

**Seminar POP88061**  
**International Politics A**  
Michaelmas Term 2022  
Monday 09:00–11:00  
Room: 2.16, 3-4 Foster Place

Lecturer: Dr Jan Berz  
Email: [berzj@tcd.ie](mailto:berzj@tcd.ie)  
Office hours: Mondays 15:00 – 16:30, by appointment  
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Trinity College Dublin  
September 9, 2022

## **1 Description & Objectives**

This graduate seminar offers an overview of major theories and analytical approaches in the field of international relations. Each week we will cover a particular theoretical lens or approach through which scholars have sought to make sense of the international environment. The readings in this module reflect research that aims to provide logically consistent and empirically supported explanations of outcomes in world politics. The overarching objective of the seminar is for students to become acquainted with scientific approaches to the study of international relations on a wide range of issue areas.

## **2 Module Requirements and Policies**

All written assignments are to be submitted through Blackboard. Each assignment will be separate on the platform. More information on this will be provided in class.

All submission deadlines are naturally in Irish time. All late work, unless excused in advance by the course lecturer will be penalized at a rate of 5 marks per day (up to a maximum of 30 marks). All requests for excuses from submission penalties, whether justified by a medical certificate, a LENS report, or other reason, must be submitted in advance of the deadline to the course instructor by the student's college tutor. Where any essay is submitted after the deadline to Turnitin for any reason, the student must also email me on [berzj@tcd.ie](mailto:berzj@tcd.ie) to inform them it has been submitted. All coursework needs to be submitted via the plagiarism detector Turnitin, now integrated into the course's Blackboard account.

Under no circumstances will written work be accepted after the set work has been marked and returned to other students, or after the end of the term. Requests for special consideration advanced at a later stage will not be accepted. Written work may, of course, be handed in earlier than the due date. Response papers, policy brief and the essay should be clearly marked with the student's name.

One point may be subtracted from any written assignment for every 100 words

over the given word limit, i.e. one point for a final essay with 3100 words, two points for a final essay of 3200 words, etc.

### **2.1 Class Discussion (15%)**

Student participation in class discussion and debate on the readings is a central element of the seminar. Students are expected to have read all required readings and to have acquired detailed knowledge and developed informed critiques of the readings prior to the class meeting. The objective of class discussion will be to critically assess the readings, discuss their relevance to understanding current international affairs and offer insights on how new research could improve the field. Students will be evaluated on the quality of their input in class discussion and debate.

It is expected that students ask informed questions after class presentation by their peers. Those who are deemed to be falling behind in class participation may be asked to submit additional response papers. Some questions to keep in mind while reading: What are the central theories discussed in the study? Are the assumptions of the theory consistent or do they contradict each other? If the study seeks to test a theory with evidence, what are the findings? How would you rate the quality of the test, e.g. do the data adequately measure the theoretical concepts; is the design strong enough to adequately test the theory? Are there cases that the author has overlooked? How would you go about re-designing the test to overcome any limitations? Can the study be extended to cover other issue areas; if so, which ones?

### **2.2 Oral Presentation (5%)**

Students will be required to give a 10 minute oral presentation of their first response paper during the term. No two students can present the same paper. This means that if you are presenting in a given week, you must submit a response paper by the Friday before the meeting. A sign-up sheet will be circulated during the first meeting. Presentations will be evaluated based on the quality of content and execution: organization, demonstrated subject knowledge, effective use of visual aids, engagement with audience, and elocution. Also, be prepared to answer questions from your peers and the lecturer. These questions will be used as starting point for our seminar discussion. For some tips on effective execution of an oral presentation, see: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1857815/>.

### **2.3 Response Papers (15%): 1 required + 1 extra**

Students will be required to submit one response paper over the duration of the term. This response papers provides a critical review of one of the required weekly readings. Students also have the opportunity to submit one extra response papers on another required reading in a different week. The final grade will count the highest of the two submitted response papers. Response papers are not mere descriptions or summaries of a reading, but rather offer critiques and/or provide connections with studies from other weeks' readings. Examples might include a

critical evaluation of research design and suggestions for overcoming limitations, discussion on the assumptions of a theoretical approach, possible extensions of a theory, and/or critical evaluation of an empirical analysis. Response papers must engage with the required readings from the week, but may also include the suggested readings as well. Submitted response papers may be circulated in class to add to the discussion.

The required length of the response paper is between 800-1000 words (excluding references, and cover sheet, but including everything else), double-spaced pages. **The deadline for submission on turnitin.com is 10 AM on the Friday before class.** Late submissions will not be accepted. The schedule for response papers will be set at the start of term.

