# EC4041 Development Economics

## Problem set 3

#### Question 1 (Ray (1998), chapter 12)

- 1. Show that in an economy with extensive possibilities for perfect crop insurance, fixed-rent tenancy must be dominant irrespective of whether potential tenants are risk-averse or risk-neutral
- 2. Show that in an economy where risk is a major factor, where tenants are risk-averse, and where the inputs of the tenant can be costlessly monitored by the landlord (and verified in court), sharecropping will be preferred to fixed-rent tenancy.
- 3. In this question, why did we add the extra-quilification that inputs can be verifiable? what happens if we drop this assumption?

## Question 2 (Ray (1998), chapter 12)

It is not uncommon to observe that in sharecropping contractys with cost sharing, the cost share borne by the tenant is equal to the output share accruing to him. Explain why this might be the case.

#### Question 3

Comment on table 5 from the paper by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) "Greed and Grievance in Civil War".

# Question 4

Comment on the following tables, taken from the paper by Miguel, Satyanah and Sergenti (2004) "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach".

TABLE 2 RAINFALL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (First-Stage) Dependent Variable: Economic Growth Rate, t

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	Ordinary Least Squares								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
Growth in rainfall, t	.055***	.053***	.049***	.049***	.053***				
	(.016)	(.017)	(.017)	(.018)	(.018)				
Growth in rainfall,	.034**	.032**	.028**	.028*	.037**				
t-1	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.015)				
Growth in rainfall,				.001					
t+1				(.019)					
Growth in terms of				, ,	002				
trade, $t$					(.023)				
Log(GDP per cap-		011							
ita), 1979		(.007)							
Democracy (Polity		.0000							
IV), $t-1$		(.0007)							
Ethnolinguistic		.006							
fractionalization		(.044)							
Religious		.045							
fractionalization		(.044)							
Oil-exporting		.007							
country		(.019)							
Log(mountainous)		.001							
		(.005)							
Log(national popu-		009							
lation), $t-1$		(.009)							
Country fixed		()							
effects	no	no	yes	yes	yes				
Country-specific			,	740	,				
time trends	no	ves	ves	ves	ves				
$R^2$	.02	.08	.13	.13	.16				
Root mean square					-3-				
error	.07	.07	.07	.07	.06				
Observations	743	743	743	743	661				

NOTE—Huber robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the country level. A country-specific year time trend is included in all specifications (coefficient estimates not reported).

\* Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence.

\*\* Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence.

\*\*\* Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence.

TABLE 4 Economic Growth and Civil Conflict

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CIVIL CONFLICT										
	Di	ependent V	/ariable: C	ivil Confl	ict ≥25 Dea	ths	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Civil Conflict ≥1,000 Deaths			
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	Probit (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	IV-2SLS (5)	IV-2SLS (6)	IV-2SLS (7)			
Economic growth rate, $t$ Economic growth rate, $t-1$ Log(GDP per capita), 1979 Democracy (Polity IV), $t-1$ Ethnolinguistic fractionalization Religious fractionalization Oil-exporting country Log(mountainous)  Log(national population), $t-1$ Country fixed	37 (.26)14 (.23)067 (.061) (.005) .24 (.26)29 (.26) .02 (.21) .077** (.041) .080 (.051)	33 (.26) 08 (.24) 041 (.050) .001 (.005) .23 (.27) 24 (.24) .05 (.21) .076* (.039) (.050) (.	21 (.20) .01 (.20) .085 (.084) .003 (.006) .51 (.40) .10 (.42) 16 (.20) .057 (.066) .182* (.086)	21 (.16) .07 (.16)	41 (1.48) -2.25** (1.07) .053 (.098) .004 (.006) .51 (.39) .22 (.44)10 (.22) .060 (.058) .159* (.093)	-1.13 (1.40) -2.55** (1.10)	-1.48* (.82) 77 (.70)			
effects Country-specific	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes			
time trends  R  Root mean square  error	no 	no .13	yes .53	yes .71	yes  .36	yes 	yes  .24			
Observations	743	743	743	743	743	743	743			