

## PIU22062 | Texts II

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<b>Credits:</b>	<b>10 ECTS</b>
<b>Contact Hours:</b>	<b>22 One Hour Seminars</b>
<b>Pre-requisite:</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Semester:</b>	<b>Hilary</b>
<b>Module Leader</b>	
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<b>Office Hours:</b>	<b>TBC</b>
<b>Lecturer(s):</b>	<b>Adrian Downey, James Levine</b>
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### Module Outline: Component 1

During the first component of this course, we shall study a text focused upon cutting-edge work in the philosophy and cognitive science of mind:

*Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content*, by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin (2013) (<https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/radicalizing-enactivism>)

Said text constitutes a manifesto for the recently popular anti-representational, enactive/embodied understandings of mind, which cut against the consensus representational view in philosophy and cognitive science. Topics covered therein include: enactivism; the 'scaling up' problem; the (shortcomings) of attempted naturalisations of mental content; and the nature of perception.

## **Learning Outcomes:**

By the end of this component, students will be:

- well versed on the pros and cons of both anti-representational and representational approaches toward the philosophical and scientific study of mind and consciousness.
- poised to critically assess, and so arrive at their own considered take upon, said approaches.

## **Recommended Reading List:**

As advised/circulated by lecturer during the lecture series.

## **Module Outline: Component 2**

In the second component of this module, we will focus on Tim Crane's 2013 book *The Objects of Thought*, which is concerned with issue (sometimes called the issue of intentionality) of what is it to think about an object.

Crane distinguishes between two views on the topic—the relational view of intentionality, according to which in order to think about an object, there must (in reality) be that object for us to think about; and the non-relational view, according to which thinking about an object does not require that there is (in reality) an object for us to think about. Crane defends a non-relational theory, and we will examine his arguments for that view and the consequences of it.

## **Learning Outcomes:**

By the end of this component, students will be:

- able to distinguish relational from non-relational theories of intentionality
- able to critically assess, and defend their own views on, these different positions.

## **Recommended Reading List**

As advised/circulated by lecturer during the lecture series.

## **Assessment:**

- Two Essays (worth 25% each)
- Two Exam Answers (worth 25% each)