## 2.4 Policy Brief (25%)

Taking the role of policy analyst, your task is to prepare a concise and structured policy brief advising the head of a government agency (e.g. U.S. Department of State, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.K. Department for International Development, etc.), an intergovernmental organization (e.g., UNICEF), or a transnational advocacy network (e.g., Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch, etc.) on why and how existing policy regarding a current world affairs issue should be changed and/or what new policy should be implemented. The objective of the policy brief is to encourage you to apply the theoretical frameworks and analytic approaches discussed in class to practical use. This brief should not be just a summary of the issue (assume that the reader watches the news), but rather a theoretically informed and evidence based analysis of current policy effectiveness and advice on new policy. The length of the policy brief is between 1,000-1,500 words (this includes everything: except references and assignment cover sheet), double-spaced pages. The policy brief must also include an executive summary of up to 200 words (does not count to overall word count). Be sure that the brief makes a clear argument, that it is focused, and that it is supported by theory and existing research in the literature. **The deadline for submission on Blackboard is 6PM on Wednesday, November 16th.**

## 2.5 Final essay (40%)

Students will be required to submit a long essay paper at the end of the term. The objective of the paper is to use a theoretical framework covered in the course to explain or analyze a chosen event or series of events from international politics. The paper must formulate a clear argument, discuss the main assumptions and predictions of the theoretical framework, and use it to analyze an event/series of events from international politics. More precisely, it needs to offer an informed discussion of the subject at hand and how existing theory can help us (or not) to understand it. The ultimate goal of the paper is to demonstrate your critical understanding of the class material, and to use of your analytical and reasoning skills to evaluate international affairs. The length of the paper should be 3,000 words (excluding references, and cover sheet, but including everything else), double-

spaced pages. **The deadline for submission on turnitin.com is 6 PM on Wednesday, 4th of January 2023.**

### **3 Academic & Professional Ethics**

Please do not plagiarize. Academic dishonesty is a serious matter, with serious consequences that can result in receiving no credit for an assignment, a failing grade for the module, and even expulsion from the programme. It is never permissible to turn in any work that contains others' ideas without proper acknowledgment. It is your responsibility to make sure that your work meets the standard of academic honesty set forth in the College Calendar (see <http://tcd-ie.libguides.com/plagiarism/calendar>). If you are paraphrasing, cite the source. If you are quoting, use quotation marks and appropriate citation. Remember that academic integrity is a reflection of one's character. In addition, we strongly recommend that you visit <http://www.plagiarism.org/> for more information on what is and is not plagiarism. Lastly, students are required to only submit "new work" in each module, which means work that has not been submitted previously in any other university module. Students who wish to use previously submitted work as part of a new project will need the approval of the lecturer.

### **4 Syllabus Modification Rights**

Please note that I reserve the right to reasonably alter the elements of the syllabus at any time. More often than not this will mean adjusting the readings to our pace in the seminar, or adding a small reading assignments as well.

### **5 Readings**

Readings will be available on the Blackboard site of the course. This class does not have a textbook. Readings consist of peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, and articles from journals intended for wider audiences. Excellent introductions to the scientific study of international politics include the following:

- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2013). Principles of international politics. CQ press.
- Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (2013). World politics: interests, interactions, institutions. New York: WW Norton. 2nd Edition

### **6 Course Outline**

Week 1 – Introduction to the Field

Week 2 – The Realist School

Week 3 – Power Parity Perspective

Week 4 – Rationalist Perspective

Week 5 – International Institutions

Week 6 – Domestic Groups and State Behavior

Week 7 – Study/Review Week

**16. November 2022 – Policy brief due, 6PM**

Week 8 – Domestic Institutions and State Behavior

Week 9 – Democratic Peace

Week 10 – Ideas, Culture, and Identity

Week 11 – Economic Interdependence and International Conflict

Week 12 – International Norms and Transnational Networks

**4. January 2023 – Final essay due, 6PM**

## **7 Course Schedule**

### **Week 1. Introduction to the Field**

#### **Required:**

1. Frieden, J. A., & Lake, D. A. (2005). “International relations as a social science: rigor and relevance.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 600(1), 136-156.
2. Walt, S. M. (1998). “International relations: one world, many theories.” *Foreign policy*, 29-46.
3. Snyder, J. (2004). “One world, rival theories.” *Foreign Policy*, 53-62.

