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Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections

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Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections^{*}

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Abstract

We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race.

Keywords: Judicial Elections, Partisan Alignment, Regression Discontinuity.

JEL: D72, D73, K40.

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*“If ANY judge ANYWHERE can stop EVERY Presidential action EVERYWHERE,
we do NOT live in a democracy.” (Elon Musk, X, February 13, 2025)*

1 Introduction

At least since [Montesquieu \(1748\)](#)’s “The Spirit of the Laws,” the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers has been regarded as a foundational principle of liberal constitutional design, intended to prevent the concentration of authority and preserve institutional checks. While this principle remains embedded in most democratic constitutions, recent developments have drawn renewed attention to the resilience of these boundaries. In a growing number of political systems—ranging from established democracies to hybrid regimes—executive leaders have attacked or questioned the constraints imposed by unaligned judiciaries, often invoking a direct mandate from the people as a basis for asserting greater control over policymaking ([Levitsky and Way, 2010](#); [Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018](#)). These claims typically rest on the perceived need for coherent governance unimpeded by institutional veto players, thereby promoting a process of “executive aggrandizement,” in which “elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one” ([Bermeo, 2016](#)). In the U.S., similar shifts are often justified by an expansive reading of the “unitary executive theory,” which posits that elected executives should wield centralized authority over the entire apparatus of government ([Calabresi and Yoo, 2008](#)).

This trend raises a key empirical question: how do voters behave with respect to the separation of powers and the presence of judicial constraints on executive action? Survey evidence suggests strong normative support for checks and balances: for instance, a 2023 national poll found that 74% of Americans support the U.S. system of separation of powers ([States United Action, 2023](#)). Yet it remains an open question whether such professed preferences translate into electoral behavior when voters have the opportunity to act on them—for example, in partisan judicial elections for state supreme courts, as observed in some U.S. states.

To use the words of Justice Sandra Day [O’Connor \(2010\)](#), “partisan judicial elections are specifically designed to infuse politics into the law.” Yet the direction of this infusion critically depends on voters’ behavior. In this paper, we investigate whether voters take into account the political orientation of the executive branch when selecting judges in partisan elections. Specifically, consider a partisan election for a state supreme court seat J occurring after the

election of a state governor E . Is voter behavior in election J causally influenced by the political outcome of election E ? This is the question our empirical analysis is designed to answer.

The mere correlation between voting patterns in gubernatorial elections and subsequent judicial elections cannot credibly answer this question, as both outcomes are likely to be endogenously influenced by a range of state-level factors. [Erikson et al. \(2015\)](#) employ a close-election regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the causal impact of the governor’s political orientation on the vote share of presidential candidates in the state in the following election. Similarly, [Folke and Snyder \(2012\)](#) show that the incumbent governor’s party tends to suffer losses in midterm state legislative elections. This “contamination” effect can also be investigated in the context of state-level judicial elections. In the U.S., many states elect supreme court judges, and some of these elections are partisan ([Kritzer, 2015b, 2020](#)).

[Kritzer \(2011\)](#) documents a positive correlation between partisan trends in gubernatorial and judicial elections. Yet this pattern may reflect unobserved changes in statewide voter preferences. Close gubernatorial elections, by contrast, can be used to isolate the causal effect of executive partisanship on judicial election outcomes. Do voters respond to the prior electoral outcome by supporting judicial candidates aligned with the opposition party, thereby fostering checks and balances? Or, conversely, do they prefer candidates aligned with the sitting governor, seeking partisan alignment across branches and fewer constraints on executive action?

We use partisan elections for state supreme courts between 1946 and 2023 and estimate the contamination effect of gubernatorial elections on judicial elections using an RDD. Our findings show that voters do not vote *à la* Montesquieu. On the contrary, they tend to favor candidates aligned with the ruling governor. A narrow victory of a Democratic governor raises the cumulative vote share of Democratic judicial candidates by 9.3 percentage points, about 18.2% relative to the average. The result is symmetric for Republican candidates, robust across specifications—including different bandwidths and sample definitions—and corroborated by placebo tests. We refer to this result as the executive spillover effect, a cross-branch alignment of voter behavior that undermines the separation of powers.

This executive spillover effect may stem either from a latent voter preference for concentration of power or from stronger mobilization efforts by the ruling party. Although we cannot directly test for these mechanisms, we provide heterogeneity analyses that shed some light on

them. We find that the effect is stronger in judicial elections held closer to the gubernatorial election, when the executive has a longer time horizon and judicial selection is more consequential. The effect is also amplified when executive and legislative powers are aligned, thereby making judicial alignment even more effective in removing any veto power of the opposition. In a subsample of judicial races for which we have campaign financing information, we find some evidence that aligned judicial candidates attract a larger number of donors. These results point to a demand-side mechanism through voters' preferences, although we cannot rule out that supply-side mechanisms through party mobilization are also at work.¹

Judicial selection has been analyzed in the context of elections, both partisan and nonpartisan (Kritzer, 2023), and of appointments, with or without a confirmation process (Stratmann and Garner, 2004). A vast literature in political science (for example, Hall and Bonneau, 2006; Hall, 2001; Brace et al., 2000), legal studies (Kang and Shepherd, 2011, 2015; Kritzer, 2016), and economics (Ash and MacLeod, 2015, 2024; Choi et al., 2010) has examined how judicial elections shape judicial behavior.² Nonetheless, evidence on the link between executive and judicial elections is scarce.

Lim and Snyder (2015) find that candidates' quality has little effect on electoral outcomes in partisan judicial elections, unlike in nonpartisan elections, where partisan affiliation is not listed on the ballot and party heuristics are less likely to drive voting behavior. They also find correlations suggesting that partisan judicial elections produce worse outcomes. Ash and MacLeod (2021) exploit a series of reforms making judicial elections less partisan between 1947 and 1994, and show that judges selected through nonpartisan processes produce higher-quality work—as measured by forward citations to their opinions—than judges selected in partisan elections. The executive spillover effect we estimate may provide a mechanism for both findings: if citizens vote with the aim of removing veto power from the judiciary, they place less weight on candidate quality, thereby reducing the quality of judges in equilibrium.

From a different angle, Kang and Shepherd (2015) show that partisanship indeed shapes judicial behavior, as campaign contributions from political parties translate into judicial decisions in the party-preferred ideological direction. Other scholars also find significant relationships

¹The 2025 Wisconsin Supreme Court race offers a case in point of how supply-side interventions can prove ineffective: despite Elon Musk's unprecedented \$25 million backing of the conservative candidate, the liberal candidate prevailed, illustrating that even substantial resources may be insufficient to sway judicial elections.

²See Lim and Snyder (2021) for a review.

between partisanship and judicial behavior, at least for higher courts (for example, Nagel, 1961, Goldman, 1975, Brace and Hall, 1997, Sunstein et al., 2004).³ In what follows, we examine whether voters also take this partisan or ideological dimension into account, thereby fostering or limiting the separation of powers.

2 Institutions and Data

State supreme courts are the courts of last resort at the state level.⁴ They interpret state constitutions and laws, and their decisions are generally final. Courts are composed of a panel of judges, typically numbering between five and nine, although this varies across states. Judges are either appointed by the governor or elected by the public in partisan or nonpartisan elections, with terms generally lasting between six and twelve years, depending on the state.⁵

In our analysis, the unit of observation is the state supreme court election, matched to the most recent gubernatorial election. We next describe our data sources, while Appendix Table A.1 reports descriptive statistics separately for gubernatorial and judicial elections.

Supreme court elections. We compile data on state supreme court elections from 1946 to 2020 using Kritzer (2015a), and extend it with hand-collected information from Ballotpedia for 2020–2023. Of 2,117 elections, we drop 868 uncontested races, 572 with nonpartisan candidates, 68 covering multiple seats, and 5 with no Republican or Democratic candidate. The final sample includes 604 elections from 1946 to 2023 in 23 states, although only 8 of them still hold partisan elections nowadays.⁶ Figure 1 shows the states with partisan Supreme Court elections in our sample. Appendix Table A.2 reports, for each state, the number and period of partisan judicial elections covered, and its current judicial selection process. For each judicial election, we record the candidates and their votes. Our outcomes of interest are: the vote share of the top Democratic and Republican candidate (*First Candidate Vote Share*); the total vote share for all candidates of each party (*Cumulative Vote Share*); and a dummy for the party winning the election (*Winning Party*). We also collect campaign finance data for a subset of judges (Lim and Snyder, 2015). For a limited sample of candidates (1998–2023), we observe the total

³The literature is vast—see Pinello (1999) for a meta-analysis.

