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# The Rise and Fall of Social Democracy, 1918-2017

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# The Rise and Fall of Social Democracy, 1918-2017\*

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## Abstract

We describe the electoral history of one of Europe’s most successful party families over the past 100 years in 31 countries. With a unique and newly collected dataset of national election results, and a large number of economic and social variables measured for each country-election observation, we find that two main factors drive the electoral performance of social democratic parties: public sector spending, and the size of the manufacturing sector. We investigate these results further with an analysis of individual-level voting behaviour, using the European Social Surveys from 2002 to 2016. Together, our findings suggest that most of the fall in support for social democratic parties in recent years is correlated with a decline in the number of industrial workers as well as a reduction in the propensity of social democratic parties’ core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them.

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# 1 Introduction

There is now a large body of research on the rise in support for populist parties in Europe (e.g. Colantone and Stanig 2018; Dinas et al. 2019; Guiso et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). Much less attention has been paid to one of the corollaries, or perhaps partially the cause, of this trend: the decline in support for mainstream parties, especially on the centre left. Across Europe, social democratic parties were by 2017 in the electoral doldrums. Parties that once commanded over 40 percent of votes have collapsed to the low twenties, teens or lower.

We do three things in this paper to investigate these trends. First, we describe the variations in support for social democratic parties across time and space, for all democratic elections between 1918 and 2017 in 31 European countries. Second, we undertake a time-series cross-sectional analysis to identify some of the correlates of the electoral fortunes of social democratic parties. Third, we supplement this aggregate-level analysis by looking at individual-level support for social democratic parties between 2002 and 2016.

Our aim is not to provide a clear causal explanation of the rise and fall of social democracy. By introducing a newly collected dataset of elections for 31 countries over 100 years, we aim to provide descriptive evidence of a time-consistent relationship between two main factors, public sector spending and industrial production, and the changing fortunes of social democratic parties. Our findings suggest that most of the fall in support for social democratic parties in recent years is correlated with a decline in the number of industrial workers as well as a reduction in the propensity of social democratic parties' core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them. We think that our analysis will stimulate scholarly discussion, boost new research on this topic and, importantly, disseminate these findings in an accessible way to a wider audience.

## 2 Evolution of Social Democracy

There has been extensive existing work in political science and political history on the evolution of social democratic parties and their electoral support. For example, scholars have looked at the formation of social democratic parties (e.g. Sassoon 1996; Bartolini 2000), the strategic challenges faced by social democratic parties of appealing to the middle class while maintaining working class support (e.g. Przeworski and Sprague 1986), the rise of a social dimension that cross-cuts a traditional left-right dimension (e.g. Kitschelt 1990), how electoral systems have shaped their behaviour and support (e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2006), and the challenges of globalization (e.g. Garrett 1998; Boix 1985). We include all the key factors discussed in this research, such as the ideological/policy positions of social democratic parties as well as their main centre right rivals, the electoral system, whether a party is in government or opposition, and the trade openness of the economy. We complement these factors by also including a wide range of other social, economic, and political variables, such as public spending, welfare spending, employment in manufacturing/industry, and electoral turnout.

We analyze are all democratic elections in Europe since 1918. We start with 1918 because many European countries extended suffrage for the first election after the First World War, and because 1918 to 2017 is conveniently a 100-year period. We define democratic elections as all elections that were held in a year when a country had either a general Polity score or a ‘Political Competition’ score greater than 5.<sup>1</sup> We only count countries that had populations larger than 500,000 in 2017 and who had democratic elections for at least one 20-year period. These criteria produce 579 elections in 31 countries, as Table 1 shows.

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<sup>1</sup>See <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

Table 1: Democratic elections in Europe, 1918 - 2017


Country	Years counted as democratic	Number of years	Number of elections
Albania	1992-2017	26	8
Austria	1918-32, 1945-2017	88	27
Belgium	1918-38, 1944-2017	95	29
Bulgaria	1918-23, 1990-2017	35	12
Croatia	1991-2017	27	8
Cyprus	1970-2017	48	10
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	1918-38, 1945-46, 1990-92, 1993-2017	51	14
Denmark	1918-39, 1943-2017	97	38
Estonia	1918-33, 1991-2017	43	13
Finland	1918-39, 1944-2017	96	29
France	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	25
Germany	1919-32, 1949-2017	83	28
Greece	1920-36, 1944-48, 1974-2017	64	24
Hungary	1920-43, 1990-2017	52	12
Ireland	1921-2017	97	30
Italy	1918-21, 1946-2017	76	20
Latvia	1920-33, 1990-2017	42	13
Lithuania	1991-2017	27	7
Luxembourg	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	20
Macedonia	1991-2017	27	8
Netherlands	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	28
Norway	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	26
Poland	1918-30, 1990-2017	41	12
Portugal	1975-2017	43	15
Romania	1925-38, 1990-2017	42	14
Slovakia	1993-2017	25	7
Slovenia	1991-2017	27	7
Spain	1977-2017	41	13
Sweden	1918-2017	100	29
Switzerland	1918-2017	100	26
United Kingdom	1918-2017	100	27
Total			579

Which parties do we count as social democratic? For most cases this is straightforward, as only one party was a member of the Socialist International and/or Party of European Socialists at a particular time. The terms socialism and social democracy are often interchangeable. Sometimes the term *social democracy* is understood as being more right-wing than the policies of the member of the Socialist International in a country. For the cases where several parties were members of the Socialist International and/or the Party of European Socialists, we combined the vote-shares for these parties – Table A1 in the Appendix lists the parties we include and the years covered for each case.<sup>2</sup> Parties with different ideological origins at different stages have been described as social democratic, or have played

<sup>2</sup>For example, for Belgium, we count the francophone (PS) and flemish (SPA) parties as one party.

a similar role to social democratic parties, such as the Italian Communist Party (PCI) since the late 1960s. We run two robustness tests to address these measurement issues. First, we estimate the models with the vote-share of all parties on the left as the dependent variable (so, social democratic, communist, greens, and other left parties). Second, because of the particular case of Italy, we estimate the models counting the PCI rather than the PSI as the social democratic party in that country from 1968 onwards, on the grounds that after that year the PCI became more moderate, the PSI remained in government as an ally of the centre right, and the PCI became the main opposition party. We put together the data on party vote shares and turnout from Nohlen and Stoever (2010), and cross-checked the data with records from national electoral commissions or equivalent where available.

Figure 1: Three measures of the electoral performance of social democratic parties



Note: Total share of votes = total votes for social democratic parties in a year in the 31 countries divided by the total number of votes cast in an election. Total share of the electorate = total votes for social democratic parties in a year in the 31 countries divided by the total number of eligible voters in an election. Average share of votes = average share of the votes for social democratic parties in a year in each of the 31 countries.

Figure 1 exemplifies the breadth of of this unique dataset and shows three measures of social democratic parties' electoral performance between 1918 and 2017. Measured by the

average vote share (percent) across our country-cases in a given year (taking the vote share for a social democratic party in the immediately previous election in a country in a year), support for social democrats peaked in the 1950s. Measured by the total share of votes across Europe in a given year (the absolute number of votes for social democrats across all countries, as a percentage of all votes cast in all countries), support for these parties peaked in the late 1990s, because of the high performance of social democrats in several larger countries (Germany, the UK, and Italy). Measured by the total share of the electorate (the absolute number of votes for social democrats across all countries, as a percentage of all eligible voters in all countries), though, support for social democrats declined in the late 1980s and then fell precipitously in the 2000s, so much so that, as a proportion of all voters, social democratic parties' support in 2017 was down to the same level as it was in the early 1920s (15 percent). Figures A1-A2 in the Appendix show the patterns for each country.


One issue, of course, is that social democracy has meant different things in different periods. The main stages of the evolution of social democracy can be summarised as three 'waves'. Figure 2 shows the periodisation of these waves by country. Here, we coded each party in each country by looking carefully at the positions of the parties in their manifestos (for the post-1945 period), as well as at historical descriptions of the parties (for the pre-1945 period) (Jacobs 1989; von Beyme 1985; Sassoon 1996; Bartolini 2000). The first wave, of a parliamentary road to socialism, started after the First World War, when most social democratic parties broke from revolutionary politics, embraced democratic elections, and aimed to achieve socialism via a parliamentary and reformist route; although sometimes retaining revolutionary objectives, as in the case of the Austrian and Italian parties in the 1920s. With the rise of industrial society and the organised working class, many expected that it was only a matter of time until these new movements won electoral majorities (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Indeed, social democrats won over 30 percent of the vote in some of the first elections after the First World War (in Germany and Austria for exam-

ple), and support for social democratic parties rose through the 1920s in most countries. In the mid-1920s, the Swedish and Austrian parties exceeded 40 percent of the vote, while the Belgian party reached 39 percent. The 1920s and 1930s also saw brief periods in government for social democrats in Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, the UK, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, most often in coalition or tolerated by other parties. When in government, social democrat-led reforms included maximum working hours, paid annual leave, collective bargaining, and pensions systems.

In this early period, not all workers supported socialist parties. Some supported Catholic parties, and this potential electoral force was one reason why Italy's anti-clerical elite delayed universal suffrage until 1913 (Bartolini 2000, p. 432). Also, many voted communist, especially in France and Italy. Meanwhile, the social democrat electorate included agricultural workers and some middle class supporters. According to Neisse (1930, p. 657-8), cited by Lipset (1983, p. 148, fn 29), in 1930, 40 percent of the German social democratic electorate was non-manual, and 25 percent of white collar workers supported the party, along with 33 percent of lower civil servants and 25 percent of the self-employed. In Italy, typified by late industrialization and a rural proletariat, support for the socialists was largely rural-based (Bartolini 2000, p. 432). The position of the French socialists differed after their break with communism in 1920, which had cost them much of the working class base as well as links with trade unions and the party press. Whereas one-third of the French party's deputies in 1924 were of working class origin, this fell to 16 of 146 by 1936 (Sassoon 1996, p. 52).



Figure 2: Three waves of social democracy



These early successes ended with the Great Depression and its economic and political aftermath. Democracy collapsed in most of central and eastern Europe while support for social democrats fell in most of western Europe. The only exceptions were in Switzerland and Scandinavia, where social democrats continued to command considerable support: winning 29 percent in Switzerland in 1931, 46 percent in Denmark in 1935, 40 percent in Finland in 1939, and 54 percent in Sweden in 1940. In France, the socialists also led the governments of the Popular Front between 1936 and 1938, though with only 20 percent of the vote.

