Lecture 25.
Doha Round agricultural trade negotiations - the issues

What we want to learn about this topic

A further round of WTO agricultural trade negotiations is now underway. This lecture discusses

• what the issues are in these negotiations
• the progress of the negotiations up to the Hong Kong Ministerial Council, December 2005

Short introduction to the issues

Start of the Doha Round

Article 20 of the UR Agreement on Agriculture

Non-trade concerns are not elaborated further in this Article, but the preamble to the URAA indicates that these include food security and the need to protect the environment. The EU is keen to see a discussion of multifunctionality and animal welfare under this heading. Other objectives and concerns mentioned in that preamble include the establishment of fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system (repeated in Article 20) and the need to take into account the particular needs and conditions of developing countries and the 'possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform programme on least developed and net food importing countries'. The special and differential treatment to developing country Members is also referred to in the URAA preamble where it says that such treatment 'is an integral element of the negotiations'.

The Doha Mandate

The agricultural text in the Doha Ministerial Council Declaration initiating the Doha Round reads as follows:

'13. We recognize the work already undertaken in the negotiations initiated in early 2000 under Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, including the large number of negotiating proposals submitted on behalf of a total of 121 Members. We recall the long-term objective referred to in the Agreement to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system through a programme of fundamental reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific commitments on support and protection in order to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. We reconfirm our commitment to this programme. Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. We agree that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural development. We take note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by Members and confirm that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture.

14. Modalities for the further commitments, including provisions for special and differential treatment, shall be established no later than 31 March 2003. Participants shall submit their comprehensive draft Schedules based on these modalities no later than the date of the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. The negotiations, including with respect to rules and disciplines and related legal texts, shall be concluded as part and at the date of conclusion of the negotiating agenda as a whole.'

Note the commitment to 'substantial improvements in market access' and the rather convoluted wording on export subsidies 'reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies', which stops short of mandating the actual elimination of export subsidies in the current round. The EU invested huge energy in avoiding a commitment to eliminate export subsidies, although later (in May 2004) it recognised that maintaining this position was just a huge stumbling block to progress.

The process

The agricultural negotiations are part of what is referred to as the WTO's 'built-in agenda'. In other words, these negotiations (along with new negotiations in the services and intellectual property rights protection) were already mandated in the Uruguay Round Agreements.

At the Third WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in November 1999, WTO Members sought to launch a new comprehensive round of trade negotiations (dubbed by some the Millenium Round) which would have embraced all the issues covered by the Uruguay Round plus, some countries hoped, new issues such as competition policy, labour standards, trade and the environment, etc. The Seattle talks failed to reach agreement to launch a new round, but agreement was reached in November 2001 at Doha to launch a new round of negotiations as a single undertaking.

From the point of view of the agricultural negotiations, including it in a comprehensive round has ambiguous effects. On the one hand, negotiating across a range of issues simultaneously broadens the scope for trade-offs and makes it easier to reach an overall agreement (in other words, a country can make up for perceived losses or concessions in the agricultural negotiations by making gains in the negotiations on services; otherwise, it must try to find offsetting gains in the agricultural talks which may be more difficult). On the other hand, introducing all the complexities of a comprehensive Round can lead to negotiations extending over many years, whereas a narrower focus on agriculture alone (especially given that the modalities of disciplining agricultural support were agreed in the Uruguay Round) could lead to an earlier agreement.

Negotiating process

Negotiations are held in a Special meeting of the Committee of Agriculture. This Committee oversees the implementation of the UR Agriculture Agreement and meets monthly in Geneva. The Special Committee meets back to back with the regular meetings. Agreed texts must be adopted at meetings of the WTO Ministerial Council which usually meeting every two years (1999 Seattle, 2001 Doha 2003, Cancun, 2005 Hong Kong), where decisions are taken by consensus. Due to the ever-increasing membership of the WTO, negotiations in the full Special Committee would be too unwieldy, and the practice has emerged of 'Green Room' meetings where a selected group of countries representing the main country interests try to reach agreements.

Developing countries have played a much more dynamic and important role in the Doha Round negotiations compared to the Uruguay Round. Negotiations have been facilitated by the emergence of a number of well coordinated groups: the G-20, led by Brazil, China, India and South Africa, with strong offensive export interests; the G-90, consisting of most other developing countries who have lobbied hard for special and differential treatment; the G-33, who are largely net-importing developing countries who have pushed the ideas of Special Products and a Special Safeguard Mechanism for developing countries; as well as other groups, e.g. the Cotton-4 consisting of four West African countries particularly dependent on cotton exports.

