List 2: Historiography

World War 2, France and the Historians.

Theme 4: Repressed Memories: Vichy France and the Jews.

Document 1: Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (1981), pp. 343-72 ('The Holocaust in France')

Document 2 Serge Klarsfeld, French Children of the Holocaust. A Memorial (1996), pp. vii - xv (Forewords), 3-8 ('History and Chronology') and excerpts from the 'Memorial'.

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VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS

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CHAPTER

8

Conclusions: The Holocaust in France

In conclusion, we found no difficulty with the Vichy government in implementing Jewish policy.

Helmut Knochen (1947)[1]

LIKE THE SS, who methodically counted the Jews sent to the east, we can calculate the toll of the Final Solution in France. By the end of 1944, almost 75,000 Jews had been deported from France to killing centers in former Polish territory.* Upon arrival, most were gassed immediately, while the rest were put to work under conditions that meant almost certain death within a few weeks or months. About 2,500, approximately 3 percent, survived.[2] Auschwitz was the destination of about 70,000 of the deportees from France. The rest were sent to other camps—Maidanek, Sobibor, and a few dozen to Buchenwald in August 1944. Close to one third of the total were French citizens. The rest were foreign refugees. Nearly 2,000 were under six years of age, over 6,000 were under thirteen, and 8,700 were sixty years or over.

These statistics emerge from German records—nominative lists of the seventy-nine convoys that left France, and archives of the Auschwitz camp administration—as well as from lists of survivors collected by the French Ministry of Veteran Affairs and similar authorities in other countries. Of course, no slaughter of this magnitude leaves absolutely precise figures, especially a slaughter that was accelerating in the closing months of a lost war; but the totals are accurate within a very small margin of error. The destruction of European Jewry was more meticulously scrutinized by record keepers than have been other massacres in history. The conclusions of the French researchers who have studied

*According to Klarsfeld, at least 815 Jews were arrested in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais departments and deported from Belgium. Adding these to the total of other deportees, one concludes that a minimum of 75,721 Jews were deported from France

these lists do not differ substantially. Most recently, in 1978 (see note 2, p. 412), following a thorough evaluation, Serge Klarsfeld has published the names of 75,721 deportees, convoy by convoy. His hundreds of pages remind one of the telephone directory of a medium-sized city, the long columns of names a mute testimony to the scale of the Nazi enterprise. More conservative than some other recent evaluations, and based upon a painstaking critique of the sources, Klarsfeld's assessment seems as close as we are likely to get to a definitive judgment.

The French government, we should add, prefers, in official statements, not to distinguish among the "racial deportees." Responding to a recent question in the Chamber of Deputies about *Jewish* deportees, the Prime Minister cited French documents in referring to 120,000 "racial deportees" of whom only 3,000 returned.[3] The divergence between these statistics and those computed from German lists is probably explained by the French government's use of the term "deportation" to cover involuntary transportation from France by the Germans for a variety of reasons besides the persecution of Jews. French government figures likely also include other groups, such as gypsies, whom the Nazis sent to the east[4] (after being interned, we might add, by the Vichy regime).

However ghastly these totals, they fell short of SS expectations. In mid-1942, Dannecker had looked forward to shipping 100,000 Jews east in the first six months of the program. Röthke, his successor, had projected that 1943 would see the deportation of all the remaining Jews in France, whom he fairly accurately estimated at 270,000.[5] The Germans soon recognized that deportations were falling behind schedule, and officials charged with the Final Solution complained, on various occasions late in the war, about its slow progress in France.

After the Liberation, defenders of Vichy took their cue from the German officials' disappointment. Just as the world learned of the enormity of the Jewish tragedy—two thirds of European Jewry killed, between five million and six million people—Pierre Laval claimed to have limited the damage in France. Xavier Vallat pointed out that, in comparison with other countries, the significant fact in France was that so many Jews had been saved. Vichy, the argument went, had served as a "shield" for thousands of Jews, especially those who were French. Vichy had dirtied its hands, its defenders were sometimes prepared to admit; but the final result was not so terrible as elsewhere, where a far greater proportion of Jews had been murdered.[6*]

*This view has been adopted by a number of historians, including some with no evident predisposition to favor Vichy, such as Gerald Reitlinger: "With the loss of less than 25 percent, no Jewish community in Occupied Europe came off so lightly, except in Denmark, and this was due in large measure to the tactics of Laval."[7]

The Germans themselves were not nearly so sure where to place the blame for their mediocre results in France. To be sure, the German police concluded by late 1943 that the French police were no longer reliable for operations against Jews, although the Germans gladly used them whenever possible as late as January 1944. Röthke concluded from the denaturalization quarrel in August 1943 that Vichy was no longer willing to cooperate on anti-Jewish policy. But when Heinrich Himmler himself was asked by his loyal lieutenant Martin Mutschmann, in July 1944, why there were still so many Jews in Normandy to aid the British and Americans, he pointed his finger in a different direction. The total evacuation of Jews from France, Himmler replied, had been "extremely difficult . . . because of the strained relations with the Wehrmacht military authorities there." If French obstruction deserved any part of the blame, Himmler forgot to mention it in July 1944. After the war, under interrogation by French authorities, Helmut Knochen, the head of the German security police in France, asserted that he recalled no serious trouble with the French on the Jewish issue during the occupation.[8]

Whose account are we to believe? In fact, the matter is more complicated than either version would suggest. We must attempt to reconstruct the ways in which Vichy officials perceived the matter of the Jews during the successive phases of the occupation. After the war, comparison with Greece, Holland, or Yugoslavia may have occurred to collaborators as they prepared their defense in 1945 or 1946. During the occupation, however, no one knew the extent of Jewish losses in various European countries. No models of other strategies presented themselves to the Vichy leaders, who knew nothing of what was being done in Denmark or Hungary to impede deportation. Beyond that, we find no evidence that the Vichy leaders even considered such comparisons in 1942 or 1943. They envisaged the matter of policy toward the Jews in terms of French internal policy and of the domestic concerns of the late 1930s and early 1940s. Well into the occupation, and perhaps to the end in some cases, they fitted new information about what was happening to the Jews into conceptions formed when France was hardening its attitude toward refugees in the late 1930s.

The theory of a "shield"—sending some Jews to certain death in order to save a substantial number of other Jews—implies a far clearer consciousness of long-term German intentions than the contemporary

evidence suggests. Like everyone else, Vichy's leaders were slow to fathom the scope of the Final Solution, in the face of mounting evidence, and despite the Nazis' repeated declarations that all the Jews of France would eventually be deported. Although Vichy had the means to understand, its officials for the most part preferred not to delve too far into such matters. Indifference to the fate of Jews was the predominant attitude. To Laval, in particular, the Jews seem generally to have been unimportant, hardly worth the effort that the "shield" strategy implied. Vichy undoubtedly hoped to save some French Jews from whatever was meant by "work" in the east. There is no indication, however, that this aim had a high priority in Vichy's calculations or that it formed part of a well-articulated plan. Laval was content not to press the Germans for any formal agreement limiting deportation to foreign Jews, even after the Germans made it clear to him that, despite some postponement, they would eventually take all the Jews of France. Did Laval know what deportation meant? Did he know what was in store for the Jews whom his police loaded into the cattle cars?

What Did Vichy Know about the Final Solution?

> . . . I see how dumbfounded everyone is when I am asked for news and when I have to reply in agony that Monsieur Roussetzki is deported.
>
> Everyone knows how terrible that is! And me, I didn't want to believe it, but the facts are there. If he had been treated humanely he would be able to write, to correspond with his family. . . .
>
> As a Frenchwoman I appeal to your ministry and shout out my indignation. Where is my husband? What has become of my husband?
>
> A letter to Marshal Pétain (1943)[9]

Immediately after the war, when the death camps had just been revealed in detail to a shocked public, it was more common than it is now to plead ignorance. German officials, almost to a man, said they did not know. Pierre Laval said that he did not know.

> I tried to find out, by questioning them, where the Germans were sending those convoys of Jews, and their reply invariably was: "To Poland, where we want to create a Jewish state." I was well aware that this meant working there in terrible conditions, most often to suffer and to die there.[10]

Xavier Vallat said that he did not know, and cited the horrified amazement of Allied troops who first liberated the death factories in the spring of 1945.[11] Just after the war, Rabbi Jacob Kaplan, summarizing the Jewish ordeal in France for an American audience, implied that there was real uncertainty even among Jewish leaders until close to the Liberation. "There came a moment, *at the beginning of 1944,* when there was no longer any doubt that the Hitlerite program called for the extermination of French Jewry by deportations and massacres" (our italics).[12]

Yet reports of mass killings began to reach the West almost as soon as they began. Unorganized mass killings had begun on the Russian front in fall 1941; systematized early in 1942, they were extended to German-controlled western Europe during July 1942 in the form of massive deportations to the east. As early as March 1942, a long memorandum given to the papal nuncio in Berne, Monsignor Bernardini, by representatives of the Jewish Agency, the World Jewish Congress, and the Swiss Jewish community, referred to the execution of "thousands of Jews in Poland and in parts of Russia occupied by the Germans," along with the more familiar grievances of expulsions, internments, exclusions from jobs and professions, and expropriation of property.[13] It has generally been believed that the first serious warning about an active German program of total extermination, a "final solution" as distinct from episodic killings, was a message sent to London and to Washington by Gerhardt Riegner, representative of the World Jewish Conference in Geneva, on 8 August 1942—less than a month after systematic deportations from western Europe began. Walter Laqueur has recently shown that credible accounts of mass killings, and even of the use of gas, reached the West before August 1942 through a variety of sources: the Polish underground, escapees, witnesses from Italian and other allied armed forces, and even Gestapo agents, some of whom were Jews. "Many more people knew about the extermination than is commonly believed, and many knew *earlier* than generally assumed."[14]

By early fall 1942 these reports were being discussed at the highest levels. It cannot be proven conclusively, without independent verification from the Vatican archives, that SS Colonel Kurt Gerstein's eyewitness account of the use of Zyklon-B gas for mass extermination at Auschwitz actually reached the Vatican through the various churchmen and Swedish diplomats whom he approached as early as August 1942. It is certain that Myron C. Taylor, U. S. ambassador to the Holy See, sent a detailed report on the mass execution of Polish and western Jews in Poland to the papal secretary of state Cardinal Maglione on 26

September 1942 and asked what the Vatican's reactions to these events would be.[15] On the floor of the House of Commons on 17 December 1942, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden denounced the massive execution of Jews in the Polish camps. The same day, the Allied governments and the French National Committee released jointly a statement describing in some detail conditions in the "main Nazi abattoir" in Poland and promising retribution for these crimes after the war.[16]

Within France itself, the roundups of Jews and their families in both zones in July–August 1942 were impossible to conceal, despite prefects' efforts at discretion. The prefects of the Unoccupied Zone themselves described in their monthly reports the public's reaction—far more negative than positive—to these shocking scenes. Departure conditions were always better known, of course, than what happened at the destination; but as early as 1 July 1942, the BBC had broadcast accounts in French of the massacre of 700,000 Polish Jews. The fate of the Jews taken from France was discussed without delay in the underground press. The clandestine newspaper *J'Accuse*, dated 20 October 1942, declared that "the Boche torturers are burning and asphyxiating thousands of men, women, and children deported from France." Another Resistance tract of 15 November 1942 reported "the most dreadful rumors" about the fate of the deportees. "According to letters from Poland the trains brought only corpses there. Now we learn that a few convoys of women, old people, the sick and children, in short all who were unfit for work, were asphyxiated by poison gas."[17] The Communist *L'Humanité* clandestinely published in October 1942 the allegation that the Germans had performed experiments with toxic gas on eleven thousand men, women, old people, and children from among the Jews deported from the two zones of France.[18]

Receiving reports was one thing; accepting them as something other than Allied or dissident propaganda was another. Prefects tended to dismiss the more alarming reports as "unlikely," "the most fantastic rumors." Prefect Dauliac of the Haute Savoie grumbled that "the enemies of the regime, exploiting popular sentimentality, did not fail to claim . . . that the 'unfortunate victims' were condemned to certain death." Prefect Gaston Jammet did not think that the upsurge of German arrests he witnessed in August 1942 in the Vendée "would have serious consequences for those concerned."[19] Indeed, there was considerable skepticism on the Allied side as well. A British Foreign Office analyst called Gerhardt Riegner's August 1942 report of a "final solution" policy decision in Germany "a rather wild story"; and the U.S. envoy in Bern commented that "there is what is apparently a wild

rumor inspired by Jewish fears that the Nazis will exterminate all at once (possibly with prussic acid) in the autumn about 4 m. Jews whom they have been assembling in Eastern Europe." "For another two or three years [after November 1941]," Walter Laqueur observes, "the general consensus in Whitehall was that the accounts about the mass murder of Jews were exaggerated."[20]

The reluctance of Jews themselves to believe these reports is particularly striking. Not until 23 November 1942, after the arrival in Palestine of a group of women and children from Poland who confirmed the reports about Treblinka and Sobibor, did the Jewish Agency in Palestine feel certain enough to release a major public statement about the extent of the mass murders. Even then it was hard to believe that these stories were not exaggerations or wartime propaganda. Even the inmates of other camps could not believe the rumors about what went on in the killing centers. Léon Blum emerged from Buchenwald (a concentration camp, not a death camp) unaware of the gas chambers.[21] Georges Wellers, a Paris lawyer who had been arrested with the thousand Jewish leaders in December 1941, "had left Drancy [for Auschwitz] on 30 June 1944, without having the slightest idea about the real meaning of the deportation of the Jews." Even though he had access to the other prisoners and had secret correspondence with his wife, he could "affirm categorically that no one had the slightest idea about the systematic murder that in reality awaited the Jews at the other end of their deportation journey."[22]

It is as if this unbearable truth had to be rediscovered and reconfirmed over and over again for those who could not or would not believe it. In the autumn of 1943—more than a year after the Consistoire central had already made an official declaration to Laval about the "exterminations" it believed were taking place in eastern Europe—Jacques Helbronner, the president of the Consistoire, received a detailed report of crematory ovens and systematic extermination which he found "so unbelievable" that he set out to find confirmation from neutral sources.[23] In January 1944, the Abbé Joseph Catry, still eager to persuade the Germans to employ him as a propagandist, implored the *Judenreferent* Röthke to give him the means to disprove the accusations of genocide that he heard around him. "There is a real effort to hide something very grave," he wrote Röthke, "but without success, because the subterfuge is very clumsy."[24] As late as April 1944, two Slovakian Jews who had escaped from Auschwitz created a sensation with their accounts of what they had seen. All along the line, beginning with the *Judenrat* in Bratislava, authorities hesitated to give them full

credence; and only in July were the Slovakians' "Notebooks from Auschwitz" published in the *Gazette de Lausanne* and the *Journal de Genève,* and in November 1944 by the United States government.[25]

On reflection, it is naïve to select retroactively—out of the myriad conflicting signals of wartime news, rumor, and propaganda—those reports that conform to the truth finally established upon the opening of the camps in May 1945, and to declare that, once these reports had arrived in the West, everyone of good faith "knew." Most of us, however, "know" only information that accords with prior expectations and patterns of intelligibility. A celebrated example involves the surprise of the Japanese attack on the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, in the Hawaiian Islands, on 7 December 1941. Having broken Japanese codes, American intelligence analysts possessed enormous quantities of raw data concerning Japanese movements, including indications of a possible strike toward the mid-Pacific. They disregarded these scraps of information, however, in favor of other scraps of information that fitted their expectation of a Japanese advance toward southeast Asia.[26] Identifying important information among a welter of conflicting signals is often possible only after subsequent events have given meaning to one signal rather than another.

