

The Pact General Election of 1922

The general election of 1922 was the first election to be held in the independent Irish state, the first held under the PR electoral system, and the first to be contested by the parties which, in modified forms, were to dominate subsequent Irish politics. The 1918 election, at which Sinn Féin had routed the Irish parliamentary party, had been the last of the old order. The 1922 election was the first of the new order — the two wings of Sinn Féin were challenged by Labour and other interests, as was to be the pattern for the next fifty years at least. In that light, this paper represents an attempt to start the scarcely-begun task of closely analysing modern Irish elections. Furthermore, the 1922 election merits attention because of the unusual circumstances under which it was held, foremost among which was the 'pact' between Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera.

Politics in the twenty-six counties of Ireland had been dominated by Sinn Féin since the 1918 general election, but since the dáil's vote on the treaty in January 1922 the party had been seriously divided. The anti-treatyites set up Cumann na Poblachta in March 1922,¹ and its leaders went on speaking tours of the country in preparation for the summer election, while the pro-treatyites began selecting candidates. Each side inserted newspaper advertisements appealing for funds for its own campaign. Civil war was a prospect increasingly referred to in the dáil as the situation deteriorated. Seán MacEntee stated that if the army embarked on civil war, 'they will have every justification before God and before man and in history for the course they are about to take',² while for the pro-treatyites Griffith declared that any civil war would be fought not on the treaty, but on the question of

¹The earl of Longford and T. P. O'Neill, *Eamon de Valera* (Dublin, 1970), p. 184.

²*Dáil Éireann rep. 1921-2*, p. 434, 17 May. See also his speech at *ibid.*, p. 345, 28 April, and those of Mary MacSwiney, *ibid.*, p. 337, 28 April, and David Ceannt, *ibid.*, p. 361, 3 May.



‘whether the people have a right, or have no right, to decide on the issues which affect them and the country’.³

In these circumstances, some members of Sinn Féin attempted to construct an agreement which would prevent the election being bitterly contested. Instead, they hoped, it would be an ‘agreed election’ at which no issue, particularly the treaty, would be decided. This desire was prompted partly by self-interest; both wings had a vested interest in preserving Sinn Féin’s monopoly of political power, and the anti-treatyites in particular knew that their strength in the dáil exceeded their popularity in the country. Many TDs had never had to face a contested election and were not eager to become acquainted with the experience. It was also motivated, though, by a feeling that Sinn Féin was not a political party at all but a ‘national movement’, and that anything which tended to divide Sinn Féin was a threat to the unity of the nation. It was also, no doubt, produced partly by a desire to return to the simple, one-dimensional politics of the pre-treaty days, when the dáil had been of one mind on all important questions.⁴ This goes some way towards explaining why, during the election campaign, Sinn Féin candidates often expressed annoyance at there being other candidates; these candidates were not only competing electorally with Sinn Féin, but were refusing to acknowledge the validity of its simplistic view of what was politically important. In any case, as George Gavan Duffy pointed out, the truth was that in any election voters would vote on the treaty whether or not Sinn Féin accepted that this was among the election issues.⁵

After army-inspired peace moves⁶ had failed, and after Griffith had actually moved the motion for the election. Collins and de Valera agreed on the ‘pact’, a seven-point agreement providing for a Sinn Féin ‘panel’ of candidates.⁷ Although the right of any other interest to contest the election was acknowledged, the pact stated that the signatories believed that ‘the national position’ required the entrusting of

³Ibid., p. 463, 19 May. See also Kevin O’Higgins’s speech, *ibid.*, p. 464, 19 May.

⁴Cf. Ronan Fanning, ‘Leadership and transition from the politics of revolution to the politics of party: the example of Ireland 1914–1939’, in *Reports – 14th International Congress of Historical Sciences*, (New York, 1977), iii, 1751.

⁵*Dáil Éireann rep. 1921–2*, p. 433, 17 May.

⁶For these, see *ibid.*, pp 357–65, 410–15; Florence O’Donoghue, *No other law* (Dublin, 1954), p. 237; C. Desmond Greaves, *Liam Mellows and the Irish revolution* (London, 1971), p. 315.

⁷For the full text see *Dáil Éireann rep. 1921–2*, p. 479.

government to 'those who have been the strength of the national situation during the last few years'. Each side was to nominate as many candidates as it then had TDs. After the election, which was to be held on 16 June, a coalition government containing TDs of both wings of Sinn Féin would be formed.

Nomination of candidates

The nomination of Sinn Féin candidates was governed by the pact, and clause 5 — 'that constituencies where an election is not held shall continue to be represented by their present deputies' — seems to have been interpreted as meaning that existing TDs should be renominated where possible. Altogether, of the 124 Sinn Féin TDs elected in 1921, 118 were re-selected as candidates; Sinn Féin's intention was that the new dáil should be practically identical to the old one, not only in terms of parties but also in terms of personnel. Three of the changes were enforced ones. Two pro-treaty TDs had died, while in Wexford, Richard Corish, who had voted for the treaty, vacated his panel seat to stand for Labour; in each case, the pro-treaty party selected a fresh candidate.

