

**Seminar PO8048**  
**International Politics A**  
Michaelmas Term 2020  
Monday 09:00–11:00  
Room: LB08 (Lloyd Institute)

Lecturer: Dr. Jan Berz  
Email: [berzj@tcd.ie](mailto:berzj@tcd.ie)  
Office hours: Tuesday 14:00 – 16:00 (Zoom)  
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Trinity College Dublin

## **1 Description & Objectives**

This graduate seminar offers an overview of major theories and analytical approaches in the field of international relations. Each week we will cover a particular theoretical lens or approach through which scholars have sought to make sense of the international environment. The readings in this module reflect research that aims to provide logically consistent and empirically supported explanations of outcomes in world politics. The overarching objective of the seminar is for students to become acquainted with scientific approaches to the study of international relations on a wide range of issue areas.

## **2 Covid-19 procedures**

We will strive for face to face teaching (F2F) but all students should be aware and prepared that teaching conditions may change on short notice if government or Trinity guidelines change. Teaching will also be dynamically adapted to the number of students who are unable to attend any F2F teaching. Students unable to participate F2F will be able to attend online and I will aim to include them as best as possible in the F2F seminar using audio/video and chat. I will set up an online session of the seminar every week in case anyone develops symptoms shortly before class.

Please do not attend any F2F class if you have Covid-19 related symptoms. All participants must follow government and Trinity guidelines when attending a F2F session!

If I have to isolate myself our weekly sessions will naturally move online – you will be notified by email. Office hours will predominantly take place on Zoom. Please schedule a separate office hour appointment if there is an issue which you would rather discuss F2F.

## **3 Module Requirements and Policies**

All written assignments are to be submitted through Blackboard. Each assignment will be separate on the platform. More information on this will be provided in

class.

All submission deadlines are naturally in Irish time. All late work, unless excused in advance by the course lecturer will be penalized at a rate of 5 marks per day (up to a maximum of 30 marks). All requests for excuses from submission penalties, whether justified by a medical certificate, a LENS report, or other reason, must be submitted in advance of the deadline to the course instructor by the student's college tutor. Where any essay is submitted after the deadline to Turnitin for any reason, the student must also email me on [berzj@tcd.ie](mailto:berzj@tcd.ie) to inform them it has been submitted. All coursework needs to be submitted via the plagiarism detector Turnitin, now integrated into the course's Blackboard account.

Under no circumstances will written work be accepted after the set work has been marked and returned to other students, or after the end of the term. Requests for special consideration advanced at a later stage will not be accepted. Written work may, of course, be handed in earlier than the due date. Response papers, policy brief and the essay should be clearly marked with the student's name.

One point may be subtracted from any written assignment for every 100 words over the given word limit, i.e. one point for a final essay with 3100 words, two points for a final essay of 3200 words, etc.

### **3.1 Class Discussion (15%)**

Student participation in class discussion and debate on the readings is a central element of the seminar. Students are expected to have read all required readings and to have acquired detailed knowledge and developed informed critiques of the readings prior to the class meeting. The objective of class discussion will be to critically assess the readings, discuss their relevance to understanding current international affairs and offer insights on how new research could improve the field. Students will be evaluated on the quality of their input in class discussion and debate.

It is expected that students ask informed questions after class presentation. Those who are deemed to be falling behind in class participation may be asked to submit additional response papers. Some questions to keep in mind while reading: What are the central theories discussed in the study? Are the assumptions of the theory consistent or do they contradict each other? If the study seeks to test a theory with evidence, what are the findings? How would you rate the quality of the test, e.g. do the data adequately measure the theoretical concepts; is the design strong enough to adequately test the theory? Are there cases that the author has overlooked? How would you go about re-designing the test to overcome any limitations? Can the study be extended to cover other issue areas; if so, which ones?

### **3.2 Oral Presentation (5%)**

Students will be required to give a 10 minute oral presentation of one response paper during the term. No two students can present the same paper. This means that if you are presenting in a given week, you must submit a response paper by the Thursday before the meeting. A sign-up sheet will be circulated during

the first meeting. Presentations will be evaluated based on the quality of content and execution: organization, demonstrated subject knowledge, effective use of visual aids, engagement with audience, and elocution. Also, be prepared to answer questions from your peers and the lecturer. These questions will be used as starting point for our seminar discussion. For some tips on effective execution of an oral presentation, see: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1857815/>.