The first reports of the death camps competed for attention against many contradictory signals. Even the examples we have quoted conflicted among themselves. Some referred to killings, but local excesses were not necessarily proof of a plan of total extermination. Some signals referred to poison gas, but in terms of "experiments" (as in the *Humanité* article previously quoted) or of "prussic acid," recalling some of the more notoriously discredited propaganda stories of the First World War. Many signals referred to the conditions of departure, which did not necessarily prove anything about the conditions at the point of arrival. A Resistance tract from July 1942, which provided an accurate account of the Vel d'Hiv roundup, then alluded vaguely to the "deportation by groups of one thousand to a prison across the Rhine."[27] In Hungary, the Germans produced a film combining accurate footage of the local fascist Arrow Cross men roughly loading the deportees and faked scenes of solicitous Germans caring for them at the destination.[28] In August 1942, the extremely well-informed Donald Lowrie of the American relief agency YMCA wrote that "no one had any illusions" about the fate of the deportees: "falling into German hands meant either forced labor or slow extermination in the Jewish 'reservation' in Poland." But still there was no certainty. As a humanitarian gesture, the YMCA put a box of books in each railway car leaving southern France for an unknown destination. "As yet no reliable news had been received

[as] to the ultimate destination of these convoys or of what happens there," Lowrie wrote on 7 October.[29] Intimate knowledge of the harsh conditions of the departure carried in itself no certain proof that the Germans had decided to apply a policy of wholesale extermination at the destination.

For one thing, the Nazis did their best to hide, from all but a few administrators and security officials, the murder of millions of Jews. Himmler, acknowledging a long statistical report on the Jewish question sent to him by Kaltenbrunner in April 1943, thanked the chief of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and the *Sicherheitsdienst* for his attention to "camouflage policy" *(Tarnungszwecken)* and for keeping in mind readers of "later times." For instance, "evacuation" *(Evakuierung)*—already a euphemism—appeared in Kaltenbrunner's statistical tables as "migration" *(Abwanderung).*[30] The agencies directly responsible for the extermination preferred to use the term "special treatment" *(Sonderbehandlung),* or "S.B.," to describe their work; at the Nuremberg trials it required repeated questioning to establish that this neutral phrase simply meant killing.*

In France, the German occupation authorities told their subordinates to use guarded language and to hide the real objectives of the deportations. To be sure, sweeping statements can sometimes be found in internal German communications, especially those of Dannecker. In May 1942, for example, the brash and inexperienced *Judenreferent* discussed with General Kohl, head of railway transport in France, the aims of German policy toward Jews, which he described as "the complete annihilation of the enemy" *(restlose Vernichtung des Gegners).*[32] But in that same month the military administration circulated a directive to avoid even the word "deportation," nomenclature held to be too reminiscent of Tsarist expulsions to Siberia. The proper formula now was "sending away for forced labor" *(Verschickung zur Zwangsarbeit),* a phrase that better masked the real significance of the transports.[33] Dannecker himself resorted to euphemisms a few weeks later, advising his staff to use the term "transfer of population" *(Umsiedlung)* which permitted the inclusion of children.[34] Pétain's own office occasionally sounded out the Germans on the fate of noteworthy deportees, operating through the intermediary of the Delegation of Armistice Services (DSA) which reported to Vichy on the coercive measures of the occupation. The Germans refused all interventions on behalf of Jews, however, including even distinguished personalities and war veterans. Reporting for the DSA to the Marshal in November 1943, General Debeney de-

*Hans Buchheim has proved the meaning of the term beyond doubt.[31]

clared that "there is a strong impression that no more can be attempted on their behalf."[35]

But we have not adequately explained the reactions of Vichy officialdom to the reports of the Final Solution if we limit ourselves to the contradictory and incomplete nature of those reports, to the incredible nature of their suggestions, or to the Nazis' efforts at secrecy. Many people at Vichy believed the official version because it fit so comfortably within the attitudes formed during the refugee crisis of 1938–41.

The Nazis' cover story had a kind of plausibility, after all, while the truth flew in the face of common sense. Conscripted labor was not uncommon in wartime. The French themselves had used German prisoners of war as labor during and after the First World War, and the Vichy regime, as we have seen, dragooned Spanish, Jewish, and other civilians into *groupements de travailleurs étrangers* after 1940 without any need for German prompting. After the campaign in Russia had bogged down into a war of attrition, the Germans recruited foreign labor, sometimes forcibly, to the point that in the summer of 1942 there were approximately three and one-half million foreigners working in the Reich. The French had intimate experience of the Germans' thirst for foreign labor, as young Frenchmen made up the largest national male contingent after the Service du Travail subjected French youths to a labor draft in February 1943. If young Frenchmen were being "deported" to work in German factories (and we have noted that this was the term universally used to describe the hated STO), what was more natural—and even desirable—than that Jews who had originated in German and German-occupied lands be "deported" for similar purposes? As we have seen, the exemption of young French Jews from labor service was a matter of some jealousy in France in 1943. It was true that some able-bodied Jewish deportees did work for a time in the chemical plant that I. G. Farben had built within the vast Auschwitz complex in order to enjoy the benefits of cheap prison labor. Even the *Manchester Guardian,* whose reporting showed more understanding than most newspapers of what was happening to the Jews, argued on 31 August 1942 that "the deportation of Jews to Poland means that Jewish muscles are needed for the German war effort."[36] Why should the Germans, locked in a life-and-death struggle with the Russians, squander precious resources and manpower on a project devoid of material advantage, and so repugnant that it could not be avowed even within the German governing elite? The "forced labor" alibi had enough verisimilitude to satisfy the indifferent and even some of those concerned.

Moreover, the idea of a Jewish colony where the unwanted refugees could be settled was both familiar and attractive. The French press and public as well as the administration had discussed a number of possible overseas settlements, such as the abortive Madagascar project, before the war and even since the armistice. More to the point, the French government had been actively seeking German cooperation since 1938 in easing the refugee burden, whether by persuading the Germans to cease their expulsions or by some kind of international Jewish settlement project. This is what Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet had talked to Ribbentrop about when the German foreign minister visited Paris in November 1938. After the Germans had dumped over six thousand Jews from Baden and the Palatinate into France in November 1940, the Vichy regime had implored them to take the refugees back. When the German government suddenly announced plans in the summer of 1942 to take them back, it was almost too good to be true. Laval told some American visitors in August 1942 that "the French government was glad that a change in German attitude toward [the foreign Jews] gave France an opportunity to get rid of them." Laval's breathtaking avowal is comprehensible only if we peel away successive layers of experience and knowledge and restore, in a kind of archaeology of consciousness, the commonplace attitudes formed during the refugee crisis of 1938–41.

The Vichy leaders were intellectually and emotionally prepared, therefore, to accept the German explanations as normal—even welcome. Some officials even added glosses of their own. Pierre Huguet, intendant of police in Limoges, issued instructions for the roundups in August 1942 telling Jews that they would be taken to central Europe, to Galicia (in reality, it was Upper Silesia) "where the German authorities intend to set up a great Jewish colony." The operation was to be described as an "ethnic reclassification."[37]

Pierre Laval took pains to validate this reassuring and familiar version of events. At lunch with General Karl Oberg, the Höhere SS- and Polizeiführer in France, on 2 September 1942, Laval reported that several foreign diplomats had questioned him about the transports of Jews leaving the Unoccupied Zone. Laval said he had told them that the convoys were going to southern Poland, but he wanted a conventional response *(Sprachregelung)* to avoid possible conflict with the Germans' version. Oberg's assistant recorded what the French were supposed to say:

> It was agreed that in the future President Laval would reply to such questions by saying that the Jews from the Unoccupied Zone

> handed over to the occupation authorities were deported to the Gouvernement General [i.e. Poland] to be put to work.[38]

The French police contributed to these fictions by adopting the Germans' blank formula in response to inquiries: "an unknown destination."[39] At this crucial moment, when the mass deportations had just been extended to the Unoccupied Zone where they had provoked the first important outcry against a Vichy policy, it is not hard to believe that Laval was trying to get his alibi straight.

The very conditions of the departure, obvious to anyone who saw them and fully reported to the authorities in Vichy, ought to have aroused skepticism about the official French and German tales of work colonies for Jews in the east. As long as the deportation convoys were made up of healthy men of working age, even internees like Georges Wellers awaiting their departure from Drancy could cling to the hope that forced labor in the east was "to be sure, a worrisome aggravation, but one that only affected the most hardy of the internees, able-bodied adult men."[40] That illusion was shattered from the time of the third convoy, on 22 June 1942, when women began to be included, sometimes reaching more than half of those on board. Then, from 5 August, the shipments periodically comprised children below fifteen. The papal nuncio in France wrote the Vatican secretary of state on 7 August that people did not believe the official version. The fact that the destination was not Germany but Poland, and the fact that the deportees included the sick and the aged "excludes the design of using them for work." All this, reported Monsignor Valerio Valeri, was producing much uneasiness *(malumore)* in the French population.[41]

Like other observers, the Jewish leaders knew that work colonies were not built by the weak or the unfit. At the end of August 1942, the Consistoire Central des Israélites de France, the traditional governing body of French Judaism, made a desperate appeal to Laval which drew upon the reports already reaching the West:

> It has been established and confirmed by the most exact information that hundreds of thousands of Israelites have been murdered in Eastern Europe or have died there after horrible suffering from ill treatment. . . . The government does not want the Jews for labor but for the clear purpose of exterminating them pitilessly and methodically.[42*]

*Even as late as fall 1943, however, the Consistoire was still trying to verify the existence of gas chambers and a plan of total extermination.[43]

Rabbi Kaplan spoke of "exterminations" in a conversation with Cardinal Gerlier on 17 August 1942.[44] The French minister in Bucharest reported to Laval the same day that deportations were taking place there under conditions "few could survive."[45] The Protestant leader Marc Boegner, a number of Catholic prelates, American refugee relief workers, and the U.S. envoy Pinkney Tuck all drew French leaders' attention to the situation of the Jews in France. Pastor Boegner described the character of the deportation itself to Marshal Pétain in a letter on 20 August:

> The "handing over" of these unfortunate foreigners happens in many places under inhumane conditions which have aroused the most hardened consciences and brought tears to the eyes of witnesses. Crammed into freight cars without any concern for hygiene, the foreigners designated for departure were treated like cattle.[46]

Boegner saw Laval on 9 September and repeated what he had heard about killings. Laval, however, stuck to the tale agreed upon with Oberg a week before: the Jews were building an agricultural colony. "I talked to him about murder," Boegner recalled after the war; "he answered me with gardening."[47]

After the summer of 1942, then, the Vichy leaders had a picture of the unfolding catastrophe of the Jews which was no more complete than that of other western governments or of Jewish leaders. There remained uncertainty about the precise conditions that prevailed in the camps of eastern Europe to which the Jews of France were being deported. That uncertainty had not been fully dispelled even in 1943. The Vichy leaders' information was no less complete, however, than that of other governments. If anything, they had more concrete details than had anyone else of the atrocious manner in which the deportees were transported from France. The conditions of the voyage itself meant death for many of the victims. Even the Germans' euphemistic version of deportation meant that many would die. The conditions of the departure in themselves—the subject of the remonstrances by Boegner and others whom we have cited—were reason enough for official French opposition. Instead, the Vichy leaders continued to regard the deportations as merely the next phase of the refugee crisis. If the details were ugly, that was not sufficient reason, in their eyes, to allow this secondary matter to trouble Franco-German relations.

Through 1943, as unbelief slowly was eroding among sections of the French population, Vichy's leaders must have heard more of the occa-

sional rumors that circulated about the murders in the east. But pressure upon Laval abated after the protests about deportations in the summer and autumn of 1942. Ministers now said as little about Jews as possible. More and more, French officials could hide behind German explanations. If private perceptions were any clearer at Vichy, leaders kept the terrible secret to themselves.