⁴Oklahoma and Texas each have two courts of last resort: one for civil appeals and one for criminal appeals.

⁵A few exceptions apply. For example, in South Carolina the legislature elects judges, while Rhode Island State Supreme Court judges are appointed for life.

⁶For Texas and Oklahoma, both the state supreme court and the court of criminal appeals are included.

amount of donations and the number of donors. Summary statistics are in Appendix Table A.3.

Gubernatorial elections. Information on gubernatorial elections from 1942 to 2023 comes from Erikson et al. (2015), and is complemented with hand-collected data from Ballotpedia. The final sample includes a total of 1,087 gubernatorial elections. As with judicial elections, we record the candidates and votes. Each judicial election is matched with the most recent gubernatorial election. Given the timing of the elections, each judicial race is typically paired with a gubernatorial election held two or four years earlier. For each gubernatorial election, we construct the margin of victory of the Democratic candidate relative to the Republican one, which serves as the running variable in the RDD. We also collect individual characteristics for a subset of gubernatorial candidates (Erikson et al., 2015). For a limited sample, we observe their gender and previous political or professional occupations. We identify whether a gubernatorial candidate has ever served as a member of the State House or Senate, as a state governor, or held a major state office.⁷ Moreover, we identify candidates with prior business experience or who have worked as lawyers. Summary statistics are in Appendix Table A.4.

State-level characteristics. We supplement the data with time-varying demographic characteristics for each state, including total population, adult population (aged 18 or more), proportion of white residents, share of college-educated adults (aged 25 or more), and urbanization rate. All demographic data are from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) database (Manson et al., 2023). Since census data are collected at 10-year intervals, we impute values for missing years using the nearest census year. Summary statistics are in Appendix Table A.5. Finally, we record the party of the U.S. President in each year of the sample and the partisan majority in both chambers of each state legislature (Folke and Snyder, 2012).

3 Identification and Validity

Our estimation strategy exploits close gubernatorial elections using RDD. The main analysis focuses on party-level outcomes—first candidate vote share, cumulative vote share, and winning party—which we denote generically by $Y_{i,t}^P$ for party $P \in \{\text{Dem}, \text{Rep}\}$ in state i and judicial election t . We compare judicial elections where the previous gubernatorial election was

⁷The major state office definition includes the following roles: Attorney General, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Governor.

marginally won by either a Democratic or a Republican candidate. Let $d_{i,t-1}$ denote the difference between Democratic and Republican candidate vote shares in the gubernatorial election in state i at time $t - 1$, where $t - 1$ represents the previous gubernatorial election. Let $T_{i,t-1}$ be an indicator variable equal to 1 if a Democratic candidate won. We then estimate the model:

$$Y_{i,t}^P = \beta T_{i,t-1} + f(d_{i,t-1}) + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where $f(\cdot)$ is a flexible control function such as a spline polynomial around the RDD cutoff. In our baseline specification, we consider a linear control function, with symmetric optimal bandwidth as in [Calonico et al. \(2019\)](#) and a triangular kernel. For robustness, we also consider a quadratic spline with triangular kernel, or a linear spline with uniform kernel. The parameter β identifies the average treatment effect on the outcomes Y^P . As suggested in [Cattaneo and Titiunik \(2022\)](#), we report mean squared error-optimal conventional point estimates, while inference relies on robust bias-adjusted procedures, with standard errors computed using the heteroskedasticity-consistent HC3 variance estimator, where bias adjustment uses a polynomial of one order higher than the point estimates. In all tables and figures, we report robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals, which need not be symmetric around the point estimates.

Consistent with recent work on the interpretation of close-election RDD ([Marshall, 2024](#); [Bertoli and Hazlett, 2025](#)), the estimated discontinuity should be interpreted as a district-level LATE for partisan judicial control induced by close gubernatorial elections, reflecting equilibrium changes in electoral outcomes, rather than a manipulation of isolated gubernatorial characteristics. The relevant counterfactual is a different partisan identity of the executive at the state level, not the same governor with all individual characteristics held fixed except party. In other words, the treatment is not an individual trait of the governor but the partisan identity of the executive, which shapes the political environment years later when judicial elections are held, and the partisan control of the executive provides voters with a salient heuristic for coordination in judicial races. That said, one may still have the concern that the individual characteristics of the governor—which may be structurally different for Democratic versus Republican politicians—act as a compound channel behind the estimated LATE.⁸ To mitigate this (interpretative) concern, in Appendix Table [A.6](#) we examine whether the observable

⁸Based on [Bertoli and Hazlett \(2025\)](#), this concern is a matter of external rather than internal validity.

characteristics of Democratic and Republican Gubernatorial candidates have a significant discontinuity at the RDD cutoff. Our results show that this is not the case and—similarly to other institutional contexts (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011)—parties’ political selection converges to candidates with comparable traits in close races, yielding no discontinuity at the cutoff.

On balance, our main identifying assumption remains that, in a close neighborhood of the zero margin-of-victory cutoff, electing a Democratic or Republican governor is a random event uncorrelated with unobservable potential confounders affecting later judicial elections. We now provide extensive evidence supporting this assumption.

3.1 Validity Tests

In this section, we present a battery of tests aimed at indirectly evaluating the validity of our identifying assumptions. We show that the running variable is not subject to manipulation, that predetermined characteristics of gubernatorial elections are balanced around the cutoff, and that the margin of victory in current close elections does not predict past outcomes. To further validate our empirical strategy, we also implement several placebo checks. Overall, the results strongly support the validity of our main identifying assumption—continuity of potential outcomes at the RDD cutoff—consistent with evidence from previous studies exploiting the same design (Erikson et al., 2015; Folke and Snyder, 2012).

Lack of manipulation. We find no evidence of bunching in the distribution of the running variable around the cutoff. This supports the assumption that close gubernatorial races are as good as random. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the graphical output of the McCrary density test (McCrary, 2008), for which we fail to reject the null of continuity at the cutoff ($p = 0.992$).

Balance in pretreatment variables. We test whether predetermined characteristics of gubernatorial elections and states change discontinuously at the margin of victory cutoff. Specifically, we estimate equation (1) using various predetermined characteristics as outcomes. Appendix Table A.7 reports the results. Across both gubernatorial election characteristics (Panel A) and state characteristics (Panel B), we find no evidence of discontinuities.

Lagged gubernatorial elections. We test whether Democratic governors winning close elections at the cutoff are correlated with outcomes of the previous gubernatorial elections. Since future outcomes cannot affect past elections, finding no effect supports the claim that

close elections identify causal effects rather than capturing persistent state patterns in partisan competitiveness. Appendix Table A.8, Panel A, reports the estimated coefficients; across all outcomes and specifications, we find no evidence of discontinuities. Panels B and C replicate the analysis of Appendix Table A.7 for lagged election and state characteristics; again, the falsification tests work as there is no evidence of significant discontinuities.

Future margin of victory. If our identifying assumption holds, the Democratic margin of victory in a gubernatorial election at time $t + 1$ cannot causally affect judicial contests held in t . Appendix Table A.9 reports the results. Across all specifications, we find no evidence of politically or statistically significant discontinuities.

4 Empirical Results

In this section, we present the main empirical results. The overall evidence indicates that voters do not behave *à la* Montesquieu: candidates for state supreme courts receive significantly more votes when the most recent gubernatorial election was narrowly won by a candidate from the same party. Figure 2 provides graphical evidence of these discontinuities using a uniform kernel and a fixed bandwidth of 10 percentage points. Across all outcome variables, voters systematically favor judicial candidates aligned with the sitting governor’s party.