The second wave of social democracy involved the transformation of the parties into mainstream electoral machines. After the Second World War, most social democratic parties attempted to reach beyond their traditional working class base (e.g. Kirchheimer 1966), after accepting that industrial workers were unlikely to emerge as a majority in society and that many workers supported communist, Catholic or other non-social democratic parties (Sassoon 1996, p.42). This new strategy started in Norway and Sweden in the 1930s –

though Przeworski and Sprague (1986, p. 115) date it back to 1888 for the Danish social democrats – then spread to social democratic parties in the UK, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands in the 1940s, and then to the parties in Germany, Italy and Switzerland in the 1950s. These ‘catch-all’ parties downgraded Marxist and class-based politics, in favour of policies that could appeal to other groups, such as public sector employees, urban professionals, and agricultural labour. By the 1960s, Alford (1964, p. 129-30) noted that a significant proportion of the emerging new middle class in the UK supported the Labour Party. In policy terms, many social democrats focused on establishing a social market economy (an objective shared with Christian democrats), building the new welfare state, nationalizing natural monopolies, macroeconomic demand management, and in slightly later years liberal social policies, on divorce and gender equality in the workplace for example. Expanding universal welfare policies shifted the preferences of sections of the middle class as well as centre right parties, who now supported some aspects of social democratic parties’ welfare policies (e.g. Gingrich and Hermann 2015). This expanded social democratic parties’ coalition options, as they could now form governments with liberal and Christian democratic parties, and in the immediate post-war years social democrats were in government almost everywhere and in single-party governments in the UK, Sweden and Norway. Most social democratic parties saw their support peak in the 1960s and 1970s, although whether this success was a result of societal changes or moderating party positions is not possible to identify clearly with aggregate cross-country data.

Yet, by the 1980s, what could perhaps be called *classic social democracy* had run out of steam. Following the 1970s oil crisis, changes in global trade patterns and rising unemployment and inflation, market liberalization and monetarist macroeconomic policies of centre right parties gained support, while green movements started to squeeze support from the left. The market liberalizing effects of European integration and globalization and the collapse of communism facilitated a renewal of social democracy (e.g. Garrett 1998; Boix

1985). In response, a third wave of social democracy emerged around the idea of a *third way* or *new middle* (*neue mitte*), which emphasised regulating free markets, supply side economic management, balanced budgets, and social liberalism and environmentalism (e.g. Giddens 1998). By 1998, social democrats were back in office in every western European country except Spain, Norway and Ireland; governing alone in the UK, Portugal, Sweden and Greece, leading coalitions in Germany, Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands, including a socialist-communist coalition in France, and in *grand coalitions* with the centre right in Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Switzerland. Also, in central and eastern Europe, former communist leaders used third way social democracy to distance themselves from the past, and emerged as electoral winners in every country in the region except Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia.

But, starting in the early 2000s, social democratic party support collapsed in many countries. This decline was so dramatic, in fact, that between 2000 and 2017, and particularly following the Great Recession of 2007-10, most social democratic parties secured their lowest levels of electoral support since 1918, or 1945 for the post-war democracies, or 1989 for the new democracies in central and eastern Europe. That said, a few countries bucked this trend, with social democrats either maintaining support, or declining and then partly recovering, or declining but less severely than elsewhere. This was the case in Albania, Croatia, Denmark, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and the UK.

This story suggests that different factors shaped the success of social democratic parties in different periods. In the interwar period, the parties emerged initially from manufacturing labour, in the postwar period social democratic parties became more moderate as they expanded to include public sector workers, then adapted their positions following globalization in the 1970s, and faced new challenges following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Great Recession in the 2000s. To investigate this story we look at each of these periods in turn. This periodisation of the analysis enables us to look at whether different factors relate

to social democratic support in different periods. Empirically, this periodisation also broadly fits the availability of data for some key independent variables. For the interwar period, we managed to find data on manufacturing and public spending, but data on party positions are not available until after WWII, while data on employment in industry and globalization only start in the 1970s. In the empirical analysis we also test that our results are not driven by the choice of our periodisation. We do this by estimating the models starting 5 years before and after our cutoff years, where the data are available.

### 3 Correlates of Electoral Support for Social Democratic Parties

To understand what factors correlate with these cross-country and cross-time variations in the electoral performance of social democratic parties we collected a wide range of institutional, economic, social, and political variables. The Appendix contains a full list of the variables.

We estimate two different types of time-series cross-sectional models:


$$V_{it} = \alpha + \beta W_{it} + \phi X_{it} + \gamma_i + \theta_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$\Delta V_{it} = \alpha + \beta \Delta W_{it} + \phi \Delta X_{it} + \gamma_i + \theta_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

Model 1 uncovers long-term changes in the levels of support for social democratic parties, while model 2 (a first-differences model) examines short-term changes, between elections. In the equations,  $V$  is a social democratic party percent vote share in country  $i$  at time (election)  $t$ ;  $\alpha$  is a constant;  $W$  is a vector of independent variables;  $X$  is a vector of control variables;  $\gamma$  are country fixed-effects;  $\theta$  are decade fixed-effects and country-specific time trends;  $\beta$ , and  $\phi$  are the parameters to be estimated; and  $\epsilon$  is the error term. We estimate both types of models

with ordinary least squares. This historical longitudinal cross-sectional analysis allows us to tackle such a large and important question. However, it poses a trade-off. Although conditional on a large set of controls and fixed effects our exercise remains descriptive in nature as this type of time series cross-sectional analysis poses several empirical challenges such as omitted variable bias, unit roots and time trends interferences. We address some of these issues in the remainder of the paper.

Figure 3: Public spending and industrial production in Western Europe



Note: For 18 western European countries, the graph plots the main measure of public spending as a percent of GDP and our three measures of industry: the manufacturing index, for the 1918-1939 period (this index is calculated by the UN from League of Nations trade data, and measures the volume of trade in manufactured goods in a country relative to 1953); industry as a percent of GDP, for 1950 to 2017 (the share of industrial output as a percent of GDP at constant 2005 prices); and the percent of total employment in industry, for the 1970 to 2017 period. The lines are plotted by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.

As a start, Figure 3 plots two main types of independent variables (for 18 western European democracies): public spending as a percent of GDP, and several measures of the size of industry/manufacturing. Public spending as a percent of GDP increased steadily from the

1920s to the early 2000s, consistent with Wagner’s (1890) law on developed economies that embark on social progress.<sup>3</sup> Industrial production rose until the 1970s, and then declined dramatically, as a result of structural changes in the economy, globalization and technological change.

To investigate these relationships further, Table 2 presents the correlates of social democratic party vote shares between 1918 and 1939 for the 16 countries who held democratic elections in this period and with the limited set of available variables. Trade in manufactured goods in this early period is strongly correlated with votes for social democratic parties. We do not find evidence that public spending (as a percent of GDP) was related to support for social democrats in this period. Together, these findings are consistent with the description of wave 1 social democratic parties, who based their support mainly on organised industrial labour. Third, when these parties made it into government, they generally lost support, whether as a single party of government or as a senior or junior party in a coalition government. In fact, this result is consistent for all the periods we look at.

Table 3 presents the correlates of social democratic party vote shares between 1945 and 2017. Because of data availability we add several economic control variables as well as some key political variables, in particular the left-right locations of social democratic and centre right parties, from the coding of party manifestos, as well as the interaction of left-right party positions and the electoral system (district magnitude). We include the policy positions of centre right parties as these were the main competitors for social democratic parties in most countries for most of this period. We accept that the positions of other parties are also relevant, particularly for the decline of social democratic parties in more recent periods. The effects of the positions of competitor parties could be the subject of future research, building on our dataset.

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<sup>3</sup>As an example, Peacock and Wiseman (1961, p. 43-5) find consistent growth in public expenditure in the UK, with a notable increases in 1924 when the first Labour government held office, and once again from 1947, following the short-term downturn in public spending with the return to peace in 1945.

Table 2: Correlates of social democracy party vote shares, 1918-1939

	<i>Analysis of levels</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public spending (% of GDP)	-0.101 (0.157)	-0.0236 (0.140)	-0.184 (0.443)	0.129 (0.337)	-0.00593 (0.433)	0.109 (0.368)
District magnitude (log)	-2.344 (5.917)	-3.327 (7.156)	3.597* (1.727)	6.259*** (1.583)	3.731 (2.299)	5.130* (2.411)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-1.108 (2.035)	-1.955 (2.049)	0.238 (2.311)	-0.199 (2.034)	0.355 (1.975)	0.0831 (1.897)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	0.535 (3.818)	0.529 (2.706)	1.424 (1.512)	2.556* (1.334)	0.360 (1.904)	1.294 (1.811)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-0.462 (3.600)	-2.097 (2.596)	-8.349*** (2.382)	-8.993*** (2.030)	-9.563*** (2.229)	-9.544*** (2.084)
Turnout	0.273* (0.141)	0.194 (0.164)	0.198 (0.185)	0.0348 (0.159)	0.0291 (0.212)	-0.00804 (0.200)
Manufacturing index					0.260** (0.0925)	0.181 (0.171)
Observations	77	77	49	49	49	49
R-squared	0.234	0.329	0.277	0.428	0.454	0.482
Number of countries	16	16	11	11	11	11
	<i>Analysis of differences</i>					
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Public spending (% of GDP)	-0.0487 (0.144)	-0.0589 (0.149)	0.0642 (0.171)	0.0940 (0.175)	0.448 (0.534)	0.431 (0.476)
District magnitude (log)	-2.339 (9.189)	-0.918 (7.545)	-3.679 (8.628)	0.435 (5.080)	5.751 (4.596)	6.450 (5.372)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-1.987*** (0.661)	-1.869** (0.730)	-2.017** (0.748)	-1.532 (0.876)	-2.381** (0.804)	-2.049** (0.812)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.853 (1.531)	-0.316 (2.159)	-1.604 (1.909)	-0.461 (3.097)	-1.576 (1.618)	0.302 (2.868)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-2.447* (1.178)	-2.848** (1.075)	-8.183* (4.466)	-11.32 (7.528)	-7.460 (4.717)	-6.974 (4.475)
Turnout	-0.125 (0.312)	-0.128 (0.307)	-0.139 (0.470)	-0.179 (0.477)	-0.318 (0.384)	-0.336 (0.415)
Manufacturing index					0.0307 (0.118)	-0.0251 (0.140)
Observations	61	61	38	38	38	38
R-squared	0.063	0.077	0.107	0.163	0.214	0.247
Number of countries	15	15	10	10	10	10
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 7 to 12 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Models 3 and 4 (9 and 10) replicate models 1 and 2 (7 and 8) with the sub-set of countries for which the manufacturing index variable exists. Standard errors in parentheses. Constant not shown. The countries where the manufacturing index variable exists are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom. \*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.05, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