A Comparative View

The proportion of Jews killed varied enormously from one part of German-dominated Europe to another, from the nearly complete survival of the Jews of Denmark to the nearly complete disappearance of the Jews of Germany, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It is far from simple, however, to draw conclusions from a comparison of raw statistics. For one runs the risk of comparing the incomparable. No two situations were the same. It is sometimes claimed, for example, that the celebrated rescue of Danish Jewry proves that an alternative policy was available to the Vichy government, that similar resolute action by French authorities could have saved thousands of Jews from the deportation trains. But fewer than 8,000 Jews lived in Denmark when the Nazis decided in September 1943 to deport them, thanks partly to a much more stringent exclusion of Jewish refugees during the 1930s from Denmark than from France. Within easy reach of neutral Sweden, which was ready to accept the Jewish fugitives, the determined Danish rescuers could evacuate Jews by sea almost overnight. By that time, moreover, the dimmed prospects of ultimate German victory encouraged resistance to the Final Solution. It does not belittle the Danish achievement to observe that circumstances were far more favorable in Denmark than in France.

As the Danish case makes clear, sheer numbers could be important. France's Jews were far too numerous to spirit across the Swiss or the Spanish frontiers, or across the Channel to Britain, even assuming those countries would have accepted them. Although the Jews composed considerably less than 1 percent of France's wartime population of 42,000,000, her Jewish population of about 300,000 was larger than that of any other country of western Europe, occupied by the Germans or not. Our study, indeed, focuses upon the period during which the center of gravity of the European Jewish community shifted to France, which

plays today the role toward which she was moving during the 1930s of housing the largest Jewish minority in Europe.

It has been suggested that terrain and dispersal offered important possibilities for Jews to escape, and that, in this respect, France was far more favored than flat, more densely settled countries like Belgium and Holland. In the highly urbanized Netherlands, two thirds of that country's 140,000 Jews were concentrated in Amsterdam, and there were no forested mountains to which they could flee. Dutch Jews, concludes Raul Hilberg, were caught in a "natural trap."[48] In France, by contrast, the scattering of Jews during the débâcle of 1940 helped keep them out of the clutches of German and French police. Vichy further facilitated the dispersal of Jews, in sharp contrast to the ghettoization policies of occupied eastern Europe; but Vichy's was a punitive policy, hardly designed to make life easier for the Jews. Those saved by dispersal owe nothing to the French authorities, who tried to make up for it with their censuses, card files, and specially stamped ID cards. Geography did on occasion aid those in hiding. The few thousand Jews who found themselves in the wild and mountainous Dordogne, for example (including a substantial proportion of the Jewish community of Strasbourg), had a much higher survival rate than those in the rest of the country. Although Jews constituted a high proportion of hostages shot in the Dordogne for various reasons, there were apparently only seventy-nine deportations for "racial" reasons from the entire department.[49]

Generally speaking, however, such factors were not decisive when the cards were stacked against the Jews for other reasons. A remote and inaccessible countryside did not save the Yugoslav Jews, over 80 percent of whom were killed. Small numbers did not protect about one half of the Jewish population of 2,000 in Norway from deportation, despite a thousand-mile frontier with Sweden and the protest resignation of several prominent members of the Norwegian collaborationist Vidkun Quisling's party when the deportations began.

In the last analysis, what governed the scale of the killings was the degree to which the Germans were able to apply their power. The massacre was most complete and extensive in Germany itself, in Poland, and in the territories conquered from Russia. It was after the deposition of Mussolini and the direct occupation of Italy by German forces that the mass deportations of Italian Jews began, in September–October 1943; these eventually took about 16 percent of Italy's 45,000 Jews. Similarly, large numbers of Hungarian Jews were deported to their deaths only beginning in May 1944, after Admiral Miklós Horthy's Hungary first came under direct German military occupation. Both

Rumania and Bulgaria held off German demands to mesh their Jewish policies with that of the Reich, although both nations dealt even more harshly than France with Jews in newly conquered territories. The Nazis could rely on puppet regimes like those in Croatia or Slovakia, and the obstacles they encountered there were largely technical. In Holland, ruled directly by a *Reichskommissar,* the Germans seized control of the civil administration in 1940, providing no leeway for local authorities in Jewish matters. In Denmark, by contrast, the monarchy and the indigenous administration were permitted to function as a result of its concessions to Germany, and preserved a wide discretion in the area of policy toward the Jews.

France fitted none of these patterns, due to the unique terms of the armistice of 1940, by which the French government maintained significant attributes of sovereignty while the victors occupied only a portion of the country. To Dutchmen who fled to France from the Netherlands in 1940, for example, France seemed remarkably free—an impression that encouraged the Zionist underground in Holland to smuggle Jews to French territory.[50] Even in the Occupied Zone, German reliance upon indigenous French administration imposed limitations upon German power greater than those in any other directly occupied country in western or northern Europe.* While France had less autonomy than Germany's allies, such as Hungary or Italy, she enjoyed more autonomy than states administered directly by the Germans, such as Holland, or those with Nazi-imposed local rulers, such as Norway.

Not that the Germans attempted to impose the same policy everywhere, uniform in both space and time. We have shown that in 1940 the German authorities—a few marginal intellectuals like Dr. Friedrich Grimm aside—had no interest in getting unoccupied France to adopt their anti-Jewish policies. On the contrary, the Germans tried in 1940 to use France as a dumping ground for German Jewish refugees; in Nazi eyes, to be allowed to join Germany among the *judenfrei* peoples was too good a fate for the defeated and racially inferior French. At this early stage, even Hitler's allies were not pressed to imitate the Nuremberg Laws, although it no doubt helped create good will in party circles when Italy, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovakia did so. German pressures were always greater in areas close to real or potential military fronts—along the Channel and North Sea coasts in 1940, on the eastern front

*A study by Dr. Werner Best in August–September 1941 showed that 2,898 German civilian personnel were assigned to occupied France, 3,192 to Holland, and 18,724 to Bohemia-Moravia. Citing Freiherr von Stein's maxim "govern little" *(wenig zu regieren)*, Best advocated letting occupied countries administer themselves as fully as possible.[51]

after July 1941, and along the Mediterranean coast after November 1942, when the Allies had reached North Africa. The Nazis showed a pathological dread of Jewish concentrations near German armies' operating areas. When extermination fully replaced emigration in German policy, and Germany faced war on multiple fronts, the Nazis tried to impose their aims on a far wider area.

The areas where the Nazis could best apply their will varied considerably with time and the course of the war. If the war had somehow ended suddenly in April 1944, France would have fared much more poorly in the comparisons, and Hungary would be able to claim among the fewest Jewish dead. And had the war in Europe continued for a year or so beyond May 1945, the remaining Jews in all occupied areas would probably have been killed, giving us yet another comparative ranking. The course of the war, and the changing opportunities it gave the RSHA to work its will under the umbrella of German power, had more to do with the final totals than matters of structure—terrain, dispersal, size of the Jewish population—or local attitudes. The more we contemplate the game of statistical comparisons, the less we feel the raw totals reveal without careful study of local conditions.

Although the Nazis' capacity to work their will was the paramount determinant of the Jews' fate in Europe, it is still important to determine how German force meshed or clashed with indigenous policies concerning Jews. It was extremely rare—the Danish case is the only example—for local forces to thwart a determined German effort. A nearly total absence of Dutch popular support for anti-Jewish measures, and the demonstrations in the Netherlands against them in February 1941[52]—a far bolder act of public resistance to antisemitism than anything known in France—could not save the Jews of Holland. On the other hand, indigenous policies could facilitate the Germans' efforts, or impede them, to some degree. How much did local anti-Jewish activities, such as those of Vichy France, help the RSHA to do its work? How did Vichy compare with other governments in this respect?

Comparison obliges us to look in unaccustomed directions. France was altogether unique among occupied western European nations in having adopted indigenous antisemitic policies. No other occupied country in western Europe took even the most tentative step in this direction on its own; although, to be sure, few of them, including Norway or Denmark, had sufficient autonomy to have done so had they wished. Some of Hitler's allies, however—Hungary and Italy in 1938, and Rumania in 1940, but not Spain or Portugal, which remained neutral—adopted their own antisemitic measures. Pétain thus had more in

common, with respect to anti-Jewish measures, with Horthy and Antonescu than with Franco and Salazar.* It is thus to Hungary and Rumania that we must turn for closer comparison.

The three countries were certainly not identical; France was Germany's defeated enemy, while Hungary and Rumania were allies. Part of French territory was subjected to an army of occupation in June 1940, and all of it after November 1942; some German divisions were stationed in Rumania by mutual consent in October 1940; but Hungary received only occasional transient German troops until March 1944. Rumania had a far more virulent antisemitic tradition than had France; and even comparatively tolerant Hungary had turned against its Jewish middle class in 1919–20. These countries came after only Poland and Lithuania in the size and urban-commercial-professional concentration of their Jewish minorities: 5.1 percent of the Hungarian population was Jewish, with 34.4 percent of the doctors and 49.2 percent of the lawyers; 4 percent to 5 percent of the Rumanian population was Jewish, with 14.3 percent of the overall urban population and up to nearly half the town populations in Czernowitz, in Bukovina.[53] The Jewish population of France never exceeded 1 percent between the wars. The authoritarian-nationalist regime of Hungary had already imposed a *numerus clausus* in 1921; and Rumania, though officially proclaiming its Latin kinship with France between the wars, was a country where violence against Jews was winked at, and where the most successful antisemitic party outside Germany and Austria won 15.5 percent of the vote and became the third largest party in the kingdom in December 1937. The France of the Third Republic, by contrast, penalized its antisemitic minority, and so little discrimination was permitted in public life that Jews were not even identified as such in the French vital statistics—an obstacle about which the German police complained after 1940.[54]

Despite these disparities, however, the general lineaments of the three countries' anti-Jewish policies had much in common. Antisemitism was greatly sharpened by defeat in all three—in Hungary in 1919, in France in June 1940, and in Rumania by the loss of one third of her territory to Hungary and Russia in summer and fall 1940. In all three countries, leaders lent their considerable authority to native anti-Jewish measures that owed more to religious and cultural protectionism than to Nazi racialism. These leaders believed they were working in the

*Throughout the period of the Final Solution, Rumania was ruled by the military dictatorship of Marshal Ion Antonescu who effectively seized full control in January 1941; Portugal was in the hands of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who had ruled since 1928.

national interest, and all hoped that the Germans would be suffic impressed with their domestic anti-Jewish measures to leave th their own devices. All distanced themselves from the German Solution when it began in 1942, and made some attempt to protect own Jewish nationals. The Germans were in a position to blackmai leader by threatening to replace him with a more radical rival—I (the most powerful contender on the extreme Right in France), th Guard (the Rumanian fascists), the Arrow Cross (their Hungarian e alent). All three regimes carried out unprecedented spoliation contributed directly to the deaths of large numbers of Jews. So le comparison proceed.

The indigenous anti-Jewish legislation of these three countries a family resemblance. All shared an economic and cultural prote ism that sought to preserve more places in a shrinking economy fo dominant national group, to expel those minorities deemed unass ble, and to hasten the assimilation of the rest in the name of cu homogeneity. Admiral Horthy led the way in Hungary in 1938 v law limiting Jews to 20 percent of the professions and private busir and abridging certain property rights; he narrowed these restric drastically in 1939 to 6 percent and 12 percent, respectively, and a absolute prohibitions upon state service and influential cultural such as publishing and theater directing.[55] In Rumania, continuin anti-Jewish campaign of his predecessors, General Antonescu en a mass of similar legislation during the six months after inheriti September 1940 the shrunken remnant of the nation from the dis ited King Carol.[56] Vichy's legislation was no less harsh, though regime had its own national priorities. In agrarian Rumania, Je landowning was prohibited early (4 October 1940); although V banned absentee Jewish landowning in late 1941. On 8 March Antonescu excluded Jews from teaching; while Pétain had seen tc in the first *Statut des juifs* on 3 October 1940. During 1941, both mania and Hungary imposed harsh labor service on Jews—a plan Laval only discussed in 1943. Also, in 1941, Hungary copied the Ger Nuremberg laws forbidding intermarriage—a move that no Fr official, not even Darquier, dared to make.[57] On the other hand, Vi definition of a Jew spread the net wider than the others did—wider than the Germans' own ordinances in Occupied France and the laws of the same period in Hungary and Slovakia.[58]* If the V regime had adopted, say, the Hungarian definition of Jewishness (t

*Both Hungary and Slovakia later tightened their definitions beyond a strictl gious criterion.

practicing the Jewish religion and their children, excluding veterans and those converted before 1919), the effect of its *Statuts des juifs* would have been considerably reduced.

All three regimes also made some efforts to protect their own Jewish nationals from the Final Solution, and all three were accused by the Nazis of "a policy of obstruction."[59] Contrary to what prior French tradition would lead us to expect, Marshal Pétain comes out less energetic than Admiral Horthy in these efforts. Apart from one incident in 1941 when Hungary expelled 11,000 to 18,000 foreign refugees into newly occupied Galicia—an episode in the battle over refugees rather than in the Final Solution—Horthy's regime handed over no Jews to the Germans until after German occupation forces arrived on 22 March 1944, nearly two years after Vichy had begun delivering Jews to the Germans from its Unoccupied Zone. Soon after huge mass deportations began in May 1944, Horthy responded to clerical and humanitarian protests and rescinded his agreement in early July. Deportations did not begin again until he had been removed from power, and the Arrow Cross had a free hand under Ferenc Szálasi in October 1944. They doomed about half of Hungary's pre-1940 Jewish population of 400,000 and an overwhelming proportion of the 250,000 Jews in those portions of Transylvania allocated to Hungary by the German-sponsored Vienna Award of 30 August 1940.* That toll was of course heavier than France's 75,000, or one-quarter of its Jews; but it was achieved by a great concentration of German force in 1944. Whether the Germans could or would have employed a comparable force simultaneously in a western European area in 1944 is open to question, and what a similarly vigorous obstruction by Pétain might have achieved in the west can only be imagined.