The other three cases were more complicated. Paul Galligan, a Cavan TD, had voted for the treaty, but had then voted in support of the re-election of de Valera as president two days later, and on the following day he supported the nomination of Griffith for the presidency; he was replaced by a new pro-treaty candidate. A vacancy existed in the Waterford-east Tipperary constituency, where Frank Drohan had resigned his seat before the treaty vote was taken, saying that this was his only option since he was against the treaty himself but felt his constituents were overwhelmingly pro-treaty. Because he had not actually committed himself in the vote, there was no agreement as to which side had the right to nominate a candidate in his place. This problem was resolved by the nomination of Dan Breen as a 'joint panel' candidate, although the background to this is not entirely clear; each side handed in a separate nomination paper for him and there was some surprise when, after the pro-treaty nomination paper had been accepted, the anti-treatyites arrived with another one.⁸ Breen himself attributed his nomination to his involvement during the previous months in moves to repair army unity, and knew nothing about his selection until he saw it in the newspapers.⁹

⁸*Nationalist* (Clonmel), 7 June, p. 3.

⁹Dan Breen, *My fight for Irish freedom* (Tralee, 1964), pp 167—8.

The third case was equally problematical. In Monaghan the anti-treatyites decided not to re-select their outgoing TD, Seán MacEntee, but to select Patrick McCarvill instead, perhaps because MacEntee had incurred some unpopularity at the time of the treaty vote because some of his constituents had understood him to have promised to resign his seat rather than vote against the treaty.¹⁰ The local pro-treatyites informed the anti-treatyites that they would regard the substitution of McCarvill for MacEntee as a violation of the pact, and they appear to have held an independent pro-treaty candidate, Thomas McHugh, in reserve, informing the anti-treatyites that he would stand unless MacEntee was reinstated. The anti-treatyites refused a meeting until the last minute, when they informed the pro-treaty camp that they were adhering to the selection of McCarvill, whereupon McHugh was duly nominated as an independent, to anti-treaty accusations that the pro-treatyites had broken the pact by failing to discourage him.¹¹

Other parties did not have these difficulties, though they sometimes had problems of a different sort. Labour approached the election in confident mood: it had always intended to stand, whether there was an agreement between the two wings of Sinn Féin or not. It originally selected 22 candidates,¹² although only 18 finally stood. The Farmers Party was less sure of where it stood. It sought the advice of Darrell Figgis, a member of the Sinn Féin standing committee, and he, addressing a meeting of the national executive of the Farmers Union, pointed out that under clause 4 of the pact it was free to stand. The national executive prudently recommended to its county associations that any candidates selected should be 'men with a national record'.¹³

Twenty-one independents eventually stood, none of them hostile to the treaty. Four were returned unopposed for the Trinity College seats. In Dublin three candidates stood on a common 'business pro-treaty' ticket, and Figgis stood on the sole issue of support for the treaty. Three other independents — two in Sligo-Mayo east, and one in Cork east and north-east — were men who had originally been selected as pro-treaty candidates but had been forced to step down when the pact was signed and the sitting TDs were re-nominated. Of the others, one was nominated by the Ratepayers' League, one was an independent farmer, and most if not all of the rest could be classified

¹⁰ *Northern Standard*, 13 January, p. 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9 June, p. 5.

¹² Arthur Mitchell, *Labour in Irish politics 1890-1930* (Dublin, 1974), p. 156.

¹³ *Irish Times*, 26 May, p. 5.

as independent pro-treaty. None of the border protestants who received strong support in elections from 1923 onwards stood; Richard Beamish in Cork borough seems to have been the only 'ex-unionist' standing outside Dublin University. Altogether there were only 54 non-Sinn Féin candidates, which meant that Sinn Féin was assured of at least 74 seats, and the coalition government envisaged under the pact could have been formed regardless of how the electorate voted.

The question of intimidation of non-panel candidates is often raised. Both Labour and the Farmers Party originally nominated more candidates than eventually stood, but this should not be automatically attributed to the threat, or the actual employment, of violence. Beyond any doubt, some non-panel candidates, or would-be candidates, were the victims of violence intended to persuade them to stand down. In Carlow-Kilkenny, the home of the Farmers Party candidate, Denis Gorey, was attacked and fired upon, but he resisted the attack and did not withdraw his candidacy; the four panel candidates in the constituency condemned the attack.¹⁴ A less resolute Farmers' candidate in Waterford-east Tipperary withdrew after a similar attack.¹⁵ An attack was made on the home of the Longford-Westmeath Ratepayers' candidate, Patrick Belton, who did not withdraw.¹⁶ In Clare the Farmers' candidates withdrew at the last moment, later explaining that this was largely because 'it was the absolute conviction of every member of our executive . . . that a free election in the circumstances was impossible'.¹⁷ There was also at least one dubious case, where a candidate in Mayo north and west whose papers arrived late offered an implausible story of a kidnapping to account for this.¹⁸

In addition to these fairly clear-cut cases of physical pressure, in none of which were the authors of the violence firmly established, there was also a good deal of moral pressure, much of it exerted in the Tipperary north, south and mid constituency. The national papers reported a Sinn Féin conference there as declaring that any candidates opposing the panel were 'disruptionist and . . . anti-

¹⁴Ibid., 7 June, p. 5.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶*Irish Independent*, 31 May, p. 5.