Several results are worth highlighting. First, public spending after 1945 is positively related to support for social democratic parties, and this result holds both for the long-term trends as well as for short-term (between election) changes in public spending. The effect is

Table 3: Correlates of social democracy party vote shares, 1945-2017

	<i>Analysis of levels</i>		<i>Analysis of differences</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.157** (0.0577)	0.193*** (0.0586)	0.168** (0.0725)	0.163** (0.0729)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.172** (0.0812)	0.170* (0.0839)	0.148** (0.0684)	0.150** (0.0687)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.00290 (0.0358)	-0.00343 (0.0346)	-0.0357 (0.0299)	-0.0357 (0.0297)
District magnitude (log)	0.574 (1.292)	0.787 (1.308)	0.948 (1.596)	0.912 (1.581)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.0576* (0.0298)	-0.0552* (0.0316)	-0.0614** (0.0265)	-0.0619** (0.0266)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	1.335 (1.256)	1.097 (1.230)	-3.175*** (0.957)	-3.187*** (0.962)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	0.976 (1.327)	0.634 (1.285)	-2.507** (0.963)	-2.506** (0.966)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-2.849*** (0.912)	-3.056*** (0.925)	-2.461*** (0.721)	-2.451*** (0.721)
Turnout	-0.0839 (0.106)	-0.0861 (0.101)	0.300** (0.130)	0.299** (0.129)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	381	381	353	353
R-squared	0.162	0.176	0.169	0.170
Number of countries	31	31	31	31

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 3 and 4 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: GDP per capita (log), GDP growth, EU member, Eurozone member, presidential system. The full results are in Table A3 in the Appendix. \*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.05, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

economically sizeable in magnitude: one increase in standard deviation in Public Spending is associated with one increase of about 1.5% in vote share for social democratic parties. What we do not know from this result, though, is whether public spending leads to more support for social democratic policies or whether a larger public sector means more workers with a vested interest in voting for social democratic parties. We know that public spending



can also rise when social democrats are not in office.<sup>4</sup>

Second, regarding party policy positions, we find evidence that social democratic parties gained votes when they moved to the centre (closer to the median voter) and lost votes when they moved further to the left. We do not find an effect of the left-right position of the main centre right competitor on social democratic support. We replicated this analysis breaking the left-right down into separate economic and social dimensions – see Table A6 in the Appendix – and we found that, in the long-run analysis at least, social democratic parties won more votes when they were more free market on the economic dimension but more conservative on the social dimension. These results challenge some existing research, for example, that there is little evidence of the link between parties’ positions and their electoral performance (e.g. Adams 2012), and also Kitschelt’s (1990) contention that social democratic parties should win support as they become left-libertarian. However, further investigation reveals that this result on the social dimension is mainly driven by social democratic parties in Eastern Europe (after 1989), where several parties, in Romania and Slovakia for example, became socially conservative and nationalist from the early 2000s and gained votes at the expense of more liberal-cosmopolitan centre right parties. In contrast, there is little evidence in Western Europe of a connection between social democratic parties’ positions on a social left-right (liberal-conservative) dimension and their electoral performance.

Interestingly, we also find that the electoral effect of a social democratic party’s policy position is magnified by the electoral system. Specifically, we find an interaction between the electoral system (measured by the median district magnitude in an election) and the left-right position of a social democratic party, such that the larger the district magnitude, the lower the support for a social democratic party as the party moves rightwards. Intuitively, this is consistent with existing theory (e.g. Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Iversen

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<sup>4</sup>With respect to the UK, for example, Borooah (1987, p. 500) finds that expenditure continued to rise from 1979 when the Conservatives were elected, particularly for health, social security (to cover growing unemployment), and defense, whereas less was spent on education, housing, and subsidies to industry.

and Soskice 2006), which has highlighted the threat of being outflanked by more left-wing parties in countries with proportional electoral systems, where the threshold for a new party winning parliamentary seats is low. So, in higher district magnitude (proportional) electoral systems, social democratic parties lost support as they become more centrist whereas in lower magnitude (majoritarian) electoral systems, they gained support as they moved towards the median voter.

Table 4 presents the results for the era of globalization, after 1975. Again, data availability enables us to add a number of new social and economic control variables. In particular, we include a globalization index, which is a combined measure of 43 economic, social and political variables, such as net and total trade volume, 5-yearly net immigration and total foreign born population, technological integration, intercultural diffusion, and so on (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019). We can also now include welfare spending as a percent of GDP. This allows us to look at public spending on redistribution as opposed to total public spending, which also includes public employment (for example in health care and education). As before, we find a strong relationship between public spending and social democratic electoral support. In addition, we find that the magnitude of the relationship between public spending on welfare and social democratic support is over twice the size of the magnitude of the relationship between the total level of public spending and social democratic vote shares. This suggests that social democrats have benefitted not only from more public sector employment but also from greater redistribution of wealth.

Another key result is the relationship between employment in industry and support for social democrats. Again, the results lend support for the general proposition that industrial workers have been the core supporters of social democratic parties, and hence that the decline in industry since the 1970s is one of the key reasons for the long-term decline in support for social democratic parties. We find little support that short-term changes in industrial employment affect social democratic support.

Table 4: Correlates of social democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1975-2017

	<i>Analysis of levels</i>				<i>Analysis of differences</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.249* (0.129)		0.222* (0.122)		0.229** (0.110)		0.206 (0.125)	
Welfare spending (% of GDP)		0.509** (0.243)		0.532** (0.239)		0.839** (0.318)		0.864** (0.327)
Employment in industry (%)	0.981*** (0.277)	0.970** (0.348)	0.866*** (0.274)	0.862** (0.324)	0.147 (0.327)	0.224 (0.334)	0.167 (0.330)	0.207 (0.323)
Globalization index	0.027 (0.350)	0.251 (0.451)	0.036 (0.345)	0.226 (0.428)	0.210 (0.473)	0.411 (0.365)	0.179 (0.477)	0.431 (0.378)
Social Dem. left-right position	0.102** (0.048)	0.046 (0.034)	0.100** (0.048)	0.049 (0.035)	0.029 (0.038)	0.040 (0.026)	0.032 (0.039)	0.040 (0.026)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.006 (0.051)	0.062 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.051)	0.049 (0.055)	-0.051 (0.043)	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.050 (0.042)	-0.024 (0.037)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-0.347 (1.451)	-0.148 (1.826)	-0.598 (1.431)	-0.524 (1.806)	-3.523** (1.393)	-3.908** (1.428)	-3.456** (1.397)	-3.954** (1.407)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.936 (1.435)	-1.002 (1.304)	-0.791 (1.460)	-1.001 (1.302)	-3.651*** (1.093)	-4.516*** (1.007)	-3.583*** (1.110)	-4.579*** (1.027)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-3.214** (1.348)	-4.703*** (1.314)	-3.233** (1.348)	-5.031*** (1.303)	-3.705*** (1.028)	-5.843*** (1.152)	-3.714*** (1.029)	-5.837*** (1.157)
Turnout	0.121 (0.148)	0.072 (0.157)	0.100 (0.139)	0.038 (0.142)	0.313* (0.171)	-0.003 (0.208)	0.309* (0.167)	-0.000 (0.207)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	244	193	244	193	227	171	227	171
R-squared	0.223	0.308	0.240	0.335	0.234	0.343	0.239	0.344
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22	27	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 5 to 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences).

Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: union density, district magnitude, employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, life expectancy, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, percent in higher education. The full results are in Table A4 in the Appendix. \*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.05, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

We do not find a relationship between globalization and the level of support for social democrats, as measured by the globalization index, at least. However, we find a negative relationship between union density and social democratic vote shares, which perhaps runs counter to some existing views about the power of unions and support for wealth redistribution (e.g. Crouch 2017).

Table 5 shows the results for the 1989 to 2017 period, first for the post-Cold War period (1989-2017) and second for the post-Great Recession period (2000-17). Again, the public

Table 5: Correlates of social democratic votes after the Cold War and the Great Recession

	Post-Cold War (1989-2017)			Post-Great Recession (2000-2017)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	<i>Analysis of levels</i>				
	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.269 (0.166)		0.223 (0.153)		0.818** (0.304)		0.792** (0.293)	
Welfare spending (% of GDP)		0.815** (0.385)		0.750** (0.353)		1.900*** (0.574)		1.873*** (0.493)
Employment in industry (%)	0.628* (0.338)	1.265** (0.462)	0.462 (0.375)	1.019** (0.488)	0.632 (0.761)	1.949* (1.001)	0.578 (0.756)	1.785* (1.022)
Globalization index	0.373 (0.424)	0.534 (0.475)	0.438 (0.423)	0.711 (0.441)	0.983** (0.366)	1.118* (0.623)	1.106** (0.424)	1.493* (0.753)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.135* (0.072)	0.054 (0.053)	0.139* (0.070)	0.059 (0.050)	0.029 (0.061)	0.114 (0.097)	0.035 (0.064)	0.133 (0.100)
Centre Right left-right position	0.008 (0.052)	0.069 (0.056)	0.009 (0.052)	0.060 (0.060)	-0.137* (0.067)	-0.006 (0.066)	-0.143** (0.064)	-0.038 (0.068)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-2.967 (2.005)	-2.371 (2.145)	-3.211 (2.078)	-3.010 (2.501)	0.359 (3.413)	-1.581 (4.283)	0.153 (3.410)	-2.269 (4.348)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.368 (1.444)	0.307 (1.034)	-0.492 (1.432)	0.033 (1.088)	-1.725 (1.557)	0.334 (1.482)	-1.776 (1.548)	-0.103 (1.509)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-3.425* (1.923)	-4.609** (1.709)	-3.497* (1.971)	-4.983** (1.873)	-4.571** (1.767)	-3.409 (2.103)	-4.757** (1.797)	-4.184* (2.328)
Turnout	0.116 (0.172)	-0.088 (0.191)	0.112 (0.172)	-0.092 (0.190)	-0.007 (0.245)	-0.346 (0.265)	0.011 (0.234)	-0.287 (0.239)
Observations	180	141	180	141	107	84	107	84
R-squared	0.204	0.323	0.209	0.341	0.502	0.534	0.505	0.548
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22	27	22
				<i>Analysis of differences</i>				
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.281* (0.139)		0.267* (0.142)		0.646** (0.312)		0.644** (0.313)	
Welfare spending (% of GDP)		0.893** (0.392)		0.918** (0.382)		1.497** (0.690)		1.615** (0.668)
Employment in industry (%)	-0.206 (0.345)	0.573 (0.398)	-0.207 (0.343)	0.588 (0.408)	0.354 (0.515)	0.652 (0.725)	0.340 (0.566)	0.565 (0.704)
Globalization index	-0.035 (0.556)	0.300 (0.464)	-0.031 (0.556)	0.283 (0.460)	0.423 (0.487)	0.281 (0.716)	0.434 (0.475)	0.568 (0.723)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.024 (0.055)	0.019 (0.047)	0.028 (0.056)	0.017 (0.047)	-0.037 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.080)	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.008 (0.077)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.054 (0.048)	0.000 (0.048)	-0.055 (0.048)	0.001 (0.048)	-0.155*** (0.048)	-0.073 (0.107)	-0.155*** (0.048)	-0.076 (0.113)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-4.958*** (1.705)	-4.183** (1.996)	-5.046*** (1.698)	-4.099* (2.016)	-1.011 (2.040)	-4.025 (2.907)	-1.018 (2.065)	-4.292 (2.825)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-4.042*** (1.177)	-3.780*** (1.320)	-4.053*** (1.175)	-3.793*** (1.327)	-3.515* (1.829)	-2.334 (2.037)	-3.511* (1.838)	-2.597 (2.042)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-4.516*** (1.258)	-5.468*** (1.430)	-4.545*** (1.243)	-5.470*** (1.453)	-4.281* (2.151)	-4.740* (2.690)	-4.282* (2.162)	-4.725* (2.671)
Turnout	0.312 (0.210)	-0.014 (0.228)	0.314 (0.211)	-0.015 (0.228)	0.094 (0.246)	-0.085 (0.348)	0.096 (0.243)	-0.034 (0.331)
Observations	170	136	170	136	107	84	107	84
R-squared	0.270	0.333	0.271	0.334	0.452	0.403	0.452	0.415
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22	27	22
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1 to 8 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas Columns 9 to 16 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences).

Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: employment in agriculture, district magnitude, women in work, urban population, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, union density, percent in higher education. The full results are in Table A5 in the Appendix. \* $p \leq 0.10$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.50$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

spending variables are significant, although this time only the welfare spending variable is significant in all specifications. In addition, employment in industry is only significant for the 1989-2000 period, but not for the 2000-2017 period. This suggests that after the 2008 financial crises and the Great Recession, industrial workers had not only declined in numbers, but were now less likely to support social democratic parties than in earlier periods.

**Robustness tests:** We undertake three types of robustness tests. First, to test whether our results depend on our definition of *social democratic parties*, we estimate the models with three alternative dependent variables: (1) our social democratic vote share variable, but counting the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as the main social democratic party in Italy from 1968 onwards (instead of the PSI); (2) the total left vote share, of all votes for social democrats, radical left, and other left parties; and (3) the centre right vote share, of votes for the mainstream centre right parties in each country. The results (in Tables A8 and A9 in the Appendix) reveal that the effect of public spending on social democratic votes is even stronger for the 1945-2017 period when counting the PCI rather than PSI. We also find that the key relationships we uncover only hold consistently for social democratic parties but not for all votes for left parties. Similarly, employment in industry is unrelated to support for the centre right, although there is some evidence that public spending is related to support for the centre right in the 1945-2017 period, but not in the 1975-2017 period. In short, only support for social democratic parties seems closely linked to the size of the manufacturing and public sectors.

Second, to explore the heterogeneity of the effect, we break down the analysis by region. Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the pattern of support for social democratic parties in North-Western Europe, Scandinavia, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe. These figures show heterogeneity across and within regions, although North Western Europe, Scandinavia and Southern Europe all show a clear ‘rise and fall’ pattern. We also estimate the models separately for the 18 Western European and 13 Eastern European cases (in Table A10 in

the Appendix), and for Southern Europe, Scandinavia, and the rest of Western Europe (in Table A11). The effect of public spending holds for Western Europe and Southern Europe, but when broken down to the smaller number of cases (in A11), the lack of power reduces the significance.

Third, given our attempt to trace the arc of social democracy over a century, issues of periodisations are crucial. To test whether our results are driven by our choice of periods, we undertake a sensitivity analysis by randomising when we stop and start the periods we analyse: so, starting in 1950 rather than 1945; starting in 1970 or 1980 rather than 1975; and starting in 1985, 1995 or 2005 instead of 2000 or 1989 or 2000. The results of this analysis (in Tables A12, A13 and A14 in the Appendix) suggest that our choice of periods in the main analysis has no effect on our main results.

## 4 Who Votes for Social Democratic Parties?

The results from this sort of aggregate analysis can only be suggestive of particular relationships between groups of voters and social democratic parties. For the most recent period, though, we can see whether the aggregate patterns can also be observed at the individual-level, using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The eight ESS waves, from 2002 to 2016, cover the period of the *great recession* (which peaked in 2007-10), the European refugee crisis (2015-16), and the decline in support for social democratic parties across this period. Fourteen countries in our aggregate data are included in all eight ESS waves: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

Following the aggregate results, we focus on the propensity of someone in a manual job in industry (in manufacturing, construction, or mining/extraction) or who was an employee in the public sector (in health and social care, education, or public administration and defence)


to vote for a social democratic party. To investigate whether social democratic parties are attracting new professionals, as Kitschelt (1990) and others have suggested, we also include a measure of whether someone is a socio-cultural professional; in legal services, the media, the creative industries, and universities (Oesch 2006). We estimate a linear probability model for each wave separately, with country-fixed effects, and we control for a person’s gender, whether they live in a city or town, and their age.

The results are summarised in the bottom panel of Figure 4 (see Appendix Table A15). The top panel of the figure shows the average percent of total employment in manufacturing and the public sector in the 14 countries at the time of each ESS wave, using Eurostat data.

Together, these data reveal a particular perspective on the decline of the social democratic electoral coalition. First, while employment in the public sector has remained stable, employment in industry declined by almost 20 percent in just 12 years (from 24.4 to 21.1 percent of the workforce). Second, there has been a decline in support for social democratic parties amongst industrial workers and public sector employees, although public sector employees remain more likely to vote social democrat than industrial workers. In addition, support for social democrats amongst socio-cultural professionals has remained stable. This coheres with the finding of Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2018), that social democrats can lose votes if their policies of investment rather than welfare are opposed by (public sector) trade unions, as well as Piketty’s (2018) view that social democrats now mainly rely on the support of ‘Brahmins’, who in our measures are public sector employees and socio-cultural professionals. Przeworski and Sprague (1986, p. 178) made a similar observation about the changing pattern of support for the German Social Democrats more than a generation earlier.

In short, in the most recent period, social democratic parties have been hit by a triple effect: 1) there has been a decline in the size of one of the main groups that has traditionally supported social democratic parties (industrial workers); 2) there has been a decline in the propensity of their core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote

Figure 4: Industrial workers, public sector employees, and socio cultural professionals and social democratic voting



Note: the bottom panel shows the effect of being a worker in industry (extraction, manufacturing, or construction), an employee in the public sector, or a socio-cultural professional on voting for a social democratic party. The data are from the 8 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) for 14 countries in our data: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. The models are estimated with country fixed-effects and several socio-demographic control variables. The full results are presented in Table A14 in the Appendix. The top panel shows the percent of total employment in manufacturing and the public sector in these same 14 countries, from Eurostat data (<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>) and using the same measures for manufacturing and public sector employment as in the ESS data.

for them; and 3) these losses have not been compensated by gains in support amongst the newer professional classes.



## 5 Conclusion

The story of the electoral performance of social democracy over the past 100 years is the story of the rise and fall of a particular electoral coalition. Social democratic parties emerged as electorally successful after 1918 to represent the industrial working class. The primary goal of these parties was to win an electoral majority and to transform capitalism. This strategy was limited by the size of this social group, and the fact that not all industrial workers supported socialism. Only after social democratic parties moderated their policies (moved closer to the median voter), could the electoral coalition be broadened. By adding another group (public sector workers) to their coalition, social democratic parties started to win between one-third and a half of all votes in many countries. This new coalition established social democrats as one of the main electoral forces in European politics between the 1950s and 1990s, on the back of an expanding public sector and growing public sector employment. This was the classic period of social democracy, which at that time aimed to manage or moderate capitalism mainly via increasing public spending. Yet, this coalition unravelled in the 2000s. Globalization and technological change meant that one pillar of this coalition, *industrial workers*, was now a relatively small group in most countries. Also, as social democratic parties tried to appeal to younger, urban professionals, many industrial workers increasingly supported other parties (such as the populist right or radical left). This left social democrats relying increasingly on public sector workers. But, with the growing constraints on public spending after the Great Recession, this was no-longer a winning strategy. Can social democratic parties build a new electoral coalition? We leave this to others to answer, and hope our results and our dataset will encourage new research in this area.

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## 6 Appendix 1: Description of the Variables

**Centre Right economic left-right position:** Economic left-right location of the main centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b (<https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu>).

**Centre Right left-right position:** Left-right location of the main centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

**Centre Right social liberal-authority position:** Social left-right location of the main centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

**Centre Right vote share:** Vote share of the centre right (conservative and Christian democratic) party/parties (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions. We allocated parties to party families via their European and international party memberships and existing categorisations, in particular Von Beyme (1985), Jacobs (1989), and Hix and Lord (1997).

**District magnitude (log):** Natural log of the electoral system median district magnitude in the year of the election. Source: Boix (1999), Carey and Hix (2011), the Constituency-Level Election Archive (CLEA) (<http://www.electiondataarchive.org>), and estimated from the size of the legislature.

**Employment in agriculture (percent):** Employment in agriculture (as a percent of total employment) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS  
(<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>).

**Employment in industry (percent):** Employment in industry (as a percent of total employment) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.IND.EMPL.ZS.

**EU member:** Country is a member of the ECSC, EEC, or EU in the year of the election. Source: European Union ([https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en)).

**Eurozone member:** Country is a member of the Eurozone in the EU in the year of the election. Source: European Union  
([https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en)).

**GDP growth:** Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the year of the election. Source: Maddison Project data  
(<http://www.ggdcc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>). Corrected to remove extreme outliers (less than -25 or greater than 25). Missing data entered from closest source, such as Penn World Tables (<http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/pwt.html>) or World Bank Development Indicator, or closest year in Maddison Project data.

**GDP per capita (log):** Natural log of GDP per capita in the year of the election. Source: Maddison Project Data (1990 Int. GK dollars). Missing data entered from closest source, such as Penn World Tables, or World Bank Development Indicator, or closest year



in Maddison Project data.

**Globalization index:** KOG Globalization index (<https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html>). Source: Gygli et al. (2019).

**Higher education:** Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (percent) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SE.TER.ENRR.