Antonescu's record in protecting some of Rumanian Jewry from the Final Solution was not so much worse than Pétain's as one would expect, considering the rest of the Rumanian antisemitic record. Rumania stood out as the one European state in addition to Germany that practiced outright extermination on its own, at least in the territories it conquered from the Russians after June 1941. When Rumanian armies cooperated with the Germans in the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Jews of reconquered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were herded into camps or ghettos or moved farther east across the Dienster (Transnistria). Almost all 250,000 of them died of forced labor, poor conditions, or simple execution by German or Rumanian *Einsatzkommandos*.[61] And yet Antonescu blocked the deportation of Jews from the *Regat*, the heartland of the country. Furthermore, he moved against the trend in his relations with the racialist extremists of Rumania, led by the Iron Guard. Although he had assumed power jointly with the Iron Guard in September 1940, he turned against the Guard in January 1941 after it had embarked on a rampage of looting and killing Jews and other "enemies." With German acquiescence, he expelled the Guard from the government and curbed it in a bloody repression. He thereby proved to anyone who wanted to observe that Hitler basically preferred order to ideological fervor in his satellites, and the satellites were less threatened by blackmail from home-grown Nazis than they seem to have feared. When the Final Solution began, Antonescu obstructed deportation from the *Regat*, even though the Iron Guard chief Horia Sima remained in reserve in Berlin. Antonescu made repeated attempts to persuade the Germans to authorize the departure of Jews for Palestine and Syria. The Germans evidently found it too troublesome or expensive to do the work themselves. In the end, most of the 300,000 assimilated Jews in the country's core survived.[62]

*The statistics in Hilberg remain generally accepted today. See also Nora Levin's and Lucy Dawidowicz's statistical appendices.[60]

Vichy's efforts to afford some protection to native French Jews were thus less vigorous than those of Horthy, and neither more vigorous nor more effective than those of Antonescu insofar as the Rumanian heartland was concerned. The course of the war determined that life chances were better for Jews in France than in either Hungary or Rumania, but it is hard to attribute much credit for that to the Pétain regime itself. The regime began by adopting, on its own initiative, a wide-ranging program of legal disabilities and property spoliations and imposing them on Jews more broadly defined than those of German satellites at the time. It interned thousands of foreign Jews in camps whose conditions, as we have seen, were more primitive than those of the Nazi concentration camps of the 1930s. The first Jewish victims of the Holocaust in France died on *French* soil. Serge Klarsfeld has collected from departmental and prefectoral archives the names of more than two thousand Jews who died in French camps, and the total is probably closer to three thousand.[63]

When the Final Solution began, the Vichy regime volunteered to round up and hand over to the Germans foreign Jews from the Unoccupied Zone of France. This step puts Vichy France among very limited company indeed. Only one other regime in all Europe delivered up numbers of Jews to the Germans from outside the area of direct German military occupation: Bulgaria, which systematically deported the Jews of newly conquered Macedonia and Thrace into German hands,

though it refused to deport Jews of the old kingdom's territory.[64]*

These cases remind us how central was the distinction between native and foreign Jews in shaping anti-Jewish policies of the allied or occupied states. Wherever there were large numbers of alien or refugee Jews, allied or occupied governments could be found who were more than willing to get rid of them. This was especially true among peoples who felt insecure or threatened, or who were attempting to reseat their authority and revive their culture in disputed borderlands. We have alluded to the efforts of Rumania to eliminate Jews from the newly reconquered regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Non-Magyarized Jews of Galicia and the Serbian city of Novi Sad suffered at the hands of the Hungarians. The Bulgarians willingly delivered up to German deportation the Jews of newly conquered Macedonia and Thrace. Foreign Jews who had found refuge in Holland or Belgium during the 1930s were more vulnerable than native-born Jews, for the former enjoyed less protection from neighbors and public officials—sometimes, indeed, suffering their hostility. Only the Italians and Danes broke this general rule. The Italians defended foreign Jews as well as Italian nationals, not only in their own country but also in France, Tunisia, Croatia, and Greece. These refreshing contrasts have much to do with the tiny, relatively homogeneous, and highly assimilated Jewish communities of Italy and Denmark. There were only about 1,500 Jewish refugees in the latter, and most Danes had probably never heard of them.[66]

Whereas foreign Jews averaged about 25 percent of the total number of Jews in western Europe in general, according to Hilberg,[67] they constituted no less than half of the Jews in France. It is true that far fewer foreign Jews entered France during the 1930s than many observers believed at the time; often the "aliens" had been in France for decades and remained alien simply because the French considered them such. But France received well over 300,000 refugees from central Europe during the 1930s—far more than any other country, including the United States, which let in 136,000.† Moreover, the French government was one of the few anywhere that spent public funds on refugees during the interwar period.[68] The backlash after 1940 was thus all the more severe.

We have discussed the 1930s refugee crisis here at length because

*Cf. also Hungary's expulsion of foreign Jewish refugees into Galicia in fall 1941, which should be seen in terms of the struggle over who would accept refugees. It was the Germans who put a stop to this move. Rumanian expulsions of Jews from Transnistria during 1942 may be viewed in the same context.[65]

†Many of the refugees who reached France left the country soon after their arrival.

we felt it essential if one is to understand the general loss of tolerance for foreigners and the more specific antisemitism of the 1940s. No country had a good record with the refugees of the 1930s or with suspicious minorities after the war began. For all its vast open spaces, Canada managed to admit only a handful of Jewish refugees before September 1939.[69] After the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor in December 1941 brought the United States into the war, the American authorities rounded up all the Japanese of the Pacific coast states of California, Oregon, and Washington—120,000 of them, some of them settled there for two generations—and put them into camps. Their property was sold for a fraction of its peacetime worth. The Canadian government did the same with its Japanese residents. In September 1939, on the outbreak of the war in Europe, the British government, like the French, interned all holders of German or Austrian passports even though most of those interned were Jewish refugees. Thus, the Vichy regime embarked after 1940 on a path already well trodden by most of the countries of the world when confronted by masses of foreigners under conditions distorted by depression and war. Vichy went farther than most, however, for the refugees were already inside the country, not at the gates. And tragically, their measures dovetailed with the more murderous enterprise of Nazi Germany.

The Vichy leaders wanted to get rid of the Jews of France. Left to themselves—at least up to the time of Darquier—they would not have killed them. They would accept those Jews who were willing to renounce all trace of cultural distinction and to disappear into the dominant nationality, provided they had proven their fitness by many generations of residence and military service, and subject to certain restrictions on careers and professions. Jews who persisted in difference, or rank newcomers, would be sent to some appropriate overseas settlement when the international situation permitted it. The refusal of other countries, such as the United States and Switzerland, to accept large numbers of refugees had already made the re-emigration of foreign Jews from France more difficult before 1940. The spread of war after 1940 made it nearly impossible. And although the Vichy government officially encouraged emigration of Jews, muddle, vindictiveness, and red tape prevented even some who had visas for North or South America from getting out. Emigration—the official goal of both the late Third Republic and the early years of Vichy—was simply not practicable after 1940.

Locked in with its unwanted refugees, the Vichy regime set out to reduce the Jews—all Jews, not merely immigrants or refugees—to a

subservient role, to strip them of their property, and to subject them to humiliating restrictions. The nightmare of old assimilated French Jewry had come true: what was perceived as an uncontrollable flood of exotic oriental Jews had compromised the position of them all.

It is striking with what alacrity the Vichy regime, enjoying more popular support at the beginning than had most preceding French governments, deliberately adopted an anti-Jewish policy after the defeat of 1940. We hope there is no longer any possible confusion about the German role in launching that policy. We can find no trace of German attempts to extend their own anti-Jewish policy to the Unoccupied Zone in the summer of 1940; at the beginning, they envisaged France as a dumping ground for their own refugees. Vichy anti-Jewish policy was thus not only autonomous from German policy; it was a rival to it. Vichy struggled with the occupying authority in an attempt to assert its own sovereignty in anti-Jewish matters, and to keep the advantages of property confiscations and refugee control for itself.

Vichy's antisemitism was not merely pre-emptive, however. It was part of a larger national effort to replace with homogeneity the enfeebling disunities of the 1930s. French political cultures from Left to Right —from Jacobinism to integral nationalism—have traditionally perceived cultural pluralism as dangerous. After the defeat of 1940, the things that had divided Frenchmen in the 1930s—class, politics, alien people, and doctrines—seemed almost fatal. Vichy leaders set about to restore the homogeneity that they imagined to have been the traditional state of France (notwithstanding a simultaneous interest in restoring regional cultures, within limits), and to whose loss in the twentieth century they attributed their military defeat. They proposed to submerge class conflict in corporatism; they proposed to replace squabbling politics with obedience and hierarchy. And as for aliens and outsiders, they proposed to put an end to the easy cosmopolitan hospitality of the Third Republic. Jews were not the only outsiders troubled. Gypsies were rounded up and interned, often under harsh conditions.* The Spanish refugees in the southwest of France aroused considerable popular hostility,[71] and a plan was afoot to send as many of them as possible to Mexico. It was not a happy time to be different in France.

Traditional French antisemitism by itself does not explain what happened. Antisemitic outbursts have not been more frequent in the full sweep of French history than in other national histories, nor have

*See the reports of Prefect André Jean-Faure on the "nomad" camps of Poitiers, Jargeau (Loiret), and Saliers (Bouches-du-Rhône) and his hopes for the nomads' "stabilization."[70]

the possibilities for Jewish acceptance and success been more limited in France than elsewhere. It is true that antisemitism became much more virulent during the 1930s in France than before. The readiness to blame Jews for the defeat in 1940 clearly had its preparation in widespread readiness in the 1930s to blame Jews for unemployment, for the threat of war, and for the dilution of French culture. Beyond the circle of active antisemites lay a broader circle that felt antipathy for foreigners in general and acquiesced in Vichy's anti-Jewish measures, or at least remained indifferent to them. The refugee problem of the 1930s had spread these antipathies widely in the administration and in the public at large. The backlash against the refugees could spread so far beyond the narrow circle of active antisemites because it drew upon an element of the republican tradition, the doctrine of assimilation.

The French doctrine of assimilation had its positive face. French language and values were deemed universal and open to all who wanted to acquire them. In a tradition leading from the honorary citizens of the 1790s through hospitality to exiles in much of the nineteenth century to warm receptivity to French-speaking African intellectuals such as Leopold Sedor Senghor in the twentieth century, French assimilationism opened the gates to anyone who wanted to be accepted. Michel Debré has written recently that a nation-state with a powerful drive for assimilation, like France, is less susceptible to racism than pluralist federations which allow multiple languages and cultures to persist.[72] In tranquil times, he may well be right. In times of crisis, however, when the national lifeboat seems ready to be swamped by a mass of exotic outsiders, the requirement of cultural assimilation can cut the other way. Difference seemed a threat after 1940; pluralism, a form of weakness. At such times, woe to Jews or gypsies or other peoples refractory to assimilation. Deliberate, obstinate, provocative difference then seems not merely a rejection, but a menace.

The comparative leniency of the Vichy regime toward blacks makes an instructive comparison. Unlike the American melting pot, French assimilationism has tended to test its aspirants by purely intellectual criteria: a willingness to submerge one's cultural identity totally in being French. Assimilated blacks in small numbers have always been more readily accepted in France than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The Vichy regime even had a black cabinet minister, the Martinique lawyer Henri Lémery, a friend of Marshal Pétain since 1934, who served as minister of colonies until September 1940. There was no longer room, of course, for Senegalese troops in the tiny army permitted France under the armistice.[73] The Vichy regime also enforced German re-

quirements forbidding "colored persons" *(gens de couleur)* from crossing the Demarcation Line into the Occupied Zone, and imposing other limitations upon blacks there, as the black deputy and member of the regime's National Council Gratien Candace complained;[74] but Vichy added no restrictions of its own upon blacks in the Unoccupied Zone, in sharp distinction to its autonomous measures against Jews. Gypsies, those irreducible outsiders, were shut up in camps to be "stabilized." It was the Jews who had always been the traditional targets when difference came to seem threatening in France, and they suffered more than any other identifiable group from the nativist outburst of 1940.

Not that the public clamored for anti-Jewish measures in the summer of 1940. The public was too stunned to do more than look up out of the abyss for leadership. A few convinced antisemites like Raphael Alibert and Xavier Vallat seized that leadership. From positions close to the center of power at Vichy, they gave legitimacy to suspicions that Jews had played a substantial role in the degradation of France, and set up machinery to penalize them. These antisemitic activists were nationalists and hostile to Germany. They disliked Nazism and felt no kinship with the biological racism of the Third Reich. While their overt supporters may never have formed a majority in Vichy France, they were left exceptional freedom by the discredit of the Third Republic values, by the disarray of the first months after defeat, by a general acquiescence in whatever was covered by the authority of Marshal Pétain, and by the widespread dislike and suspicion of foreigners in general and of Jews in particular that had spread during the 1930s.

What added to the persuasiveness of men like Alibert and Vallat was the bargaining advantage that persecution of the Jews seemed likely to afford the hard-pressed Vichy regime. In what proved to be a colossal miscalculation, the Vichy leader assumed that the German authorities would be grateful to the French for pursuing a parallel anti-Jewish policy, and would respond by yielding greater authority to France over this and other spheres of national activity. In reality, the Germans wanted something quite different. At first, they wanted to evacuate large numbers of German Jews to France. Later, they engaged in a subtle form of entrapment. They relieved themselves of much of the trouble of their own racial policy and, by exploiting Vichy's desire to regain control over administration in the Occupied Zone, nudged the French ever deeper into measures against the Jews. Even when these measures aroused private reservations among Vichy ministers and administrators, there was no open dissent from within, no systematic refusal to apply any of the new laws; there were at most a

few quiet exceptions in favor of the well-connected. Once the direction of policy had been set by Laval or Darlan, the prestigious mantle of Marshal Pétain and the pulls of administrative unity, duty in times of national peril, and sheer routine turned the machinery of government implacably against the Jews.