#### **Suggested:**

- Mearsheimer, J. J., Walt, S. M. (2013). Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), 427-457.
- Lake, D. A. (2013). Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), 567-587.
- Singer, J.D. (1961) “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations” *World Politics*, 14(1): 77-92.
- Colgan, J. D. (2019). American Perspectives and Blind Spots on World Politics. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 4(3), 300-309.

### **Week 2. The Realist School**

#### **Required:**

1. Morgenthau, H. J. (1985). *Politics Among Nations*, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, pp. 4-16.
2. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. WW Norton & Company. Chapters 1-2.
3. Monteiro, N. P. (2012). Unrest assured: Why unipolarity is not peaceful. *International Security*, 36(3), 9-40.
4. Thucydides, “Melian Dialogue”, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 5,

sections 84-116 (pp. 301-307).

5. Anghel, V. & Stolle, D. (2022). In praise of reality, not realism: An answer to Mearsheimer. <https://euideas.eui.eu/2022/06/28/in-praise-of-reality-not-realism-an-answer-to-mearsheimer/>

**Suggested:**

- Waltz, K. N. (2001). *Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis*. Columbia University Press. cc. 4,6,&8.
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of international relations*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Webley, Chapters 5,6,& 8.
- Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is anybody still a realist?. *International Security*, 24(2), 5-55.
- Ashley, R. K. (1984). "The poverty of neorealism." *International Organization*, 38(02), 225-286.
- Milner, H. (1991). "The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique." *Review of International Studies*, 17(1), 67-85.
- Rathbun, B. (2008). A rose by any other name: Neoclassical realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural realism. *Security Studies*, 17(2), 294-321.

**Media:**

- [Kenneth Waltz in conversation with James Fearon \(2011\) \[59:06\]](#)
- [The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war. A lecture by John J. Mearsheimer \[2:07:15\]](#)
- [Why Mearsheimer is wrong about Russia and the war in Ukraine. Five arguments from Alexander Stubb. \[22:12\]](#)

**Week 3. Power Parity Perspective**

**Required:**

1. Lemke, D., & Werner, S. (1996). "Power parity, commitment to change, and war." *International Studies Quarterly*, 235-260.
2. Efird, B., Kugler, J., & Genna, G. (2003). "From war to integration: Generalizing power transition theory." *International Interactions*, 29(4), 293-313.
3. Bussmann, M., & Oneal, J. R. (2007). "Do hegemony distribute private goods? A test of power-transition theory." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(1), 88-111.

**Suggested:**

- Lemke, D. (2002). *Regions of war and peace (Vol. 80)*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3&5.
- De Soysa, I., Oneal, J. R., & Park, Y. H. (1997). "Testing power-transition theory using alternative measures of national capabilities." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(4), 509-528.

- DiCicco, J. M., & Levy, J. S. (1999). "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(6), 675-704.
- Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1980). *The War Ledger*. University of Chicago Press, pp. 13-63.

**Media:**

- Jacek Kugler (2014) "Ukraine, EuroAsia and Global Restructuring" [22:45]

**Week 4. Rationalist Perspective**

**Required:**

1. Lake, D. A. (2011). "Two cheers for bargaining theory: Assessing rationalist explanations of the Iraq War." *International Security*, 35(3), 7-52.
2. Fearon, J. D. (1995). "Rationalist explanations for war." *International organization*, 49(03), 379-414.
3. Freedman, L., & Karsh, E. (1991). "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War." *International Security*, 5-41.

**Suggested:**

- Lake, D. A., & Powell, R. (Eds.). (1999). *Strategic choice and international relations*. Princeton University Press. cc. 1-3.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes." *American Political Science Review*, 88(3), 577-592.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. "Applications of game theory in support of intelligence analysis." *Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations*: 57-82.
- Schelling, T. C. (1967). *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press. cc. 1-2.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1988) "The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(8): 629-652.

**Media:**

- Robert McNamara on misunderstandings and the Vietnam War, excerpt from *The Fog of War* [2:40]
- Frontline (24 March 2008) "Bush's War" [2:25:32]
- Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (2009) "On Iran's Future" [20:08]

**Week 5. International Institutions**

**Required:**

1. Keohane, R. O. (2005). *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton University Press. cc. 1, 4-6.
2. Goldstein, J. L., Rivers, D., & Tomz, M. (2007). "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization*, 61(1), 37-67.
3. Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996). "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?." *International Organization*, 50(03), 379-406.