Table 1 confirms this finding across alternative specifications. Panel A reports effects on the vote share of the top candidate from each party in subsequent judicial elections; Panel B presents results for the cumulative vote share of all candidates from each party; and Panel C reports the probability that each party wins the judicial election. This structure is consistent across all tables. The estimates show that a Democratic gubernatorial victory leads to a statistically significant increase in both the vote share of the leading Democratic candidate and the cumulative vote share of Democrats in the subsequent judicial election, with a corresponding decrease for Republican candidates. In Panel A, Column 1, the vote share of the leading Democratic candidate increases by 10.2 percentage points (20.3% of the average), while that of the leading Republican candidate decreases by 11.9 points (23.5%). In Panel B, Column 1, the cumulative vote share of Democratic candidates rises by 9.3 percentage points (18.2% of the average), while that of Republican candidates falls by 9.7 percentage points (19%). Both for Democrats and Republicans, the point estimates on the first candidate are larger than the point

estimates on the cumulative vote share of all candidates, suggesting a slight concentration of votes on the main candidate. From Panel C of Table 1, we find that a Democratic gubernatorial victory increases the probability of the Democratic Party winning the subsequent partisan judicial election by 18.7 percentage points, while the probability of a Republican victory decreases by 18.2 percentage points. Although these effects are not statistically significant in our baseline specification, they become significant under alternative bandwidth choices (Appendix Figure A.3), asymmetric bandwidths (Appendix Table A.10), and when controlling for state and decade fixed effects (Appendix Table A.11) in the robustness analysis reported below.

The RDD differences out smooth state-level factors, including underlying partisan preferences. If voters relied on party heuristics in partisan judicial elections—as documented by Lim and Snyder (2015)—we would expect no discontinuity at a zero margin of victory, since states just above and below the cutoff display similar levels of partisanship and polarization. The fact that we instead find nonzero effects supports the presence of an executive spillover effect, by which voters systematically favor partisan concordance between the executive and the judiciary.

4.1 Robustness Checks

In this section, we present a series of robustness checks, assessing whether our main results hold under alternative model specifications and sample definitions.

Re-defining victory. To validate that the zero margin-of-victory cutoff is meaningful, we re-estimate equation (1) under alternative placebo thresholds. Specifically, we iteratively re-define the cutoff $c \in \{-0.15, -0.10, -0.05, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15\}$, excluding in each case gubernatorial elections that would fall on the opposite side of the true cutoff at $c = 0$. Appendix Figure A.2 plots the estimated coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the effect on the first-candidate vote share in subsequent judicial elections. At all placebo thresholds, the estimated magnitudes are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This supports the interpretation that our main effects are not driven by arbitrary discontinuities in the relationship between margins of victory and judicial outcomes away from the true cutoff.

Sensitivity to bandwidth selection. One concern is that both the magnitude and precision of our estimates may depend on the chosen bandwidth. To address this, we re-estimate our baseline specification (Table 1, Columns 1 and 4) using multiples of the optimal

data-driven bandwidth. Appendix Figure A.3 reports the resulting RDD coefficients for $l \in \{0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4\}$ times the optimal bandwidth. Across all bandwidths, we reject the null of no effect at the 5% level, except for the probability of the winning party, which—as in the main specification—is imprecisely estimated and only significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the coefficients declines with larger bandwidths.

Appendix Table A.10 reports results from re-estimating Table 1 using optimal asymmetric bandwidths, which allow the bandwidth to differ on each side of the cutoff. The results remain consistent: we reject the null of no effect in most specifications, and the estimated magnitudes are only slightly smaller than in our preferred specification. Under asymmetric bandwidths, we also find a statistically significant increase in the probability that Democratic (Republican) candidates win judicial elections following their party’s gubernatorial victory.

Sensitivity to alternative samples and specifications. Appendix Figure A.4 examines robustness to alternative samples by excluding one state at a time. The estimated effects on our main outcomes remain stable across these specifications, indicating that no single state is driving the results. Appendix Table A.11 replicates Table 1 while adding state and decade fixed effects. The results are again robust, further reinforcing the stability of our findings across alternative model specifications.

4.2 Potential Mechanisms

The executive spillover effect documented in our main results may reflect either an underlying voter preference for concentrating political authority or enhanced mobilization efforts by ruling parties. Although we cannot directly disentangle these demand-side and supply-side mechanisms, we present below a set of heterogeneity analyses that shed some light on the relative importance of both channels. In Figure 3, we report the results of three heterogeneity analyses for the first candidate vote share.⁹ Similar analyses for the other main outcome variables—the cumulative vote share and the winning party—are reported in Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6, respectively. We consider three dimensions of heterogeneity: (i) the party of the U.S. President at the time of the judicial election, (ii) the partisan alignment between the governor and the state legislature, and (iii) the distance in years between gubernatorial and judicial elections.

⁹Appendix Tables A.12, A.13, and A.14 report the corresponding estimation results.

Figure 3, Panel A, reports results by the party of the U.S. President. The estimated effects are consistent with the main analysis, though less precisely estimated. Panel B shows that the effect is concentrated in states where the governor’s party controls both legislative chambers, suggesting that support for partisan concordance is stronger in the absence of veto tension between the executive and the legislature. Panel C indicates that the effect is driven by judicial elections held within two years of the gubernatorial contest, while for later elections we cannot reject the null of no effect. Taken together, these results show that voters’ support for partisan concordance between the executive and the judiciary is strongest precisely when unified government reduces institutional frictions and when gubernatorial influence is most relevant.

We now turn to the supply side by examining candidate entry. Specifically, we test whether a Democratic victory in the most recent gubernatorial election affects the number of candidates from each party running in subsequent judicial elections. We consider both the raw count of candidates and the effective number of candidates, measured by the Laakso–Taagepera index. Appendix Table A.15, Panels A and B, report the results for each party. Across all specifications, we cannot reject the null that a Democratic gubernatorial win has no effect on either measure of candidate entry, providing no evidence of supply-side adjustment.

We finally turn to campaign finance data, which are available only for a limited subsample. Contributions provide additional insight into the underlying channels: increases in total funding without a rise in the number of donors would point to elite-driven supply-side mobilization, whereas growth in the number of donors is more consistent with demand-side voter realignment. Appendix Figure A.7 shows that Democratic (Republican) candidates receive greater financial support—both in terms of total donations and number of contributors—when the preceding gubernatorial election was won by their party. Appendix Table A.16 corroborates this evidence. While data limitations preclude strong causal claims, the point estimates consistently support a demand-side interpretation, whereby partisan alignment strengthens voter support.

5 Conclusion

This paper shows that partisan judicial elections do not insulate state supreme courts from executive politics. Using close gubernatorial elections as a source of quasi-random variation, we document a systematic executive spillover effect, whereby voters favor judicial candidates

aligned with the sitting governor's party. The effect is strongest under unified government and when judicial elections closely follow gubernatorial races, highlighting how electoral coordination can erode the separation of powers even in formally independent institutions.

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
Tables and Figures

Table 1: RDD Main Results

<i>Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.102*** (0.045; 0.179)	0.115*** (0.040; 0.201)	0.104*** (0.043; 0.179)	-0.119*** (-0.207; -0.060)	-0.165*** (-0.280; -0.081)	-0.078*** (-0.148; -0.030)
Obs	319	437	258	253	317	299
Bandwidth	(-0.112; 0.112)	(-0.167; 0.167)	(-0.088; 0.088)	(-0.087; 0.087)	(-0.110; 0.110)	(-0.099; 0.099)
<i>Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.093*** (0.025; 0.178)	0.102** (0.012; 0.197)	0.083** (0.013; 0.163)	-0.097*** (-0.182; -0.038)	-0.149*** (-0.263; -0.062)	-0.086*** (-0.164; -0.033)
Obs	334	430	284	299	323	253
Bandwidth	(-0.118; 0.118)	(-0.165; 0.165)	(-0.094; 0.094)	(-0.099; 0.099)	(-0.114; 0.114)	(-0.088; 0.088)
<i>Panel C: Winning Party</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.187 (-0.080; 0.443)	0.206 (-0.088; 0.480)	0.121 (-0.102; 0.400)	-0.182 (-0.452; 0.076)	-0.200 (-0.501; 0.106)	-0.199 (-0.474; 0.059)
Obs	325	455	292	323	435	262
Bandwidth	(-0.114; 0.114)	(-0.185; 0.185)	(-0.098; 0.098)	(-0.115; 0.115)	(-0.163; 0.163)	(-0.090; 0.090)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win in the last gubernatorial election on subsequent judicial elections outcomes. Panel A presents the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Panel B presents the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Panel C presents the probability of the Democratic and Republican party winning. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.