**Inflation:** Consumer price inflation (annual percent) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG.

**Life expectancy:** Life expectancy at birth, total (years) in the year of election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.DYN.LE00.IN.

**Manufacturing index:** Index of manufacturing production (1953=100), which measures the volume of trade in manufactured goods in a country relative to 1953. Source: UN International Trade Statistics, 1900-1960.

**Population:** Natural log of total population in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.TOTL.

**Population aged 0 to 14:** Population aged 0 to 14 (percent of the total) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS.

**Population aged 65 and over:** Population aged 65 and older (percent of the total) in

the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS.

**Population growth:** Population growth (annual percent change) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.GROW.

**Post-tax inequality (GINI):** Post-tax and spending income inequality in the year of the election, as measured by GINI coefficient. Source: Standardized World Income Inequality Database, version 5.1 (<http://fsolt.org/swiid>).

**Public spending (percent of GDP):** Government expenditure in the year of the election (as a percent of GDP). Source: combined from general government final consumption expenditure in the year of the election (as a percent of GDP) from the World Bank Development Indicator (GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS) and government expenditure in the year of the election (as a percent of GDP) from Our World in Data (<https://ourworldindata.org/public-spending>).

**SD economic left-right position:** Economic left-right location of social democratic party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

**SD party in gov't (coalition-junior):** coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social democratic party is in a coalition government, but does not hold the Prime Minister position. Source: Nohlen and Stoecker (2010), plus other available sources.

**SD party in gov't (coalition-PM):** coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social democratic party is in a coalition government, and also holds the Prime Minister position.

Source:Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.

**SD party in gov't (single-party):** coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social democratic party is in government, and is the only party in the government. Source:Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.

**SD social liberal-authority position:** Social left-right location of the social democratic party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

**(Semi) Presidential system:** Presidential, semi-presidential, or power-sharing regime in the year of the election. Source: Robert Elgie ([http://www.semi\(Semi\)Presidentialism.com/?p=1053](http://www.semi(Semi)Presidentialism.com/?p=1053)).

**Share of industry in GDP:** Share of the industrial sector in gross domestic product, measured in constant 2011 international-dollars. Source: Timmer et al. (2015).

**Social Democrat left-right position:** Left-right location of the social democratic party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

**Social Democratic party electorate share:** Share of total electorate (percent) won by the social democratic party in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

**Social Democratic party vote share:** Share of votes (percent) won by the social

democratic party in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

**Total left vote share:** Vote share of the social democrats and the radical/ other left party/parties (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

**Turnout: Turnout (percent) in the election.** Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

**Unemployment:** Unemployment in the year of the election, as a percent of the total labour force (modelled International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS.

**Union density:** Trade union density (measured as the percent of total wage earners who are trade union members) in the year of the election. Source: ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 51 countries between 1960 and 2014 (<http://www.uva-aiaa.net/en/ictwss>).

**Urban population:** Urban population (as a percent of total population) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS.

**Women in work:** Labour force participation rate, female (as a percent of the female population aged 15 or older), national estimate. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SL.TLF.CACT.FE.NE.ZS.

**Years of democracy:** Number of years of continuous democracy in the year of the election ( $\text{POLITY} \geq 7$ ), counted from year of first election, and then starting again at 1 following a period of a non-democracy. Source: Polity IV project (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>).

**Youth unemployment:** Youth unemployment in the year of the election, as a percent of the labour force aged 15 to 24 (modelled ILO estimate). Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.UEM.1524.ZS.

## 7 Appendix 2: Supplementary Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Vote shares of social democratic parties in Western Europe




Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.

Figure A2: Vote shares of social democratic parties in Eastern Europe



Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.

Figure A3: Vote shares of social democratic parties in 4 regions



Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing. North Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.



Table A2: Cases of social democratic parties

Country	Abbr	Name	English name	Years
Albania	PS	Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	Socialist Party of Albania	1992-2017
Albania	PSD	Partia Socialdemokrate e Shqipërisë	Social Democratic Party of Albania	1992-2017
Albania	LSI	Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrim	Socialist Movement for Integration	2004-2017
Austria	SDAPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs	Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria	1918-1945
Austria	SPÖ	Sozialistische/Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	Socialist/Social Democratic Party of Austria	1945-2017
Belgium	BWP/POB	Parti Ouvrier Belge/Belgische Werkliedenpartij	Belgian Labour Party	1918-1945
Belgium	PSB/BSP	Parti socialiste Belge/Belgische Socialistische Partij	Belgian Socialist Party	1945-1978
Belgium	PS	Parti socialiste	Socialist Party (Wallonia)	1978-2017
Belgium	SP / SPa	Sozialistische Partij / Sozialistische Partij Anders	Socialist Party / Socialist Party Differently (Flanders)	1978-2017
Bulgaria	BSP-B	Balganska rabotnicheska sotsialdemokraticheska partia (shiroki sotsialist)	Bulgarian Social Democratic Workers Party (Broad Socialists)	1919-1923
Bulgaria	BSP / KzB	Bulganska sotsialisticheska partiya / Koalitsiya za Bulgaria	Bugarian Socialist Party / Coalition for Bulgaria	1991-2017
Croatia	SDP	Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske	Social Democratic Party of Croatia	1992-2017
Cyprus	EDEK / KISOS	Kinima Sosialdimokraton Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosi Kentrou / Kinima Sosialdimokraton	Movement of Social Democrats / Social Democrats Movement	1960-2017
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	ČSDSD / ČSD	Československá sociálně-demokratická dělnická / Československá sociální demokracie	Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers Party / Czechoslovak Social Democracy / Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party / Czech Social Democratic Party	1920-1946
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	DSADP	Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik	German Social Democratic Workers' Party in the Czechoslovak Republic	1920-1938
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	SD / ČSSD	Sociální demokracie / Československá strana sociálně demokratická / Česká strana sociálně demokratická	Social Democracy / Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party / Czech Social Democratic Party	1990-2017
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	ČSS	Československá strana socialistická	Czechoslovak Socialist Party	1990-1991
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	SDL	Strana demokratickej ľavice	Party of the Democratic Left	1992-1995
Denmark	SD	Socialdemokratiet	Social Democrats	1918-2017
Estonia	ESDTP / ESTP	Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatiline Tööliste Partei / Eesti Sotsialistlik Tööliste Partei	Estonian Social Democratic Workers' Party / Estonian Socialist Workers' Party	1918-1933
Estonia	SDE	Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond	Social Democratic Party	1992-2017
Finland	SSDP	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue	Social Democratic Party of Finland	1918-2017
France	SFIO	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière	French Section of the Socialist International	1918-1965
France	FGDS	Fédération de la gauche démocratique et socialiste	Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left	1965-1969
France	PS	Parti socialiste	Socialist Party	1969-2017
Germany	SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Social Democratic Party of Germany	1918-2017
Greece	UFWR	United Front of Workers, Farmers and Refugees	United Front of Workers, Farmers and Refugees	1926-1927
Greece	ALP	Agricultural and Labour Party	Agricultural and Labour Party	1928-1934
Greece	APF	All People Front	All People Front	1935-1945
Greece	NPU	National Political Union	National Political Union	1946-1948
Greece	PASOK / DS	Panellinio Sosisialistiko Kinima Ellados / Dimokratiki Symparataxi	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement / Democratic Alignment	1974-2017
Greece	Potami	To Potami	The River	2015-2017
Hungary	MSZDP / SZDP	Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt / Szociáldemokrata Párt	Hungarian Social Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party	1920-1994
Hungary	MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungarian Socialist Party	1989-2013
Hungary	Ö	Összefogás	Unity	2014-2017
Ireland	Lab	Labour Party	Labour Party	1918-2017
Italy	PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano / Partito Socialista Unificato (1968)	Italian Socialist Party / Unified Socialist Party	1918-1947, 1953-1966
Italy	FdP	Fronte del Popolo (PCI+PSI)	People's Front	1948-1952
Italy	PCI/PDS/DS	Partito Democratico della Sinistra / Democritici di Sinistra	Democratic Party of the Left / Democrats of the Left	1967-2005
Italy	Ulivo / PD	L'Ulivo / Partito Democratico	The Olive Tree / Democratic Party	2006-2017
Latvia	LSDSP	Latvijas Sociāldemokrātiskā Strādnieku Partija	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party	1920-2017
Latvia	SLAT / TSP	Saskana Latvījai - Atdzimšana Tautsaimniecībai / Tautas Saskapas partija	Harmony for Latvia / National Harmony Party (of Russian minority)	1990-1994
Latvia	SDS / SDP	Sociāldemokrātu savienība / Sociāldemokrātiskā partija	Social Democratic Union / Social Democratic Party	2002-2005
Latvia	SDLP	Sociāldemokrātiskā Labklājības partija	Social Democratic Welfare Party	2002-2005
Latvia	SC / SDPS	Saskapas Centrs / Sociāldemokrātiskā Partija "Saskana"	Harmony Centre / Social Democratic Party "Harmony"	2006-2017
Lithuania	LSDP	Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija	Social Democratic Party of Lithuania	1991-2017
Lithuania	LDPP	Lietuvos demokratine darbo partija	Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania	1991-2003
Lithuania	SDC-AB	Social-Democratic Coalition of Algirdas Brazauskas	Social-Democratic Coalition of Algirdas Brazauskas	2000-2003
Luxembourg	PS / LSAP	Parti socialiste / Lëtzebuurger Sozialistesche Aarbechterpartei	Socialist Party / Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	1918-2017
Macedonia	SDSM	Socijaldemokratski savez na Makedonija	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia	1990-2017
Netherlands	SDAP	Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij	Social Democratic Workers' Party	1918-1945
Netherlands	PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid	Labour Party	1946-2017
Norway	DNA	Det norske Arbeiderparti	Labour Party	1918-2017
Poland	PPS	Polska Partia Socjalistyczna	Polish Socialist Party	1919-1928
Poland	SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Democratic Left Alliance	1990-2017
Poland	UP	Unia Pracy	Labour Union	1993-2006
Poland	LiD	Lewica i Demokraci	Left and Democrats	2007-2010
Poland	ZL	Zjednoczona Lewica	United Left	2015-2017
Portugal	PS	Partido Socialista	Socialist Party	1975-2017
Romania	FPSR	Federația Partidelor Socialiste din România	Federation of Socialist Parties from Romania	1926-1927
Romania	PSD	Partidul Social Democrat	Social Democratic Party	1928-1948
Romania	FDSN	Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale	Democratic National Salvation Front	1992-2005
Romania	PSDR	Partidul Social Democrat Român	Romanian Social Democratic Party	1996-2011
Romania	USL	Uniunea Social Liberală	Social Liberal Union	2012-2017
Slovakia	SDL	Strana demokratickej ľavice	Party of the Democratic Left	1993-2005
Slovakia	SDSS	Sociálnodemokratická strana Slovenska	Social Democratic Party of Slovakia	1993-2005
Slovakia	Smer	Smer–sociálna demokracia	Direction Social Democracy	2002-2017
Slovakia	SDA	Sociálnodemokratická alternatíva	Social Democratic Alternative	2002-2005
Slovenia	ZL / SD	Združena lista socialnih demokratov / Socialni demokrati	United List of Social Democrats / Social Democrats	1992-2017
Slovenia	LZJ-PS	Lista Zorana Jankovića – Pozitivna Slovenija	Zoran Janković's List – Positive Slovenia	2011-2013
Slovenia	ZL	Združena levica	United Left	2014-2017
Spain	PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	1977-2008
Spain	PSC	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya	Party of the Socialists of Catalunya	1977-2008
Sweden	SAP	Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti	Social Democratic Workers' Party	1918-2017
Switzerland	SPS/PSS	Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz/Parti socialiste suisse/Partito Socialista Svizzero	Social Democratic/Socialist Party of Switzerland	1918-2017
United Kingdom	Lab	Labour Party	Labour Party	1918-2017

