Summary

This project includes the most carefully constructed, large scale statistical analysis of the influence of the components of consociational government on stability. The variables and cases used in this analysis conform as closely as possible to the concepts of consociationalism, stability, and plural societies, as they are described by Lijphart in his extensive body of work regarding consociationalism. Accurate quantitative representation of his theory and recognition of the value of its analysis are facilitated by the discussions presented in Chapters 2 and 3. These chapters confirm the precise components of the theory, discuss criticisms that have been made concerning it, and describe another quantitative treatment of the performance of one of consociationalism’s components. This project’s quantitative analysis comprises multiple regression tests involving two sets of cases, which correspond to plural societies and plural societies which are also democratic. The latter set of cases and an independent controlling variable corresponding to democracy are used to ascertain whether consociationalism produces the stability which characterizes democracies, in contrast to the lack of upheaval, rebellion, and protest that results from severe oppression under undemocratic regimes. After the definition of plural societies to be used to choose cases is identified in Chapter 4, the independent variables and data representing them are identified and justified in Chapter 5. The independent variables correspond to each consociational component and six phenomena to be controlled for, including democracy and five of the conditions identified by Lijphart as conducive to the successful promotion of stability by consociationalism. This project enables separate analysis of Lijphart’s four components of consociationalism, which correspond to “grand” coalition executives including potentially antagonistic groups, segmental autonomy granting groups’ control over cultural issues, proportional empowerment of groups, and potential veto power for minorities. Although some of these components cannot be quantitatively represented in a form which perfectly corresponds to Lijphart’s portrayal of them, the variables and data corresponding to them in this analysis do represent them more faithfully than any other large-scale, quantitative exploration of consociationalism.

Chapter 6 contains a description and justification of the manner in which stability is represented in the dependent variable, an identification of which plural states have used consociationalism most extensively, and the results of the quantitative analyses which indicate whether consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. Although Lijphart describes stability as comprising four elements, only two of them can be represented through the dependent variable and one more can be partially controlled for.

The quantitative analyses of both sets of cases suggest that highly inclusive coalitions deter violent and nonviolent instability but that potential minority veto power and PR
electoral systems actually exacerbate it. The consociational component of segmental autonomy was not found to exert a statistically significant influence on stability. Of all of the independent variables representing consociational components and other phenomena, those corresponding to somewhat and highly inclusive coalitions, potential minority veto power, PR, and democracy were found to influence stability to an extent that was statistically significant. The collective influence of the consociational components shown in these tests challenges the theory that consociational components can be consistently relied upon to promote stability in plural societies.

Comparison of the results of these quantitative analyses with qualitative assessments of individual countries' experiences is presented in chapters 7 and 8. This qualitative treatment of seven places that have experienced consociationalism also facilitates comprehension of the role of this governance system because many of them are considered to have used the system successfully but most of them could not be quantitatively examined for diverse methodological reasons. These seven places include Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. The case studies examining their experiences indicate that the performance of consociationalism is influenced by a number of factors in addition to the consociational components, some of which it is difficult to represent quantitatively. Some of these factors include overarching loyalty and patriotism by antagonistic groups toward their state, cross-cutting cleavages which tend to make a society less clearly polarized, and incentives for intergroup compromise and moderation of political appeals. These countries' experiences also illustrate that such incentives need not be introduced through mechanisms which could permanently exclude potentially antagonistic groups from power. In these places, the segmental autonomy and empowerment provided by consociationalism seems most conducive to long-term stability when it is tempered by conditions and mechanisms which encourage groups' to coexist and consider one another's perspectives. The insights suggested by these case studies can be used to formulate hypotheses concerning the operation of consociationalism examined in the quantitative tests. However, the idiosyncratic nature of each place's experiences means that they cannot be relied upon as accurate indications of universal trends.

The general conclusions supported by the statistical tests and also suggested by the qualitative case studies performed for this project are that consociational autonomy and empowerment for potentially antagonistic groups are most conducive to long-term stability in plural societies when they are combined with conditions and mechanisms which motivate mutual understanding of each other's perspectives.