The subsequent horrors of the Final Solution have tended to obscure the autonomous French anti-Jewish project of 1940–42. The measures of those first two years had catastrophic effects upon the Jews of France. Snapping the material links that bound Jews to French society, Vichy confiscated their property through aryanization, dismissed them from government service, excluded them from professions and higher education. Thousands of productive French Jews were thus turned into refugees, who swelled the ranks of those already uprooted by other states, and who offered self-fulfilling validation of the popular animus against "parasites." Vichy also snapped the legal links that normally offered protection to citizens and visitors. Officials entrusted with upholding constitutional guarantees deprived a segment of French citizenry of them, owing to circumstances of ancestry rather than for anything individuals had done. The way was open for legal disabilities without limit in the name of administrative convenience or the rulers' taste. Finally, Vichy snapped the links of moral solidarity among peoples. Even though he never pronounced the word "Jew" in a public statement, Marshal Pétain lent his immense prestige implicitly to a systematic propaganda of collective denigration. Two years of government measures that linked national revival to antisemitism dulled the consciences of many French people toward a group officially blamed for everything from high prices to the defeat. The first two years of Vichy made it hard to see Jews as victims rather than as problems.

When the Germans began their systematic deportation and extermination of Jews in 1942, Vichy's rival antisemitism offered them more substantial help than they received anywhere else in western Europe, and more even than they received from such allies as Hungary and Rumania. Having begged the Germans for years to take back their refugees, the Vichy leaders offered to dispatch foreign Jews from unoccupied areas—something that Bulgaria alone, in eastern Europe, did on a similar scale. They had already accumulated large numbers of foreign Jews in internment camps and labor battalions. They had systematically enumerated and identified the Jews of the Unoccupied Zone as well as the Occupied Zone, devoting the best of their new perforated-card statistical technology to the purpose,[75] and setting up elaborate file systems that simplified the task of the SS and the French police who did

the work of rounding up Jews for deportation. After December 1942, they marked the ID and ration cards of all Jews—citizens as well as refugees—with a large *Juif* or *Juive,* thus exposing all of them to the increasingly haphazard raids of the SS. The CGQJ, an organ of the French government, performed much of the administrative routine that elsewhere was forced upon the Jewish councils or *Judenräte.* The French police were indispensable. As SS-General Oberg wrote to French Police Chief Bousquet on July 1942, as the two police services solidified their agreement to work together, "I am happy to confirm, moreover, that the French police has up to now performed in a manner worthy of appreciation."[76] The Germans could never have accomplished as much on their own.

Were there reasonable alternatives? Vichy's supporters contend that outright refusal in this matter that engaged the Nazis' emotions so deeply would have precipitated "the worst": the Germans would have turned France over to right-wing fanatics from Paris, so goes this argument, and the Nazis would have become even more directly involved in arrests and deportations. As to the first point, the evidence suggests simply that Vichy miscalculated. Throughout Europe the Germans wisely preferred conservative and nationalist leaders to fascist adventurers. The Nazis knew that the satellite fascists would further drain the Reich's resources by plunging their countries into chaos, civil war, and expansionism. Moderating his own fanaticism with shrewd calculation, Hitler could be sensitive to political limits. In his midnight harangues at the dinner table, he talked of grandiose schemes of ridding the world of Jews; in the sober light of morning he drew back until worsening war situations seemed to demand complete control. The Germans did not expend much effort to bring the Italians into line on the Jewish question, for example, despite the Italians' open sabotage of the Final Solution.[77] In Finland, a much weaker ally, government resistance to deportation policy withstood the menaces of Heinrich Himmler and the presence of a powerful German army. In the end, the Finnish Jews were not deported.[78] Horthy withheld Jews from deportation in Hungary until 1944; and Antonescu, who had successfully turned against the main native pro-Nazi party in 1941, refused the deportation of the Jews from the heartland of Rumania—whatever his barbarities toward the Jews of the reconquered provinces. Stunned by the débâcle, however, Vichy failed to appreciate the limits of German power. With France, the German bluff worked admirably. In the same way, Vichy misjudged the capacity of the Germans to move against Jews on their own. Given the shortages of German manpower in the west, without the exertions

of the French police and administration, the Germans would have had to withdraw substantial forces from military uses in order to have sent an equivalent number of Jews to the east by themselves.

A number of modest acts would have obstructed the deportation of Jews in 1942 even without raising any major confrontation with the Germans over police cooperation or otherwise troubling the basic policy of collaboration. The camps could have been emptied before the Germans arrived in November 1942. The emigration of foreign Jews—Vichy's declared policy—could have been eased and simplified, and bureaucratic hostility to individual would-be emigrants at the local level eliminated. Above all, the regime might have refrained from stamping Jews' ID and ration cards with the words *Juif* or *Juive.* A large number of Jewish refugees might have been permitted to retreat to North Africa. This last option was excluded by Vichy's keen ear for European opinion in North Africa; the others were excluded by administrative punctilio. None was imaginable in the climate of anti-Jewish feeling deliberately cultivated by the regime.

Some may wonder how three quarters of the Jews of France survived after all. Some native-born French Jews observed all the laws scrupulously, wearing the star in the Occupied Zone, having their cards stamped, shopping only at the specified times, exercising some modest craft without direct dealings with the public, and not hiring anyone. The files of the Vichy anti-Jewish police, the Sections d'Enquête et Contrôle contain a few such cases too modest for even those zealots.[79] Many other Jews benefited by the assistance or complicity of a friend or neighbor—sometimes out of self-interest, sometimes benevolent—who took over a shop or sheltered young people on a farm (where their labor was desperately needed), received family valuables, or offered simply the gift of silence. Jews of French citizenship sometimes benefited from the Vichy government's preference that foreigners go first, though often the SS took anyone who came to hand. The course of the war saved Jews whose departure Vichy had only postponed. As for foreigners, the chance of finding a helpful friend or neighbor was smaller. The possibilities of escape overseas were mainly reserved for the rich, the famous, or the extremely resourceful—and the lucky ones among these. Even Jews who had volunteered for the French army in 1940, and whom the Vichy leaders felt engaged the regime's prestige, could not be exempted by Vichy's feeble efforts. The most fortunate foreigners escaped from French law by holding a favored passport: British or American, of course, or of a British possession such as Egypt, or of one of the states such as Turkey, Italy, or Hungary that refused to

let its citizens be deported. Another way of escaping French law was —ironically enough—to escape to a fascist country: into the Italian zone of occupation as long as the Italians were in charge, or across the Pyrenees to Spain or Portugal. The most vulnerable by far, of course, were those who were most unwelcome in France, the refugees from Germany and eastern Europe for whom no one would speak any more; among that last category, the poorest were most vulnerable of all.

In the summer and autumn of 1942, when the French police and administration lent their hands to the task, some 42,500 Jews were deported from France to their deaths—perhaps one third of them at Vichy's initiative from the Unoccupied Zone. When Vichy began to drag its feet in 1943, the number declined to 22,000 sent east in the year 1943. After the last use of French police in January 1944, and despite feverish last-minute German efforts, the number deported up to August 1944 was 12,500. One can only speculate on how many fewer would have perished if the Nazis had been obliged to identify, arrest, and transport without any French assistance every Jew in France whom they wanted to slaughter.



FRENCH CHILDREN OF THE HOLOCAUST

A Memorial

Serge Klarsfeld

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FOREWORD

Serge Klarsfeld and his wife Beate are best known to the public as Nazi hunters. It's a term they're not fully comfortable with, since the restoration of the names and faces of the victims is more important to them than the punishment of the murderers. Still, over three decades, the actions of this couple against Nazi criminals, focusing on the "desk murderers" rather than on lowly camp guards, have been astonishingly effective. As private citizens, they wield neither political nor police power, depending instead on dramatic acts of moral symbolism to get results. The first and purest example was Beate's public slapping of West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in 1968. That slap was a reproach to the presumption that a man who had been an ambitious Nazi propagandist should lead a new, democratic Germany. Kiesinger lost the 1969 general election to Willy Brandt, who had been an opponent of and a refugee from Nazism.

In the early 1970's, the Klarsfelds focused global attention on Klaus Barbie, the former Gestapo officer known as the "Butcher of Lyons," then in his comfortable Bolivian hiding place. They persevered in a lonely, ten-year campaign to bring Barbie to justice, culminating in his dramatic extradition to France in 1983 and his trial four years later. Another long effort finally brought the trial in Cologne in 1979 of Kurt Lischka, Ernst Heinrichsohn, and Herbert Hagen, three Nazis responsible for the deportation of Jews from Occupied France, who, until then, had been living free and unpunished in postwar Germany. The couple also carried out on-site campaigns against such Nazi criminals as Walter Rauff, inventor of the mobile gas chamber, who had found refuge in Chile, and Aloïs Brunner, a trusted henchman of Adolf Eichmann, hosted by Syria. Brunner was another key figure in the deportation of Jews–especially children–from France. He also headed a special unit which arrested Jews in Nice in 1943. Among those arrested was Serge's father, Arno, who offered himself for arrest in order to save his wife and children who were hiding behind a false panel in their apartment. He was murdered in Auschwitz.

No less astonishing than their record against Nazi criminals is the fact that, despite putting their bodies on the line in many unfriendly venues, including Damascus, Beirut, Khomeini's Iran, and Karadzic's Pale, the Klarsfelds are still alive to tell the tale. The only casualty has been their car–destroyed by a bomb in its garage in 1979.

While the Klarsfelds often act alone, they created in 1979, on the eve of the Cologne trial, the Fils et Filles des Déportées Juifs de France–FFDJF, the Sons and Daughters of Jews Deported from France. This organization filled a special train which carried them to the trial at Cologne, where they marched proudly, the first Jews to do so in Germany since Hitler rose to power. Another special train organized by the FFDJF marked the 50th

anniversary of the first deportation convoy from France by duplicating its route to Auschwitz. The organization also created a striking memorial to the French Holocaust at Roglit, Israel, overlooking the valley where David slew Goliath. A long, slightly curving wall on which are inscribed the 76,000 names of the victims, the memorial is a conceptual precursor to the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C. A different kind of memorial is the plaque at the Hotel du Parc in Vichy, headquarters of the Vichy régime (1940-44). No other public recognition is to be found in this pleasant resort town recalling the "crimes and dishonor" of Vichy.

Understandably, given the high drama of the Klarsfelds' actions against Nazi criminals, their parallel and equally astonishing publication record is not so well known by the public. Yet, for over 30 years, Serge Klarsfeld has written or produced dozens of original books, meant to be tools of explication, evidence, and memory. Some document Nazi crimes, some point fingers elsewhere by revealing the contents of hard-won official files. A prime example is *Vichy-Auschwitz* (written by Klarsfeld and published in 1983 and 1985 in two volumes by Fayard in Paris), which tells the story, with meticulous documentation, of the role of the Vichy government in the Final Solution in France. The *Calendrier de la Persécution des Juifs de France* (written, edited, and published in 1993 by Klarsfeld in France) is a deceptively compact, yellow-covered tome in which the day-by-day recounting of the Holocaust as it unfolded in France becomes a universe of suffering even before the transport of the victims to Auschwitz. One book which manages to stand out even within the Klarsfeld canon is *Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers* (published in 1989 by the Beate Klarsfeld Foundation in New York). This oversized work, reprinting German blueprints and correspondence concerning the construction of the killing apparatus, counters the perennial lie that the gas chambers were not big enough to carry out genocide. Author Jean-Claude Pressac, once a Holocaust doubter, was converted to a believer after several study trips to Auschwitz.

In the autumn of 1979, I flew to Paris, on assignment for the *New York Times Magazine*, to cover the impending trial in Cologne of those three top Nazis who'd been active in France. After the overnight trip from New York, I'd hoped to adjourn with the Klarsfelds to a café for a chat over a restorative cup of coffee. But, arriving at the couple's office, then on the Rue de Rivoli, I found a more pressing task at hand: Amidst much bustle, Beate was preparing to hand deliver to Paris newspapers copies of a large book, about the size of the Manhattan telephone directory, that was fresh off the press, *Le Mémorial de la Déportation des Juifs de France* ("The Memorial to Jews Deported from France"). Seeing Beate weighed down by her load, I could no longer think of lounging in a café and instead offered to help her on her delivery rounds while Serge remained behind, preparing for the trial. Only later did I examine the *Mémorial*. What I saw, even after having perused numerous Holocaust narratives, had a revelatory impact. Here were the 76,000 names of Auschwitz-bound Jews, listed by train convoy and identified by last name, first name, date of birth, place of birth, and nationality (or lack of one if stripped of citizenship). Whole families, from grandparents born in

Queen Victoria's prime to babies born behind French barbed wire, appeared on the lists. Some of these families were deported together. Others were split so that children separated from their parents were forced to make the horrific journey uncomforted by loved ones. "In spite of our own domestic happiness," Serge wrote in his preface, "we often wept when confronted with the images which loomed from these lists full of children's names."

Though primarily meant as an act of "piety and homage" to the victims, the *Mémorial* also functioned as legal evidence. Its text explicated the deportation machinery in France, named its German operatives and French collaborators, and catalogued their official telegrams and internal memos. Introduced at the Cologne trial, this book was consulted by the judges and helped to convict the three defendants, Lischka, Heinrichson, and Hagen. Long after assuming they were quite literally "home free," this trio went to jail.