Figure 1: Number of Judicial Partisan Elections (1946-2023)




Notes. Data refer to the working sample in use. The figure depicts the number of partisan court elections by state.

Figure 2: RDD Plots for Different Outcomes


Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share



Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share




Panel C: Winning Party




Notes. The figures plot binscatters of the relationship between the first Democratic candidate margin of victory in the gubernatorial election and subsequent judicial elections outcomes around the cutoff. Figures A and B present the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures C and D present the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures E and F present the probability of the Democratic and Republican party winning, respectively. Lines represent linear fits separately estimated with data before and after the cutoff, as well as the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Each graph plots data in the range of 10 percentage points below and above the cutoff, to reflect the typical range of the data-driven optimally computed bandwidths presented in Table 1.

Figure 3: Heterogeneity Analyses, Effects on First Candidate Vote Share


Panel A: By Sitting POTUS



Panel B: By Governor and Chambers Alignment



Panel C: by Distance in Time between Gubernatorial and Judicial Elections



Notes. The figures plot RDD coefficients analogous to the ones reported in Column 1 of Table 1, for different types of heterogeneity analyses. The outcome variable is First Candidate Vote Share of the Democratic (left) or Republican (right) Party. Panel A presents heterogeneity by the party of the sitting president of the United States at the moment of the judicial election. Panel B presents heterogeneity by whether the executive and legislative branches (both State Senate and House) belonged to the same party at the time of the judicial election. Panel C presents the coefficients by the time interval relative to the latest gubernatorial election. The vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

A Online Appendix [Not for Publication]

Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections
Nicola Fontana, Tommaso Nannicini, James M. Snyder, Jr

A.1 Appendix Tables

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Obs	S.d.	Min	Median	Max
Gubernatorial Elections						
Total Votes Cast (in Millions)	2.015	227	1.557	0.1	1.5	8.3
Turnout (Over Population Above 18)	0.474	227	0.129	0.1	0.5	0.8
Number of Candidates	3.379	227	2.041	2.0	3.0	20.0
Number of Candidates (Dem)	1.004	227	0.066	1.0	1.0	2.0
Number of Candidates (Rep)	1.000	227	0.000	1.0	1.0	1.0
Open Seat Election	0.489	227	0.501	0.0	0.0	1.0
Incumbent Running (Dem)	0.242	227	0.429	0.0	0.0	1.0
Incumbent Running (Rep)	0.269	227	0.444	0.0	0.0	1.0
Elected Gov. (Dem)	0.502	227	0.501	0.0	1.0	1.0
Elected Gov. (Rep)	0.498	227	0.501	0.0	0.0	1.0
First Candidate Vote Share (Dem)	0.505	227	0.112	0.1	0.5	0.9
First Candidate Vote Share (Rep)	0.481	227	0.110	0.1	0.5	0.9
Laakso-Taagepera Index	2.006	227	0.304	0.6	2.0	4.3
Laakso-Taagepera Index (Dem)	1.004	227	0.065	1.0	1.0	2.0
Laakso-Taagepera Index (Rep)	1.000	227	0.000	1.0	1.0	1.0
Margin of Victory (Dem)	0.024	227	0.199	-0.5	0.0	0.8
Court Elections						
Total Votes Cast (in Millions)	2.287	604	2.115	0.0	1.8	11.0
Turnout (Over Population Above 18)	0.361	604	0.169	0.0	0.4	0.7
Elected Judge (Dem)	0.491	570	0.500	0.0	0.0	1.0
Elected Judge (Rep)	0.549	579	0.498	0.0	1.0	1.0
Number of Candidates	2.185	604	0.566	2.0	2.0	8.0
Number of Candidates (Dem)	0.969	604	0.306	0.0	1.0	3.0
Number of Candidates (Rep)	0.977	604	0.281	0.0	1.0	5.0
Open Seat Election	0.333	604	0.472	0.0	0.0	1.0
Incumbent Running (Dem)	0.293	604	0.456	0.0	0.0	1.0
Incumbent Running (Rep)	0.373	604	0.484	0.0	0.0	1.0
First Candidate Vote Share (Dem)	0.503	570	0.127	0.1	0.5	1.0
First Candidate Vote Share (Rep)	0.507	579	0.130	0.1	0.5	0.9
Cumulative Vote Share (Dem)	0.511	570	0.136	0.1	0.5	1.0
Cumulative Vote Share (Rep)	0.511	579	0.133	0.1	0.5	1.0
Laakso-Taagepera Index	1.938	604	0.328	1.0	2.0	5.6
Laakso-Taagepera Index (Dem)	0.965	604	0.293	0.0	1.0	3.0
Laakso-Taagepera Index (Rep)	0.973	604	0.252	0.0	1.0	4.0

Notes. Court elections with multiple seats are excluded from the sample. The Laakso-Taagepera is a measure of the effective number of candidates computed as $1/\sum_c s_c^2$, where s_c is the vote share of candidate c in the election. Laakso-Taagepera indices for each party are for votes among candidates of the same party.

Table A.2: Election Years, by State

State	Nr. of elections	First	Last	Current Type of Election
AL	41	1954	2022	P
AR	6	1984	2000	NP
AZ	8	1946	1972	AA
CO	12	1946	1964	AA
FL	3	1968	1968	AA
IA	3	1946	1958	AA
IL	37	1947	2022	P
IN	22	1946	1970	AA
KS	20	1946	1958	AA
KY	17	1946	1974	NP
LA	27	1974	2020	P
MI	27	1946	2016	MM
MS	4	1980	1992	NP
NC	42	1948	2022	P
NM	35	1948	2022	P
NY	6	1946	1973	AA
OH	96	1946	2022	P
OK	17	1946	1966	AA
PA	20	1950	2023	P
TN	8	1962	1988	AA
TX	136	1946	2022	P
UT	3	1946	1950	R
WV	14	1946	2010	NP

Notes. Information on the current type of judicial selection is provided by Ballotpedia, and reflects the type of judicial election in 2024. Types: partisan (P), nonpartisan (NP), retention (R), assisted appointment (AA), gubernatorial appointment (GA), Michigan method (MM).

Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Campaign Funding for Judicial Court Elections Candidates

	Mean	Obs	S.d.	Min	Median	Max
Democratic Candidates						
Total Received (Thousands)	571.463	67	761.951	0.0	290.6	4,564.9
Number of Donors	605.326	92	566.284	1.0	474.0	2,972.0
Average Donation per Donor (Thousands)	1.093	67	1.904	0.0	0.6	13.5
Republican Candidates						
Total Received (Thousands)	744.563	82	892.448	0.0	514.7	4,960.6
Number of Donors	842.752	117	986.992	1.0	524.0	4,946.0
Average Donation per Donor (Thousands)	1.322	82	2.117	0.0	0.7	15.4

Notes. The table presents descriptive statistics on campaign financing (sample 1998-2023) at the candidates level.

Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics - Gubernatorial Candidates Characteristics

	Mean	Obs	S.d.	Min	Median	Max
Democratic Candidates						
Female Candidate	0.096	1,088	0.294	0.0	0.0	1.0
Previous experience: State major office	0.734	696	0.442	0.0	1.0	1.0
Previous experience: Governor	0.386	696	0.487	0.0	0.0	1.0
Previous experience: State House or Senate	0.482	1,036	0.500	0.0	0.0	1.0
Previous experience: Business	0.917	384	0.277	0.0	1.0	1.0
Previous experience: Lawyer	0.680	384	0.467	0.0	1.0	1.0
Republican Candidates						
Female Candidate	0.052	1,054	0.222	0.0	0.0	1.0
Previous experience: State major office	0.722	627	0.448	0.0	1.0	1.0
Previous experience: Governor	0.439	627	0.497	0.0	0.0	1.0
Previous experience: State House or Senate	0.471	998	0.499	0.0	0.0	1.0
Previous experience: Business	0.932	322	0.253	0.0	1.0	1.0
Previous experience: Lawyer	0.547	322	0.499	0.0	1.0	1.0

Notes. The table presents descriptive statistics on individual gubernatorial candidates characteristics.

