically

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[1] This and all further direct quotes of *Lysis* are taken from Lombardo's translation (see bibliography).

motivated critique (Glidden, 1981). The response for certain readers is to dismiss the dialogue's interest as friendship at all, seeing it as oriented towards a general theory of desire as Naomi Reshotko (1997) has proposed.

In what follows I do not attempt to refute any particular theory of friendship that may be read from the *Lysis*. Rather, I propose a distinct interpretive avenue, situating the dialogue as formally and thematically complementing *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* in their treatment of the irrational and its connection with love and wisdom.

2. Socrates at play

Paul Plass (1967) describes a notion of 'play' or *paidia* (παιδιά) as a literary feature supporting the characteristic and more recognisable concept of Socratic irony. Like many aspects of Plato's writing, it is a motif appearing both in form and content, frequently in a complementary manner. The *Symposium* is notably exemplary of such play, despite (and in part due to) its mature content and Bacchic context.[2] Plass studies the *Phaedrus,* from which it protrudes most strikingly as a literary trait, and discusses its exemplary wordplay and innuendo as well as a convincing account of play as an element of erotic love. Some such παιδιαί are bawdily comedic, such as the omission of an implied limiting adverb 'only' at 233b:

> If you are persuaded by me, in the first place I shall be with you not [only] out
>
> of interest in immediate pleasure but also out of interest in the benefit that will
>
> be in the future… (Plass, 1967, p. 350)

Although it is not an aporetic dialogue, the *Phaedrus* is threatened existentially by its diatribe against the practice of writing books (274c–278b), provoking a distinct negative counterpoint in the dialogue: why is Plato writing a dialogue in which his characters, even Socrates, emphatically admit the futility of writing? That paradox is complemented by Plato's allusive and oblique self-reference (Zaslavsky, 1981), which only accentuates, *par excellence*, the *Phaedrus*' literary irony. This instance of metatextual debasement perhaps most closely mirrors the paralogistic equivocations that would undermine the *Lysis*.

It would then seem to be no mistake if each of the dialogues whose contents orbit love

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[2] *Cf.* Aristophanes' speech, *Symposium*, 189c–193e. Indeed, his presence alone is surely intended to elicit play and banter, for Socrates was satirised acerbically by the former in *The Clouds*.

(*Lysis*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*) draws formally on literary playfulness. Now, leaving all the above aside for a moment, I will note that if any of these three were to engage in such playful dialectic *a priori,* it is *Lysis*. For it is here that we see Socrates engage with the youngest character in any of the above dialogues (Nails, 2022, p. 195), who is naturally the most given to play. Moreover, the dialogue's setting in the wrestling school, though we have no direct depiction of this sport or any other, itself imports a certain ludic atmosphere. Though sport was evidently taken seriously in Athenian culture, that the same aspect of play serves to evoke the agonistic facet of pursuing ἔρος in the *Phaedrus* is remarkable (Plass, 1967, pp. 345–46). Plass' account details in particular how play can be pursued seriously and for serious aims which we might take as relevant here.

We would do well not to forget the importance of Lysis' innocence in the dialogue. Regardless of his exact age, Lysis is a *cadet* and he knows it or is made to know it. When Socrates inquires admiringly as to why it is he has little agency for himself at 208a, it seems to have less to do with age than what he does not yet understand. This 'tête-à-tête' is halted by Ctesippus' jab at their flirtatious 'private party' (211c). Such familiarity is clearly intended jocularly and incidentally is suggestive in a somewhat 'camp' fashion of the erotics that have hitherto been insinuated, probably once again in a manner leaving Lysis haplessly unaware. In any case the outcome is clear: although the character of Socrates takes Lysis on apparently in good humour and faith and with no small amount of admiration, Plato makes it clear in his writing that he is not an authoritative character and indeed does not yet know very much at all.

Noting this, we cannot, as readers, expect argumentative rigour in *Lysis* simply because it is not called for anywhere. Socrates certainly engages in witty combat to defeat sophistic thinking and chauvinism in such other early dialogues as *Hippias Major*. But to campaign in such a manner in *Lysis* would be patronising and pointless given Lysis' intellectual juniority, which is clear, I have argued, from the above passage and the dialogue's overall tone. The same is so for Menexenus whom Socrates ironically sets up as a capable debater, despite his gaping inability to refute anything Socrates subsequently proceeds with (Kenyon, 2020, p. 62); his superficial fear of being made a fool of is later reversed into a sexual joke launched over the young Menexenus' head at 216c–d. Such irony is, I emphasise, *not* idiosyncratically Socratic; it is a familiarly universal παιδιά played by elders on children. All this is evidence from within the text itself that its interlocutors are among the most objectively incapable in the Platonic canon.

3. Befriending wisdom

Lysis, I have argued, is akin to the other erotic dialogues in exemplifying the playfulness that Plato's dramatic characters employ in their practice of philosophy. Now, the young men at the wrestling school need no introduction to such playfulness or παιδιαί. Evidently, though Socrates fails to condescend them in so many words, what they lack is maturity and understanding in their play. What I hope to evince is that Socrates nudges his interlocutors, and Plato his readers, towards a more thoughtful notion of παιδιά such that they begin to 'play' with thought so as to pursue wisdom, namely that they engage in philosophy.