The *Mémorial*, published in an American edition in 1983 and now out of print, seemed definitive to all but Serge Klarsfeld. He resisted requests to reprint it, choosing, rather, to build on it and further advance the restoration of memory. The result is the book in your hands. The world knows the face of Anne Frank. Here are the faces of 2,500 children, under age 18, all but a tiny fraction soon to he killed. There's a depthless quality to the children's memorial. No matter how often I open it to a random page, it seems there's always a new face, solemn or smiling, that I'd missed, as from a luminous spring burbling up from a dark source. Each time, with the same fragile optimism, I check convoy number, hoping it's a later one from 1944, allowing for the slight chance that the child survived if he or she was old enough to be selected for slave labor. Far more likely, the convoy falls in that dreadful summer and fall of 1942, following the mass arrests of Jews in both Occupied and Vichy France, when more than half of these children were deported. From that time, almost no child survived.

A cold silence once enveloped Vichy's crimes. It would be broken, Serge Klarsfeld once predicted, by the actions of the sons and daughters of deportees. That silence, early on, was total. Consider the publication in 1947 of *Our Vichy Gamble*, by William Langer, Coolidge Professor of History at Harvard University. In this major study of the U.S.-Vichy diplomacy, not a single mention is made of the state's anti-Jewish laws, arrests, incarceration, and delivery of victims for deportation, nor even that Vichy had a commissioner of Jewish Affairs. Jews do not exist in Langer's portrayal of Vichy. It is a long way from that vacuum to the publication of this book.

It is invidious to single out any one image from the children's memorial for attention. Still, I must point to one that strikingly shows how incomprehensible was the prospect of Holocaust to Jews in France. It's the Kogan family's 1941 New Year's card from Paris, featuring a photo of baby Marceline and offering the wish that 1942 will be a "good year." How to imagine that it would be the year in which Marceline and her mother would be arrested, deported, and murdered at Auschwitz?

The Klarsfelds have always placed an emphasis on the deported children. To me, that emphasis was puzzling. Why single out any group when all met the same end? Then I became a parent, as the Klarsfelds already

were, and I had my answer, its full force coming at an unexpected moment that recalled what Magda Bogin, who translated some of these pages, has referred to as our "interchangeability" with the victims. It was on a summer day in Bar Harbor, Maine, where I was strolling with my three-year-old daughter. We were two tourists among many, gazing into shop windows. Thinking that she had her eye on me, I stepped into a shop for a moment which must have turned into two or three. Suddenly, I heard a shriek from the sidewalk. I dashed out to see my daughter's face filled with the fear of having been deserted in a strange town. At that instant, I had a flash of an image of her, separated from parents and uncomforted, first in the filth of Drancy, then in a boxcar on the way to Auschwitz: the actual fate of 11,000 children arrested in France. Then I understood, not with my intellect but with a father's protective instinct, why the Klarsfelds had always emphasized the children.

As parents, we observe simultaneously our own aging and our children's blossoming. Our expectations for ourselves are gradually transferred to them. If we could put our bodies in the way of their pain, even trading our lives for theirs, we would do so–as Arno Klarsfeld had done. The parents of the children in this book could not do that. They were powerless even to preserve the memory of their children. This memorial book full of innocent faces accomplishes that sacred task.

Peter Hellman
New York, October 1996

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The eyes of 2,500 children gaze at us from across the years in these pages. They are among the more than 11,400 children whose lives are chronicled here[1] innocent children who were taken from their homes all over France to be deported and put to death in the Nazi camps. Here are the names, addresses, birth dates, and the truth about what happened to all of these children. Their biographies are brief because their lives were brief. On behalf of the few survivors of their families, this book is their collective gravestone.

More than 50 years have passed since the murders of these beautiful children–for they are all beautiful in my eyes–who once played in the streets of Paris, Marseilles, Lyons, Nice, and other French cities and villages you may know. It has taken so long for many people in France to confront what happened here, to these children from our neighborhoods and towns and cities. And perhaps it is time to share this with others so they may know how these terrible events happened and come to know some of the young victims, arrested in the streets you will find if you visit France.

This book is born of my obsession to be sure that these children will not be forgotten. Twenty years ago, when reconstructing the lists of Jews deported to death from France, I found that some of the deported children were listed only by number–the infants were too young to know or say their names–and I felt a deep shame that they died nameless to the world. At first I was gripped with an obsession to know all their names and to discover the places where they lived; eventually I had an obsession to know their faces. After years of searching, of asking French survivors, of writing in Jewish newspapers and speaking on the radio in France, Israel, America, and other countries, I have found photographs of more than 2,500 of these lost children. After 50 years their faces are seen again in the pages of this book.

There is no question that in France, during the period the French refer to as the Shoah and Americans as the Holocaust, children were a smaller proportion of the Jews annihilated than was the case in some neighboring countries. We know there was a great effort in France to rescue Jewish children, an effort initiated by Jewish organizations, supported by many Christian and secular groups, and aided by many ordinary citizens who acted spontaneously against the persecutions of

1. Jewish children under the age of 16 made up not less than 21 percent of the total Jewish population in France at the beginning of World War II, based on censuses taken by both the Germans and the Vichy government. This age distribution was probably similar in Belgium and Italy. While comparisons of relative numbers of deportees are not exact because the age categories do not match precisely, nonetheless they substantiate the point: In France, 9,300 of the 75,700 Jews deported, or 12.3 percent, were under age 16; 11,400, or 15 percent, were under age 18. In Belgium, where 5,200 Jewish children under the age of 15 were deported out of a total of 25,500 Jewish deportees, the proportion was 20 percent. In Italy, 21.5 percent of the deportees were under age 20.

Jewish families. But at the same time, the agents of the Gestapo depended in France less on their own forces than on the efficient complicity of the police and administration of the French state. That state tormented and martyred thousands of Jewish families.

Three episodes in particular will remain part of history, because they were culminating moments of the Final Solution in France–and all three involved children. The first and largest, the action known as the roundup of the Vélodrome d'Hiver (or Vel d'Hiv)–the winter bicycling stadium–which brought the arrests of more than 4,000 Jewish children of the Paris region, was carried out exclusively by French police in the summer of 1942. None of the thousands of children deported following these police raids survived. The second was the April 1944 roundup by the Lyons Gestapo, headed by SS officer Klaus Barbie, of 44 Jewish children who had taken refuge in the hamlet of Izieu in central France. All 44 were murdered in the East. The final episode was the raid led by Aloïs Brunner, a key SS officer involved with deportations of Jews, in July 1944 on the eve of the Liberation, to arrest 250 children boarded in Jewish children's homes in the Paris area. Many of the children whose photographs are included in this volume were victims of these events.

I myself was a Jewish child hunted by the Gestapo. Brunner seized my father in Nice on September 30, 1943, but failed to find me or my mother and sister; the three of us were hidden behind a false partition in a deep closet. We were of Romanian nationality, and if we had remained in Paris we would already have been arrested, a year earlier, in the great roundup of Romanian Jews by French police in the early morning hours of September 24, 1942. We would have been deported September 25 on convoy 37–the 37th convoy of railway freight cars that shipped Jews to the East–and gassed at Auschwitz on September 27, 72 hours after our arrest.

Brunner led the Nazi action in Nice, preferring to work with his own commando of Austrian SS rather than use the local French police, whom, as a result, I never feared. It was the men of the Gestapo whom we feared every moment and from whom we succeeded in escaping. From November 1942 to September 1943, Jews living in the Italian Zone of occupation, as we did, were in an oasis of tolerance, protected by the Italian army with the support of Italian diplomats in Rome. The Italian military authorities prevented, by force when necessary, the arrest of Jews by the Vichy police. I never feared the French police nor knew I should. When Brunner's SS broke into our Nice apartment building, beating our friends and neighbors, from our hiding place I heard–and I hear it still–my friends' father shouting, "Help! Help! French police–Help! We're French! Save us! Save us!"

Later, from March until August 1944, hiding in the Upper Loire, where the Gestapo had no antennae–we did not have to fear either French police or the area's German civil or military authorities, who were little or not at all concerned with the Jewish Question.

And so, I was able to avoid the terrible wound suffered by thousands of Jewish children who survived to become adults, many of them remnants of maimed families, who saw men in French uniforms rob them of their family happiness and their lives. Moreover, I did not have to wear the yellow star, which was imposed only in the Occupied Zone.

While they ruled, the Italian occupation authorities in the south of France even prevented French administrators from stamping the word "Jew" on our identity papers.

At moments when we did feel the danger of arrest around us, we also felt the active solidarity of many French people, both secular and religious people, who held out their hands to us, knowing the situation in which we found ourselves and who we really were.

And much later, when I began to struggle against the immunity enjoyed by the German criminals responsible for the Final Solution in France, it was, first of all, Germans who gave me firm support–that of my wife being the most precious and effective. And then a generation of sons and daughters of the Jewish deportees of France involved themselves in our work. It is to their support that we owe the convictions of the German criminals, the indictments of their French accomplices, and the change in attitudes of French society, particularly our youth, toward the guilt of the Vichy government.

The Gestapo wanted to destroy all traces of the existence of its Jewish victims. Whatever personal papers Jews carried with them were destroyed on their arrival at extermination centers–at the same time that most of the victims themselves were destroyed. Those who survived the "selection" for work or death on the arrival ramps were registered and tattooed with a serial number that became their entire concentration camp identity. Furthermore, total destruction of the archives of the extermination of millions of human beings was anticipated in case of a Nazi defeat. This included the documents recording Jews' arrivals in the camps, and in particular their camp registration cards. Ultimately, in fact, most of these documents were burned. We should always remember the declaration of Heinrich Himmler to SS leaders about the Final Solution: "It is a glorious page that will never be written."

In France, the Gestapo and French police administrators used arrested Jews' identity papers to create registration files at Drancy and in the camps in Loiret, Compiègne, and other places, and to make up the deportation lists. The act of recording was misleading, since the final goal of the process was total disappearance of the deportees. And whatever the outcome for Germany, victory or defeat, these files and other French archives on the arrest and internment of Jews were destined to be kept secret. This is the traditional rule in France if documents risk creating problems or causing embarrassment for the generation that lived through the events. For example, at the Liberation, the Prefecture of Police in Paris destroyed almost all its voluminous archives on arrests of Jews, and in addition quietly transferred the family and individual files from the Prefecture's Jewish registry, and files on Jews arrested in Paris, to the Ministry of Veterans and War Victims Affairs.

At the Liberation, a true balance sheet of the catastrophe experienced by Judaism in France would not have been possible if Jews had not taken responsibility for their history into their own hands. This happened first at Drancy, where those responsible for the camp registers conscientiously saved them and the deportation lists they possessed and turned them over to the new French authority, which would become the Ministry of Veterans and War Victims. As it happened, that organization would jealously guard these documents

essential to identifying the victim, and would never release copies, not even to the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation (CDJC). The precious CDJC, created in 1943 by the Jewish community, is the institutional memory of the fate of France's Jews during the Holocaust.

Fortunately, the CDJC, acting quite illegally but with full legitimacy, seized and guarded the archives of the Jewish Affairs Service of the Gestapo in France. These archives did not include a copy of the Drancy register, but they did contain the carbon copies of most convoy lists, made at the time of the deportations. Without these documents, which have been made accessible to researchers, historians, journalists, students, and citizens, it would have been impossible to reconstruct exactly what happened to the Jews in France during the Second World War.

Other documents have been released over time, often as a result of our lawsuits. I won access to the archives of the trials of German criminals by French military courts; the records of the Vichy Interior Ministry's delegation in German-occupied France; and the archives of the Paris Prefecture of Police, the Ministry of Veterans and War Victims, and the camps of the Loiret region. Some documents are held by other institutions, including the Union Générale des Israelites de France (UGIF) archives at the YIVO Institute in New York, and many at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem. The archives at these institutions and elsewhere have been used to prepare a series of reference works on the fate of French Jews during the war.

The first of these works was the 1978 volume *Le Mémorial de la Déportation des Juifs de France* (published in English by the Klarsfeld Foundation in 1983 as *The Memorial to the Jews Deported from France*). That work contains name, birth date, nationality, and deportation convoy for each of the 75,700 Jews deported from France. It was the culmination of a lengthy research effort to restore to the victims their dignity by identifying each one. In fact, until we found and reconstructed all the convoy deportation lists to create the *Memorial*, there had been no agreement even on how many Jewish victims there were. Thirty-six years after the Final Solution was put in motion, this work thwarted efforts to conceal or minimize the work of the Nazi executioners and their Vichy accomplices.

The *Mémorial* had a profound impact. Despite some errors–for example, incorrect spellings–names were usually recognized by surviving members of a family. Many learned for the first time the details of the deportation and death of their vanished relatives from the book's histories of the convoys from Drancy and other French camps. In addition, the research helped document the crimes of Kurt Lischka, and Herbert Hagen, and Ernst Heinrichsobn, Gestapo leaders for France and the cities of Paris and Bordeaux, who were only then being tried and convicted hy a Germau court in Cologne.

The publication of the *Mémorial* in 1978, listing the names of all Jews then known to have been deported to their deaths from France, generated an immense shock in the Freneh Jewish eommunity. Typed out from the original deportation lists, convoy by convoy, the names, addresses, and birth dates and places were like an electric eurrent in mobilizing the community to confront its past. Now that the *Mémorial* has been out of print for more than five years, I am often

asked to prepare a new edition. But there can be no new edition without use of all the documentation still in the hands of the Veterans Affairs Ministry and the French National Archives. Several years ago, the Ministry began to computerize the data it holds on each deportee. When this program is complete, it doubtless will be able to publish a work based on the many sources thus brought together.