Table A.5: Population Characteristics, by State

State	Nr. of elections	Pop. (in Millions)	Prop. Over 18	Prop. White	Prop. College Over 25	Urbanization Rate
AL	41	4.369 (0.405)	0.714 (0.032)	0.709 (0.028)	0.183 (0.042)	0.579 (0.031)
AR	6	2.448 (0.177)	0.702 (0.017)	0.818 (0.014)	0.140 (0.023)	0.529 (0.008)
AZ	8	1.467 (0.371)	0.591 (0.013)	0.899 (0.011)	0.107 (0.021)	0.747 (0.081)
CO	12	1.540 (0.224)	0.627 (0.027)	0.974 (0.005)	0.095 (0.012)	0.682 (0.057)
FL	3	6.789 (0.000)	0.657 (0.000)	0.842 (0.000)	0.103 (0.000)	0.805 (0.000)
IA	3	2.712 (0.079)	0.630 (0.026)	0.990 (0.001)	0.060 (0.006)	0.513 (0.031)
IL	37	10.874 (1.383)	0.687 (0.044)	0.822 (0.091)	0.158 (0.095)	0.828 (0.035)
IN	22	4.576 (0.500)	0.626 (0.027)	0.942 (0.011)	0.065 (0.012)	0.623 (0.020)
KS	20	2.001 (0.134)	0.650 (0.023)	0.958 (0.003)	0.068 (0.010)	0.552 (0.043)
KY	17	3.069 (0.120)	0.606 (0.009)	0.929 (0.002)	0.054 (0.015)	0.446 (0.067)
LA	27	4.389 (0.217)	0.693 (0.042)	0.645 (0.037)	0.184 (0.038)	0.710 (0.023)
MI	27	8.839 (1.195)	0.672 (0.057)	0.850 (0.057)	0.152 (0.080)	0.726 (0.017)
MS	4	2.547 (0.030)	0.654 (0.021)	0.638 (0.004)	0.135 (0.014)	0.472 (0.002)
NC	42	6.686 (2.045)	0.687 (0.071)	0.727 (0.046)	0.166 (0.088)	0.504 (0.108)
NM	35	1.408 (0.493)	0.644 (0.082)	0.763 (0.149)	0.179 (0.072)	0.695 (0.077)
NY	6	16.616 (1.529)	0.673 (0.031)	0.905 (0.030)	0.095 (0.019)	0.855 (0.001)
OH	96	10.507 (1.153)	0.684 (0.053)	0.877 (0.048)	0.151 (0.077)	0.746 (0.023)
OK	17	2.302 (0.127)	0.633 (0.004)	0.906 (0.007)	0.072 (0.014)	0.554 (0.072)
PA	20	11.885 (0.727)	0.702 (0.058)	0.875 (0.062)	0.158 (0.098)	0.729 (0.033)
TN	8	4.249 (0.467)	0.653 (0.040)	0.836 (0.003)	0.104 (0.036)	0.588 (0.028)
TX	136	20.395 (6.066)	0.688 (0.034)	0.712 (0.097)	0.221 (0.065)	0.807 (0.058)
UT	3	0.689 (0.000)	0.582 (0.000)	0.983 (0.000)	0.078 (0.000)	0.653 (0.000)
WV	14	1.870 (0.090)	0.651 (0.070)	0.950 (0.007)	0.086 (0.048)	0.398 (0.048)

Notes. The table reports population characteristics of each state in court election years in the main sample. Standard deviations of each variable across years are presented in parentheses.

Table A.6: Balance Characteristics of Gubernatorial Candidates

<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	<i>Gubernatorial Candidates Characteristics</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female Candidate	0.085*	0.040	0.130*
	(-0.008; 0.194)	(-0.047; 0.135)	(-0.016; 0.273)
Obs	113	131	91
Bandwidth	(0.097; 0.097)	(0.121; 0.121)	(0.078; 0.078)
Female Candidate (Dem)	0.079*	-0.049	0.047
	(-0.006; 0.191)	(-0.162; 0.040)	(-0.056; 0.167)
Obs	124	107	135
Bandwidth	(0.110; 0.110)	(0.094; 0.094)	(0.126; 0.126)
Female Candidate (Rep)	0.000	0.014	0.000
	(-0.009; 0.014)	(-0.016; 0.050)	(-0.013; 0.028)
Obs	57	126	62
Bandwidth	(0.047; 0.047)	(0.112; 0.112)	(0.053; 0.053)
Previous experience: State major office	0.078	0.101	0.053
	(-0.171; 0.364)	(-0.201; 0.387)	(-0.243; 0.352)
Obs	123	154	85
Bandwidth	(0.138; 0.138)	(0.197; 0.197)	(0.090; 0.090)
Previous experience: State major office (Dem)	-0.071	-0.102	-0.136
	(-0.338; 0.205)	(-0.361; 0.185)	(-0.556; 0.237)
Obs	65	69	67
Bandwidth	(0.091; 0.091)	(0.094; 0.094)	(0.093; 0.093)
Previous experience: State major office (Rep)	0.176	0.297	0.131
	(-0.293; 0.700)	(-0.279; 0.952)	(-0.304; 0.580)
Obs	73	77	70
Bandwidth	(0.122; 0.122)	(0.132; 0.132)	(0.120; 0.120)
Previous experience: Governor	-0.037	0.046	-0.084
	(-0.434; 0.372)	(-0.363; 0.514)	(-0.562; 0.312)
Obs	108	127	82
Bandwidth	(0.116; 0.116)	(0.141; 0.141)	(0.086; 0.086)
Previous experience: Governor (Dem)	-0.073	0.045	-0.082
	(-0.611; 0.513)	(-0.623; 0.815)	(-0.623; 0.455)
Obs	85	87	79
Bandwidth	(0.127; 0.127)	(0.135; 0.135)	(0.108; 0.108)
Previous experience: Governor (Rep)	0.111	0.222	0.078
	(-0.462; 0.698)	(-0.397; 0.920)	(-0.525; 0.700)
Obs	70	77	52
Bandwidth	(0.118; 0.118)	(0.130; 0.130)	(0.087; 0.087)
Previous experience: State House or Senate	0.256	0.402	0.181
	(-0.106; 0.729)	(-0.105; 1.028)	(-0.165; 0.543)
Obs	124	144	139
Bandwidth	(0.109; 0.109)	(0.136; 0.136)	(0.131; 0.131)
Previous experience: State House or Senate (Dem)	0.323	0.387	0.227
	(-0.086; 0.853)	(-0.095; 0.977)	(-0.153; 0.666)
Obs	105	155	116
Bandwidth	(0.093; 0.093)	(0.148; 0.148)	(0.099; 0.099)
Previous experience: State House or Senate (Rep)	0.156	0.258	0.103
	(-0.208; 0.693)	(-0.189; 0.833)	(-0.243; 0.622)
Obs	91	126	81
Bandwidth	(0.079; 0.079)	(0.118; 0.118)	(0.071; 0.071)
Previous experience: Business	-0.339	-0.355	-0.310
	(-0.896; 0.121)	(-1.135; 0.443)	(-0.889; 0.188)
Obs	74	71	52
Bandwidth	(0.125; 0.125)	(0.121; 0.121)	(0.080; 0.080)
Previous experience: Business (Dem)	-0.393	-0.647	-0.349
	(-1.572; 0.599)	(-2.436; 0.826)	(-1.534; 0.607)
Obs	50	57	36
Bandwidth	(0.134; 0.134)	(0.163; 0.163)	(0.089; 0.089)
Previous experience: Business (Rep)	-0.306	0.007	-0.380
	(-0.733; 0.240)	(-0.372; 0.575)	(-0.920; 0.140)
Obs	43	42	44
Bandwidth	(0.118; 0.118)	(0.110; 0.110)	(0.123; 0.123)
Previous experience: Lawyer	-0.151	-0.110	-0.107
	(-0.761; 0.364)	(-0.946; 0.803)	(-0.617; 0.313)
Obs	74	74	77
Bandwidth	(0.129; 0.129)	(0.128; 0.128)	(0.134; 0.134)
Previous experience: Lawyer (Dem)	-0.186	-0.391	-0.060
	(-2.003; 1.484)	(-2.573; 1.488)	(-1.276; 0.938)
Obs	38	48	38
Bandwidth	(0.092; 0.092)	(0.128; 0.128)	(0.092; 0.092)
Previous experience: Lawyer (Rep)	0.019	0.434	-0.223
	(-0.623; 0.879)	(-0.318; 1.465)	(-0.886; 0.523)
Obs	41	42	41
Bandwidth	(0.107; 0.107)	(0.114; 0.114)	(0.107; 0.107)