¹⁷*Clare Champion*, 17 June, p. 3.

¹⁸See *Irish Times*, 7 June, p. 5, and, for scepticism and Sinn Féin denials of involvement, *Irish Independent*, 8 June, p. 5, *Western People*, 10 June, p. 5 and *Connaught Telegraph*, 10 June, p. 3.

national in the present crisis'.¹⁹ Dan Breen 'succeeded in inducing the Farmers' candidates to withdraw from the contest'.²⁰ He also visited Dan Morrissey, the Labour candidate, but failed to 'induce' him to do likewise. Breen claimed that he appealed to Morrissey to stand down in the interests of national unity and that only Morrissey's lust for power stood in his way,²¹ while Morrissey stated that although Breen himself made no threats, one of those accompanying him at their meeting had said ominously that clause 4, allowing all interests to stand, should never have been in the pact.²²

Heavy moral pressure was brought to bear on Patrick Hogan, the Labour nominee in Clare, in the approach to the moment after which nominations could not be withdrawn. Several anti-treatyites asked him to stand down 'in the interests of national unity', and the other three nervous non-panel candidates said that they would withdraw if he did. The legal assessor even turned back the hands of his watch to give Hogan more time to make the desired decision. Finally his own proposer joined in the appeals to him, and he withdrew, though seemingly rather reluctantly.²³ In Kerry, the Farmers Party at first chose three candidates, but then decided, again 'in the interests of national unity', that it would not run any.²⁴ Even when such a phrase was not a euphemism for a direct threat of violence, it must be borne in mind that at a time of heightened nationalist consciousness it was a powerful appeal, and it took a candidate prepared to risk considerable personal opprobrium to resist it.

The election campaign

Once nominations closed on 6 June, the campaign began in earnest. The minor parties, naturally, concentrated on their own areas of interest. The Farmers Party stated at the outset that it did not 'regard the issue as being one concerned with the treaty, but it approaches the

¹⁹*Irish Independent*, 30 May, p. 5. The chairman of the meeting maintained that he had immediately repudiated this attitude because it conflicted with the spirit of the pact, but his disclaimer was published only locally. See the *Nationalist* (Clonmel), 7 June, p. 3.

²⁰*My fight for Irish freedom*, p. 168.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Nationalist* (Clonmel), 10 June, p. 5.

²³See the account in *Clare Champion*, 10 June, p. 1; see also William O'Brien; *Forth the banners go* (Dublin, 1969), pp 220–1.

²⁴*Cork Examiner*, 5 June, p. 2 and 7 June, p. 6.

election with a desire solely to advance agricultural interests',²⁵ and its candidates stuck closely to this brief. Labour, similarly, argued for greater representation for its interests, and maintained that the time had come when more attention should be given to social and economic issues.²⁶ The party sought in effect to cash in the credit accumulated by standing aside from the 1918 and 1921 elections. All the non-panel candidates pointed to the bitterness and 'wrangling' which had characterised the previous dáil, and argued that to return the same TDs to the next dáil would simply protract this situation.

Sinn Féin, despite the obvious splits which had appeared since December 1921, now managed to close its ranks quite impressively. Separate appeals for funds were replaced by joint appeals.²⁷ Candidates of both persuasions united to hold joint panel meetings at which, as had been envisaged in the pact, voters were asked simply to support Sinn Féin, and at which the treaty was not mentioned except when a speaker assured his listeners that it was not an issue in the election. Each wing seems to have kept its own separate organisation in the constituencies — each usually had its own election agent, for example, although sometimes, as in Wexford, all the panel candidates shared the same one. The essence of the Sinn Féin campaign was that the present TDs were the people who had brought Ireland thus far in the 'national struggle'.

Deprived rather artificially of the opportunity of attacking those with whom its differences were in some senses most serious, i.e. the other wing of Sinn Féin, each wing concentrated its fire on the other parties and the independents for having forced the election. The first shot in this battle was fired before nominations closed by Collins and de Valera, who issued a 'joint manifesto' complaining that non-panel candidates should have been so self-interested as actually to exercise the freedom to stand which had been generously granted to them. While acknowledging that the pact had given them this right, they commented that 'in view of the fact that one of the most obvious aims of the agreement was the avoidance of electoral contests, which could not fail at present to engender bitterness and promote discord and turmoil, the signatories had hoped that the spirit of the pact would have ensured that such contests would be reduced to a minimum'.²⁸

²⁵ *Irish Times*, 26 May, p. 5. For the party's manifesto see *Freeman's Journal*, 27 May, p. 7.