**Suggested:**

- Martin, L. L., & Simmons, B. A. (1998). "Theories and empirical studies of international institutions." *International Organization*, 52(4), 729-757.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). "The rational design of international institutions." *International organization*, 55(4), 761-799.
- Grieco, J. M. (1988). "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism." *International organization*, 42(3), 485-507.
- Phelan, W. (2012). "What Is Sui Generis About the European Union? Costly International Cooperation in a Self-Contained Regime." *International Studies Review*, 14(3), 367-385.
- Von Stein, J. (2005). "Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance." *American Political Science Review*, 99(4), 611-622.
- Keohane, R. O. (1998). "International institutions: Can interdependence work?." *Foreign Policy*, 82-194.
- Milgrom, P. R., & North, D. C. (1990). "The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs." *Economics & Politics*, 2(1), 1-23.

**Media:**

- [Robert Keohane \(2004\) "Conversations with History" \[57:00\]](#)
- [The Road to Europe \(2003\) – video file on Blackboard \[1:01:15\]](#)

**Week 6. Domestic Groups and State Behavior**

**Required:**

1. Moravcsik, A. (1997). "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics." *International organization*, 51(4), 513-553.
2. Putnam, R. D. (1988). "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International organization*, 42(3), 427-460.
3. Kaufmann, C. D., & Pape, R. A. (1999). "Explaining costly international moral action: Britain's sixty-year campaign against the Atlantic slave trade." *International Organization*, 53(4), 631-668.
4. Oakes, A. (2006). "Diversionary war and Argentina's invasion of the Falkland



Islands.” *Security Studies*, 15(3), 431-463.

**Suggested:**

- Kaarbo, J. (1997). Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research. *Political Psychology*, 18(3), 553-581.
- Frieden, J. A. (1991). Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance. *International Organization*, 45(04), 425-451.
- Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). What determines individual trade-policy preferences?. *Journal of International Economics*, 54(2), 267-292.
- Mansfield, E. D., & Mutz, D. C. (2009). Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(03), 425-457.
- Hiscox, M. J. (2002). Commerce, coalitions, and factor mobility: Evidence from congressional votes on trade legislation. *American Political Science Review*, 96(03), 593-608.
- Krasner, S. D. (1972). “Are bureaucracies important? (or Allison Wonderland).” *Foreign Policy*, 159-179.
- Levy, J. S., & Vakili, L. I. (1992). “Diversionary action by authoritarian regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas case.” In *The internationalization of communal strife* (ed. Midlarsky, M. I.), New York: Routledge, pp. 118-46.
- Gartner, S. S., & Segura, G. M. (1998). “War, casualties, and public opinion.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3), 278-300.
- Allison, G. T. (1969). “Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis.” *American political science review*, 63(3), 689-718.

**Media:**

- [Andrew Moravcsik “Liberal Theory” \[9:48\]](#)
- [Robert McNamara on the Cuban Missile Crisis, excerpts from The Fog of War, Part 1 \[9:41\]; Part 2 \[1:34\]](#)
- [Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics with John Mearsheimer \[1:25:46\]](#)

**Week 8. Domestic Institutions and State Behavior**

**Required:**

1. Rogowski, R. (1999). Institutions as constraints on strategic choice. *Strategic choice and international relations*, 115-136.
2. Milner, H. V., & Kubota, K. (2005). “Why the move to free trade? Democracy and trade policy in the developing countries.” *International organization*, 59(1), 107-143.
3. Henisz, W. J., & Mansfield, E. D. (2006). “Votes and vetoes: the political determinants of commercial openness.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(1), 189-212.

4. Ehrlich, S. D. (2007). "Access to protection: Domestic institutions and trade policy in democracies." *International Organization*, 61(3), 571-605.
5. De Mesquita, B. B., & Siverson, R. M. (1995). War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 89(04), 841-855.

**Suggested:**

- Person, T., & Tabellini, G. (2004). Constitutions and economic policy. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 75-98.
- Evans, C. L. (2009). A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics: An empirical investigation. *Economics & Politics*, 21(2), 278-307.
- Kennedy, P. M. (1981). "Strategy versus finance in twentieth-century Great Britain." *The International History Review*, 3(1), 44-61.
- Bernhard, W., & Leblang, D. (1999). "Democratic institutions and exchange-rate commitments." *International Organization*, 53(1), 71-97.
- Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2006). "Who cares about corruption?" *Journal of International Business Studies*, 37(6), 807-822.
- MacIntyre, A. (2001). "Institutions and investors: The politics of the economic crisis in Southeast Asia." *International Organization*, 55(1), 81-122.
- De Soto, H. (2003). *Mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else*. Basic books.
- Broz, J. L. (2002). Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes. *International Organization*, 56(04), 861-887.

