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The model theory is an alternative to the view that deduction depends on formal rules of inference akin to those of a logical calculus. The distinction between the two sorts of theories parallels the one in logic between proof-theoretic methods based on formal rules and model-theoretic methods based, say, on truth tables. Which psychological theory provides a better account of naive human reasoning is controversial.
Introductory references for formal rule theories:
Rips, L.J. (1994). The Psychology of Proof. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Braine, M. D. S. & O' Brien, D. P. (1991). A theory of IF: a lexical entry reasoning program, and pragmatic principles. Psychological Review, 98, 182 - 203.
Introductory references for domain-specific inference rule theories:
Cheng, P.W. & Holyoak, K.J. (1985). Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas. Psychology. 17, 391-416.Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange. Cognition. 31, 187-276.
Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange. Cognition. 31, 187-276.
Some references for specific criticisms of the model theory of deduction:
Bonatti, L. (1994). Propositional reasoning by model? Psychological Review, 101, 725-733.Greene, S.B. (1992). Multiple explanations for multiply quantified sentences: are multiple models necessary? Psychological Review, 99, 184-187.
O'Brien, D.P., Braine, M.D.S., & Yang, Y. (1994). Propositional reasoning by mental models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice. Psychological Review, 101, 711-724.
A collection of criticisms is contained in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences open peer commentaries (pp. 334-380) following: Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Precis of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 323-334. |