Issues in the Doha Round

Market access

Tariffs

• Because average tariffs still range between 35 and 50 percent for many commodity groups, and with much higher tariffs on particular commodities, an obvious issue in the current round is achieving further reductions in these tariffs, the extent of these reductions and the modalities of how to achieve this.
• The UR approach exacerbated the dispersion in tariff rates because it allowed lower tariff reductions on sensitive products. It was accepted from an early stage that the current talks should reduce higher tariffs more than lower ones in order to reduce this disperstion. Tariff rates could be harmonised, for example, based on the Swiss formula which was used in the Tokyo Round to harmonise tariff peaks on industrial products left as a result of the linear formula used in the Kennedy Round. The point of the Swiss formula is that it leads to greater percentage reductions in higher tariffs than in lower ones. The Swiss formula is Tn = (amax * T0)/(amax + T0) where T0 is the original tariff, Tn is the new tariff and amax is the upper bound on all resulting tariffs. With amax = 50, an initial tariff of 40 percent would be reduced to 22 percent. Alternative options were based on banded or tiered approaches.

Tariff rate quotas

• Whether the rules governing the administration of TRQs should be tightened up. A wide variety of methods are used, including first come first served, auctioning, historical shares, imports undertaken by state enterprises or applied tariffs (cases where imports are allowed in unlimited quantities at the in-quota tariff rate or below).
• Some countries argue that administrative mechanisms are being used to keep imports out and point to evidence of quota underfill. They want more clarity on what mechanisms are legitimate.
• There are discrepancies in the rates of in-quota tariffs applied by different countries. These were generally set at whatever rate the importing country thought would be sufficient to achieve the minimum access guaranteed. In future, it might be agreed that rates cannot exceed a specified percentage (for example, one thirdof the MFN rate?) or even zero.
• The rate at which market access might be expanded will be a crucial consideration. If minimum access quantities were doubled, for example, it would make many of the high bound over-quota tariffs irrelevant.

Safeguards

Safeguards are contingency restrictions on imports taken temporarily to deal with a sudden surge in imports. WTO has special rules governing safeguards, but the Agriculture Agreement has its own (slightly less constraining) rules - the Special Safeguard clause SSG. However, only countries which underwent tariffication and reserved the right to use the SSG in their schedules of commitments can make use of this clause for those particular commodities. Issues include whether the SSG should be abolished, or extended to a wider group of countries.

Export subsidies

• The EU is the major user of exports subsidies and agreed initially only to negotiate some further reduction in their use. Other countries are seeking their complete abolition.
• The EU made its agreement conditional on disciplines being extended to the use of export credits, the operation of state-trading agencies and disciplines on food aid. Export credits can be a form of de facto export subsidy if the credit terms extended are more favourable than normal market interest rates. Within the OECD, countries have negotiated a code for non-agricultural export credits which puts limits on credit terms and the length of credit extension but agriculture is not included in this agreement. Presumably the easiest way to deal with it would be to calculate the 'subsidy equivalent' embodied in credit terms which went beyond the allowable terms on such credit, and to charge this against a country's export subsidy constraints in its schedules.
• For state trading exporters, the concern centres on the competitive advantages they might have from their monopoly position through the opportunities for discretionary pricing facilitated by domestic price pooling.
• Disciplines on food aid are also sought to prevent food aid being used as a way of getting round subsidised export restrictions.
• The converse of export subsidies - export taxes and controls - received relatively little attention in the Uruguay Round. But there is an inconsistency in expecting importers to open their markets to trade and then withholding exports from the market in times of shortage. Within the GATT export controls are generally disallowed, though export taxes are deemed innocuous. In 1995/96, the EU imposed export taxes on wheat to limit the rise in domestic prices. Article XI of GATT 1947 prohibits quantitative export restrictions but makes an explicit exception for 'export prohbitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party'. Article 12 of the URAA tightens this a little by calling on Members, with respect to new restrictions on foodstuffs, to give 'due consideration' to the food security concerns of importing countries and requires adequate notice and consultation prior to implementation. Developing countries are exempt from these provisions unless they are regular food exporters. Food importing developing countries may seek a tightening up of this rule, although those developing countries where export taxes are an important source of revenue may have a different interest.