### **3.3 Response Papers (30%): 3 required + 2 extra**

Students will be required to submit three (3) response papers over the duration of the term. Students also have the opportunity to submit up to two (2) extra response papers. The final grade will count the highest three submitted response papers. Response papers are not mere descriptions or summaries of the readings, but rather offer critiques and/or provide connections with studies from other weeks' readings. Examples might include a critical evaluation of research design and suggestions for overcoming limitations, discussion on the assumptions of a theoretical approach, possible extensions of a theory, and/or critical evaluation of an empirical analysis. Response papers must engage with the required readings from the week, but may also include the suggested readings as well. Submitted response papers may be circulated in class to add to the discussion.

The required length of the response papers is between 600-800 words, double-spaced pages. **The deadline for submission on turnitin.com is 4 PM on the Thursday before class.** Late submissions will not be accepted. You may not submit more than one response paper per week. Submission of response papers must comply with the following schedule:

- One paper due between weeks 2-5
- One paper due between weeks 6-9
- One paper due between weeks 10-12

### **3.4 Policy Brief (20%)**

Taking the role of policy analyst, your task is to prepare a concise and structured policy brief advising the head of a government agency (e.g. U.S. Department of State, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.K. Department for International Development, etc.), an intergovernmental organization (e.g., UNICEF), or a transnational advocacy network (e.g., Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch, etc.) on why and how existing policy regarding a current world affairs issue should be changed and/or what new policy should be implemented. The objective of the policy brief is to encourage you to apply the theoretical frameworks and analytic approaches discussed in class to practical use. This brief should not be just a summary of the issue (assume that the reader watches the news), but rather a theoretically informed and evidence based analysis of current policy effectiveness and advice on new policy. The length of the policy brief is between 1,000-1,500 words, double-spaced pages. The policy brief must also include an executive summary of up to 200 words (does not count to overall word count). Be sure that the brief makes a

clear argument, that it is focused, and that it is supported by theory and existing research in the literature. **The deadline for submission on Blackboard is 6PM on Monday, November 16th.**

### **3.5 Final essay (30%)**

Students will be required to submit a long essay paper at the end of the term. The objective of the paper is to use a theoretical framework covered in the course to explain or analyze a chosen event or series of events from international politics. The paper must formulate a clear argument, discuss the main assumptions and predictions of the theoretical framework, and use it to analyze an event/series of events from international politics. More precisely, it needs to offer an informed discussion of the subject at hand and how existing theory can help us (or not) to understand it. The ultimate goal of the paper is to demonstrate your critical understanding of the class material, and to use of your analytical and reasoning skills to evaluate international affairs. The length of the paper should be 3,000 words (including reference list, footnotes, and title page), double-spaced pages. **The deadline for submission on turnitin.com is 6 PM on Monday, December 21th.**

## **4 Academic & Professional Ethics**

Please do not plagiarize. Academic dishonesty is a serious matter, with serious consequences that can result in receiving no credit for an assignment, a failing grade for the module, and even expulsion from the programme. It is never permissible to turn in any work that contains others' ideas without proper acknowledgment. It is your responsibility to make sure that your work meets the standard of academic honesty set forth in the College Calendar (see <http://tcd-ie.libguides.com/plagiarism/calendar>). If you are paraphrasing, cite the source. If you are quoting, use quotation marks and appropriate citation. Remember that academic integrity is a reflection of one's character. In addition, we strongly recommend that you visit <http://www.plagiarism.org/> for more information on what is and is not plagiarism. Lastly, students are required to only submit "new work" in each module, which means work that has not been submitted previously in any other university module. Students who wish to use previously submitted work as part of a new project will need the approval of the lecturer.

## **5 Syllabus Modification Rights**

Please note that I reserve the right to reasonably alter the elements of the syllabus at any time. More often than not this will mean adjusting the readings to our pace in the seminar, or adding a small reading assignments as well.

## 6 Readings

Readings will be available on the Blackboard site of the course. This class does not have a textbook. Readings consist of peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, and articles from journals intended for wider audiences. Excellent introductions to the scientific study of international politics include the following:

- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2013). Principles of international politics. CQ press.
- Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (2013). World politics: interests, interactions, institutions. New York: WW Norton. 2nd Edition

## 7 Course Outline

Week 1 – Introduction to the Field

Week 2 – The Realist School

Week 3 – Power Parity Perspective

Week 4 – Rationalist Perspective

Week 5 – International Institutions

Week 6 – Domestic Groups and State Behavior

Week 7 – Study/Review Week

**16 November 2020 – Policy brief due, 6PM**

Week 8 – Domestic Institutions and State Behavior

Week 9 – Democratic Peace

Week 10 – Ideas, Culture, and Identity

Week 11 – Diffusion Processes in International Politics

Week 12 – International Norms and Transnational Networks

**21 December 2020 – Final essay due, 6PM**

## 8 Course Schedule

### Week 1. Introduction to the Field

#### Required:

1. Mearsheimer, J. J., Walt, S. M. (2013). Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), 427-457.
2. Lake, D. A. (2013). Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), 567-587.
3. Walt, S. M. (1998). "International relations: one world, many theories." *Foreign policy*, 29-46. Also, Snyder, J. (2004). "One world, rival theories." *Foreign Policy*.
4. Singer, J.D. (1961) "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" *World Politics*, 14(1): 77-92.
5. Colgan, J. D. (2019). *American Perspectives and Blind Spots on World Politics*.