²⁶ For Labour's manifesto see *Freeman's Journal*, 23 May, p. 2.

²⁷ E.g. *Cork Examiner*, 5 June, p. 6.

²⁸ *Irish Independent*, 6 June, p. 5.

During the campaign itself, at the most inoffensive level, Sinn Féin speakers argued that there was no need for Labour or the Farmers Party to have their own TDs since both interests were already represented in the Dáil, a number of TDs being either farmers or working men.²⁹ Even some of those Sinn Féin TDs who commented adversely on there being other candidates seemed to do so as much in perplexity as to their credentials as in annoyance. Con Collins confessed that he had never heard of Dan Morrissey before he was selected as a Labour candidate: 'he never met him in prison, nor in an ambush'.³⁰

Other remarks were more forceful, if not menacing. In Cork east and north-east a TD said that it was 'not fair or honourable for individuals to come forward to satisfy party interests at present',³¹ and a Wexford TD, also an anti-treatyite, accused the Farmers Party of being permeated by 'Orangemen and Freemasons'.³² Sometimes words gave way to actions. Denis Gorey, who had been the victim of an earlier attack, referred to a general campaign of intimidation against the Farmers, and asked bitterly why Labour seemed to have been spared this.³³ Darrell Figgis, who had become unpopular with the anti-treatyites for seeming to encourage Farmers and Independents to stand — Macardle described his speeches as 'an attempt to wreck the coalition' — had his beard cut off by men who forced their way into his flat.³⁴ In the Sligo-Mayo east constituency the five panel candidates wrote a letter to the local papers, complaining that the two independents there had forced the election upon the constituency and accusing them of 'acting against the best interests of Ireland and contrary to the spirit of the Collins-de Valera agreement'.³⁵ On election day some of the independents' agents were 'kidnapped', and the independents later protested at 'the gross impersonation and intimidation which was practised on and before the day of the poll'. In the same constituency, protestant voters were said to have received notes advising them not to vote 'or else it will mean some night duty for us next week'.³⁶

²⁹See, for example, the speech of Eamon de Valera, *Irish Times*, 14 June, p. 6.

³⁰*Freeman's Journal*, 15 June, p. 6.

³¹Seamus Fitzgerald, in *Cork Examiner*, 12 June, p. 6.

³²Seán Etchingham, in *Freeman's Journal*, 14 June, p. 6.

³³*Kilkenny Journal*, 17 June, p. 3.

³⁴*Ir. republic*, p. 717; *Irish Times*, 13 June, p. 5.

³⁵*Sligo Champion*, 10 June, p. 4.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 24 June, p. 5.

The spirit of the pact between the two wings of Sinn Féin was generally observed, with only a few exceptions. In Waterford-east Tipperary, the uncertainty over the position of Dan Breen led to the seceder of his pro-treaty nomination being compelled to leave Clonmel after receiving threats from anti-treatyites who felt that the pro-treaty nomination should have been withdrawn when they handed in theirs.³⁷ The only constituency in which the pact broke down completely was Monaghan. Here the pro-Treaty candidates, Eoin O'Duffy and Ernest Blythe, openly campaigned on the merits of the treaty, criticized the anti-treaty candidate, and urged their supporters to give their third preference votes to the independent.³⁸

However, despite the joint campaigning undertaken in most constituencies, a noticeable feature of the campaign was an absence of joint panel advertisements in the newspapers; there were only a few advertisements appealing for panel votes, and these were all inserted by the anti-treaty organization, Cumann na Poblachta.³⁹ Moreover, leading pro-treatyites did not tour the country appealing for support for the joint panel as did the anti-treaty leaders. This was, of course, partly because they were preoccupied with the business of government, particularly with the task of drafting the Free State constitution, but for many of them this was probably a welcome excuse.

Whether the pro-treatyites went further and actually 'called the pact off' is much debated; the suggestion arises, of course, from Collins's famous Cork speech in which he urged his listeners to 'vote for the candidates you think best of'.⁴⁰ His speech, like another made on the same occasion by J. J. Walsh, made no mention of the desirability of preserving the solidarity of the panel, and thus implied that Collins would not have minded if pro-treaty voters were not scrupulous in giving lower preferences to the anti-treaty candidates. Although it has been suggested that his speech was 'a direct repudiation of the pact',⁴¹ this is very much a *post hoc* interpretation.

³⁷*Freeman's Journal*, 10 June, p. 6.

³⁸*Northern Standard*, 16 June, p. 5. The pro-treaty candidates in Griffith's constituency of Cavan also campaigned strongly on the merits of the treaty, but here there were no anti-treaty candidates.