Domestic supports

• Amber Box limits on trade-distorting support will be further reduced. However, what formula should be used? Should countries have to meet a percentage reduction target as in the UR (which maintains existing inequities in support levels), or should countries aim to reach a harmonised maximum level of support by the end of the period?
• The continuation of the Blue Box is an issue. This was designed to fit EU and US policies as part of the Blair House Agreement between the two regions and was then incorporated into the final Agreement. However, under its 1996 FAIR Act, the main US deficiency payment programmes were eliminated and thus the Box currently only protects EU compensatory payments. The EU argues Blue Box payments should not be restricted because it distorts trade less than other types of support and can be helpful in achieing certain non-trade objectives. Revision could take the form of reviewing the eligibility criteria for exemption or its entire elimination.
• The Green Box criteria may also be revisited. The key criterion for inclusion in the Green Box is that policies have nor or minimal distorting effects on production and trade. However, the concept of 'minimal effect' has not been explained or quantified. Some countries will want to revisit the definition of Green Box measures with a view to excluding some types of programmes currently allowed, e.g. crop insurance and environmental payments. Other countries may argue that it should be expanded, to permit food security policies or rural viability payments to keep farming in particular areas. The EU, supported by other countries, believes that payments in support of the multifunctionality of agriculture and nontrade concerns should not be prevented by WTO trade rules.

Non-trade concerns

Multifunctionality

Multifunctionality exists where a public good is a joint product with agricultural production activity, such that the stimulation of the public good requires payments coupled to the maintenance of agricultural production. Currently, such payments would have to be included in the Amber Box as part of a country's AMS and would have to be reduced over time. The EU wants the right to support agricultural production where it provides multifunctional benefits to be recognised in the WTO rules.
The legitimacy of multifunctionality as a justification for permitting general payments to farmers has been attacked (see Lecture 5 for discussion of multifunctionality). What is at issue is whether general agricultural programmes are the most efficient means of ensuring the provision of those public goods associated with agricultural production, as distinct from targeted programmes which address the market failure directly. Also, given the EU's generally protectionist record in the agricultural negotiations, many other countries are highly suspicious that the proposal is designed simply to allow the EU to continue to support its farmers under another guise.

Animal welfare

• should farmers be compensated for the extra costs they bear when they are required to meet higher standards of animal welfare. EU has proposed that such payments be treated as Green Box. Developing countries worry that such measures are at the cost of human welfare in their countries.

Food quality (geographical indications)

• EU argues that the right to label food of specific qualities produced in specific localities should be protected in the Agreement. Other countries argue this is a matter for other WTO Committees such as TRIPS or the Technical Barriers to Trade Committee.

Progress in the negotiations up to the Hong Kong Ministerial Council 2005

Phase 1. Special Session on Agriculture

• Began early 2000 and ended with a stock-taking meeting in March 2001.
• 126 WTO Members submitted 45 proposals and 3 technical documents

Phase 2. March 2001 to March 2002.

• 'Informal' discussions on the more technical details of specific issues.

Doha Ministerial Council, November 2001

• made objectives more explicit (the Doha Declaration)
• set deadlines for the negotiations
• agriculture now part of a single undertaking in which all linked negotiations are to end by 1 January 2005.

Phase 3. March 2002 - March 2003. The 'modalities'

• objective is to produce numerical targets, formulas and other 'modalities' for countries' commitments by 31 March 2003.
• Overview document produced in December 2002 which lists all the proposals which have been made.

The US first negotiating proposal

[Download a summary of the US negotiating proposal]

• US is proposing a two-phase process, in which the first phase would see the elimination of export subsidies and a reduction in worldwide tariffs and trade-distorting domestic support over a five-year period, while the second phase would see the eventual elimination of all tariffs and trade-distorting domestic support.
• Elimination of all export subsidies in equal steps over five years and prohibition of export taxes (except for developing countries in special circumstances). Wants a rules-based approach to export credits.
• Proposes the use of a harmonising formula (the Swiss formula) to reduce agricultural tariffs, ensuring that no individual tariff exceeds 25% after a five-year phase in period. Tariffs should be simplified to either ad valorem or specific but not mixed.
• Proposes expansion of TRQs by 20% and elimination of in-quota duties, with mechanisms to ensure the re-allocation of quota if there is evidence of underfill.
• On domestic support, the US proposes using a formula to limit all countries' use of trade-distorting support to 5% of the total value of agricultural production, with reductions from current ceilings over a five-year period. Proposes elimination of the Blue Box and its inclusion in the Amber Box ceiling.