Table A3: Correlates of social democratic party vote shares, 1945-2017

	Analysis of levels		Analysis of differences	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.157** (0.058)	0.193*** (0.059)	0.168** (0.073)	0.163** (0.073)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.172** (0.081)	0.170* (0.084)	0.148** (0.068)	0.150** (0.069)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.003 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.035)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.036 (0.030)
District Magnitude	0.574 (1.292)	0.787 (1.308)	0.948 (1.596)	0.912 (1.581)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.058* (0.030)	-0.055* (0.032)	-0.061** (0.027)	-0.062** (0.027)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	1.335 (1.256)	1.097 (1.230)	-3.175*** (0.957)	-3.187*** (0.962)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	0.976 (1.327)	0.634 (1.285)	-2.507** (0.963)	-2.506** (0.966)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-2.849*** (0.912)	-3.056*** (0.925)	-2.461*** (0.721)	-2.451*** (0.721)
Turnout	-0.084 (0.106)	-0.086 (0.101)	0.300** (0.130)	0.299** (0.129)
GDP per capita (Madison)	3.577 (2.877)	5.310 (3.238)	2.008 (2.969)	2.447 (2.910)
GDP growth (Madison)	-0.097 (0.138)	-0.057 (0.145)	-0.166 (0.224)	-0.167 (0.225)
EU member	-1.136 (2.055)	-0.385 (2.055)	-1.283 (1.476)	-1.052 (1.572)
Eurozone member	2.646 (2.182)	2.848 (2.112)	-0.082 (1.335)	-0.021 (1.307)
Presidential system	11.214** (4.179)	10.644** (3.886)	2.444 (4.763)	2.463 (4.777)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	381	381	353	353
R-squared	0.162	0.176	0.169	0.170
Number of countries	31	31	31	31

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 3 and 4 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences).

Standard errors in parentheses \*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.50, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

Table A4: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1975-2017

	Analysis of levels				Analysis of differences			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.249*	0.222*			0.229**	0.206		
	(0.129)	(0.122)			(0.110)	(0.125)		
Welfare spending (% GDP)			0.509**	0.532**			0.839**	0.864**
			(0.243)	(0.239)			(0.318)	(0.327)
Employment in industry (%)	0.981***	0.866***	0.970**	0.862**	0.147	0.167	0.224	0.207
	(0.277)	(0.274)	(0.348)	(0.324)	(0.327)	(0.330)	(0.334)	(0.323)
Globalization Index	0.027	0.036	0.251	0.226	0.210	0.179	0.411	0.431
	(0.350)	(0.345)	(0.451)	(0.428)	(0.473)	(0.477)	(0.365)	(0.378)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.102**	0.100**	0.046	0.049	0.029	0.032	0.040	0.040
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.006	-0.008	0.062	0.049	-0.051	-0.050	-0.024	-0.024
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.037)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-0.347	-0.598	-0.148	-0.524	-3.523**	-3.456**	-3.908**	-3.954**
	(1.451)	(1.431)	(1.826)	(1.806)	(1.393)	(1.397)	(1.428)	(1.407)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.936	-0.791	-1.002	-1.001	-3.651***	-3.583***	-4.516***	-4.579***
	(1.435)	(1.460)	(1.304)	(1.302)	(1.093)	(1.110)	(1.007)	(1.027)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-3.214**	-3.233**	-4.703***	-5.031***	-3.705***	-3.714***	-5.843***	-5.837***
	(1.348)	(1.348)	(1.314)	(1.303)	(1.028)	(1.029)	(1.152)	(1.157)
Turnout	0.121	0.100	0.072	0.038	0.313*	0.309*	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.148)	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.142)	(0.171)	(0.167)	(0.208)	(0.207)
Union density	-0.197	-0.184	-0.457**	-0.442**	-0.113	-0.106	-0.454*	-0.456*
	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.191)	(0.182)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.241)	(0.245)
Higher education	-0.057	-0.017	-0.052	0.014	-0.040	-0.039	-0.177	-0.175
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Life Expectancy	2.500***	2.769***	0.850	1.573**	1.916	1.827	-1.289	-1.310
	(0.707)	(0.714)	(0.639)	(0.585)	(1.241)	(1.221)	(1.575)	(1.570)
District magnitude (%)	2.033*	1.922*	1.835**	1.667***	1.071	1.053	1.247	1.233
	(1.166)	(1.051)	(0.667)	(0.583)	(1.270)	(1.219)	(0.851)	(0.836)
Employment in agriculture	0.490*	0.394	0.543	0.479	0.116	0.135	-1.072**	-1.102**
	(0.272)	(0.259)	(0.583)	(0.516)	(0.306)	(0.315)	(0.461)	(0.481)
Women in work	0.072	0.087	-0.035	-0.010	-0.062	-0.078	-0.218	-0.214
	(0.161)	(0.155)	(0.138)	(0.131)	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.217)	(0.223)
Urban population	-0.070	-0.030	-0.220	-0.125	-0.324	-0.336	-0.623	-0.624
	(0.228)	(0.231)	(0.256)	(0.248)	(0.608)	(0.615)	(0.459)	(0.449)
Population (log)	-5.476	-6.076	16.241	11.144	-36.827	-45.650	-10.967	-6.510
	(12.266)	(11.672)	(17.767)	(15.900)	(46.721)	(47.695)	(47.187)	(48.821)
Population aged 65 and over	0.261	0.398	0.939	0.999	-1.306	-1.330	-1.197	-1.210
	(0.955)	(0.953)	(0.923)	(0.908)	(0.793)	(0.836)	(0.971)	(0.982)
Population aged 0 to 14	-0.018	-0.060	0.380	0.285	1.499	1.575	1.605	1.529
	(0.537)	(0.554)	(0.560)	(0.629)	(1.047)	(1.070)	(1.056)	(1.103)
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	244	244	193	193	227	227	171	171
R-squared	0.223	0.240	0.308	0.335	0.234	0.239	0.343	0.344
Number of countries	27	27	22	22	27	27	22	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 5, 6, 7 and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). \* $p \leq 0.10$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

Table A5: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1989-2017

	Analysis of levels				Analysis of differences			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.269 (0.166)	0.223 (0.153)			0.281* (0.139)	0.267* (0.142)		
Welfare spending (% GDP)			0.815** (0.385)	0.750** (0.353)			0.893** (0.392)	0.918** (0.382)
Employment in industry (%)	0.628* (0.338)	0.462 (0.375)	1.265** (0.462)	1.019** (0.488)	-0.206 (0.345)	-0.207 (0.343)	0.573 (0.398)	0.588 (0.408)
Globalization Index	0.373 (0.424)	0.438 (0.423)	0.534 (0.475)	0.711 (0.441)	-0.035 (0.556)	-0.031 (0.556)	0.300 (0.464)	0.283 (0.460)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.135* (0.072)	0.139* (0.070)	0.054 (0.053)	0.059 (0.050)	0.024 (0.055)	0.028 (0.056)	0.019 (0.047)	0.017 (0.047)
Centre Right left-right position	0.008 (0.052)	0.009 (0.052)	0.069 (0.056)	0.060 (0.060)	-0.054 (0.048)	-0.055 (0.048)	0.000 (0.048)	0.001 (0.048)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-2.967 (2.005)	-3.211 (2.078)	-2.371 (2.145)	-3.010 (2.501)	-4.958*** (1.705)	-5.046*** (1.698)	-4.183** (1.996)	-4.099* (2.016)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.368 (1.444)	-0.492 (1.432)	0.307 (1.034)	0.033 (1.088)	-4.042*** (1.177)	-4.053*** (1.175)	-3.780*** (1.320)	-3.793*** (1.327)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-3.425* (1.923)	-3.497* (1.971)	-4.609** (1.709)	-4.983** (1.873)	-4.516*** (1.258)	-4.545*** (1.243)	-5.468*** (1.430)	-5.470*** (1.453)
Turnout	0.116 (0.172)	0.112 (0.172)	-0.088 (0.191)	-0.092 (0.190)	0.312 (0.210)	0.314 (0.211)	-0.014 (0.228)	-0.015 (0.228)
Union density	-0.156 (0.160)	-0.143 (0.155)	-0.662* (0.348)	-0.669* (0.336)	-0.028 (0.174)	-0.025 (0.172)	-0.236 (0.452)	-0.207 (0.492)
Higher education	0.011 (0.087)	0.039 (0.094)	-0.105 (0.128)	-0.065 (0.141)	0.023 (0.139)	0.021 (0.138)	-0.113 (0.154)	-0.107 (0.153)
District magnitude (%)	3.193** (1.387)	3.037** (1.314)	2.501*** (0.703)	2.341*** (0.687)	2.119 (1.690)	2.101 (1.653)	1.774*** (0.623)	1.764** (0.626)
Employment in agriculture	0.443 (0.263)	0.347 (0.244)	0.371 (0.849)	0.251 (0.743)	0.106 (0.297)	0.113 (0.299)	-0.852 (0.693)	-0.918 (0.740)
Women in work	0.075 (0.213)	0.096 (0.222)	-0.269 (0.189)	-0.220 (0.198)	-0.056 (0.305)	-0.091 (0.340)	-0.027 (0.302)	0.018 (0.355)
Urban population	-0.407 (0.316)	-0.292 (0.352)	-0.452 (0.419)	-0.251 (0.414)	-1.071 (1.303)	-0.980 (1.388)	-1.075 (1.248)	-1.178 (1.402)
Population (log)	0.091 (16.104)	1.331 (16.198)	36.301* (19.970)	38.016* (19.812)	-32.993 (49.717)	-28.514 (48.114)	-10.697 (52.510)	-14.727 (52.238)
Population aged 65 and over	0.112 (0.970)	0.365 (1.058)	1.045 (0.938)	1.434 (1.038)	-1.987* (1.115)	-1.988* (1.118)	-1.774 (1.456)	-1.809 (1.495)
Population aged 0 to 14	0.796 (0.853)	0.886 (0.861)	1.194 (0.825)	1.376 (0.859)	0.450 (1.126)	0.587 (1.185)	1.399 (1.267)	1.288 (1.301)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	180	180	141	141	170	170	136	136
R-squared	0.204	0.209	0.323	0.341	0.270	0.271	0.333	0.334
Number of countries	27	27	22	22	27	27	22	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 5, 6, 7 and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences) Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.50, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