Journal of Global Security Studies, 4(3), 300-309.

## **Week 2. The Realist School**

### **Required:**

1. Morgenthau, H. J. (1985). *Politics Among Nations*, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, pp. 4-16.
2. Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of international relations*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Webley, Chapters 5,6,& 8.
3. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. WW Norton & Company. Chapters 1-2.
4. Monteiro, N. P. (2012). Unrest assured: Why unipolarity is not peaceful. *International Security*, 36(3), 9-40.
5. Rathbun, B. (2008). A rose by any other name: Neoclassical realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural realism. *Security Studies*, 17(2), 294-321.

### **Suggested:**

- Waltz, K. N. (2001). *Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis*. Columbia University Press. cc. 4,6,&8.
- Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is anybody still a realist?. *International Security*, 24(2), 5-55.
- Ashley, R. K. (1984). "The poverty of neorealism." *International Organization*, 38(02), 225-286.
- Milner, H. (1991). "The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique." *Review of International Studies*, 17(1), 67-85.

### **Media:**

- [Kenneth Waltz in conversation with James Fearon \(2011\) \[59:06\]](#)
- [John Mearsheimer \(2015\) "The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis" \[1:14:15\]](#)

## **Week 3. Power Parity Perspective**

### **Required:**

1. Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1980). *The War Ledger*. University of Chicago Press, pp. 13-63.
2. Lemke, D., & Werner, S. (1996). "Power parity, commitment to change, and war." *International Studies Quarterly*, 235-260.
3. Efrid, B., Kugler, J., & Genna, G. (2003). "From war to integration: Generalizing power transition theory." *International Interactions*, 29(4), 293-313.
4. Bussmann, M., & Oneal, J. R. (2007). "Do hegemons distribute private goods? A test of power-transition theory." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(1), 88-111.

**Suggested:**

- Lemke, D. (2002). *Regions of war and peace* (Vol. 80). Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3&5.
- De Soysa, I., Oneal, J. R., & Park, Y. H. (1997). "Testing power-transition theory using alternative measures of national capabilities." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(4), 509-528.
- DiCicco, J. M., & Levy, J. S. (1999). "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(6), 675-704.

**Media:**

- Jacek Kugler (2014) "Ukraine, EuroAsia and Global Restructuring" [22:45]

**Week 4. Rationalist Perspective**

**Required:**

1. Lake, D. A. (2011). "Two cheers for bargaining theory: Assessing rationalist explanations of the Iraq War." *International Security*, 35(3), 7-52.
2. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. "Applications of game theory in support of intelligence analysis." *Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations*: 57-82.
3. Schelling, T. C. (1967). *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press. cc. 1-2.
4. Freedman, L., & Karsh, E. (1991). "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War." *International Security*, 5-41.

**Suggested:**

- Lake, D. A., & Powell, R. (Eds.). (1999). *Strategic choice and international relations*. Princeton University Press. cc. 1-3.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes." *American Political Science Review*, 88(3), 577-592.
- Fearon, J. D. (1995). "Rationalist explanations for war." *International organization*, 49(03), 379-414.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1988) "The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(8): 629-652.

**Media:**

- Robert McNamara on misunderstandings and the Vietnam War, excerpt from *The Fog of War* [2:40]
- Frontline (24 March 2008) "Bush's War" [2:25:32]
- Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (2009) "On Iran's Future" [20:08]

## **Week 5. International Institutions**

### **Required:**

1. Keohane, R. O. (1998). "International institutions: Can interdependence work?" *Foreign Policy*, 82-194.
2. Keohane, R. O. (2005). *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton University Press. cc. 1, 4-6.
3. Goldstein, J. L., Rivers, D., & Tomz, M. (2007). "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization*, 61(1), 37-67.
4. Milgrom, P. R., & North, D. C. (1990). "The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs." *Economics & Politics*, 2(1), 1-23.
5. Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996). "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?." *International Organization*, 50(03), 379-406.