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients of a Democratic win in the gubernatorial election on each gubernatorial candidates' characteristics as outcomes. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.7: Balance Pre-treatment Characteristics of Gubernatorial Elections

<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	<i>Panel A: Gubernatorial Elections Characteristics</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of Candidates	0.588 (-1.014; 2.353)	0.473 (-1.091; 1.939)	0.787 (-1.136; 2.577)
Obs	165	155	119
Bandwidth	(0.159; 0.159)	(0.146; 0.146)	(0.099; 0.099)
Open Seat Election	0.085 (-0.305; 0.524)	0.092 (-0.376; 0.558)	0.080 (-0.361; 0.536)
Obs	123	141	92
Bandwidth	(0.106; 0.106)	(0.133; 0.133)	(0.078; 0.078)
Incumbent Running (Dem)	-0.037 (-0.451; 0.388)	-0.029 (-0.559; 0.511)	-0.014 (-0.399; 0.384)
Obs	139	166	123
Bandwidth	(0.127; 0.127)	(0.161; 0.161)	(0.105; 0.105)
Incumbent Running (Rep)	-0.043 (-0.495; 0.333)	-0.092 (-0.573; 0.364)	-0.104 (-0.563; 0.309)
Obs	125	171	91
Bandwidth	(0.109; 0.109)	(0.172; 0.172)	(0.076; 0.076)
<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	<i>Panel B: State Characteristics</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Proportion Over 18	-0.014 (-0.064; 0.033)	-0.017 (-0.084; 0.046)	-0.016 (-0.067; 0.033)
Obs	160	169	121
Bandwidth	(0.150; 0.150)	(0.168; 0.168)	(0.101; 0.101)
Proportion of White Population	0.010 (-0.072; 0.102)	0.021 (-0.090; 0.137)	-0.009 (-0.096; 0.085)
Obs	140	165	107
Bandwidth	(0.129; 0.129)	(0.159; 0.159)	(0.093; 0.093)
Proportion of College Graduates 25 or above	0.001 (-0.063; 0.068)	0.004 (-0.079; 0.090)	0.006 (-0.057; 0.076)
Obs	150	172	114
Bandwidth	(0.142; 0.142)	(0.176; 0.176)	(0.098; 0.098)
Urbanization Rate	-0.016 (-0.140; 0.092)	-0.028 (-0.163; 0.093)	-0.013 (-0.129; 0.112)
Obs	127	169	114
Bandwidth	(0.115; 0.115)	(0.167; 0.167)	(0.097; 0.097)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients of a Democratic win in the gubernatorial election on each pre-election characteristics as outcomes. Panel A presents gubernatorial election characteristics. Panel B presents State characteristics. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.8: Effect of a Democratic Win on Lagged Gubernatorial Election Outcomes and Characteristics

<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	<i>Panel A: Lagged Election Outcomes</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Margin of Victory (Dem)	0.005 (-0.099; 0.126)	-0.033 (-0.205; 0.105)	-0.006 (-0.138; 0.137)
Obs	135	137	87
Bandwidth	(0.141; 0.141)	(0.144; 0.144)	(0.086; 0.086)
Elected Gov. (Dem)	0.066 (-0.346; 0.632)	0.131 (-0.409; 0.754)	0.202 (-0.223; 0.768)
Obs	109	150	83
Bandwidth	(0.107; 0.107)	(0.163; 0.163)	(0.081; 0.081)
Elected Gov. (Rep)	-0.066 (-0.632; 0.346)	-0.131 (-0.754; 0.409)	-0.202 (-0.768; 0.223)
Obs	109	150	83
Bandwidth	(0.107; 0.107)	(0.163; 0.163)	(0.081; 0.081)
First Candidate Vote Share (Dem)	0.022 (-0.043; 0.092)	-0.022 (-0.114; 0.051)	0.006 (-0.073; 0.090)
Obs	150	125	100
Bandwidth	(0.164; 0.164)	(0.130; 0.130)	(0.095; 0.095)
First Candidate Vote Share (Rep)	0.018 (-0.048; 0.074)	0.020 (-0.051; 0.101)	0.023 (-0.051; 0.087)
Obs	124	145	94
Bandwidth	(0.127; 0.127)	(0.151; 0.151)	(0.092; 0.092)
<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	<i>Panel B: Lagged Election Characteristics</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Nr. of Candidates	0.504 (-1.039; 2.018)	0.096 (-2.002; 1.848)	0.683 (-1.391; 2.816)
Obs	113	131	82
Bandwidth	(0.114; 0.114)	(0.138; 0.138)	(0.080; 0.080)
Open Seat Election	0.094 (-0.255; 0.526)	0.120 (-0.394; 0.630)	0.049 (-0.425; 0.523)
Obs	138	151	83
Bandwidth	(0.145; 0.145)	(0.165; 0.165)	(0.080; 0.080)
Incumbent Running (Dem)	0.190 (-0.115; 0.541)	0.207 (-0.124; 0.587)	0.212 (-0.119; 0.596)
Obs	113	158	83
Bandwidth	(0.112; 0.112)	(0.180; 0.180)	(0.081; 0.081)
Incumbent Running (Rep)	-0.275* (-0.630; 0.021)	-0.353* (-0.788; 0.037)	-0.201 (-0.559; 0.085)
Obs	111	145	88
Bandwidth	(0.110; 0.110)	(0.151; 0.151)	(0.087; 0.087)
<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	<i>Panel C: Lagged State Characteristics</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Proportion Over 18	-0.003 (-0.052; 0.045)	-0.008 (-0.080; 0.056)	-0.003 (-0.058; 0.047)
Obs	158	154	113
Bandwidth	(0.180; 0.180)	(0.170; 0.170)	(0.112; 0.112)
Proportion of White Population	0.014 (-0.056; 0.098)	0.036 (-0.066; 0.147)	0.006 (-0.068; 0.089)
Obs	149	145	117
Bandwidth	(0.160; 0.160)	(0.155; 0.155)	(0.118; 0.118)
Proportion of College Graduates 25 or above	0.001 (-0.051; 0.055)	0.004 (-0.071; 0.080)	-0.000 (-0.064; 0.056)
Obs	156	151	109
Bandwidth	(0.174; 0.174)	(0.165; 0.165)	(0.105; 0.105)
Urbanization Rate	-0.025 (-0.147; 0.075)	-0.038 (-0.162; 0.081)	-0.027 (-0.157; 0.082)
Obs	110	145	100
Bandwidth	(0.108; 0.108)	(0.155; 0.155)	(0.095; 0.095)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients of a Democratic win in the gubernatorial election on lagged gubernatorial election outcomes. Panel A presents lagged election outcomes. Panel B presents lagged election characteristics. Panel C presents lagged State characteristics. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.9: Placebo with Future Margin of Victory as Running Variable