An issue for the US is that the credibility of its proposals was undermined by the significant increases in support payments it has made to its farmers since the late 1990s and which are now written into its 2002 Farm Act, even though these increased payments look likely to be within its WTO commitments. The USDA ERS page explains the contents of the 2002 Farm Act.

The EU first negotiating proposal

[download its negotiating proposal]
Proposals for the EU's agricultural offer in the WTO negotiations were submitted by the European Commission to EU agricultural ministers and the Article 133 Committee on December 16th 2002. The EU proposal suggests the following actions be taken over a six-year period for developed countries and a ten-year period for developing countries:

• a 55% cut in trade-distorting farm subsidies in the Amber Box, and the elimination of de minimis for developed countries which it believes has been exploited by the US to increase support for its farmers;
• the rolling back of budget expenditures on export refunds by about 45% on average with the complete dismantling of export refunds on cereals oilseeds, olive oil and tobacco, provided that all other forms of export subsidy are also abandoned for these products (in this context the EU is calling for stronger disciplines to be introduced on export credits, state-run trading enterprises and abuses of food aid);
• a further opening of agricultural markets by reducing agricultural tariffs by 36% on average, with a cut of at least 15% per dutiable item.

In addition the EU is proposing that:

• other developed economies and advanced developing countries should introduce 'Everything but Arms' style treatment for LDCS;
• there should be support for a 'food security box' involving a special safeguard instrument to ensure food security;
• issues such as food labelling, the precautionary principle, animal welfare and the extension of geographical indications (GI) should be addressed directly in the agriculture negotiations
• an extension of the peace clause, which prevents existing support measures from being challenged in the WTO.
• maintenance of the Blue Box which shields EU MacSharry-type compensatory payments from AMS disciplines.

Developing country positions

See specific lecture.

Phase 4. Countries to submit comprehensive draft commitments by the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003.

• Harbinson draft modalities (initial and revised) produced in February and March 2003
• Adoption of the Fischler reforms in the EU June 2003
• EU/US Joint Initiative August 2003
• Cancun Ministerial drafts September 2003, Castillo pre-conference draft and Derbez conference draft - Ministerial Council breaks up without agreement

The Harbinson Draft Modalities

• Proposed cutting high tariffs by more than low tariffs using a banded approach
• Introduced formula to address tariff escalation
• Proposed elimination of the special safeguard provision
• Proposed doubling of TRQs to 10% of domestic consumption plus improvements in TRQ administration
• Proposed phased elimination of export subsidies, with parallel movement on export credits and food aid
• Proposed 60% reduction in AMS support
• Capping and reduction of Blue Box payments

Phase 5. The July 2004 Framework Agreement

• EU's offer to eliminate export subsidies in May 2004
• Framework Agreement July 2004

July Framework Agreement

• Market access to be improved suing a tiered formula, with deeper cuts in higher tariffs. Cuts will be made from bound, not applied, rates, and some flexibility will be provided for import sensitive products. The number of tiers and the tariff reduction in each tier remain to be negotiated.
• A number of sensitive products can be designated for which 'substantial improvement' in market access must be provided through expanded TRQs and tariff reductions.
• Developing countries will be allowed to designate Special Products and have access to a Special Safeguard Mechanism.
• Other issues to be addressed include tariff escalation, tariff simplication and the erosion of trade preferences of developing countries. The framework declares that developed countries, and developing countries in a position to do so, should provide duty-free and quota free market access for products of LDCs.
• Ambitious results to be achieved 'expeditiously' on cotton .
• Introduces concept of Overall Trade Distorting Support (ODTS) which is the sum of amber box, blue box and de minimis. ODTS to be reduced using a tiered or banded approach to achieve harominisation in levels of support. 20% reduction from bound (maximum permitted) levels of support in first year of agreement.
• Separate reduction commitments for the components of ODTS. Amber box support also to be cut by a tiered formula to achieve harmonisation. Product specific amber box support to be capped at average levels
• Modification of blue box definition to include direct payments that do not require production (designed to fit US counter-cyclical payments) and capped at 5% of a member country's average total value of agricultural production.
• De minimis spending also to be reduced according to formula to be agreed.
• Green Box measures to be reviewed to ensure that they have no, or at most minimal, trade distorting effects.
• Special and differential treatment for developing countries
• By an end date to be negotiated, WTO members will eliminate export subsidies, export credits longer than 180 days, trade distorting practices of STEs, and food aid not in conformity with disciplines to be agreed.