### **Suggested:**

- Martin, L. L., & Simmons, B. A. (1998). "Theories and empirical studies of international institutions." *International Organization*, 52(4), 729-757.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). "The rational design of international institutions." *International organization*, 55(4), 761-799.
- Grieco, J. M. (1988). "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism." *International organization*, 42(3), 485-507.
- Phelan, W. (2012). "What Is Sui Generis About the European Union? Costly International Cooperation in a Self-Contained Regime." *International Studies Review*, 14(3), 367-385.
- Von Stein, J. (2005). "Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance." *American Political Science Review*, 99(4), 611-622.

### **Media:**

- [Robert Keohane \(2004\) "Conversations with History" \[57:00\]](#)
- [The Road to Europe \(2003\) – video file on Blackboard \[1:01:15\]](#)

## **Week 6. Domestic Groups and State Behavior**

### **Required:**

1. Moravcsik, A. (1997). "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics." *International organization*, 51(4), 513-553.
2. Putnam, R. D. (1988). "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International organization*, 42(3), 427-460.



3. Kaufmann, C. D., & Pape, R. A. (1999). "Explaining costly international moral action: Britain's sixty-year campaign against the Atlantic slave trade." *International Organization*, 53(4), 631-668.
4. Allison, G. T. (1969). "Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis." *American political science review*, 63(3), 689-718.
5. Oakes, A. (2006). "Diversionary war and Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands." *Security Studies*, 15(3), 431-463.

**Suggested:**

- Kaarbo, J. (1997). Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research. *Political Psychology*, 18(3), 553-581.
- Frieden, J. A. (1991). Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance. *International Organization*, 45(04), 425-451.
- Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). What determines individual trade-policy preferences?. *Journal of International Economics*, 54(2), 267-292.
- Mansfield, E. D., & Mutz, D. C. (2009). Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(03), 425-457.
- Hiscox, M. J. (2002). Commerce, coalitions, and factor mobility: Evidence from congressional votes on trade legislation. *American Political Science Review*, 96(03), 593-608.
- Krasner, S. D. (1972). "Are bureaucracies important? (or Allison Wonderland)." *Foreign Policy*, 159-179.
- Levy, J. S., & Vakili, L. I. (1992). "Diversionary action by authoritarian regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas case." In *The internationalization of communal strife* (ed. Midlarsky, M. I.), New York: Routledge, pp. 118-46.
- Gartner, S. S., & Segura, G. M. (1998). "War, casualties, and public opinion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3), 278-300.

**Media:**

- [Andrew Moravcsik "Liberal Theory" \[9:48\]](#)
- [Robert McNamara on the Cuban Missile Crisis, excerpts from The Fog of War, Part 1 \[9:41\]; Part 2 \[1:34\]](#)
- [Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics with John Mearsheimer \[1:25:46\]](#)

**Week 8. Domestic Institutions and State Behavior**

**Required:**

1. Rogowski, R. (1999). Institutions as constraints on strategic choice. *Strategic choice and international relations*, 115-136.
2. Milner, H. V., & Kubota, K. (2005). "Why the move to free trade? Democracy

and trade policy in the developing countries.” *International organization*, 59(1), 107-143.

3. Henisz, W. J., & Mansfield, E. D. (2006). “Votes and vetoes: the political determinants of commercial openness.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(1), 189-212.

4. Ehrlich, S. D. (2007). “Access to protection: Domestic institutions and trade policy in democracies.” *International Organization*, 61(3), 571-605.

5. De Mesquita, B. B., & Siverson, R. M. (1995). *War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability*. *American Political Science Review*, 89(04), 841-855.

### **Suggested:**

- Person, T., & Tabellini, G. (2004). *Constitutions and economic policy*. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 75-98.
- Evans, C. L. (2009). *A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics: An empirical investigation*. *Economics & Politics*, 21(2), 278-307.
- Kennedy, P. M. (1981). “Strategy versus finance in twentieth-century Great Britain.” *The International History Review*, 3(1), 44-61.
- Bernhard, W., & Leblang, D. (1999). “Democratic institutions and exchange-rate commitments.” *International Organization*, 53(1), 71-97.
- Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2006). “Who cares about corruption?” *Journal of International Business Studies*, 37(6), 807-822.
- MacIntyre, A. (2001). “Institutions and investors: The politics of the economic crisis in Southeast Asia.” *International Organization*, 55(1), 81-122.
- De Soto, H. (2003). *Mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else*. Basic books.
- Broz, J. L. (2002). *Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes*. *International Organization*, 56(04), 861-887.