³⁹E.g. *Freeman's Journal*, 13 June, p. 2.

⁴⁰See *Irish Independent*, 15 June, p. 7.

⁴¹Macardle, *Ir. republic*, p. 721. Very many other writers interpret the speech similarly, e.g. Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, p. 336; F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the famine* (London, 1971), p. 456; Eoin Neeson, *Civil war in Ireland* (Cork,

Despite Macardle's description of newspapers printing headlines 'in large type' and reporting the speech in such a way as to imply that the pact was 'breaking up',⁴² their coverage of it was not quite so dramatic.

The *Irish Times* devoted only a paragraph to it and did not comment editorially. The *Cork Examiner* reported it quite prominently, but interpreted it editorially only as confirming that non-panel candidates had the right to stand. The *Independent* also reported the speech fairly prominently, but made no editorial comment.⁴³ The *Freeman's Journal* initially reported the speech very unobtrusively, but on the following day, polling day, it printed the key passage from it at the head of its editorial, although it was not accompanied by comment or interpretation.⁴⁴ Only two of the papers gave their readers any editorial guidance at all, the *Irish Times* urging its readers to vote first for the non-panel candidates and to give their next preferences to the pro-treaty panellists, and the *Independent* assuring its readers that the return of non-panel candidates would not in any way harm the national cause. In other words, none of the Irish newspapers gave its readers to understand that Collins had repudiated the pact, or used his speech as a basis for advising them to vote in any particular way.

The election results

Ireland was divided into 26 territorial constituencies returning 120 TDs, with each returning at least 3 TDs, and 2 university constituencies, each returning 4 TDs; the single transferable vote was the electoral system used. Because the election was fought under such unusual conditions, with candidature patterns distorted by the pact arrangement, interpreting the results is not a straightforward task. Most interests could, and did, claim that their performance represented success (see table 1).

Sinn Féin as a whole was obviously entitled to claim the results as a victory for itself, since it won 94 of the 124 seats it contested, and 94 out of 128 overall. 34 of its seats were won without contest in the 7

1969), p. 106; O'Donoghue, *No other law*, p. 244; Calton Younger, *Ireland's civil war* (London, 1968), p. 303; Longford and O'Neill, *Eamon de Valera*, p. 189.

⁴²*Ir. republic*, p. 721.

⁴³See issues of 15 June.

⁴⁴*Freeman's Journal*, 16 June, p. 4.

Table 1

Votes won by parties in each contested constituency

	<i>pro-treaty</i>	<i>anti-treaty</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Farmers</i>	<i>Inde- pendents</i>	<i>Total</i>
Carlow-Kilkenny	9,752	4,478	10,875	6,122		31,227
Cavan	18,473			5,620		24,093
Cork Borough	11,388	5,812	6,836		6,311	30,347
Cork E & NE		11,796		6,989	5,029	23,814
Cork N, S, Mid, SE & W	25,070	12,623	10,737	6,372		54,802
Dublin Mid	4,295	5,670			19,164	29,129
Dublin NW	22,582		5,195			27,777
Dublin S	9,884	5,259	4,734		6,431	26,308
Dublin County	18,434	4,826	8,220	3,697	16,700	51,877
Galway	19,896	11,780	4,821			36,497
Kildare-Wicklow	9,170	6,568	12,515	6,261		34,514
Laois-Offaly	17,425		15,167			32,592
Longford-Westmeath	14,428	5,022	7,073		2,258	28,781
Louth-Meath	16,774	5,733	13,994			36,501
Monaghan	11,792	5,046			3,681	20,519
Sligo-Mayo E	10,193	19,457			4,849	34,499
Tipperary N, S, Mid	9,309	11,508	7,819			28,636
Waterford-Tipp. E	6,778	7,039	10,658	5,871	583	34,077*
Wexford	2,370	8,882	13,923	7,786		32,961
National University	1,182	663			791	2,636
Ireland	239,195	132,162	132,567	48,718	65,797	621,587*
(%)	(38.48)	(21.26)	(21.33)	(7.84)	(10.59)	(100.0)
Candidates	65	58	18	13	21	176*
Seats	58	36	17	7	10	128

*including the 3,148 votes of Dan Breen, joint panel candidate

Note: 17 pro-treaty candidates, 17 anti-treaty and 4 independents were returned unopposed.

Source: provincial and national newspapers.

constituencies where no non-panellists had come forward, so in all it won 60 seats out of the 90 it had to contest; two-thirds of its candidates who were compelled to fight were elected. It won 60.2 per cent of the votes cast, its strength ranging from 34.1 per cent in Wexford to 86.8 per cent in Galway. Sinn Féin had a majority of votes in 13 of the 20 contested constituencies, and a plurality in 5 others.