Such a connection to wisdom is variously evident in the other erotic dialogues: in the playful style of the *Phaedrus*, and in the *Symposium*, where Alcibiades complains to Socrates that he 'spends his entire life in irony and play at the expense of men' (Plass, 1967 p. 359). In *Lysis*, despite the aforementioned ethical criticisms, we see clear reproach of 'bad' παιδιά with respect to Hippothales' maudlin lyrics. Noting the bond between παιδιά and education, Plato valuing the latter not only as a philosopher but also as a teacher, and the pointed decadence of the *Phaedrus*' amusement, it is plausible that

> In Plato's eyes sophisticated play was in danger of becoming mere modish cleverness, all the more objectionable because it could pervert education by putting up a facade to further its aim. (ibid., p. 346)

This is precisely the problem with the conceited poetry of Hippothales', who, if the rumours of his soppy poems are true, merits ridicule in Socrates' eyes (205d). It is not the fact that Hippothales composes poetry that deserves reprimand; rather, he is going about such matters in the wrong way, or more heinously, in bad taste.

Now I wish to draw attention to a crucial, and comparatively lucid passage in which Socrates' exhortation to philosophy is most evident in *Lysis*, at 217d–218b. This interlude is distinctively philosophical in tone, appearing as an abridged account of essential and accidental qualities, that 'some things are of the same sort as what is present with them, and some are not' (217c), such that the essential is in agreement with its substrate. What is of import is what follows the conclusion of this argument, namely that

> We may infer that those who are already wise no longer love wisdom [philosophise], whether they are gods or men... The upshot is that those who are as yet

> neither good nor bad love wisdom [philosophise]... (218a–b)

This direct reference to philosophising (φιλοσοφεῖν) and philosophy (φιλοσοφία, love of wisdom, *befriending* of wisdom) is operative in constructing a plausible and integrative reading of the *Lysis*. For the sake of completeness, the other references we have to wisdom and the wise heretofore are—in increasing order of relevance—at 207d, in a passing and ironic remark; at 206a and 210a, in the sense of being skilled;[3] at 214b, another presumably ironic reference to 'the authors who reason and write about Nature and the Universe'; and finally at 210d, when Socrates advises Lysis that he must become wise in order to earn friendship. Notably, all but the first (which we may discount) and last are in certain senses distinct from the art of reasoned thinking Socrates urges. At this latter point, Socrates is engaged with Lysis, but we must remember that his comments are really a foil for his attempt at teaching Hippothales a lesson in the art of loving (*cf.* 206c). We may therefore identify three decisive points in the dialogue: the opening which sets out the aim of the dialogue—to teach Hippothales a lesson; the point at which what it is Hippothales must learn—to be wise—is brought into view; and the conclusive point at which φιλία is most explicitly linked with the practice of philosophy.

That this last moment is a critical one may be made more evident by a study of what follows. Socrates follows this turning point with a much more ruthless analysis of what he has established, rejecting it as circular by *reductio* (219c–d). This is reified by his urges that we need a 'first principle' leading into a discussion of value more generally, as well as a subtle but dazzling evocation of good as antinomic to bad as φάρμακον (220d), redolent of the risky ambiguity throughout the dialogue and incidentally evoking the same notion's iconic treatment in the *Phaedrus.* In the discussion that follows this turn in the dialectic, the same tactic of antinomy manifests in the critical failure to outline a definition of φιλία rooted in either good, bad, both, or neither (221c–d).

As elusive as progress remains, the perplexity not only of the conclusion but also of the meandering eristic is acknowledged by Socrates, who indicates that he has made a fool of himself in front of children by squandering countless arguments. Yet it is far more plausible that all this is feigned in an attempt to elicit the sense of *aporia* the early Plato clearly values for its pedagogic worth, and the impetus it provides to reflect, as is made explicit in his conclusion (*cf.* 222e–223b). In attending to that reflection, we would do well to refer to his hyperbolic claim at the outset as

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[3] Notably, in a manner almost exactly parallel to *Phaedrus*; *cf.* Plass, *op cit.*, p. 353.

being 'so far from having [friendship] that I don't even know how one person becomes the friend of another' (211d–212b). The φιλία that Socrates is in search of is not of men—thereof, evidently, he has no lack at all—but a pure love of wisdom. Such whimsy need not threaten the value of the dialogue but rather may point to a dimension in Plato's writing in which this playful tactic, analogous to his illuminating use of myth elsewhere, urges detachment and reflection on one's place in the grand scheme of things.

I hope to have rendered a defence of *Lysis* by outlining a plausible reading: as an aporetic invitation to philosophy helped by the conceptual interplay between love, friendship and wisdom using the pedagogic medium of play. This analysis is not only coherent with the theoretical and literary qualities of the corresponding dialogues *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* but is evident in Socrates' playfulness and equivocation as well as the youthful foolishness of his interlocutors. We can therefore understand Socrates' sophistic palaver as an attempt to rile and later catch the excitement of young love through play, and later to purify it, to direct it towards wisdom.

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