### **Media**

- [PBS \(2002\) Commanding Heights: Episode 3, The New Rules of the Game \[1:56:55\]](#)
- [How "the special relationship" shaped the world for the worse - with Jeremy Green \[31:00\]](#)

## **Week 9. Democratic Peace**

### **Required:**

1. Russett, B. (1994). *Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world*. Princeton University Press. cc. 1-2.
2. Doyle, M. W. (1986). “Liberalism and world politics.” *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1151-1169.
3. Russett, B. M., & Oneal, J. R. (1999). “The Kantian peace: the pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992.” *World*

Politics, 52(1), 1-37.

4. Farber, H. S., & Gowa, J. (1997). "Common interests or common polities? Reinterpreting the democratic peace." *The Journal of Politics*, 59(2), 393-417.

5. Rosato, S. (2003). "The flawed logic of democratic peace theory." *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 585-602.

#### **Suggested:**

- Rummel, R. J. (1983). "Libertarianism and international violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(1), 27-71.

- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). "An institutional explanation of the democratic peace." *American Political Science Review*, 791-807.

- Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. S. (2001). "Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992." *American Political Science Review*, 33-48.

- Lemke, D., & Reed, W. (1996). "Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace." *International Interactions*, 22(2), 143-164.

- Schultz, K. A. (1999). Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. *International Organization*, 53(2), 233-266.

#### **Media:**

- [US Presidents and Democratic Peace Theory \[2:20\]](#)

### **Week 10. Ideas, Culture, and Identity**

#### **Required:**

1. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). "Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics." *Annual review of political science*, 4(1), Read 391-404, review rest.

2. Finnemore, M. (1996). *National interests in international society*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-33.

3. Haas, M. L. (2005). *The ideological origins of great power politics, 1789-1989*. Cornell University Press. pp. 1-39.

4. Huntington, S. P. (1993). "The clash of civilizations?." *Foreign affairs*, 22-49.

5. Henderson, E. A., & Tucker, R. (2001). "Clear and present strangers: the clash of civilizations and international conflict." *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(2), 317-338.

#### **Suggested:**

- Wendt, A. (1992). "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." *International organization*, 46(02), 391-425.

- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters. 3&6.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1998). "What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge." *International organization*, 52(4), 855-885.

**Media:**

- [Kathryn Sikkink on 'The role of agency in constructivism'](#)
- [Francis Fukuyama: "The Origins of the State: China and India" \[1:23:14\]](#)

**Week 11. Diffusion Processes in International Politics**

**Required:**

1. Elkins, Z., Simmons, B. (2005). On waves, clusters, and diffusion: A conceptual framework. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 598(1), 33-51.
2. Simmons, B. A., Dobbin, F., Garrett, G. (2006). Introduction: The international diffusion of liberalism. *International Organization*, 60(4), 781-810.
3. Gilardi, F. (2010). Who learns from what in policy diffusion processes?. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(3), 650-666.
4. Zhukov, Y. M., Stewart, B. M. (2013). Choosing your neighbors: Networks of diffusion in international relations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(2), 271-287.
5. Ward, H., Cao, X. (2012). Domestic and international influences on green taxation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(9), 1075-1103.

**Suggested:**

- Maggetti, M., Gilardi, F. (2011). The policy-making structure of European regulatory networks and the domestic adoption of standards. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(6), 830-847.
- Houle, C., Kayser, M. A., Xiang, J. (2016). Diffusion or confusion? Clustered shocks and the conditional diffusion of democracy. *International Organization*, 70(4), 687-726.
- Genovese, F., Kern, F. G., Martin, C. (2017). Policy alteration: rethinking diffusion processes when policies have alternatives. *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(2), 236-252.
- Gleditsch, K. S., Ward, M. D. (2006). Diffusion and the international context of democratization. *International Organization*, 60(4), 911-933.

**Week 12. International Norms and Transnational Networks**

**Required:**

1. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics* (Vol. 35). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapters

1-3.

2. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). "International norm dynamics and political change." *International organization*, 52(04), 887-917.
3. Tannenwald, N. (1999). "The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use." *International Organization*, 53(03), 433-468.
4. Moravcsik, A. (2000). "The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe." *International Organization*, 54(02), 217-252.
5. Neumayer, E. (2005). "Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?." *Journal of conflict resolution*, 49(6), 925-953.

#### **Suggested:**

- Hathaway, O. A. (2002). "Do human rights treaties make a difference?." *Yale Law Journal*, 1935-2042.
- Hathaway, O. A. (2007). "Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(4), 588-621.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2005). "Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression." *International Organization*, 59(3), 593-629.

#### **Media**

- [Isao Hashimoto "1945-1998" \[14:24\]](#)
- [George Perkovich \(2014\) "Taboo or Not Taboo: That is not the question"](#)
- [Oona Hathaway on US intervention in Syria \[10:02\]](#)