After the 1993 publication of the *Calendrier de la Persécution des Juifs de France*, a detailed account of these events by date, I determined to attempt a new reference work in the domain of memory and feeling. In my eyes and in the eyes of many others, crimes against humanity are above all the crimes committed against innocents, those who threaten no one. For some time, I had felt the need to develop a full memorial book to the Jewish children deported from France. *Les Enfants d'Izieu* (1983), published in English by Harry N. Abrams in 1984 as *The Children of Izieu: A Human Tragedy*, was the first work I devoted specifically to children. It was created in the memory of the 44 children so cruelly taken in April 1944 from the group home in eastern France where they had been sent for protection, and deported to Auschwitz. And it was in their memory that, beginning in 1971, we were driven on the long campaign to find and expose the man responsible, Klaus Barbie, in Bolivia and bring him to justice in France. In the same way, it was the memory of the 250 children seized in the summer of 1944 from children's centers in the Paris area, run by the UGIF, that drove us to begin a campaign to have Aloïs Brunner extradited from Syria and tried.

I wanted to create a children's book that would make an original contribution to the literature on the Holocaust. I believe this has now been done by bringing together the children's *names*, with precise personal information; *places*, their addresses at the moment they were arrested; and *faces*–as many photos as possible of the deported children. We have been able to identify in this book the faces of more than 2,500 of these children.

This memorial to the children comes from the heart and from my experiences documenting their lives, as well as my personal relationships with survivors from the families that lost children. I would have wanted a book of 11,000 pages, of 11,000 faces; but this work as it exists is the culmination of more than 20 years of militant engagement. For this work to exist, it was necessary to experience what I have since my childhood and to do what I have done. And I publish this book hoping it will strike a blow against anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia.

Serge Klarsfeld
Paris, June 1996

Families and friends of young deportees from France–those who were under 18 years of age at the time of deportation and are not included in this volume–are urged to send their photographs so that we can publish these precious documents.

HISTORY AND CHRONOLOGY: THE NAZI WAR AGAINST THE JEWS

In the early morning hours of September 1, 1939, the armies of Nazi Germany invaded Poland, unleashing the second world war in 21 years. It was a conflict that would last six years and would claim the lives of tens of millions of human beings. Among the dead were six million Jews who were hunted down in Western and Central Europe, the Baltic states, the Soviet Union, and the Balkans and were put to death by the Nazi genocide machine in what has come to be known as the Holocaust.

This book is about one dark and little known corner of that genocide–the murders of 11,400 Jewish children who were arrested in France and deported to Nazi concentration camps, where they were killed in gas chambers and their bodies were burned.

The Nazi war against the Jews, proclaimed in Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* in 1924 and incessantly repeated in the German leader's speeches and his party's programs, had roots deep in historic German anti-Semitism. The Nazis and their followers raged that the Jews were an inferior race and the source of all weaknesses and failures in modern German history; they must, the Nazis declared, be eliminated from Germany's public, economic, and cultural life. After Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933, Germany's Jews, who were extremely assimilated, successful, and loyal, were progressively driven from society. Those who could escape left the country.

The Nazi hatred of the Jews, however, knew no frontiers. The countries bordering Germany, and especially France, were reviled as "rotten" with Jewish influence; it was implicit in Nazi ideology that the racial war would be extended to Jews in any country coming under German domination. Beginning in 1940, when one European country after another surrendered to Nazi aggression, the war against the Jews came to those countries with the German army. But it was not until January 1942 that German officials made plans at the infamous Wannsee Conference in Berlin to achieve "the final solution of the Jewish Question" by mass killings of Jews in military zones and in the concentration camp system then being built in Poland and elsewhere in Central Europe.

The Nazi war on Poland was a short one—the Polish armies were crushed in three weeks—but the attack led Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. In the nine months that followed, the German war machine, which had been freed of the threat of a two-front war by the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, prepared its offensive in the West. It struck in April 1940 against Norway and Denmark; a few weeks later, on the morning of May 10, German forces invaded the Netherlands and Belgium and drove toward the French and British armies arrayed against them in northern France. Within five days,

German columns had subjugated the Netherlands and Belgium and reached French territory amid massive tank battles. In four more weeks, French forces were defeated, the remaining British troops were being evacuated from the beaches of Dunkerque, and the French government was being moved from Paris in anticipation of the capital's fall. German troops entered Paris on June 14, parading their victory under swastikas on the Champs Elysées.

The French government, now in Bordeaux, called on Marshal Philippe Pétain, the 84-year-old World War I hero, on the night of June 16-17 to form a new cabinet and seek an armistice with Germany. It was the first legal step toward dissolution of the French Third Republic and creation of a new French state that would collaborate with Nazi Germany. The new regime, formed in the resort city of Vichy on July 11, with Pétain as chief of state, immediately began adopting anti-Jewish regulations and laws that would rival those of Nazi Germany.

The Occupation of France and the Vichy Regime

The armistice ratifying France's surrender was signed June 25, 1940, in Rethondes, a village near Compiègne, in northern France, in the same railway carriage in which the Germans had signed their World War I surrender in November 1918. Millions of French civilians who had fled Paris and other cities, adding to the chaos that engulfed the country in the face of the German advance, began moving back toward their homes and an uncertain future.

Under the terms of the armistice, France was divided into two zones–an Occupied Zone under German control in the northern half of the country and an Unoccupied Zone, also known as the Vichy or "Free" Zone, under French control, in the southern half. In the west, the Occupied Zone included the provinces of France's entire Atlantic and Channel coasts, Paris and the central provinces, and the provinces bordering Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and Switzerland. The demarcation line between the two zones ran northwest from the Spanish border to a point near Tours and then eastward to the Swiss frontier. In the north, two departments, the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, were placed under jurisdiction of the German command for Belgium and northern France, administered from Brussels. Alsace and a large part of Lorraine, the northeastern border provinces, were annexed outright by Germany, returning the Franco-German frontier substantially to where it had been in 1871.

The demarcation line between the two zones quickly hardened into a true frontier. Special passes were required for civilians crossing the line, and they were subject to currency and other controls; at the start only 300 letters per day were permitted to cross the line. However, illegal crossings of the demarcation line persisted as long as it existed, despite severe penalties for those who were caught.

The Occupied Zone was subject to direct administration in all security matters by the Militarbefehlhaber in Frankreich–the German Military Headquarters in France, located in Paris. The German Embassy, responsible for relations with the Vichy government and for advising the German military command on political matters, was also located in Paris, as

were the headquarters of the German security and intelligence apparatus known as the SiPo-SD (Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst—Security Police and Security Service) and the feared Gestapo (State Secret Police). As of September 1940, the Gestapo's Jewish Affairs Department was headed in France by Theodor Dannecker. An underling of Adolf Eichmann, the chief of all Gestapo operations affecting Jews, Dannecker became one of the leading forces applying the Final Solution in France. To this end, he put both direct and indirect pressure on Vichy, often acting through Helmut Knochen, the SiPo-SD chief in France, and Kurt Lischka, the SiPo-SD chief in Paris.

The Unoccupied Zone in the south became the domain of the new French government. Although the armistice agreement envisaged that the new regime would return to Paris and plans were made for the move, the Germans never permitted it to take place; the government remained in the south, with its headquarters in Vichy. All French territory in both zones was nominally under the jurisdiction of the Vichy regime and its laws, on condition that they were consistent with German regulations in the Occupied Zone. The Vichy regime effectively controlled French governmental institutions in both zones, though it was subject to a German veto in all matters affecting the course of the war, and especially military, economic, and foreign policies. However, the new regime, under a government formed by Premier Pierre Laval, was itself intent on making a "national revolution" that would do away with the republican past and find an important place for France in Nazi Germany's new European order.

Vichy France and the War Against the Jews

From the beginning, and without pressure from the Germans, the Vichy government demonstrated its hostility to Jews, especially those born abroad. The laws and measures passed early by the Vichy regime without Nazi prompting made its attitude clear: (1) From July 1940 the naturalizations of foreign-born Jews could be revoked. (2) In August 1940, anti-Semitic propaganda was given free reign. (3) A law of October 3, 1940, on the status of the Jews excluded them from most public positions and private professions and defined Jews on the basis of racial criteria. (4) A law of October 4, 1940, made it legal for the French police to arbitrarily arrest "any foreigner of the Jewish race." And without Nazi pressure, Vichy created a French concentration camp system out of an existing network of internment camps.

The camps had been set up by the French government before the war to hold Spanish republican soldiers fleeing the Franco regime and other foreign nationals who had claimed asylum in France. On September 10, 1939, certain males aged 18 to 50—an age limit later extended to 65—were interned as enemy aliens and sent to the camps; most were from Germany or Austria. A few were pro-Nazi, but the vast majority were anti-Nazis and most of these were Jews. About 12,000 Germans and 5,000 Austrians were interned, although many were released early in 1940 for French military service in companies of foreign volunteers. Thousands more were interned following the Nazi breakthrough in May 1940. The French camps were primitive,

verminous, and often short of food. Many prisoners died in them.

Vichy also reacted to German pressure. At Dannecker's urging, French officials took a census of Jews in occupied territories at the end of 1940; Jews in the Unoccupied Zone were counted after the publication of a second law on the status of Jews (June 1941), which broadened the definition of a Jew. Again under pressure from the Germans, the Vichy government set up the Commissariat General aux Questions Juives (CGQJ), which was, in effect, a ministry of Jewish affairs. A special police for Jewish affairs and a Jewish umbrella organization similar to those created in other occupied countries, the Union Générale des Israelites de France (UGIF), also were established.

The first mass arrests of Jews were made in Paris in May 1941; 3,733 men, most of them Polish Jews, were seized and sent to Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande, two camps in the Loiret Department, near Orléans. Another roundup took place in the streets of Paris on August 20, 1941; 4,078 men, including more than a thousand French Jews, were sent to Drancy, a suburb northeast of Paris, where a camp was set up under abominable conditions in an unfinished apartment complex. On December 12, 1941, another 700 French Jews were arrested and sent to a camp at Compiègne, where conditions were the same. All of these camps were in the Occupied Zone.

The first deportation of Jews from France to the Auschwitz concentration camp, in Polish territory annexed by Germany, took place March 27, 1942, allegedly in retaliation against terrorist attacks. Four more convoys left in June, and at a meeting in Berlin on June 11 plans were made to arrest Jews on a wider scale. Heinrich Himmler, chief of the SS and German police, had reinforced his police forces in France and had appointed a high-ranking officer, SS General Karl Oberg, to command all German SS and police units in France. Helmut Knochen, head of the SiPo-SD, was concerned with keeping peace in France to guarantee France's collaboration with the war effort.

Premier Laval, who had been replaced by Admiral François Darlan in December 1940, had returned to power in April 1942 with a program of deepened collaboration. His new Commissioner for Jewish Questions, Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, was a fanatic anti-Semite, and his Secretary General (chief) of the National Police, René Bousquet, was anxious to reach an agreement with the Germans to reinforce Vichy's control of French police in the Occupied Zone. The price paid by Bousquet was a French police commitment to pursue the Reich's and Vichy's common enemies—Jews, Communists, and Gaullists. Dannecker intended to deport both French and non-French Jews aged 16 to 45 in this phase of deportations. However, he was already planning to deport Jewish children whenever he could persuade Berlin to approve it.

But the French government refused to arrest Jews holding French citizenship in either zone and seemed unwilling to let French police make the arrests demanded by the Germans in the Occupied Zone. Dannecker was furious. Eichmann arrived in Paris on June 30, 1942, but his plans to deport Jews who were French citizens were abandoned the following day by Knochen, the realist. Knochen feared Vichy would prevent its police forces from cooperating in occupied territory;

he was well aware that the German police forces available were too limited to make all the arrests themselves. His plan was to remain in the shadow of the French police. For his part, Bousquet knew that if disagreement with the Germans resulted in the failure of a round-up by German police alone, it would prevent the police accord he sought. He and Knochen therefore concluded an agreement on July 2 that French police would arrest 22,000 (later reduced to 20,000) stateless Jews living in Paris; French Jews would not be arrested, at least for the time being. Bousquet also promised to arrest and deliver to the Germans stateless Jews living in the Vichy Zone.

On July 4, Premier Laval reaffirmed the Bousquet-Knochen agreement and in addition offered something that had not been asked by the Germans—to hand over to them the children of stateless Jews living in the Vichy Zone. Further, Laval said that the fate of children of stateless Jews living in occupied territory "does not interest" him. Thus, for the first time, he gave the Nazis a free hand in deporting thousands of children.

The Bousquet-Knochen agreement was a silent starting gun for the planning of mass arrests of Jews in Paris. On July 16 and 17, 1942, Paris police rounded up 13,000 Jews in Paris and its suburbs, more than 4,000 of them children, arresting them in their apartments and in the streets. In their neighborhoods, the Jews were herded onto city buses to be brought to the Vélodrome d'Hiver, the indoor (winter) sports and bicycling stadium in Paris. But the number arrested in the "Vel d'Hiv" roundup was far fewer than the 20,000 sought by Dannecker.

On July 17, representatives of the French police, led by Jean Leguay, Bousquet's delegate in the Occupied Zone, insisted to the Germans that children be deported with their parents, or by themselves if their parents were deported beforehand. This would assure that deportation convoys, now scheduled for three per week, would be full. It also would mean that French police would not have to arrest other Jews to replace them, and the Vichy regime would be spared the problem of lodging and caring for 4,000 children. On July 20, Eichmann agreed to take the children within a few weeks.

Toward the end of July, before Eichmann had given a green light to deporting the children, Jewish mothers in the Beaune-la-Rolande and Pithiviers camps were bludgeoned—by French police—into giving up their children. The mothers were sent from the Loiret camps to Drancy and deported to the East early in August. The young children followed them a few weeks later. They were brought to Drancy in a pitiful state and were put into convoys with adults they did not know, to make it seem as though families were being deported together. From Drancy they went to Auschwitz, where the death installations had begun operation, and convoys arriving from France were subject to "selections" of children, mothers, the aged and the weak for the gas chambers and ovens beginning on July 21.