On the other hand, although in normal circumstances a party

would be well satisfied to have won 73 per cent of the seats, Sinn Féin had hoped to win even more, and to that extent the result was a disappointment. Of the 20 contested constituencies, only 4 returned the full Sinn Féin panel intact; the party lost 1 seat in 7 constituencies, 2 seats in 4 constituencies, and 3 seats in the other 5. Moreover, its votes per candidate were actually lower than for non-panel candidates (see table 2).

Table 2

Votes won per candidate

<i>pro-treaty</i>	<i>anti-treaty</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Farmers</i>	<i>inde- pendents</i>	<i>all panel- lists</i>	<i>all non- panel- lists</i>	<i>all candi- dates</i>
5,174	3,372	7,365	3,748	4,334	4,333	5,354	4,689

Comparing the performances of the two Sinn Féin wings, there is no doubt that the pro-treatyites came off better. In only 5 of the 16 constituencies where each had candidates did the anti-treatyites win more votes; in 4 of these they had 3 candidates against just 1 pro-treatyite, and in the other the balance was 3 to 2 in the anti-treatyites' favour. This last case, Sligo-Mayo east, was the only constituency in which the anti-treatyites won a majority of the votes. Excluding the uncontested seats, the pro-treatyites won 41 seats as against just 19 for the anti-treatyites; 22 of the latter's candidates were defeated, as against only 7 pro-treaty candidates. Eight outgoing anti-treaty TDs lost their deposits out of only 14 candidates altogether who did so, and there was the further striking statistic that not a single anti-treaty candidate headed the poll in any constituency. The pro-treaty candidates were returned intact in 13 of the 19 contested constituencies in which they stood; anti-treatyites were returned solidly in only 4 out of 17 constituencies. Overall, the anti-treaty share of the poll ranged from 9.3 per cent in Dublin County to 56.4 per cent in Sligo-Mayo east, and the pro-treaty share from 7.2 per cent in Wexford to 81.3 per cent in Dublin north-west.

Labour's campaign was extremely successful—17 of its 18 candidates were elected, and the other was defeated by 13 votes on the last count. Caution cost it at least 2 certain seats, since its single candidates in both Leix-Offaly and Louth—Meath got more than

enough votes to elect 2 candidates comfortably, and in Carlow-Kilkenny its one candidate received nearly enough votes for 2 seats. In all, Labour won 21.4 per cent of the votes cast; its best performance since then has been 17.0 per cent in 1969. This was partly because no votes were cast in some of Labour's traditionally weak areas (Donegal, Leitrim, Mayo and Roscommon), but some of its then strong areas, like Clare and Limerick, also had no contest. Five of its candidates topped the poll in their constituencies, and altogether Labour won more votes than the anti-treatyites.⁴⁵ The 1922 campaign was probably the most successful Labour has ever fought.

It would be naive to assume that all of Labour's votes came from people sympathetic to the party's social and economic policies. The probability is that it got a good deal of support not only from 'natural' Labour voters but also from former supporters of the Irish parliamentary party and others who were prepared to vote for almost any candidate rather than support Sinn Féin. It is perhaps significant that Labour won its largest two votes in constituencies where the Labour candidate was the only one standing against the panel, although this was not a universal relationship. A provincial journalist predicted — correctly — that the Labour candidate in Louth-Meath was going to win more votes than he ever would again, because he was the only candidate 'who gave the electors a chance of breaking the cold chain of silence that has bound them since 1918'.⁴⁶ In addition, several reporters commented that Labour's campaign had been much more vigorous than that of Sinn Féin or the other groups.⁴⁷ The Farmers' Party was also fairly successful, winning a seat in all but one of the constituencies in which it stood, and even there its candidate was only 15 votes short on the final count. However, unlike Labour, the party was to do better in subsequent elections. Independents too did reasonably well, with 10 of the 21 candidates being elected, including the four from Trinity College.

Finally, it is worth noting the very pronounced regional variations in the voting patterns. Sinn Féin as a whole, and the anti-treaty wing in particular, did better in the more remote, agricultural parts of the country; they fared worst in Dublin and best in Connacht and Ulster, where only one panel seat was lost (see table 3). The pattern of Labour and Farmers Party support was much as would be expected, both

⁴⁵If Dan Breen's votes were taken as anti-treaty, the anti-treaty vote would exceed Labour's.

⁴⁶*Dundalk Democrat*, 17 June, p. 4.

⁴⁷See *ibid.* and *Freeman's Journal*, 14 June, p. 5.

doing best in areas where they were to do best in subsequent elections, i.e. where large farmers and farm labourers were most numerous. Independents' strength, however, was largely confined to Dublin and the universities. In Dublin county Darrell Figgis received a huge vote, and two pro-treaty independents headed the poll in mid Dublin. Outside Dublin, only one independent was elected, in Cork east and north-east, and he was one of the pre-pact pro-treaty candidates who had been deprived of the official pro-treaty label by the pact, standing in a constituency where there were now no pro-treaty panel candidates. The main reason for this pattern was that fewer non-panel candidates came forward in the least industrialised parts of the country. This in turn could be attributed to the greater possibility of exerting pressure on would-be non-panel candidates in the areas where Dublin Castle's rule had in the past been least effective, although it may be that, for this very reason, the high Sinn Féin vote here simply reflected a more intense commitment to nationalism.