Table A6: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 2000-2017

	Analysis of levels				Analysis of differences			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.818** (0.304)	0.792** (0.293)			0.646** (0.312)	0.644** (0.313)		
Welfare spending (% GDP)			1.900*** (0.574)	1.873*** (0.493)			1.497** (0.690)	1.615** (0.668)
Employment in industry (%)	0.632 (0.761)	0.578 (0.756)	1.949* (1.001)	1.785* (1.022)	0.354 (0.515)	0.340 (0.566)	0.652 (0.725)	0.565 (0.704)
Globalization Index	0.983** (0.366)	1.106** (0.424)	1.118* (0.623)	1.493* (0.753)	0.423 (0.487)	0.434 (0.475)	0.281 (0.716)	0.568 (0.723)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.029 (0.061)	0.035 (0.064)	0.114 (0.097)	0.133 (0.100)	-0.037 (0.046)	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.007 (0.080)	-0.008 (0.077)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.137* (0.067)	-0.143** (0.064)	-0.006 (0.066)	-0.038 (0.068)	-0.155*** (0.048)	-0.155*** (0.048)	-0.073 (0.107)	-0.076 (0.113)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	0.359 (3.413)	0.153 (3.410)	-1.581 (4.283)	-2.269 (4.348)	-1.011 (2.040)	-1.018 (2.065)	-4.025 (2.907)	-4.292 (2.825)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-1.725 (1.557)	-1.776 (1.548)	0.334 (1.482)	-0.103 (1.509)	-3.515* (1.829)	-3.511* (1.838)	-2.334 (2.037)	-2.597 (2.042)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-4.571** (1.767)	-4.757** (1.797)	-3.409 (2.103)	-4.184* (2.328)	-4.281* (2.151)	-4.282* (2.162)	-4.740* (2.690)	-4.725* (2.671)
Turnout	-0.007 (0.245)	0.011 (0.234)	-0.346 (0.265)	-0.287 (0.239)	0.094 (0.246)	0.096 (0.243)	-0.085 (0.348)	-0.034 (0.331)
Union density	-1.403*** (0.324)	-1.406*** (0.318)	-1.662*** (0.471)	-1.682*** (0.439)	-0.603* (0.326)	-0.607* (0.338)	-0.305 (0.658)	-0.286 (0.664)
Higher education	-0.132 (0.154)	-0.129 (0.156)	-0.192 (0.175)	-0.198 (0.177)	-0.153 (0.153)	-0.153 (0.156)	-0.154 (0.188)	-0.117 (0.187)
District magnitude (%)	6.667*** (0.696)	6.795*** (0.658)	5.831*** (0.858)	6.178*** (1.010)	8.456*** (0.856)	8.463*** (0.869)	7.998*** (2.681)	8.005*** (2.794)
Employment in agriculture	0.153 (0.519)	0.075 (0.555)	-0.282 (1.308)	-0.529 (1.339)	0.518 (0.572)	0.516 (0.575)	-1.062 (1.381)	-1.083 (1.378)
Women in work	0.262 (0.450)	-0.202 (0.494)	-0.571 (0.473)	-0.432 (0.484)	-0.168 (0.607)	-0.166 (0.611)	-0.025 (0.834)	0.154 (0.883)
Urban population	0.452 (0.861)	0.660 (0.888)	-0.069 (1.135)	0.333 (1.140)	-2.729 (2.544)	-2.727 (2.555)	-5.336*** (1.876)	-5.408*** (1.799)
Population (log)	-15.089 (20.793)	-13.923 (20.159)	69.958 (41.905)	76.205* (43.486)	12.364 (65.421)	12.418 (65.911)	33.798 (75.560)	33.826 (81.849)
Population aged 65 and over	-1.185 (1.364)	-0.683 (1.956)	0.048 (1.417)	1.235 (1.895)	-0.970 (1.871)	-0.981 (1.854)	-0.229 (2.403)	-0.498 (2.282)
Population aged 0 to 14	6.257*** (1.321)	6.341*** (1.364)	6.919*** (1.683)	6.809*** (1.582)	2.697 (2.041)	2.669 (2.030)	3.208 (2.306)	2.828 (2.093)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	107	107	84	84	107	107	84	84
R-squared	0.502	0.505	0.534	0.548	0.452	0.452	0.403	0.415
Number of countries	27	27	22	22	27	27	22	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 5, 6, 7 and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences) Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*p≤0.10, \*p≤0.05, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

Table A7: SD Economic and Social Left Right position over the period 1945 to 2017

	<i>Aggregate Sample</i>	<i>Non East Europe</i>	<i>East Europe</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
SD <i>economic</i> left-right position	0.160** (0.071)	0.061 (0.047)	0.551** (0.224)
SD <i>social</i> left-right position	0.160** (0.068)	0.084 (0.051)	0.574*** (0.154)
Centre Right <i>economic</i> left-right position	0.012 (0.046)	0.045 (0.046)	-0.251*** (0.069)
Centre Right <i>social</i> left-right position	-0.022 (0.048)	-0.067* (0.036)	0.118 (0.091)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	381	294	87
R-squared	0.157	0.170	0.232
Number of countries	31	18	13

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. All models estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p \leq 0.10$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

Table A8: Robustness tests: social democratic party vote share vs. social democratic, including the Italian Communist party, vote share vs. total left vote share and vs. centre right vote share as dependent variables, 1945-2017

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Soc. Dem. vote share	SD with Communist Party	Total Left vote share	C. Right vote share
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.190*** (0.066)	0.207*** (0.065)	0.084 (0.066)	0.143* (0.077)
District magnitude (log)	2.624*** (0.941)	3.444*** (0.921)	2.714*** (0.936)	0.787 (1.098)
Turnout	-0.171** (0.066)	-0.162** (0.065)	-0.131** (0.066)	0.087 (0.077)
GDP per capita (Madison)	6.817** (2.645)	7.826*** (2.589)	6.560** (2.692)	0.752 (3.159)
GDP growth (Madison)	-0.068 (0.108)	-0.045 (0.106)	-0.152 (0.108)	0.187 (0.127)
Observations	409	409	409	409
R-squared	0.159	0.188	0.088	0.167
Number of Countries	31	31	31	31
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Column 1 exhibits estimates for Soc. Dem as in Table 3; Column 2, includes the Italian Communist Party; Column 3 focuses on total left and Column 4 total right. All models are conditional on country Fes, Decade Fes and, progressively, Country Year Time Trends. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include regime types, european membership and parties left and right social and economic position. \*\*p≤0.10, \*p≤0.50, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

Table A9: Robustness tests: social democratic party vote share vs. total left vote share and vs. centre right vote share as dependent variables, 1975-2017

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Soc. Dem. vote share	SD with Communist Party	Total Left vote share	C. Right vote share
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.753*** (0.233)	0.737*** (0.226)	0.140 (0.228)	0.202 (0.285)
Employment in industry (%)	0.655** (0.321)	0.546* (0.311)	-0.114 (0.313)	0.385 (0.392)
Globalization Index	0.164 (0.263)	0.373 (0.255)	0.198 (0.257)	0.104 (0.321)
turnout	0.156 (0.116)	0.126 (0.112)	0.115 (0.113)	-0.029 (0.141)
Union density	-0.380*** (0.111)	-0.391*** (0.107)	-0.212* (0.108)	-0.285** (0.135)
Higher education	0.017 (0.072)	0.015 (0.069)	0.023 (0.070)	-0.278*** (0.088)
District magnitude (%)	1.321 (1.238)	2.935** (1.199)	2.213* (1.208)	1.951 (1.512)
Employment in agriculture	0.367 (0.398)	0.345 (0.386)	-0.010 (0.389)	-0.858* (0.487)
Women in work	0.036 (0.128)	0.078 (0.124)	0.217* (0.125)	-0.468*** (0.156)
Urban population	-0.039 (0.192)	0.033 (0.186)	0.204 (0.187)	0.286 (0.234)
Population (log)	-4.082 (15.455)	-3.351 (14.974)	-14.793 (15.086)	18.556 (18.888)
Population aged 65 and over	0.030 (0.584)	-0.509 (0.566)	-0.481 (0.570)	0.525 (0.714)
Observations	209	209	209	209
R-squared	0.317	0.337	0.160	0.294
Number of countries	22	22	22	22
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Column 1 exhibits estimates for Soc. Dem as in Table 3; Column 2, includes the Italian Communist Party; Column 3 focuses on total left and Column 4 total right. All models are conditional on country Fes, Decade Fes and, progressively, Country Year Time Trends. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include regime types, european membership and parties left and right social and economic position. \*\*p≤0.10, \*p≤0.50, \*\*\*p≤0.01.