**Media**

- [PBS \(2002\) Commanding Heights: Episode 3, The New Rules of the Game \[1:56:55\]](#)
- [How "the special relationship" shaped the world for the worse - with Jeremy Green \[31:00\]](#)

**Week 9. Democratic Peace**

**Required:**

1. Russett, B. (1994). *Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world*. Princeton University Press. cc. 1-2.
2. Doyle, M. W. (1986). "Liberalism and world politics." *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1151-1169.
3. Russett, B. M., & Oneal, J. R. (1999). "The Kantian peace: the pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992." *World Politics*, 52(1), 1-37.
4. Rosato, S. (2003). "The flawed logic of democratic peace theory." *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 585-602.

**Suggested:**

- Rummel, R. J. (1983). "Libertarianism and international violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(1), 27-71.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). "An institutional explanation of the democratic peace." *American Political Science Review*, 791-807.
- Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. S. (2001). "Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992." *American Political Science Review*, 33-48.
- Lemke, D., & Reed, W. (1996). "Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace." *International Interactions*, 22(2), 143-164.
- Schultz, K. A. (1999). Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. *International Organization*, 53(2), 233-266.
- Farber, H. S., & Gowa, J. (1997). "Common interests or common polities? Reinterpreting the democratic peace." *The Journal of Politics*, 59(2), 393-417.

**Media:**

- [US Presidents and Democratic Peace Theory \[2:20\]](#)

**Week 10. Ideas, Culture, and Identity****Required:**

1. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). "Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics." *Annual review of political science*, 4(1), Read 391-404, review rest.
2. Finnemore, M. (1996). *National interests in international society*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-33.
3. Haas, M. L. (2005). *The ideological origins of great power politics, 1789-1989*. Cornell University Press. pp. 1-39.
4. Henderson, E. A., & Tucker, R. (2001). "Clear and present strangers: the clash of civilizations and international conflict." *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(2), 317-338.

**Suggested:**

- Wendt, A. (1992). "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." *International organization*, 46(02), 391-425.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters. 3&6.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1998). "What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge." *International organization*, 52(4), 855-885.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). "The clash of civilizations?." *Foreign affairs*, 22-49.

**Media:**

- [Kathryn Sikkink on 'The role of agency in constructivism'](#)
- [Francis Fukuyama: "The Origins of the State: China and India" \[1:23:14\]](#)

**Week 11. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict**

**Required:**

1. Mansfield, E. D., & Pollins, B. M. (Eds.). (2009). *Economic interdependence and international conflict: New perspectives on an enduring debate*. University of Michigan Press., Part I (pp. 31–59, 89–147).
2. Ottaway, M., & Ottaway, D. (2014). How the Kurds Got Their Way: Economic Cooperation and the Middle East's New Borders. *Foreign Aff.*, 93, 139.
3. Gartzke, E., & Lupu, Y. (2012). Trading on preconceptions: Why World War I was not a failure of economic interdependence. *International Security*, 36(4), 115-150.

**Suggested:**

- Krickovic, A. (2015). When interdependence produces conflict: EU–Russia energy relations as a security dilemma. *Contemporary security policy*, 36(1), 3-26.
- Mark JC Crescenzi. (2003). Economic exit, interdependence, and conflict. *Journal of Politics*, 65(3):809–832.
- Bruce M Russett and John R Oneal. (1990). *Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations*, volume 9. Norton.
- Zeev Maoz. (2009). The effects of strategic and economic interdependence on international conflict across levels of analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(1):223–240.
- Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. (2001). Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and international conflict. *International Organization*, 55(02):391–438.

**Week 12. International Norms and Transnational Networks**

**Required:**

1. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics* (Vol. 35). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1-3.
2. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). "International norm dynamics and political change." *International organization*, 52(04), 887-917.
3. Tannenwald, N. (1999). "The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use." *International Organization*, 53(03), 433-468.

### **Suggested:**

- Hathaway, O. A. (2002). “Do human rights treaties make a difference?.” *Yale Law Journal*, 1935-2042.
- Hathaway, O. A. (2007). “Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(4), 588-621.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2005). “Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression.” *International Organization*, 59(3), 593-629.
- Moravcsik, A. (2000). “The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe.” *International Organization*, 54(02), 217-252.
- Neumayer, E. (2005). “Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?.” *Journal of conflict resolution*, 49(6), 925-953.

### **Media**

- [Isao Hashimoto “1945-1998” \[14:24\]](#)
- [George Perkovich \(2014\) “Taboo or Not Taboo: That is not the question”](#)
- [Oona Hathaway on US intervention in Syria \[10:02\]](#)