Table 3

Seats and votes won by Sinn Féin in contested constituencies, by province

	<i>pro-treaty</i>			<i>anti-treaty</i>		
	<i>seats</i>	<i>(candi- dates)</i>	<i>votes, in per cent</i>	<i>seats</i>	<i>(candi- dates)</i>	<i>votes, in per cent</i>
Dublin	10	(12)	40.9	1	(6)	14.7
Rest of Leinster	11	(15)	35.6	4	(11)	18.7
Munster	7	(8)	35.5	7	(15)	28.4
Connacht	6	(6)	42.4	5	(6)	44.0
Ulster	5	(5)	67.8	1	(1)	24.6

Inter-party relationships

The single transferable vote system allows voters to list as many candidates as they wish in order of their own preference. Consequently, analysis of the transfers carried out as the votes were counted can enable conclusions to be drawn about how supporters of each party felt about the other parties.

Of most interest, of course, is the relationship between the two wings of Sinn Féin. The pact envisaged supporters of each wing of Sinn Féin giving their next preferences to Sinn Féin candidates of the other wing. Macardle says that anti-treaty voters, 'loyal to the terms

of the Pact', did this, but makes no comment on pro-treaty voters' behaviour.⁴⁸ Greaves reports the strongly anti-treaty IRA leader Rory O'Connor seizing some boxes of votes 'with the object of checking the 'treaty' party's loyalty to the pact', and finding, no doubt to his indignation, that 'many second preferences had gone to non-panel candidates'.⁴⁹

The evidence is, however, that the pact held up very well in this respect. Not a single seat was lost to the anti-treatyites by lack of panel solidarity on the part of pro-treaty voters. The joint panel candidate Dan Breen would, though, have been elected if supporters of the pro-treaty candidate in his constituency had given their next preferences more solidly to the other panel candidates. The anti-treaty group itself lost two seats through a lack of solidarity in transfers between its own candidates, in Carlow-Kilkenny and Dublin south. Apart from Waterford-east Tipperary, the only constituency where Sinn Féin won fewer seats than its first preferences 'entitled' it to was the large Cork county constituency: this was because Michael Collins's huge surplus did not go solidly to the other Sinn Féin candidates, but it was a pro-treaty seat that was lost.

In a few constituencies, the voting patterns revealed a failure on the part of treaty supporters to observe the spirit of the pact. In Monaghan, where, as we have seen, the two wings of Sinn Féin were in conflict from the start of the campaign, about twice as many pro-treaty transfers went to the independent as to the anti-treatyite, although the latter held the seat because of his substantial first preference vote. The result of the count in the National University, too, shows that Rory O'Connor's conclusion had some justification, since more pro-treaty transfers went to the independents than to the anti-treaty candidates, although the number of votes was small and the outcome was not affected. In Dublin county, many more pro-treaty lower preferences went to non-panellists than to the anti-treatyite. Since all the panellists in the constituencies of both Arthur Griffith and Kevin O'Higgins were pro-treatyites, there is no possibility of examining their supporters' attitudes to the anti-treatyites.

Overall, as table 4 shows, panel supporters observed the pact much more in the rule than in the breach. Over 70 per cent of anti-treaty

⁴⁸*Ir. republic*, p. 723.

⁴⁹*Liam Mellows*, p. 336. The votes were from the National University constituency, in which the count had been completed before the boxes were taken.

Table 4

Transferring of votes between panel candidates

	<i>Destiny of pro-treaty transfers</i>		<i>Destiny of anti-treaty transfers</i>	
	<i>when pro-treaty panel candidates were available to receive transfers</i>	<i>when anti-treaty panel candidates were available to receive transfers but pro-treaty panellists were not</i>	<i>when anti-treaty panel candidates were available to receive transfers</i>	<i>when pro-treaty panel candidates were available to receive transfers, but anti-treaty panellists were not</i>
total	48,951	15,246	22,495	5,188
to: pro-treaty	36,392	—	1,852	3,672
(per cent)	(74.3)	—	(8.2)	(70.8)
anti-treaty	5,664	10,411	16,697	—
(per cent)	(11.6)	(68.3)	(74.2)	—
joint panel	—	310	—	—
(per cent)	—	(2.0)	—	—

Source: as for table 1.

transfers went, where possible, to pro-treaty candidates when there were no anti-treaty candidates in the running, and over 70 per cent of pro-treaty transfers went to anti-treaty candidates or to Dan Breen in corresponding circumstances. Altogether 82.2 per cent of pro-treaty transfers went to other panellists where possible, and 80.6 per cent of anti-treaty transfers did the same.