Table A10: Heterogeneity Analysis, 1945-2017

	Western Europe		Eastern Europe	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.143** (0.056)	0.164*** (0.055)	1.147** (0.482)	1.147** (0.482)
District magnitude (log)	-1.076 (0.785)	0.526 (1.172)	2.478 (3.516)	2.478 (3.516)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.276*** (0.062)	-0.276*** (0.062)
Social democratic party in government	3.001** (1.177)	2.871** (1.082)	-2.225 (3.780)	-2.225 (3.780)
Turnout	0.062 (0.091)	0.035 (0.089)	-0.134 (0.136)	-0.134 (0.136)
GDP per capita (Madison)	2.653 (4.075)	5.126 (3.485)	-9.069 (11.479)	-9.069 (11.479)
GDP growth (Madison)	-0.042 (0.127)	0.010 (0.107)	-0.140 (0.207)	-0.140 (0.207)
EU member	-0.782 (2.443)	-0.255 (2.199)	-5.496 (4.067)	-5.496 (4.067)
Presidential system	9.609*** (1.502)	10.709*** (1.564)	2.266 (5.623)	2.266 (5.623)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	294	294	87	87
R-squared	0.135	0.150	0.242	0.248
Number of countries	18	18	13	13

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties in Western Europe. Western Europe includes Southern European and Scandinavian countries. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the overall level of support for SD parties in Eastern Europe. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p \leq 0.10$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

Table A11: Heterogeneity Analysis within Western Europe, 1945-2017

	Western Europe	Southern Europe		Scandinavia
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.128 (0.088)	-0.646* (0.251)	-0.368 (0.414)	0.051 (0.111)
District magnitude (log)	-2.109 (1.183)	-0.375 (1.155)	1.135 (0.879)	4.828 (4.300)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.018 (0.016)	0.047 (0.079)	-0.015 (0.044)	0.045 (0.046)
Social democratic party in government	1.653 (1.729)	1.642 (2.230)	1.352 (0.887)	-0.009 (0.560)
Turnout	0.131 (0.136)	0.617** (0.197)	0.649** (0.199)	-0.079 (0.149)
GDP per capita (Madison)	10.616** (3.339)	-16.434* (7.126)	-12.159 (9.770)	-1.580 (3.903)
GDP growth (Madison)	0.005 (0.083)	-1.047** (0.271)	-0.819** (0.264)	0.217 (0.170)
EU member	-2.921 (1.983)	6.105 (5.688)	6.039 (4.792)	5.868 (3.912)
Observations	155	59	59	80
R-squared	0.480	0.576	0.548	0.639
Number of countries	9	5	5	4
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Columns 1 exhibits estimates on the overall level of support for social democratic parties in Western Europe. Column 2 and 3 focus on Southern Europe. Column 2 studies the effect on SD parties, Column 3 includes the Italian Communist Party. Column 4 focuses on Scandinavian countries. All estimates are conditional on country fixed effects, decade fixed effects and, progressively, country year specific time trends. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p \leq 0.10$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.50$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

Table A12: Randomisation, 1950-2017

	Post-1950	
	<i>Analysis of levels</i>	<i>Analysis of differences</i>
	(1)	(2)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.197** (0.079)	0.148** (0.066)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.158 (0.097)	0.134** (0.059)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.012 (0.040)	-0.034 (0.028)
District magnitude (log)	0.139 (1.537)	0.970 (1.455)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.046 (0.035)	-0.056** (0.025)
Social democratic party in government	1.250 (1.175)	-6.392*** (1.308)
Turnout (%)	-0.123 (0.107)	0.287** (0.122)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes
Observations	381	353
R-squared	0.176	0.170
Number of countries	31	31

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Column 1 estimates effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas Column 2 estimates changes in support between elections (first differences). The estimates replicate Table 3, but with a different time period, from 1950 onwards. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: GDP per capita (log), GDP growth, EU member, Eurozone member, presidential system. \*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.05, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

Table A13: Randomisation, 1970-2017 and 1980-2017

	Post-1970				Post-1980			
	<i>Analysis of levels</i>		<i>Analysis of differences</i>		<i>Analysis of levels</i>		<i>Analysis of differences</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.205*		0.225*		0.110		0.200	
	(0.105)		(0.112)		(0.121)		(0.146)	
Welfare spending (% of GDP)		0.613**		0.794**		0.675**		0.794**
		(0.238)		(0.362)		(0.241)		(0.362)
Employment in industry (%)	0.841***	0.810**	0.201	0.267	0.766**	0.939**	0.152	0.267
	(0.241)	(0.307)	(0.338)	(0.388)	(0.345)	(0.355)	(0.390)	(0.388)
Globalization index	0.030	0.211	0.261	0.455	0.093	0.263	0.297	0.455
	(0.327)	(0.437)	(0.488)	(0.426)	(0.362)	(0.447)	(0.496)	(0.426)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.078	0.048	0.008	0.018	0.105**	0.049	0.019	0.018
	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Centre Right left-right position	0.002	0.053	-0.052	-0.023	0.002	0.050	-0.054	-0.023
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Social dem. party in government	-1.675	-2.748**	-3.475**	-3.293**	-3.071**	-3.163**	-3.960**	-3.293**
	(1.040)	(1.280)	(1.307)	(1.523)	(1.109)	(1.350)	(1.557)	(1.523)
Turnout (%)	0.110	0.039	0.350**	0.202	0.041	-0.008	0.363**	0.202
	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.160)	(0.210)	(0.146)	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.210)
Union Density	-0.192	-0.463**	-0.120	-0.436	-0.183	-0.517**	-0.125	-0.436
	(0.116)	(0.191)	(0.144)	(0.292)	(0.140)	(0.214)	(0.161)	(0.292)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	244	193	244	193	227	171	227	171
R-squared	0.223	0.308	0.240	0.335	0.234	0.343	0.239	0.344
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22	27	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Estimates replicate Table 4, but with a different time period. Precisely, Columns 1 to 4 perform the analysis from 1970 onwards, whereas Columns 5 to 8 do so from 1980 onwards. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, life expectancy, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, percent in higher education. \* $p \leq 0.10$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.50$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ .

Table A14: Randomisation, 1985-2017, 1995-2017 and 2005-2017

	Post-1985		Post-1995 <i>Analysis of levels</i>		Post-2005	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.223 (0.151)		0.505** (0.209)		0.746* (0.396)	
Public spending on social welfare (% of GDP)		0.905*** (0.239)		1.032** (0.381)		0.843 (0.786)
Employment in industry (%)	0.627* (0.354)	1.007** (0.447)	0.547 (0.548)	1.033 (0.630)	0.428 (1.549)	1.507 (1.862)
Globalization index	0.248 (0.410)	0.475 (0.421)	0.930*** (0.212)	0.984** (0.473)	-0.608 (0.994)	-2.814 (2.442)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.112 (0.068)	0.033 (0.050)	0.116* (0.062)	0.128* (0.062)	0.052 (0.066)	0.007 (0.104)
Centre Right left-right position	0.007 (0.057)	0.075 (0.054)	-0.123** (0.051)	0.007 (0.068)	-0.186*** (0.048)	0.021 (0.132)
Social democratic party in government	-2.833* (1.424)	-3.292* (1.615)	-2.289* (1.322)	-2.743 (1.752)	-2.714 (2.694)	0.260 (2.781)
Turnout (%)	0.083 (0.166)	-0.073 (0.167)	-0.004 (0.179)	-0.147 (0.219)	0.171 (0.206)	0.650 (0.532)
Observations	201	162	141	111	73	58
R-squared	0.171	0.340	0.496	0.471	0.474	0.504
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22
			<i>Analysis of differences</i>			
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.297* (0.156)		0.661** (0.250)		0.484 (0.439)	
Public spending on social welfare (% of GDP)		0.873** (0.399)		1.756*** (0.528)		-0.269 (1.036)
Employment in industry (%)	-0.104 (0.363)	0.666 (0.467)	0.289 (0.452)	1.084* (0.536)	-0.992 (0.870)	-0.909 (1.354)
Globalization index	0.073 (0.530)	0.342 (0.488)	-0.270 (0.748)	0.460 (0.597)	-0.095 (1.198)	-0.027 (1.373)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.006 (0.047)	0.002 (0.036)	0.006 (0.066)	-0.005 (0.055)	-0.086 (0.079)	0.051 (0.144)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.058 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.110* (0.054)	-0.016 (0.079)	-0.155* (0.086)	-0.065 (0.170)
Social democratic party in government	-4.432*** (1.590)	-3.420* (1.807)	-3.559** (1.404)	-4.119* (2.214)	-9.589*** (2.559)	-8.585*** (2.724)
Turnout (%)	0.349* (0.189)	0.164 (0.221)	0.295 (0.221)	0.065 (0.278)	0.344 (0.230)	0.067 (0.375)
Observations	191	157	139	107	73	58
R-squared	0.207	0.206	0.258	0.337	0.573	0.560
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 7 to 12 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). The estimates replicate Table 5, but with a different time period. Precisely, Columns 1, 2, 7 and 8 perform the analysis for a period just before the end of the Cold-War, whereas Columns 3, 4, 9 and 10 for a period just after the end of it. Columns 5, 6, 11 and 12 perform the analysis for a period just after the Great Recession. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, union density, percent in higher education. \*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.05, \*\*\*p≤0.01.

Table A15: Individual-level correlates of voting for a social democratic party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
ESS Waves	1-2002	2-2004	3-2006	4-2008	5-2010	6-2012	7-2014
Worker in industry	0.0311*** (0.007)	0.0392*** (0.009)	0.0386*** (0.0079)	0.0303*** (0.0078)	0.0122* (0.00713)	0.0204*** (0.0070)	0.0209*** (0.007)
Public sector employee	0.0784*** (0.0082)	0.0862*** (0.00816)	0.0646*** (0.00755)	0.0805*** (0.00743)	0.0790*** (0.00712)	0.0632*** (0.007)	0.0664*** (0.00674)
Socio - cultural professional	0.0241*** (0.0082)	0.0208** (0.00864)	0.0352*** (0.0078)	0.0291*** (0.00782)	0.0131* (0.00734)	0.0402*** (0.0074)	0.0261*** (0.007)
Male	0.0108** (0.00491)	0.00461 (0.00501)	0.00101 (0.00491)	-0.0019 (0.00492)	0.0029 (0.00457)	0.00502 (0.00453)	0.00177 (0.00443)
Lived in a city	0.0205*** (0.0077)	0.0106 (0.00676)	0.0415*** (0.00682)	0.0214*** (0.0066)	0.035*** (0.00624)	0.0264*** (0.00607)	0.0231*** (0.00606)
Lives in a town	0.0186*** (0.00543)	0.0236*** (0.00555)	0.0292*** (0.00535)	0.0273*** (0.00533)	0.0168*** (0.00513)	0.0144*** (0.00506)	0.0172*** (0.00491)
Age	0.00260*** (0.000131)	0.00255*** (0.000132)	0.0022*** (0.00013)	0.00269*** (0.000126)	0.00247*** (0.00012)	0.00266*** (0.00012)	0.00258*** (0.00012)
Observations	28,686	27,843	28,603	29,049	27,428	28,921	26,947
R-squared	0.018	0.018	0.016	0.021	0.020	0.022	0.023
Number of countries	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

Note: Dependent variable: vote for a social democratic party. Estimation: Linear probability model with country fixed-effects. Baselines: female, lives in a rural area, other professional and socio-economic status. Data from the 8 waves of the European Social Survey. Countries included: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Standard errors in parentheses. \*p≤0.10, \*\*p≤0.05, \*\*\*p≤0.01.