Phase 6. Cancun Ministerial Council, 2003

• Castillo draft modalities largely based on EU/US agreement in the previous month
• Market access to be improved using a blended approach (where a certain proportion of tariff lines would be reduced using the Swiss formula, a certain proportion using the UR formula, and a certain proportion would be duty-free) as well as by setting a maximum tariff.
• Notable for emergence of developing countries as a negotiating force, both generally and particularly in the agriculture negotiations (formation of the G20 group, Sectoral Initiative on Cotton) as well as for the role played by civil society organisations.
• Collapse of talks without positions being taken on the conference draft modalities (Derbez draft)

Phase 7. Hong Kong Ministerial Council, 2005

Market access negotiations

By common consent, the market access issue pillar is proving the most difficult to negotiate. The Framework Agreement (FA) had set out a number of agreed principles to guide the negotiations. These were: a high level of ambition in the overall outcome; that highest tariffs would be reduced the most; that a tiered approach would be used; that special treatment would apply to sensitive products; and that SDT would apply to developing countries. However, no numbers were provided to show how these principles would be made operational.

A number of proposals were made regarding the structure of an appropriate formula in the run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial. The G-20 put forward a possible structure with the following elements. Developed countries' tariffs would be categorised in 4 bands (0-20%; 20-50%; 50-75%; 61-80%; and above 75%). Developing countries would have four wider bands (0-30%; 31-80%; 81-130%; and above 130%). There would be a linear cut for each tariff line within each band, with the rate of reduction being steeper, the higher the band. The cuts would be on a line-by-line basis (in contrast to an average cut, as in the Uruguay Round). The rates of reduction for developing countries would be lower than those for developed countries. Developed countries would cap their tariffs at 100% and developing countries at 150%.

The US proposal was for a single set of four bands to be applied to both developed and developing countries, with the following thresholds: tariff lines of 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, and above 60%. It suggested a mixed approach to the formulae to be used for making tariff reductions. Tariff lines which fall into the highest band would be reduced using a Swiss formula, those lines in the middle bands would be cut using a linear formula, and those lines in the lowest band would be subjected to a Uruguay Round approach. However, it later adopted the G-20 proposal of a linear formula cut in each band with modifications to ensure deeper cuts and to apply the concept of progressivity in each band. SDT would be operationalised by allowing lower reduction coefficients to developing countries in whichever formula applied. It also sought a cap on tariffs though at a lower level than the G-20 proposal.

The EU proposal in July 2005 was for a formula with three bands, with different thresholds for developed and developing countries. For developed countries, the thresholds would be 0-20%, 20-100% and above 100%. For developing countries, the thresholds would be 0-30%, 30-150% and above 150%. Within each band, it proposed the Uruguay Round approach (average percentage cuts with minimum cuts in each band). It proposed that the rates of reduction by developing countries would be two-thirds of the reduction rates for developed countries. It disagreed with the capping of tariffs. In October 2005 it made a more radical offer which narrowed the bands (0-30%, 30-60%, 60-90%, and over 90%) and increased the cuts within each band (with a maximum of 50% in the highest band, or 60% if additional flexibility was built in).

In the absence of numbers, the likely outcomes from these proposals cannot be compared. The G-20 proposal can be seen as forging a middle ground between the radical liberalisers (such as the US and the Cairns Group which advocate the use of the Swiss formula with a low tariff cap) and the reluctant liberalisers (such as the G-10 and the EU who favour the Uruguay Round approach).

The outcomes are further complicated by the provision in the FA concerning sensitive products. One issue is the number of tariff lines which might be declared sensitive - the US has suggested 1% while the EU has proposed 8%. The debate on sensitive products is linked to the degree of flexibility included in the tariff reduction formula. To ensure a significant degree of market opening, it is accepted that tariff rate quotas would have to be increased to compensate for a lower tariff reduction. However, there is disagreement whether the tariff reduction/TRQ expansion combination should be related to the main formula for tariff reduction or not. The EU has proposed a TRQ expansion formula which has not been accepted by the other main parties.