Voters for Labour, the Farmers Party and independents clearly felt more sympathetic to the pro-treaty panellists than to the anti-treatyites (see table 5). In each case, about twice as many of their transfers went to pro-treaty panellists as to anti-treatyites when both were available to receive them.

However, both Labour and Farmers party voters favoured their own party candidates when possible; 73.5 per cent of Labour transfers went to other Labour candidates when these were available, and 66.8 per cent of Farmers party transfers did the same. It is also clear from table 5 that many supporters of the Farmers party and of independent candidates were reluctant to give transfers to Sinn Féin, letting them go to other parties or even become non-transferable instead.

Aftermath and conclusion

By the time the election results were in, the pact's provision for a coalition government had been overtaken by events. Although

Table 5

Destiny of non-panel transfers, when both pro and anti-treaty panellists were available to receive them.

<i>From:</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Farmers</i>	<i>Independents</i>	<i>All non-panellists</i>
Total	21,953	5,906	20,509	48,368
to: pro-treaty	9,674	2,335	6,886	18,895
(per cent)	(44.1)	(39.5)	(33.6)	(39.1)
anti-treaty	6,121	797	1,951	8,869
(per cent)	(27.9)	(13.5)	(9.5)	(18.3)
other parties,	6,158	2,774	11,672	20,604
(per cent)	(28.1)	(47.0)	(56.9)	(42.6)

Source: as for table 1.

Macardle writes that de Valera waited 'daily' for an invitation from Collins to forward the names of the anti-treaty ministers for the coalition cabinet⁵⁰ — itself a tacit admission that the anti-treatyites did not regard Collins's Cork speech as having 'called off' the pact — circumstances had by now changed completely. The Free State constitution, in the form finally insisted upon by the British, was one which everyone realised was unacceptable to the anti-treatyites, and there was no possibility of their being willing to work within its framework in government. Whether such a coalition government could have been workable anyway is, of course, highly questionable. In any case, when the provisional government began its attack on the Four Courts, provoked by the capture of J. J. O'Connell and under heavy British pressure, the anti-treaty party sided with those under attack, and the ensuing civil war ended the fragile unity of Sinn Féin.

By any standards, the 1922 general election was an extraordinary one. The protagonists were the two wings of an almost-sundered party, which, until just four weeks before polling day, had been fierce critics of each other and had seemed to be drifting into armed conflict. Less than a fortnight after polling day this armed conflict did indeed break out, and developed into a bitter civil war the legacy of which shaped the entire Irish political system. And yet, for a brief period of less than six weeks, the two groups were asked to co-operate under the terms of an agreement which required them to act as if they constituted just one party, and, as the above account has shown, for the most part they genuinely did co-operate in this manner. Although

⁵⁰*Ir. republic*, p. 727. Cf. Greaves, *Liam Mellows*, p. 336.

many hoped there would be no contests, enough non-panel candidates came forward to ensure that the election was in the end a reasonably reliable test of the electorate's feelings. In the short term, the election was followed by civil war, but the fact that the election affirmed the primacy of the ballot box, at a time when this seemed very much in the balance, may in the long term have been its most important consequence.

MICHAEL GALLAGHER

Giraldiana

History has an attraction for the amateur as well as for the professional, and though the attraction may be of a similar kind, the amateur is rarely given access to primary sources. Yet it is from these that history is written and fundamentally experienced. Giraldus Cambrensis (1146-1223) wrote about Ireland and his native Wales in the late twelfth century in such a fashion that his works can be read with pleasure, profit and, if correctly presented, understanding by both amateur and professional. Most of his works have been available to professional historians for a century in the edition published in the Rolls Series; the rest of his works have been edited since then.¹ Yet surprisingly, rather little use was made of them until very recently. Only over the past decade has the work of this colourful and controversial individual attracted more than passing attention.

In Ireland, Giraldus is by no means unknown, but his partisanship and bias has long been taken as an excuse for not studying him seriously. Partisan and biased he most certainly was, but, while in other historical material authorship as well as partisanship are often extremely hard to determine and thus difficult to take fully into account, enough is known about Giraldus to prevent his bias from deceiving the careful reader. We know more or less where his sympathies lay, and we can read his works, including the famous *Conquest of Ireland*, with this knowledge in mind.

The year 1978 marks an important advance in the possibilities of appreciating Giraldus. It saw the publication of a new critical edition, complete with English translation, full scholarly apparatus and ample historical annotation, of one of Giraldus's major works, *The Conquest of*

¹*Giraldi Cambrensis Opera*, ed. J. S. Brewer, J.F. Dimock, G. F. Warner, 8 volumes, Rolls Series 21 (London, 1861-91); *Giraldus Cambrensis, De Invectionibus*, ed. W. S. Davies in *Y Cymmrodor* xxx (1920); *Giraldus Cambrensis, Speculum Duorum*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Yves Lefèvre, General Editor Michael Richter (Cardiff, 1974).