Ruth Byrne

Books

Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press.
 

Journal Articles

Espino, O., Santamaria, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (In press). People think about what is true, not what is false. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.

Moreno-Rios, S., Garcia-Madruga, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2008). Semifactual 'even if' reasoning, Acta Psychologica, 128, 197 – 209

Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). Precis of The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 439 – 453

Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The rational imagination and other possibilities: Author's response, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 470 – 480

Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The effects of reasons for acting on counterfactual thinking., Thinking and Reasoning, 13, 461 – 483

McEleney, A. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2006). Spontaneous causal and counterfactual thoughts. Thinking and Reasoning. 12, 235-255

Santamaria, C., Espino, O. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Counterfactual and semifactual conditionals prime alternative possibilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 31, 1149 - 1154

Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2004). Counterfactual thinking: the temporal order effect. Memory & Cognition, 32,  369-378. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. & Egan, S.M. (2004). Counterfactual and Prefactual Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 113-120  byrneandegan2004.pdf

Quelhas, A. C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2003). Reasoning with deontic and counterfactual conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning, 9, 43 -66.  (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 6, 10, 426-431 (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J.  (2002) Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.  Psychological Review. 109, 646-678.(PDF)

Segura, S. Fernandez-Berrocal, P. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002).  Temporal and causal order effects in counterfactual thinking. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 55, 1295-1305.(PDF)

Thompson, V. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002).  Reasoning about things that didn't happen. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 28, 1154-1170.(PDF)

McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002).  Semifactual "Even If" Thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 8,  41-67. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. & McEleney, A. (2000)  Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1318-1331. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J., Segura, S., Culhane, R., Tasso, A., & Berrocal, P.  (2000) The temporality effect in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. Memory & Cognition,  28, 264-281.(PDF)

McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J.  (2000) Counterfactual thinking about controllable actions. Memory & Cognition, 28, 1071-1078. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. & Quelhas, C. (2000). Raciocinio contrafactual e modelos mentais.  Analise Psicologia.  713-721.

Byrne, R.M.J. & Tasso, A. (1999). Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition.  27,  726-740. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C.  (1999). Counterexamples and the suppression of inferences. Journal of Memory & Language, 40, 347-373. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Spatial mental models in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. Kognitionswissenschaft,   7, 19-26. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C.  (1998). Context suppresses inferences. Analise Psicologica ,  210-214. 

Byrne, R.M.J. (1997). Cognitive processes in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation,  Advances in Research and Theory.  Vol 37. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  pp. 105-154. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1997). Reasoning strategies for suppositional deductions.Cognition,   62, 1-49. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1996). Mental models and syllogisms.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19,  543 - 546. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1995). A model point of view. Thinking and Reasoning,   1, 339-350. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J., Handley, S.J.,  and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1995). Reasoning with suppositions. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.  48A, 915-944. (PDF)

Schaeken, W., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., d'Ydewalle, G. (1995). A comparison of conditional and disjunctive inferences: a case study of the mental model theory of reasoning. Psychologica Belgica. 35, 57-70.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). Models, necessity, and the search for counterexamples.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences,  17, 775-777. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1994).  Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: a reply to Bonatti, and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang. Psychological Review, 101, 734-739. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Precis  of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,  16, 323-333. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Mental models or formal rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences,  16, 368-380. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1992). Reasoning Strategies. Irish Journal of Psychology: Trinity 400 Special Issue, 13, 111-124.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1992). The spontaneous use of propositional connectives. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,  45A, 89-110. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1992). Modal reasoning, models, and Manktelow and Over. Cognition.  43, 173-182. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1992).  Propositional reasoning by model. Psychological Review,  99, 418-439. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P. (1992). In defense of reasoning: A reply to Greene.  Psychological Review,  99, 188-190. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J.  (1991).  Can  valid  inferences  be  suppressed?  Cognition,  39,  71-78.  (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1991).  Modelos mentales en el razonamiento deductivo. Revista de Occidente, 119, 85-111. Trans F. Torres Oliver.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Meta-logical problems: knights, knaves, and Rips.

Cognition, 36, 69-84. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31,61-83. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Everyday reasoning with conditional sequences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental  Psychology, 41A, 141-166. (PDF)

Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Human deductive reasoning. Cognitive Science: Special Issue of the Irish Journal of Psychology, 10,  216-231.

Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1989). Spatial reasoning. Journal of Memory and Language,  28, 564-575. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Only   reasoning.Journal of Memory and Language,  28, 313-330. (PDF)

Johnson-Laird, P.N.,  Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P.  (1989). Reasoning by model: the case of multiple quantification. Psychological Review,  96, 658-673. (PDF).