Other relevant market access commitments in the Hong Kong Declaration included the offer of duty free and quota free access to virtually all (97% of tariff lines, but the missing 3% could be crucial) exports of least developed countries to developed country markets and greater clarification on the rules governing special products and a special safeguard mechanism for developing countries.

Export subsidies

The FA contained conditional agreement on the elimination of export subsidies. The remaining issues to be fleshed out in modalities were the parallel commitments in export credits, export state trading enterprises, and food aid, as well as to define the 'credible end date' and the implementation path. At the Hong Kong meeting, it was agreed to eliminate export subsidies by 2013, with front-loading to ensure a significant reduction in the early years of the implementation period. .

Domestic support

Time line

The Declaration suggested a new deadline of April 30 2006 for the completion of modalities and the submission of comprehensive draft Schedules based on these modalities by 31 July 2006. The Declaration also established a crosslink between the agricultural negotiations and negotiations on non-agricultural market access (NAMA) by stating that the negotiators should aim for a comparably high level of ambition in market access in both sets of negotiations.

Reading suggestions

Negotiating issues

Blandford, D. and Josling, T., 2006. Options for the WTO Modalities for Agriculture, IPC Discussion Paper, May.

Gifford, M., 2006. Unblocking the Doha Round Impasse: Possible Scenarios for the Agricultural Negotiations, IPC Issue Brief 21, November.

Negotiating progress

House of Commons, 2006. The WTO Doha Development Round: where next for world trade?, Research Paper 06/43
(useful background to the Doha Round as a whole, to set the agricultural negotiations in a broader context)

Supplementary reading

International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium Trade Policy Issue Papers
TP1 Disciplines on Domestic Support in the Doha Round
TP2 Market Access
TP3 Export Competition Disciplines in the Doha Round
(These papers were commissioned by the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council).

Hanrahan, C. and Schnepf, R, 2005, WTO Doha Round: Agricultural Negotiating Proposals, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.
(good overview of the different positions and outstanding issues just before the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting)

The WTO Secretariat has prepared a useful briefing on tariff reduction methods in the agriculture negotiations.

Web resources

The WTO website has relevant resources, including links to the main documents from the Doha Ministerial Conference and through its agriculture website. See, in particular, the Briefing Note on Agriculture prepared as background for the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting.

FAO is developing a series of short trade policy briefs and more detailed trade policy technical notes on issues related to the WTO negotiations on agriculture .
( The trade policy briefs provide a succinct introduction to key policy questions addressed in major recent studies and their main findings. The trade policy technical notes provide a detailed discussion of the analytical approaches taken in recent studies and provide suggestions for further research required to fill identified gaps in empirical work )

World Bank pages on the agricultural negotiations. These are scattered on the Bank's Agricultural Trade website and on its Trade website. See in particular the useful Trade Notes series.

International Centre for Sustaintable Trade and Development agtradepolicy.org website
(this is a highly respected NGO which provides a reporting service on WTO meetings and events through regular weekly and monthly briefings. The agtradepolicy.org website has excellent links to documents and resources on the WTO agricultural negotiations. Their quarterly agricultural reports provide a good up to date account of developments.)

The International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council has a good set of short briefs on WTO and other agricultural trade issues.

Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy Trade Observatory pages

International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium papers

Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) trade papers (select year from button on left hand side)

The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture maintains a 'WTO and Multifunctionality' website which has links to conference papers produced by the 'Friends of Multifunctionality' group and other resources. See also the paper 'Non-trade Concerns and Multifunctional Agriculture' presented by Norway to the WTO Special Session on Agriculture.

EU negotiating positions

DG Agri has started a new publications series called MAP - Monitoring Agri-Trade Policy. It consists both of a quarterly newsletter and occasional briefings providing in-depth analysis of relevant agricultural trade and agri-trade policy issues. As of December 2005, relevant briefings include:

The EU's position on trade-distorting farm support, Dec 2005 (3pp.)
The EU offer on market access, Nov 2005 (4pp.)
Technical note on deriving the TRQ expansion formula (2pp)
Analysing the EU's Oct 28th 2005 offer (4pp)
Defining AVEs (4pp)

DG Agri has also prepared a powerpoint file analysing the effects of their October 2005 offer on EU agriculture.