Between July 17 and the end of September, 33,057 Jews were deported from France to Auschwitz in 34 convoys of freight cars. As knowledge of the arrests and deportations spread, the French public became increasingly indignant. Pétain and Laval balked at German plans to step up the pace of deportation convoys to one per day by the end of September. With a traditional commitment to humanitarian values, the French were scandalized to

see their own police, soldiers, and even firemen hunting down Jews in the Vichy Zone. Leading clergymen, among them the bishops of Toulouse and Montauban, protested the arrests as violations of human rights. The archbishop of Lyons went further and protected Jewish children; many Jewish mothers entrusted their children to Christian militants who, waiting at the Lyons railway station, convinced them their final destination was certain death.

Laval hung back at the beginning of September; he knew his regime could be jeopardized if he accepted the demands of Heinz Röthke, Dannecker's successor as head of the Gestapo's Jewish Affairs Department. Röthke, seemingly less single-minded about his work, nonetheless pursued the same goals. In order to keep to the October schedule, it would be necessary to step up arrests of French Jews. Laval refused.

The Germans did not retaliate in any way against Laval for his refusal to accept accelerated deportations. Their failure to respond suggests it might have been possible for him to resist the German pressures that led to the Vel d'Hiv arrests and the deportations of children.

Before 1942 ended, nearly 42,000 Jews were deported from France to the East. In 1943 the Germans deported 17,000 Jews from France, and in 1944, 15,000 more. (Nearly 2,000 more Jews were deported through Belgium and in other transports.) As the war progressed and an Allied victory seemed more and more inevitable, French police became increasingly reluctant to take part in the roundups of Jews. The Vichy political police, known as the Milice, along with a special commando group led by Aloïs Brunner, helped to make the arrests for deportations during this period. The ferocity of Nazi anti-Semitism assured that deportations of Jews to the death camps in the East would continue until the day Allied troops began the liberation of Paris. However, in 1943 and 1944, more and more ordinary French people contributed greatly to saving Jews.

In all, the Germans deported more than 75,700 Jews from France, transporting most of them to Auschwitz in convoys of freight cars, each carrying an average of a thousand people. Only 2,564 French deportees are known to have survived the war. Including the Jews who died of malnutrition and disease in French camps, there were 80,000 victims of the Final Solution in France. This was approximately one-quarter of the 325,000 Jews who were estimated to be living in France at the start of the war.

There were 11,174 children on the 75 major deportation convoys that were dispatched from France to Auschwitz and the other Nazi death camps in the East. To this number must be added 228 children from the Departments of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, who were deported through Belgium, for a total of 11,402 children deported from France. In addition, 85 children are known to have died of disease or malnutrition in French camps, and 31 children, some as young as 15—one was only 14 years old—were shot by the Germans, a few while attempting to escape and the rest by firing squads. Very few of the 11,402 children who were deported, perhaps 300 of them, survived the war.

A French policeman salutes a German officer in front of the Arc de Triomphe.



This anti-Jewish propaganda poster from 1941 says, "Jews must be swept away to make our house clean."



A child in the Vichy camp of Gurs (Pyrénées-Atlantiques, near Spain) in 1941.

January 27, 1944. During a roundup in the Aube Department, Colette Rozen, 12, whose parents had been deported in July 1942, is arrested. She writes these letters to her adoptive family from her prison cell in Chalons-sur-Marne.

> It was very painful for me to leave you and I think constantly about Annette. Still, I have to be brave to accomplish such a difficult task. I hope to see you again soon for you know I'm suffering like this so far away from you, and besides it's a really unjust fate for me. We're in the prison of Chalons. They put eight of us in the same cell. Last night was very cold. I slept on a straw mat about three feet across, not even, with the other little girl.
>
> We don't know when we're leaving. I hope I'll be able to send you more news. Oh, assuming I return. Life won't be rosy. Until soon, then.
>
> A thousand hugs and kisses for the whole family.
>
> Colette who loves you forever.
>
> We just found out that we're leaving by train for Paris. We've been told to put all our baggage in the baggage car, but I'm keeping mine with me.
>
> What a life. I'll write you from Drancy if I can.
>
> Try to send me a package. I wish I had brought my brown dress. My provisions are running out and I'm already hungry. Oh how miserable I'm going to be. . . .

Deported from Drancy on February 10 on convoy 68, Colette, like her parents, was murdered at Auschwitz.

March 30, 1944. A report by OSE to its correspondents in Switzerland:

> The closing of the children's homes is complete. All the children have been sent to secure places. Since October more than 1,000 children in this category have been transferred to family placements. For the moment we have kept open the Limoges nursery, which will be turned over to the Red Cross. The identities of all the children have been changed. Furthermore, we have left functioning the Chaumont home, whose 50 children are subject to the Public Assistance agency, which does not permit immediate closing of the home.
>
> In recent days we have been obliged to take under our wing 300 more children belonging to families recently deported.
>
> As you can see, we are doing everything we can to make our work conform to the needs existing in all domains. You will understand, however, how complicated the situation is and how difficult it is to do what is needed in the present conditions.
>
> We know that you will do everything possible to help us in our work. It is particularly important that your financial aid comes regularly and that we have in hand reserve funds in order not to be taken short, something that could easily lead to catastrophe.

April 6, 1944. The chief of the Gestapo in Lyons, SS Lieutenant Klaus Barbie, cables the Jewish Affairs Department of the Gestapo in Paris that a children's home in the village of Izieu, in the Rhone Valley east of Lyons, has been "cleaned out" and that 44 Jewish children and 7 adult staff members are under arrest and will be transferred to Drancy the next day.

The Izieu home is situated in a large farmhouse, high in the small, relatively isolated village. Once a Catholic children's vacation home, it is registered as a shelter for refugee children and is secretly financed by OSE.



Colette ROZEN (page 82), shortly before she was deported.



Part of a page from the Drancy register of daily entries; this format was used from May 15, 1943, to August 15, 1944. This page, from January 18, 1944, includes three Jewish children from a boarding school in Avon, Jacques Halpern, Maurice Schlosser, and Jean (Hans) Michel (pages 1696 and 1697). They are memorialized in the 1987 Louis Malle film, *Au revoir, les enfants*.

These photos from the summer of 1943 were taken on the terrace, and outside, of the children's home in Izieu. The upper picture includes Léa Feldblum, one of the leaders and the only person among 51 deportees from the home to survive.



VII 10

Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

Im Bereich des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich

Fernschreibstelle

Aufgenommen Tag Monat Jahr Zeit: 6 AVRIL 1944 21 45 von durch

Befördert Tag Monat Jahr Zeit an durch

FS-Nr.

Verzögerungsvermerk

FS-Annahme an: Uhr. ab: Uhr.

Raum für Eingangsstempel: 7 Avril 1944 33405 IV B 7 AVR 1944

LYON NR. 5269 6.4.44 2010 UHR == FI. =
= AN DEN SDS - ABT L. ROEM. 4 B - PARIS =
= BETR: JUEDISCHES KINDERHEIM IN IZIEU-AIN =
= VORG: OHNE ==
IN DEN HEUTIGEN MORGENSTUNDEN WURDE DAS JUEDISCHE KINDERHEIM '' COLONIE ENFANT '' IN IZIEU-AIN AUSGEHOBEN. INSGESAMT WURDEN 41 KINDER IM ALTER VON 3 BIS 13 JAHREN FESTGENOMMEN. FERNER GELANG DIE FESTNAHME DES GESAMTEN JUEDISCHEN PERSONALS , BESTEHEND AUS 10 KOEPFEN, DAVON 5 FRAUEN. BARGELD ODER SONSTIGE VERMOEGENSWERTE KONNTEN NICHT SICHERGESTELLT WERDEN ==
= DER ABTRANSPORT NACH DRANCY ERFOLGT AM 7.4.44 ==

DER KDR. DER SIPO UND DES SD LYON ROEM. 4 B 61/43
I. A. GEZ. BARBIE SS-OSTUF==

Cable to the anti-Jewish section of the Gestapo in Paris, signed by Klaus Barbie, announcing the liquidation of the children's home in Izieu. This document, the original of which was found by Serge Klarsfeld in 1984, helped convict Barbie of crimes against humanity.

CONVOY 71 of April 13, 1944

Family Name	First Name	Date and place of birth	Assembly point	Last known address
TEITELBAUM	Hermann	*01.11.33 Anvers*	LYON	- Izieu (Ain)
TEITELBAUM	Max	*14.08.31 Anvers*	LYON	- Izieu
UHR	Charles	*04.12.34 Anvers*	GRENOBLE	- La Martelière-Voiron (Isère)
UHR	Erwin	*14.04.28 Gyongzos*	GRENOBLE	- La Martelière-Voiron (Isère)
VAISBOURTE	Estelle	*28.07.36 Nancy*	NANCY	167, rue du Sgt Blandin - Nancy
VOGELHUT	Sabine	*23.09.27 Strasbourg*	PERIGUEUX	- La Bachellerie (Dordogne)
WACHSMAN	Hélène	*14.04.40 Vichy*	PERIGUEUX	Opinsac - Vichy
WEIL	Alain	*28.04.39 Paris*	DRANCY	148, rue de Picpus - Paris 12
WEIL	Lucie	*26.09.26 Ingen*	PERIGUEUX	51, av. Bourdeille - Brantôme
WEILL	Colette	*13.12.30 Strasbourg*	NANCY	- Plainfaing (Vosges)
WEILL	Gilbert	*29.07.33 Stotzheim*	NANCY	11, rue de Rome - Bertrichamps (Meurthe-e
WEILL	Jeannine	*18.06.31 Stotzheim*	NANCY	11, rue de Rome - Bertrichamps
WEILL	José	*13.04.29 Colmar*	NANCY	Route de la Vieville - Dompaire (Vosges)
WEILL	Marc	*05.10.28 Strasbourg*	NANCY	6, rue du Parc - Saint-Dié
WEILL	Milly	*17.11.31 Sélestat*	NANCY	- Saulcy S/Meurthe (Vosges)
WEILL	Mireille	*14.11.31 Strasbourg*	NANCY	31, rue de Villers - Nancy
WEILL	Nicole	*02.01.32 Strasbourg*	NANCY	- Celles/Plaines (Vosges)
WEILL	Paul	*28.04.33 Strasbourg*	NANCY	- Ban-de-Sapt (Vosges)
WEILL	Pierre	*01.11.26 Stotzheim*	NANCY	- Saulcy S/Meurthe (Vosges)
WEILL	Raymond	*18.01.29 Stotzheim*	NANCY	- Saulcy S/Meurthe
WEILL	René	*23.08.33 Sélestat*	NANCY	- Saulcy S/Meurthe
WEILL	Roger	*16.08.37 Stotzheim*	NANCY	11, rue de Rome - Bertrichamps (Meurthe-et-
WEILL	Yvette	*26.03.28 Rosheim*	NANCY	- Ban-de-Sapt (Vosges)
WEINBERG	Hélène	*27.08.27 Francfort*	MARSEILLE	13, rue Desparat - Aigues
WERTHEIMER	Gilbert	*11.10.30 Strasbourg*	NANCY	- Moussey (Vosges)
WERTHEIMER	Liliane	*03.08.33 Strasbourg*	NANCY	- Moussey
WERTHEIMER	Otto	*05.02.32 Bade-Wurtemberg*	LYON	- Izieu (Ain)
WORMS	Arlette	*14.12.35 Nancy*	NANCY	16, rue de l'Equitation - Nancy
WORMS	Huguette	*11.10.39 Remilly*	NANCY	17, rue G. Richard - Rambervillers (Vosges)
WORMS	Jacqueline	*11.06.28 Remilly*	NANCY	17, rue G. Richard - Rambervillers
WORMS	Josette	*22.10.36 Metz*	NANCY	13, rue de la Visitation - Nancy
WORMS	Nicole	*16.07.31 Remilly*	NANCY	17, rue G. Richard - Rambervillers (Vosges)
WURMFELD	Yvonne	*06.12.37 Paris*	DRANCY	189, fbg. Poissonnière - Paris 09
ZAJAC	Fleurette	*26.07.26 Lublin*	DRANCY	96, r. Ch. des Rentiers - Paris 13
ZAJAC	Maurice	*16.06.30 Lublin*	DRANCY	96, r. Ch. des Rentiers - Paris 13
ZARADE	Alice	*07.04.28 Marseille*	MARSEILLE	3, rue Château Payan - Marseille
ZLOTISTY	Claude	*14.11.29 Nancy*	NANCY	107, bd. Emile Zola - Nancy
ZUCKERBERG	Emile	*15.05.38 Anvers*	LYON	- Izieu (Ain)

Myriam BLOCH was born on September 27, 1937, in Metz (Moselle). She was the daughter of the courageous rabbi of Poitiers, Elie Bloch. He was deported with his wife and child on convoy 63 of December 17, 1943, after having devoted himself unceasingly to the many Jews of the area.

Nicole BLUM was born on March 6, 1933, in Boulogne (Vendée), near the Atlantic coast. She was arrested in central France, in St-Gérard-le-Puy (Allier), and deported with her parents, Gilberte and Marcel, and her grandparents, Mathilde and Nathan Lévy, chief rabbi of the synagogue in rue des Tournelles, Paris. They were taken on convoy 62 of November 20, 1943.

Lotti and Sarah BLUMENKRANZ were 11 and 14 years old, respectively, when they were deported on convoy 77 of July 31, 1944. They were taken from the UGIF Lamarck center.

Nicole BLOCH was born on January 12, 1939, in Le Mans (Sarthe). She was deported with her mother, Odette, on July 31, 1943, on convoy 58. They lived at 23 quai Ledru-Rollin in Le Mans. Her father, Roger, had been deported on convoy 8.