<i>Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t+1)	0.038	0.027	0.032	-0.028	0.014	-0.020
	(-0.029; 0.109)	(-0.058; 0.099)	(-0.030; 0.117)	(-0.086; 0.052)	(-0.062; 0.119)	(-0.088; 0.047)
Obs	310	378	238	255	264	249
Bandwidth	(-0.129; 0.129)	(-0.170; 0.170)	(-0.094; 0.094)	(-0.100; 0.100)	(-0.111; 0.111)	(-0.098; 0.098)
<i>Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t+1)	0.040	-0.036	0.069*	-0.020	0.013	-0.033
	(-0.042; 0.105)	(-0.148; 0.043)	(-0.005; 0.150)	(-0.081; 0.057)	(-0.061; 0.113)	(-0.095; 0.052)
Obs	259	258	209	271	279	198
Bandwidth	(-0.106; 0.106)	(-0.102; 0.102)	(-0.083; 0.083)	(-0.114; 0.114)	(-0.119; 0.119)	(-0.076; 0.076)
<i>Panel C: Winning Party</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t+1)	0.118	0.077	0.145	-0.102	-0.111	-0.111
	(-0.240; 0.435)	(-0.408; 0.496)	(-0.166; 0.441)	(-0.424; 0.251)	(-0.576; 0.359)	(-0.395; 0.218)
Obs	248	278	221	248	271	210
Bandwidth	(-0.098; 0.098)	(-0.118; 0.118)	(-0.089; 0.089)	(-0.098; 0.098)	(-0.113; 0.113)	(-0.087; 0.087)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for the placebo effect of a Democratic win in the next period gubernatorial election on past judicial elections. Panel A presents the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Panel B presents the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.10: Robustness to Asymmetrical Bandwidths

<i>Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat Wins (t-1)	0.104*** (0.053; 0.179)	0.117*** (0.046; 0.196)	0.098*** (0.050; 0.169)	-0.116*** (-0.196; -0.068)	-0.140*** (-0.222; -0.073)	-0.085*** (-0.157; -0.039)
Obs	305	436	275	247	368	270
Bandwidth	(-0.092; 0.138)	(-0.145; 0.207)	(-0.087; 0.107)	(-0.063; 0.130)	(-0.095; 0.205)	(-0.079; 0.106)
<i>Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat Wins (t-1)	0.093*** (0.028; 0.177)	0.103** (0.016; 0.188)	0.082*** (0.024; 0.167)	-0.102*** (-0.182; -0.051)	-0.126*** (-0.210; -0.056)	-0.078*** (-0.153; -0.029)
Obs	333	445	293	275	369	276
Bandwidth	(-0.107; 0.137)	(-0.165; 0.202)	(-0.094; 0.100)	(-0.071; 0.137)	(-0.097; 0.206)	(-0.080; 0.108)
<i>Panel C: Winning Party</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat Wins (t-1)	0.216* (-0.026; 0.465)	0.202 (-0.095; 0.477)	0.247** (0.036; 0.520)	-0.188 (-0.454; 0.071)	-0.200 (-0.493; 0.114)	-0.205* (-0.482; 0.008)
Obs	366	442	296	311	433	286
Bandwidth	(-0.103; 0.160)	(-0.178; 0.179)	(-0.089; 0.132)	(-0.099; 0.127)	(-0.155; 0.166)	(-0.084; 0.132)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win in the last gubernatorial election on subsequent judicial elections outcomes. Panel A presents the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Panel B presents the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: asymmetric MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.11: RDD Main Results - State and Decade FE

<i>Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.099*** (0.068; 0.163)	0.223*** (0.175; 0.295)	0.109*** (0.065; 0.169)	-0.176*** (-0.241; -0.139)	-0.240*** (-0.312; -0.192)	-0.173*** (-0.239; -0.116)
Obs	310	248	229	179	243	150
Bandwidth	(-0.103; 0.103)	(-0.080; 0.080)	(-0.073; 0.073)	(-0.061; 0.061)	(-0.079; 0.079)	(-0.049; 0.049)
<i>Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.129*** (0.096; 0.194)	0.212*** (0.160; 0.285)	0.110*** (0.064; 0.169)	-0.142*** (-0.208; -0.107)	-0.230*** (-0.303; -0.180)	-0.161*** (-0.226; -0.108)
Obs	245	248	216	220	247	152
Bandwidth	(-0.076; 0.076)	(-0.080; 0.080)	(-0.070; 0.070)	(-0.073; 0.073)	(-0.082; 0.082)	(-0.050; 0.050)
<i>Panel C: Winning Party</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.226** (0.056; 0.498)	0.360*** (0.096; 0.656)	0.158* (-0.033; 0.383)	-0.238** (-0.518; -0.063)	-0.331** (-0.631; -0.078)	-0.231** (-0.506; -0.041)
Obs	345	361	345	325	399	262
Bandwidth	(-0.123; 0.123)	(-0.130; 0.130)	(-0.122; 0.122)	(-0.116; 0.116)	(-0.142; 0.142)	(-0.091; 0.091)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win in the last gubernatorial election on subsequent judicial elections outcomes. Panel A presents the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Panel B presents the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. All columns include State and Decade FE. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.12: Heterogeneity by Presidential Cycle. Outcome: First Candidate Vote Share

<i>Panel A: Democratic POTUS</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.142*** (0.046; 0.247)	0.138* (-0.017; 0.286)	0.143*** (0.055; 0.245)	-0.138*** (-0.238; -0.045)	-0.190** (-0.355; -0.043)	-0.134*** (-0.248; -0.040)
Obs	178	178	150	187	154	120
Bandwidth	(0.135; 0.135)	(0.133; 0.133)	(0.103; 0.103)	(0.136; 0.136)	(0.111; 0.111)	(0.088; 0.088)
<i>Panel B: Republican POTUS</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.072*** (0.025; 0.147)	0.085*** (0.031; 0.154)	0.037 (-0.020; 0.104)	-0.093*** (-0.184; -0.032)	-0.113*** (-0.213; -0.035)	-0.085** (-0.174; -0.018)
Obs	96	169	133	93	151	75
Bandwidth	(0.063; 0.063)	(0.112; 0.112)	(0.082; 0.082)	(0.063; 0.063)	(0.095; 0.095)	(0.053; 0.053)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win in the last gubernatorial election. Panel A considers judicial elections taking place with a Democratic sitting president of the United States. Panel B considers judicial elections taking place with a Republican sitting president of the United States. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.13: Heterogeneity by Governor and Chambers Alignment. Outcome: First Candidate Vote Share

<i>Panel A: Aligned Executive and Legislative Branches</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.190***	0.242***	0.175***	-0.179***	-0.350***	-0.142***
	(0.096; 0.307)	(0.103; 0.403)	(0.103; 0.282)	(-0.310; -0.088)	(-0.594; -0.171)	(-0.249; -0.056)
Obs	147	168	140	140	126	140
Bandwidth	(0.123; 0.123)	(0.144; 0.144)	(0.117; 0.117)	(0.109; 0.109)	(0.093; 0.093)	(0.114; 0.114)
<i>Panel B: Not Aligned Executive and Legislative Branches</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.029	0.039	0.031	-0.043*	-0.079**	-0.063**
	(-0.008; 0.081)	(-0.010; 0.097)	(-0.014; 0.087)	(-0.112; 0.004)	(-0.165; -0.015)	(-0.139; -0.008)
Obs	141	171	96	151	174	91
Bandwidth	(0.078; 0.078)	(0.106; 0.106)	(0.059; 0.059)	(0.089; 0.089)	(0.108; 0.108)	(0.051; 0.051)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win in the last gubernatorial election. Panel A considers judicial elections taking place with executive and legislative branches (both State Senate and House) belonging to the same party at the time of the judicial election. Panel B considers the remaining judicial elections when the above condition is not fulfilled. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.14: Heterogeneity by Distance in Time between Gubernatorial and Judicial Elections. Outcome: First Candidate Vote Share

