Paal Antonsen
Timothy Furlan
Robert Grant
David Horan
Ross Inman
David King
Ausra Kregzdyte
Donall McGinley
Gwendoline Murphy
Yasuaki Nakano
Proinsias O'Fearghail
Sarah Otten
Kieran Troy
Dr. Thomas McNally
Position: IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Research Project: Wittgenstein on Meaning and Rules: A Kripkean Reading
Other Research Interests: The Tractatus and logicism; Kant on judgement; Husserl
Email: mcnallt@tcd.ie
Research Project Description
The research project is devoted to providing an interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophical writings on meaning and rules, and specifically an interpretation broadly in line with Saul Kripke's reading in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Kripke proposes a controversial reading of Wittgenstein as a type of sceptic about meaning. Drawing on the so–called 'factualist' readings of Kripke's book (particularly those of George Wilson and Martin Kusch), I argue that there is a distinction to be made between the radical sceptic about meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. The distinction can be drawn when we realise that the radical sceptical conclusion – 'that there is no such thing as meaning anything by a term' – can be derived only by making a substantial and questionable assumption about meaning (such as what Kripke calls the 'classical realist' assumption). I argue that Kripke's Wittgenstein differs from the radical sceptic by rejecting the classical realist assumption on the grounds that it leads to the radical sceptical conclusion. Therefore, insofar as Kripke's Wittgenstein is a sceptic about meaning at all, he is merely a sceptic about the existence of certain classes of semantic facts, such as those that philosophers are inclined to posit. The other half of my project is devoted to providing an interpretation of Wittgenstein's later writings and arguing that his remarks on meaning and rule–following can be co–ordinated with the depiction of Kripke's Wittgenstein that I defend.
Education
Ph.D. (Philosophy) Trinity College Dublin
M.Phil. (Philosophy) Cambridge University
M.Litt. (Philosophy) University College Dublin
B.A. (Philosophy) Milltown Institute
Publications
'Wittgenstein, Constructivism and Mathematical Proof' Hermathena (Forthcoming)
2012 (with S. McNally). 'Chomsky and Wittgenstein on Linguistic Competence.' Nordic Wittgenstein Review, vol. 1.