<i>Panel A: 2 years or less</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.147***	0.169***	0.152***	-0.194***	-0.249***	-0.163***
	(0.075; 0.252)	(0.077; 0.282)	(0.080; 0.259)	(-0.319; -0.116)	(-0.396; -0.142)	(-0.269; -0.093)
Obs	219	295	169	157	207	148
Bandwidth	(0.117; 0.117)	(0.188; 0.188)	(0.086; 0.086)	(0.077; 0.077)	(0.104; 0.104)	(0.075; 0.075)
<i>Panel B: More than 2 years</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.015	0.011	0.015	-0.001	-0.012	0.006
	(-0.062; 0.076)	(-0.067; 0.079)	(-0.073; 0.086)	(-0.068; 0.055)	(-0.082; 0.050)	(-0.051; 0.081)
Obs	102	152	88	95	126	85
Bandwidth	(0.101; 0.101)	(0.166; 0.166)	(0.085; 0.085)	(0.098; 0.098)	(0.131; 0.131)	(0.085; 0.085)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win in the last gubernatorial election. Panel A considers judicial elections taking place within 2 years of the last gubernatorial election. Panel B considers judicial elections taking place more than 2 years after the last gubernatorial election. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

Table A.15: Effects on Candidate Selection Outcomes

<i>Panel A: Number of Candidates</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	-0.034 (-0.130; 0.059)	-0.049 (-0.161; 0.051)	-0.014 (-0.132; 0.082)	0.060 (-0.041; 0.190)	0.081 (-0.036; 0.236)	0.048 (-0.057; 0.202)
Obs	327	313	213	354	459	228
Bandwidth	(-0.110; 0.110)	(-0.102; 0.102)	(-0.068; 0.068)	(-0.124; 0.124)	(-0.169; 0.169)	(-0.073; 0.073)
<i>Panel B: Effective Number of Candidates (Laakso-Taagepera Index)</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	-0.031 (-0.113; 0.054)	-0.039 (-0.137; 0.049)	-0.004 (-0.107; 0.089)	0.052 (-0.040; 0.169)	0.094 (-0.023; 0.241)	0.040 (-0.056; 0.183)
Obs	318	311	232	355	417	228
Bandwidth	(-0.105; 0.105)	(-0.100; 0.100)	(-0.074; 0.074)	(-0.125; 0.125)	(-0.144; 0.144)	(-0.073; 0.073)

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win in the last gubernatorial election on the number of candidates in the judicial election. Panel A considers the number of candidates. Panel B considers the Laakso-Taagepera Index. The Laakso-Taagepera is a measure of the effective number of candidates computed as $1/\sum_c s_c^2$, where s_c is the vote share of candidate c in the election. Laakso-Taagepera indices for each party are for votes among candidates of the same party. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.


Table A.16: RDD Campaign Financing

<i>Panel A: Total Received (Millions)</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	0.954 (-1.023; 1.867)	3.704 (-131.348; 138.901)	0.987 (-1.744; 2.876)	-0.787 (-3.518; 0.825)	-2.179 (-6.800; 2.163)	-2.436* (-5.757; 0.375)
Obs	57	32	53	68	68	23
Bandwidth	(-0.284; 0.284)	(-0.097; 0.097)	(-0.215; 0.215)	(-0.222; 0.222)	(-0.206; 0.206)	(-0.090; 0.090)
<i>Panel B: Number of Donors (Thousands)</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	1.703*** (0.653; 2.833)	1.494*** (0.616; 2.559)	1.736*** (0.688; 2.803)	0.148 (-0.694; 1.196)	0.320 (-0.698; 1.478)	-0.077 (-0.886; 1.012)
Obs	21	40	15	23	32	23
Bandwidth	(-0.042; 0.042)	(-0.095; 0.095)	(-0.034; 0.090)	(-0.050; 0.050)	(-0.090; 0.090)	(-0.044; 0.090)
<i>Panel C: Average Donation per Donor (Thousands)</i>						
	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Gov. (t-1)	1.830 (-5.494; 5.553)	8.399 (-410.924; 427.795)	-3.169 (-14.160; 6.979)	-2.847 (-11.840; 4.408)	-3.697 (-15.345; 7.526)	-3.220** (-6.305; -0.631)
Obs	57	32	25	45	54	31
Bandwidth	(-0.258; 0.258)	(-0.108; 0.108)	(-0.092; 0.092)	(-0.139; 0.139)	(-0.177; 0.177)	(-0.104; 0.104)
Polynomial Order	1	2	1	1	2	1
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform	Triangular	Triangular	Uniform

Notes. Reporting RDD conventional coefficients for a Democratic win at the last gubernatorial election on candidates' campaign financing. Panel A presents total amount received. Panel B presents the number of donors. Panel C presents the average donation per donor. Robust bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals are displayed in parentheses. Bandwidth selection in all columns: MSE-optimal. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% by **, and at the 1% by ***.

A.2 Appendix Figures


Figure A.1: McCrary Test for Testing Manipulation of the Running Variable




Notes. The data includes all the 230 gubernatorial elections in the sample. The estimate of the discontinuity in the density is -0.01 , with a p -value of 0.992, estimated on the data-driven optimal bandwidth $(-0.05, 0.05)$. Estimate is for a polynomial of order 1 and triangular kernel.

Figure A.2: Placebo: Changing the RDD Cutoff


Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share



Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share




Panel C: Winning Party




Notes. RDD coefficients computed for different cutoffs $c \in \{-.15, -.10, -.05, 0, .05, .10, .15\}$. The baseline specification is reported in Column 1 of Table 1. Local-linear model, with triangular kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidths. Figures A and B present the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures C and D present the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures E and F present the probability of the Democratic and Republican party winning, respectively. The vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.3: Sensitivity to Different Bandwidth Lengths


Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share



Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share




Panel C: Winning Party




Notes. The figures plot RDD coefficients analogous to the ones reported in Column 1 of Table 1, for different lengths of the bandwidth. The data-driven optimal bandwidth is normalized to 1, and the other bandwidth lengths are $l = \{.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4\}$, where l is multiplied by the reported optimal bandwidth. Figures A and B present the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures C and D present the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures E and F present the probability of the Democratic and Republican party winning, respectively. The vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.4: Sensitivity to Removing Each State from the Sample


Panel A: First Candidate Vote Share



Panel B: Cumulative Vote Share




Panel C: Winning Party




Notes. The figures plot RDD coefficients analogous to the ones reported in Column 1 of Table 1, for different samples and dependent variables. Figures A and B present the vote share of the first party candidate in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures C and D present the cumulative vote share in judicial elections for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Figures E and F present the probability of the Democratic and Republican party winning, respectively. Each sample excludes one of the 23 states at a time, indicated along the horizontal axis. The vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.5: Heterogeneity Analyses, Effects on Cumulative Vote Share


Panel A: By Sitting POTUS



Panel B: By Governor and Chambers Alignment




Panel C: by Distance in Time between Gubernatorial and Judicial Elections




Notes. The figures plot RDD coefficients analogous to the ones reported in Column 1 of Table 1, for different types of heterogeneity analyses. The outcome variable is Cumulative Vote Share of the Democratic (left) or Republican (right) Party. Panel A presents heterogeneity by the party of the sitting president of the United States at the moment of the judicial election. Panel B presents heterogeneity by whether the executive and legislative branches (both State Senate and House) belonged to the same party at the time of the judicial election. Panel C presents the coefficients by the time interval relative to the latest gubernatorial election. The vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.6: Heterogeneity Analyses, Effects on Winning Party


Panel A: By Sitting POTUS



Panel B: By Governor and Chambers Alignment




Panel C: by Distance in Time between Gubernatorial and Judicial Elections



Notes. The figures plot RDD coefficients analogous to the ones reported in Column 1 of Table 1, for different types of heterogeneity analyses. The outcome variable is Winning Party in the Judicial Elections, Democratic (left) or Republican (right) Party. Panel A presents heterogeneity by the party of the sitting president of the United States at the moment of the judicial election. Panel B presents heterogeneity by whether the executive and legislative branches (both State Senate and House) belonged to the same party at the time of the judicial election. Panel C presents the coefficients by the time interval relative to the latest gubernatorial election. The vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.7: Descriptive Campaign Financing



Notes. The figures plot the median amount of money received by each party in millions of dollars (left panel) and the number of donors in thousands (right panel) in the judicial elections. The candidates are grouped by the alignment of the Governor in the previous election.